Publication Date
12-14-2015
Abstract
In a string of recent opinions, the Supreme Court has made it harder for consumers to avoid arbitration clauses, even when businesses strategically insert provisions in them that effectively prevent consumers from being able to bring any claim in any forum.
Arbitration differs from litigation in ways that harm the interests of consumer antitrust plaintiffs. For example, arbitration limits discovery and has no meaningful appeals process. Furthermore, defendants use the terms in arbitration clauses to prevent class actions and to undercut the pro-plaintiff features of antitrust law, including mandatory treble damages, meaningful injunctive relief, recovery of attorneys’ fees, and a lengthy statute of limitations.
The problems associated with antitrust arbitration are magnified in concentrated markets. Supporters of enforcing arbitration clauses assume that they these contractual provisions are the result of an informed, voluntary bargain. But when a market is dominated by a single supplier or a small group of firms, consumers often find it impossible to purchase a necessary product while retaining the right to sue, especially since arbitration clauses are generally embedded in contracts of adhesion. This means that in the markets most likely to be affected by antitrust violations, consumers are least likely to be able to avoid mandatory arbitration clauses.
Antitrust authorities can address the problem of proliferating arbitration clauses. We argue that antitrust officials should condition merger approval on the merging parties’ agreement to not require arbitration of antitrust claims.
Recommended Citation
Mark A. Lemley and Christopher R. Leslie,
Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval,
110
Nw. U. L. Rev.
1
(2015).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr/vol110/iss1/1