Corruption, both in the public and private sector, has long plagued Korea’s economy. Unfortunately, the detection of corruption and bribery is inherently difficult because the crime is by its nature self-concealing. Thus, governments heavily rely on inside information for detection and prosecution of bribery. Such inside information comes through primarily two types of sources: (i) self-reporting by wrongdoers, and (ii) whistleblowers with inside knowledge. However, Korea’s legal sanction regime does not sufficiently incentivize corporations and individuals to self-report or come forward to reveal misconduct. This Comment proposes that Korea’s current anti-corruption laws could be strengthened by embracing the two regulatory tools that have proven very effective in bringing forth inside information in the U.S. context: (i) The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Amnesty Program, and (ii) the False Claims Act (FCA) Qui Tam Enforcement Model. Overall, the adoption of these features would establish a “carrots and sticks” regulatory framework for optimal enforcement of Korean anti-corruption laws.
Sang Beck Kim,
Dangling the Carrot, Sharpening the Stick: How an Amnesty Program and Qui Tam Actions Could Strengthen Korea’s Anti-Corruption Efforts,
Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.