


1947

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### Recommended Citation

Leo F. Cain, Mark S. Richmond, The Success and Failure of 926 Naval Offenders, 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 390 (1946-1947)

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# THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF 926 NAVAL OFFENDERS

LEO F. CAIN AND MARK S. RICHMOND

Until recently, the authors of this article were assigned to the Navy's correctional program as Reserve Officers in charge of prisoner training and classification. Dr. Cain is now Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of Oklahoma. Mr. Richmond has returned to the Federal Prison Service as Administrative Officer for prisoner morale and discipline. This article, based on a study undertaken by them while on active duty in the Navy, will be of particular interest to criminologists as an analysis of certain factors in the post-release adjustment of prisoners. The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Navy Department.—EDITOR.

The opinions or assertions contained herein are the private ones of the writers and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the Naval Service at large. (Art. 113 (2), U. S. Navy Regulations.)

The evaluation of programs of rehabilitation is a difficult but necessary undertaking if such programs are to be further developed on the basis of factual experience. The present Navy program for the rehabilitation of general court-martial prisoners was begun in March, 1944, and the study that follows was instituted primarily as a means of providing a more complete understanding of the nature of the problems to be dealt with through an analysis of factors relating to the success and failure of offenders restored to duty. Secondly, this study was made in the hope that one or more postulates would evolve which might be useful in improving techniques and procedures. Finally, it was thought that significant clues might be discovered that would point the way for further research.

As presently organized, the Bureau of Naval Personnel administers four types of confinement activities for general court-martial prisoners:

1. *Prisons* for long-term and serious offenders. The program is predominantly industrial, although a general educational program exists utilizing vocational trade training, voluntary evening classroom instruction and a wide selection of correspondence courses.

2. *Disciplinary Barracks* for short-term offenders who do not qualify for confinement at a retraining command. At these activities an industrial program also is provided, but greater emphasis is placed on training. In addition to that which is available at the prisons, there exists a compulsory training program for those who eventually will be restored to duty.

3. *Retraining Commands* for short-term tractable military offenders who offer the best prospects for restoration to duty. The program consists of as much diversified training for res-

toration to duty as time and facilities permit. Included are such subjects as basic seamanship, orientation, military drill and specialized training in Navy trades. Supplemental instruction in other subjects and a wide choice of correspondence courses are available on a voluntary basis. Work is primarily of a maintenance nature and is assigned as training schedules permit.

4. *Brigs* primarily for detentioners and persons serving confinement sentences other than general court-martial, although of necessity, several of the larger brigs are authorized to confine certain short-term general court-martial prisoners. Due to the highly transitory nature of their populations no standardized program of training has been formulated for the brigs.

In general, it has been the objective of the Navy to restore to duty as many qualified men as possible through the utilization of such standard penological principles as classification, individualization of prisoner programs and a positive approach to individual problems and needs.

## METHOD

### *Source of the Data*

Special records of all Navy general court-martial prisoners are maintained in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. These records are initiated by the several activities confining general court-martial prisoners and forwarded to the Bureau on a commitment card. This card contains commitment data (name, rate, service number, offense, sentence, probation violation, district, date received) and personal data (age, race, marital status, G.C.T. score, mental status, education, mechanical aptitude, physical status, civil occupations, branch of service, length of service, last ship or station, previous offenses).

Service records on all naval personnel are also maintained in the Bureau. These records contain all enlistment data, beneficiary slips, change of rating and advancements, medical entries, disciplinary actions including offenses and punishments, transfers, change of duty, commendations, and separation records. Such records, while only revealing adjustment to the service in an indirect manner, do give an authentic report of any individual's status in the service at any given time.

These two sources were used exclusively for this study. The commitment card information was utilized to describe the population and the service records to determine adjustment to the service itself. These data do not give any narrative information on the offenders such as is contained in a social history or psychiatric report and while the value of such are fully recognized it was not possible to obtain such supplemental reports and records for this survey.

### *The Sample*

The population studied was drawn from the men released from confinement during March, 1945. Only Navy general court martial prisoners were considered who were restored to active service duty. Marine and Coast Guard prisoners were excluded, partly because of

the inaccessibility of their service records and partly because they were restored to duty under quite different circumstances. The Navy releases totaled 1496, representing 91% of all general court martial releases for the month. Of the number 80% or 1199 were restored to duty and 297 or 20% were discharged to civilian life upon completion of sentence. Of the 1197 possible cases, 926 were analyzed; 237 were eliminated because of lack of information. Such elimination was of a random and not of a selective nature.

