Abstract
The uncoordinated reorganization and resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions in different countries pose many challenges. Contingent capital provides a viable alternative for the efficient restructuring and resolution of failing financial institutions. Contingent Capital provides a mechanism for internalizing banks’ failure costs and helps return distressed financial institutions to solvency. This article offers a comparative perspective on bank resolution and restructuring in the European Union, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Germany and shows that Contingent Capital could play a substantial role in bank restructuring.
Recommended Citation
Christoph K. Henkel and Wulf A. Kaal,
Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring,
32
Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.
191
(2012).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol32/iss2/1
