Dumping generally brings lower prices to the consumers of the importing country, the benefit of which is dispersed throughout the economy unless it is outweighed by genuine injury to a domestic industry. The essential element in the regulation of dumping is, therefore, the problem of determining when injury is sufficient to justify remedial action. In the United States, and in many other countries, the standard for such determination have evolved from the notion that dumping is an example of price discrimination between countries. If a higher price in the exporting country can be traced to monopolistic control over the domestic market by the exporter, then dumping is more clearly seen as anticompetitive behavior, and the potential injury to an industry in the importing country may be substantial. Accordingly, antidumping regulation in the United States has placed considerable emphasis on less-than-fair-value pricing, which is a designated form of unreasonable price discrimination.
John A. Zerby, Robert A. Ellsworth, and Austin L. Schmitt,
Dumping of Non-Factor Services: Some Implications of Recent Experiences with Controlled-Economy Shipping,
Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.