March releases were also selected because during that month tabulated records were completed for the entire general court-martial prisoner population for the first time. Analysis of these records furnished the first statistical basis for an understanding of the nature of the prisoner population and these results have been used in part as a control against which to measure certain findings of this study. The essential features of the Corrective Services program were not placed into effect until the Fall months of 1944, during which the majority of the March releases were first committed, as will be shown subsequently. So far as the follow-up portion of the study is concerned, the selection of March releases made possible analysis of certain post-release factors under war-time conditions, since the follow-up period ended in September and hostilities ended in August. Such an analysis would not have been possible had some subsequent month of releases been chosen.

### *Factors Considered*

The data available for analysis were divided into two groups: "static" data, relating to factors obtained from the commitment card and "follow-up" data, obtained from the service record relating to factors occurring after release from confinement. The source of both series of data has been discussed above.

The reasons for the choice and use of the static data presented were, first, their availability and their relationship to certain control factors available in the cross section survey that was made from tabulated records pertaining to all general court-martial prisoners confined in March, 1945, as well as to the total Navy population at that time. Secondly, factors were selected that might have some possible significance with respect to success and failure following restoration to duty. Third, factors were chosen that would have a standardization value with reference to other studies. Finally, certain factors which might be expected to have some bearing on success and failure were not considered because of unavailability. These were intelligence scores, measures of physical condition and psychiatric data. Other, such as civil offenses and occupational skills, were discarded because of lack of complete uniformity in recording.

The selection and use of follow-up factors was determined entirely by availability. Additional data would have been highly desirable, particularly information relating to subsequent psychiatric findings, positive adjustment factors and details of circumstances surrounding changes in status.

### *Treatment of Data*

The data were first considered in terms of the primary purpose of the study, i.e., that of comparing the success and failure groups. Comparison was also made, where possible, between the sample considered and the total Navy population. Because the Naval Corrective Services program is predicated on the principle of prisoner classifi-

cation and as offenders were designated to confinement activities in terms of their probable readjustment, prisons, disciplinary barracks and retraining commands were also analyzed separately. In addition, because of some unexpected findings, the four largest of the disciplinary barracks were considered individually.

### *Limitations*

The data from which the following study was made have a number of definite limitations:

1. The study is based entirely on performance records. Hence, not only was there no opportunity for interviewing or personal examination of the data used, but all available information is subject to the usual errors of recording. More important, however, is the lack of such pertinent data as psychiatric findings, psychometric measures (including attitudes), previously acknowledged. Again, a number of incomplete items were discovered which showed up as "unknown" on the tabulations. The reliability and validity of a few items are also open to question. These will be pointed out as they occur in the discussion of findings.

2. Success and failure is based upon a six months period of adjustment.

3. While 926 cases ordinarily is a sufficiently large sample within which to expect statistically significant findings, the number of cases restored to duty from "prisons" and "other" activities was too small in proportion to the number restored to duty from "retraining commands" and "disciplinary barracks" to permit valid comparisons of all factors.

4. Certain of the service records were incomplete, although, a one month lag was allowed before any follow up data were taken from the records. There were some cases where it was obvious that current entries had not been filed, particularly those relating to commendations and citations which are frequently awarded long after the incident for such takes place.

### *Success and Failure*

The definitions of "success" and "failure" used in this study have been made arbitrarily by the authors. A case was considered a failure under each of the following circumstances: if absent over leave or without leave and still at large six months after date of restoration to duty; if reconfined after being restored to duty awaiting disciplinary action for any offense for which probation might have been revoked or for which a subsequent general court-martial might have been awarded; if reconfined after being restored to duty to serve the remainder of a sentence as a probation violator or to serve a subsequently imposed general court-martial sentence; and if discharged from the Naval service prior to the six-month interval for violation of probation. All other cases were considered "successful."

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### *Static Data*

Of the 926 men studied, 614 or 66.31% succeeded and 312 or 33.69% failed. By types of confinement activities, it is indicated that a greater percentage of success were restored to duty from retraining commands than from disciplinary barracks, although there appeared substantial differences between cer-

tain institutions of the same type. In general, the nature of the sample, with respect to such factors as age, education, race, marital status, length of service, and previous service rate held,<sup>1</sup> approximated that of the total enlisted Navy population (where comparison was possible) and that derived from a cross-section survey of all general court-martial prisoners in confinement during the month of March 1945. Neither were there any statistically significant differences in these factors between eventual success and failure.

