Abstract
The equal protection claim closely tracks the substantive due pro- cess claim. Both claims will succeed only if the liability limitations prove not to be means rationally related to a legitimate purpose. A right-to-travel challenge to the liability limitations should also fail. The liability limitations simply do not restrict travel. Nor do the liability limitations impose a prohibitive penalty on international air trav- elers. There is no constitutional right to the most desirable liability terms nor to the least expensive transportation. There remains the question of whether the liability limitations, converted to dollars at the last official price of gold, are unconstitutionally low. Whether the liability limitations are unconstitutionally low, however, may depend on whether the other provisions of the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement still provide an adequate quid pro quo for the liability limitations. This Comment is concerned with the merits of constitutional chal- lenges to the liability limitations. Section 113 defines two important terms, "means" and "purpose." Section II13 addresses the question of whether the liability limitations violate substantive due process. The principle question there is whether the liability limitations are a means rationally related to a legitimate purpose. Section IV4 raises the ques- tion of whether the other provisions of the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement are a quid pro quo for the liability limitations. Section V41 addresses the question of whether the liability limitations violate the fifth amendment by affecting a "taking without just compensation." Finally, Section V142 addresses the question of whether the liability limitations violate the fundamental right to travel.
Recommended Citation
Thomas J. Dolan,
Warsaw Convention Liability Limitations: Constitutional Issues,
6
Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.
896
(1984).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol6/iss3/28
