Abstract
Swindlers, purveyors of substandard products or services, and honest traders unable to perform their agreements can access the global market as easily as legitimate and capable businesses. The impersonal nature of e-commerce makes it more difficult for traders to discern a merchant or transaction that will not satisfy their expectations. This article analyzes procedural due process concerns as an element of arbitration in online dispute resolution ("ODR") in business-to-consumer ("B2C") e-commerce. B2C e-commerce will be worth an estimated $250 billion by the end of 2003, but one factor hindering its growth is the lack of effective dispute resolution. For reasons of cost, jurisdiction, and other problems relating to transnational litigation, courts may not be a feasible forum, thus leaving private mechanisms, such as ODR, as the primary source of dispute resolution. Existing incentives may provide for a level playing field for online arbitration in disputes between merchants; however, these incentives may be nonexistent or inadequate with regard to disputes between consumers and merchants. Swindlers, purveyors of substandard products or services, and honest traders unable to perform their agreements can access the global market as easily as legitimate and capable businesses. The impersonal nature of e-commerce makes it more difficult for traders to discern a merchant or transaction that will not satisfy their expectations. This article analyzes procedural due process concerns as an element of arbitration in online dispute resolution ("ODR") in business-to-consumer ("B2C") e-commerce. B2C e-commerce will be worth an estimated $250 billion by the end of 2003, but one factor hindering its growth is the lack of effective dispute resolution. For reasons of cost, jurisdiction, and other problems relating to transnational litigation, courts may not be a feasible forum, thus leaving private mechanisms, such as ODR, as the primary source of dispute resolution. Existing incentives may provide for a level playing field for online arbitration in disputes between merchants; however, these incentives may be nonexistent or inadequate with regard to disputes between consumers and merchants.
Recommended Citation
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons,
Creating a Market for Justice; a Market Incentive Solution to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in Online Consumer Arbitration,
23
Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.
1
(2002).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol23/iss1/6
Included in
Consumer Protection Law Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, International Law Commons