TABLE I  
SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF 926 MEN RESTORED DURING  
MARCH BY TYPE OF CONFINEMENT ACTIVITY

TYPE OF ACTIVITY	TOTAL		SUCCESS		FAILURE	
	No.	PERCENT	No.	PERCENT	No.	PERCENT
Prisons	25	100.00	19	76.00	6	24.00
DisBars	661	100.00	418	63.24	243	36.76
Retra Coms	185	100.00	135	72.98	50	27.02
Other <sup>2</sup>	55	100.00	42	76.36	13	23.64
TOTAL	926	100.00	614	66.31	312	33.69

The type of last duty was a significant factor in subsequent success or failure following restoration to duty. A greater percentage of successes than failures had previous duty aboard ship. The actual difference was 17.50% with a critical ratio of 5.06,<sup>3</sup> which lends support to the hypothesis that men whose last duty was aboard ship tend to be better risks for restoration to duty than those who were not on such duty.

TABLE II  
SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF 926 MEN RESTORED TO DUTY  
DURING MARCH BY TYPE OF LAST DUTY

STATION	SUCCESSES		FAILURES		DIFF.	C. R.
	No.	PCT.	No.	PCT.		
Large or small ship	322	52.44	109	34.94	17.50	5.06
Other	292	47.56	203	65.06	17.50	5.06

The findings also showed that there was a significantly greater percentage of men with previous duty aboard ship in the Retraining Command group than in the Disciplinary Barracks group. This suggests that while the Retraining Command population was unselected with respect to such factors as age, education, etc., enumerated above, the men confined in such commands may have had more positive motivations for restoration to duty than those confined elsewhere by virtue of their previous duty aboard ship. Undoubtedly there were other factors in such motivation, too, but no additional data

<sup>1</sup> The majority of the sample was in the non-rated category.

<sup>2</sup> A very small percentage of general court martial prisoners were authorized to be confined in larger brigs due to lack of space facilities in Prisons, Disciplinary Barracks and Retraining Commands. In these activities a training and work program was operated. Such have been designated "other" throughout this report.

<sup>3</sup> In considering differences between groups the ratio of 3.00 between the actual difference and the standard error of the difference was used as the critical reliability score.

were available for analysis. One such set of factors might have derived from the nature of the program of the Retraining Commands and the men's response to it.

The length of time the men comprising this sample were required to serve in confinement was relatively short as indicated by an over-all average of 6.27 months for the successes and 6.42 months for the failures. With the exception of those confined in the prisons, the variations in this average by type of confinement activity was very small. Neither were there significant differences between ultimate success and failure. The principal reason for this probably lies in the fact that more than 90% of the men had been committed to serve "probated<sup>4</sup> sentences" which predetermined the time and conditions of release from confinement without particular reference to the adjustment potential of the individual concerned.

TABLE III  
AVERAGE LENGTH OF APPROVED SENTENCES OF SUCCESSES  
AND FAILURES AMONG 926 MEN RESTORED TO  
DUTY DURING MARCH BY TYPE OF  
CONFINEMENT ACTIVITY

TYPE OF ACTIVITY	SUCCESS		FAILURES	
	No.	MEAN	No.	MEAN
Prisons	19	27.37	6	17.66
DisBars	418	6.30	243	5.59
RetraComs	135	6.95	50	8.12
Other	42	5.20	13	3.85
TOTAL	614	6.27	312	6.42

Unauthorized absence was the predominate offense of the group, accounting for 94.79% of the successes and 98.40% of the failures. In this, the sample studied differed significantly from the March, 1945 cross-section survey referred to. This was expected because the sample consisted of only those who were restored to duty.

<sup>4</sup> The awarding of "probated" sentences was an administrative policy (later modified) whereby the court convening authority, in approving a court-martial sentence, was authorized to stipulate that if the prisoner satisfactorily served a specified portion of the sentence he would be restored to duty automatically with the balance of the sentence held in abeyance pending good behavior for a specified period of probation. Under this sentencing procedure, it was incumbent upon the commanding officer of the institution to restore the prisoner to duty, as directed by the sentence, so long as the prisoner maintained a satisfactory conduct record while confined. Such action was mandatory regardless of the opinions of the commanding officer of the confinement activity and his staff as to the timeliness and suitability of restoration to duty. In this sense, the term "probation," as used by the Navy and in this study actually approximates "parole" as applied in civil cases. It had been hoped that it might be possible to compare the success and failure of those restored to duty in this manner with the success and failure of those restored to duty as the result of the recommendation of the commanding officer and subsequent action of the Navy Clemency Board. Unfortunately, there were found in the 926 cases only 48 of the latter and it was concluded that any differences relating to only 5% of the sample would not be significant.

