Publication Date
3-15-2026
Abstract
Recent developments, including reductions in the federal workforce, effective suspension of certain enforcement activities, and attempted centralization of independent agency rulemaking in the White House, have significantly weakened administrative agencies. This administrative retrenchment is concerning as private enforcement of a number of consumer protection statutes has been simultaneously curtailed through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which dramatically narrowed plaintiffs’ standing. These decisions rely in part on a vision of strong executive authority, positing that broad private standing conflicts with an Article II framework where a politically accountable President faithfully implements laws and exercises coordinated enforcement discretion. When the Executive interprets this discretion so expansively as to effectively nullify enforcement of federal statutory schemes, Congress retains few tools to engage in meaningful lawmaking to advance policies across different domains. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) offer a telling case study: as courts have systematically restricted private enforcement, particularly class actions, they have channeled enforcement toward the CFPB—theoretically positioning the agency to address systemic violations through enforcement, monitoring, and information gathering. While individual consumers may still access state courts or raise FDCPA violations defensively, addressing systemic violations requires robust administrative enforcement if the Article II justification for restricting private standing is to remain coherent. The possibility for such enforcement now faces mounting challenges from increased politicization of enforcement, executive disempowerment of agencies, and growing judicial skepticism about the propriety of independent agencies and their investigative and interpretative authority. The risk is that some consumer protection statutes will become effectively unenforceable as neither private litigation nor state alternatives can adequately fill the resulting enforcement gap.
Recommended Citation
Alisher Juzgenbayev,
The Vanishing Enforcer: Consumer Protection in an Era of Dual Retrenchment,
120
Nw. U. L. Rev.
1449
(2026).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr/vol120/iss5/6
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