Document Type

Working Paper

Repository Date



jurisdiction, separation of powers, role of Supreme Court, historical antecedents to Article III, Scottish influence on framing of Constitution

Subject Categories

Jurisdiction | Law | Legal History


Historically-minded scholars and jurists invariably turn to English law and precedents in attempting to recapture the legal world of the framers. Blackstone's famous Commentaries on the Laws of England offers a convenient reference for moderns looking backwards. Yet the generation that framed the Constitution often relied on other sources, including Scottish law and legal institutions. Indeed, the Scottish judicial system provided an important, but overlooked, model for the framing of Article III. Unlike the English system of overlapping jurisdiction, the Scottish judiciary featured a hierarchical, appellate-style judiciary, with one supreme court sitting at the top and an array of inferior courts of original jurisdiction down below. What's more, the Scottish judiciary operated within a constitutional framework -- the so-called Acts of Union that combined England and Scotland into Great Britain in 1707 -- that protected the role of the supreme court from legislative re-modeling.

This Article explores the influence of the Scottish judiciary on the language and structure of Article III. Scotland provided a model for a single "supream" court and multiple inferior courts, and it defined inferior courts as subordinate to, and subject to the supervisory oversight of, the sole supreme court. Moreover, the Acts of Union entrenched this hierarchical judicial system by limiting Parliament to "regulations" for the better administration of justice. Practice under this precursor to Article III's Exceptions and Regulations Clause establishes that a supreme court's supervisory authority over inferior courts would survive restrictions on its as-of-right appellate jurisdiction. The Scottish model thus provides important historical support for the scholarly claim that unity, supremacy, and inferiority in Article III operate as textual and structural limits on Congress's jurisdiction-stripping authority.