TABLE IV  
SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF 926 MEN RESTORED DURING  
MARCH BY TYPE OF OFFENSE

OFFENSE	TOTAL		SUCCESS		FAILURE		GCMP DIFF. SUC.		C. R.
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	MAR. '45 FAIL.		
AWOL, AOL									
Desertion	889	96.00	582	94.79	307	98.40	83.22	12.78	10.06
Other	37	4.00	32	5.21	5	1.60	16.78	3.61	

The presence and nature of previous naval delinquency showed up significantly as a possible factor in success or failure. About one-third of the men had no previous recorded naval offenses but the proportion of successes having no previous naval offenses was 12.45% greater than the failures, with a critical ratio of 3.82. Conversely, while the majority of previous offenses were unauthorized absence, the percentage of such previous offenses for the success group was 14.05% less

TABLE V  
SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF 926 MEN RESTORED TO DUTY  
DURING MARCH BY TYPE OF PREVIOUS OFFENSE

OFFENSE	TOTAL		SUCCESS		FAILURE		GCMP DIFF. SUC.		C. R.
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	MAR. '45 FAIL.		
AWOL, AOL	445	48.06	266	43.32	179	57.37	53.49	14.05	4.06
Desertion									
Other	173	18.68	118	19.23	55	17.63		1.60	1.31
No Offense	308	33.26	230	37.45	78	25.00		12.45	3.82

than that of the failure group. A critical ratio of 4.06 suggests that not only the extent of prior delinquency but the nature of the delinquency pattern (in this case unauthorized absence) is a significant factor in post-release adjustment.

Factors relating to institutional adjustment, other than the forfeiture of "good time" and escape from confinement, were not available. No significant findings resulted from analysis of these two items.

#### *Follow-Up Data*

In considering the "follow-up" data a number of assumptions made during the operation of the program were tested within the limit of the data. For example, it had been thought that the length of time existing between date of release from confinement and date of reporting to first permanent duty might be a causal factor for failure. On the contrary the average elapsed time for the successes was 21.88 days and for the failures who reached permanent duty stations 10.93 days. The critical ratio between them was 5.95, which lends to the hypothesis that motivations for restoration to duty appear to bear no relationship to the length of intervening time involved. This same differential existed for the men restored to duty from the disciplinary barracks but not those from the retraining commands. In the latter case there was no significant difference.



TABLE VI  
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS TO FIRST PERMANENT  
DUTY STATION

	SUCCESSES		FAILURES		DIFF.	C.R.
	No.	M.	No.	M.		
Total	587	21.88	149	10.93	10.95	5.95
Prisons	18	28.39				
DisBar	403	27.97	108	10.01	17.96	8.31
Retr'n'g	128	17.62	36	13.94	3.68	.54
Other	38	36.34				

With respect to the number of intervening activities passed through enroute to first permanent duty station, it was found that generally, this number had no bearing on eventual success or failure. The percentage of failures who went through no intervening activities appears larger than that of the successes, but this was due to the high percentage of failures who failed before reporting to their first permanent duty.

TABLE VII  
NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES PASSED THROUGH PRIOR TO FIRST  
PERMANENT DUTY STATION BY SUCCESS AND FAILURE

No. ACTIVITIES	TOTAL SUCCESS		TOTAL FAILURE		DIFF.	C. R.
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.		
0	24	3.92	20	13.42	9.50	4.48
1	424	69.06	117	78.52	9.46	2.29
2	130	21.17	8	5.37	15.80	4.50
3	1	.16	3	2.01	1.85	
4	2	.34	1	.66	.32	
Unknown	33	5.37	0			
Total	614	100.00	149	100.00		
1 or more	557	90.72	129	86.58	4.14	1.51

In analyzing the types of transient activities the sample group passed through, it was found that they conveniently grouped themselves into five categories:

1. Receiving Stations, Training and Distribution Centers and Armed Guard Centers. These activities were the most frequently used activities for redistribution purposes.

2. Receiving Station to ship to Receiving Station. In many cases the man was sent to a continental receiving station then placed on board a ship as a passenger and sent to an overseas receiving station for further assignment.

3. Other. This was a small group who were assigned to a training center or other activity which is not normally a distribution center for further assignment.

4. None. This was the group which went directly from the confinement activity to a permanent billet.

5. Unknown. This was a small group upon which no information was available.

Table VIII indicates that the majority of both successes and failures were restored to duty via Receiving Stations, Training and Distribution Centers and Armed Guard Centers. While the actual difference between successes and failures in this cate-

gory amounted to 10.17%, the critical ratio was only 2.48. A relatively small percentage of cases were restored to duty via the Receiving Station-Ship-Receiving Station sequence, but it will be noted that the number of successes was greater than the number of failures. The reason for this is clear. As will be shown, the overwhelming majority of failures was caused by unauthorized absence. Those who were restored to duty via Receiving Stations-Ships-Receiving Stations left the continental United States almost immediately after release from confinement and thereby were confronted with little opportunity or incentive to "go over the hill" again. The numbers of cases going through "other" and "unknown" activities were extremely small. The category in Table VIII indicating the number of men going through no intervening activities is the same as that in Table VII. A large number of failures became involved in further trouble before reaching their assigned duty.

TABLE VIII  
NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES PASSED THROUGH PRIOR TO FIRST  
PERMANENT DUTY STATION BY SUCCESS AND  
FAILURE OF 926 MEN

TYPE ACTIVITY	SUCCESSSES		FAILURES		DIFF.	C. R.
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.		
Receiving Station; T&DC; A.G.C.	428	69.7	119	79.87	10.17	2.48
RecSta-Ship- RecSta	99	16.12	4	2.68	13.44	4.32
Other	30	4.89	6	4.03	.86	
None	24	3.92	20	13.42	9.50	4.48
Unknown	33	5.37	0	0		
Total	614		149			

A total of 79.63% of the success group was assigned to a ship as first permanent duty station following restoration. Of the 312 failures only 149 remained on duty long enough to reach a first permanent duty station. Of this latter group a total of 61.33% was assigned to ships. Of the total failure group 29.48% actually reported aboard ships. Although a significantly lower number of failures than successes failed to receive shipboard assignments more than half of the failure group did not reach any kind of permanent duty station. Of the failure group that reached a first permanent duty station the percentage assigned to ships was significantly lower than the total group and disciplinary barracks group and from the corresponding success groups. There was no significant difference between the corresponding retraining groups. These findings point to the desirability of assigning restored men to ships for first permanent duty.

Despite the relatively large number of men who were assigned duty aboard ship, less than one-third of the successes and only 4 of the failures were on duty in a combat zone long enough to qualify for a campaign area ribbon at the end of

the six month follow-up interval. Although this difference was significant in favor of the successes, there were no significant differences between the four types of confinement activities in which the men had been confined. The number who participated in battle engagements or received various commendations was exceedingly small. Approximately one-fourth of the total group received subsequent advancements in rate, but only seven (7) of them were in the failure group and it apparently made no difference whether the men were restored from a retraining command or some other type of confinement activity.

TABLE IX  
PARTICIPATION IN THEATERS OF WAR BY SUCCESS  
AND FAILURE

THEATERS	TYPE ACTIVITY	SUCCESSSES		FAILURES		DIFF.	C. R.
		No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.		
None	Total all activities	432	70.36	308	98.72	28.36	10.24
None	DisBar	292	69.86	241	99.18	29.32	9.28
None	ReTra	89	65.93	48	96.00	30.07	4.13
One or More	Total all activities	182	29.64	4	1.29	28.36	
One or More	DisBar	126	30.14	2	.82	29.32	
One or More	ReTra	46	34.07	2	4.00	30.07	

On the negative side, while 87.13% of the successes did not become involved in any subsequent disciplinary action, 69 committed offenses on one occasion, eight (8) on two occasions, one (1) on three occasions and one (1) on four occasions. There were no significant differences between types of confinement activities. Five of the 79 committing subsequent offenses were either declared probation violators or awarded a second general court-martial, but they were restored to duty again within the six month follow-up interval. These arbitrarily were included in the success group. Most of these subsequent offenses were for unauthorized absence and occurred on an average of sixty-four days after the date of release from confinement. Eighteen of the successes were discharged from the naval service by the end of the follow-up period.

Eighteen of the successes were discharged from the Naval Service prior to the termination of the six months' follow-up period. Fourteen were released under honorable conditions, one as unsuitable for the naval service and three for dependency. The reasons for discharge showed fourteen released as a result of medical survey, one because of discharge points and three for dependency. These men stayed on duty an average of 108 days from the date of release from confinement to date of discharge.

At the end of the six month interval 180 of the 312 failures were reconfined (most of them as probation violators or as the

result of a subsequent general court-martial), 44 were still "at large" and 88 had been discharged from the service. Practically the entire group (96.67%) was in difficulty for unauthorized absence. As previously indicated, more than one-half of them had not yet reported to their first permanent duty before the offense was committed. These men were of little value to the Navy from the standpoint of service. The average length of time from date of release from confinement to date of failure offense was only 35 days. The Retraining Command failures were in a duty status significantly longer before failing than those from the other confinement activities. This ability to make a satisfactory adjustment for a longer period of time is possibly due, in part, to the fact that a greater percentage of these men found themselves aboard ship in a relatively short time after they were released from confinement.

TABLE X  
STATUS OF FAILURES—TERMINATION OF FOLLOW-UP PERIOD

STATUS	TOTAL		PRISONS		DISBAR		RETRA		OTHER	
	No.	PCT.	No.	PCT.	No.	PCT.	No.	PCT.	No.	PCT.
Confined	180	57.69	1	16.66	142	58.44	27	54.00	10	76.92
At Large	44	14.10	1	16.66	33	13.58	9	18.00	1	7.69
Discharged	88	28.21	4	66.67	68	27.98	14	28.00	2	15.38

#### SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FOUR DISCIPLINARY BARRACKS

One unanticipated result of the study was the finding that a considerable discrepancy existed between the successes and failures of men restored to duty from the same type of confinement activity. During the period of confinement of the 926 offenders comprising this study there existed six disciplinary barracks located in various parts of the United States. Although the mission and organization of each were identical, no two were alike. Not only did the physical plant differ widely in each case but the stage of program development and other factors were definitely dissimilar.

To determine the nature and extent of some of these differences, four disciplinary barracks were selected for further study. They have been designated as Disciplinary Barracks, A, B, C, and D. These particular commands were chosen for several reasons. First, they were the four largest and therefore the most likely to produce the most reliable results. They were in operation during most of the time the 926 offenders studied were confined. Two each were chosen to represent the East Coast and West Coast confinement activities in the event there might be discovered a significant geographical differential. Finally, there existed in these four commands several factors which it was thought might influence in considerable degree the success-failure ratio beyond what might have been expected of these institutions as disciplinary barracks type confinement activities.

TABLE XI  
DIFFERENCE IN SUCCESS AND FAILURE AMONG FOUR  
DISCIPLINARY BARRACKS

	TOTAL	SUCCESS		FAILURE	
	No.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
DisBar "A"	154	95	61.69	59	38.31
DisBar "B"	178	85	47.75	93	52.25
DisBar "C"	103	74	71.84	29	28.16
DisBar "D"	149	111	74.50	38	25.50

Table XI indicates that between these four commands the percentage of success varied from 47.75 to 74.50. Approximately one-third (36.76%) of the "disciplinary barracks" group of the total 926 sample failed. By comparison, 52.25% of the Disciplinary Barracks B, 38.31% of those from Disciplinary Barracks A, 28.16% of Disciplinary Barracks C, and 25.50% from Disciplinary Barracks D failed. The failures of Disciplinary Barracks B only were significantly different (higher) than the total "disciplinary barracks" group and significantly higher than the failures of Disciplinary Barracks C and D.

The same factors analyzed for the total sample were analyzed again in the same manner for the four disciplinary barracks. With respect to those factors indicative of the nature of the population, significant differences were found only in the following: marital status, length of service, previous rate held, type of last duty and length of sentence.

Disciplinary Barracks A had significantly more married men than the "disciplinary barracks" group of the total sample, and while there was no appreciable difference between success and failure, significantly more of the Disciplinary Barracks A successes were married than the successes of either Disciplinary Barracks B, C or D. This was thought to be due partly, at least to the location of Disciplinary Barracks A in metropolitan New York, toward which men with families tended to gravitate while on unauthorized leave. To a lesser extent this was also true of Disciplinary Barracks C by virtue of its proximity to Los Angeles.

Length of service, as a factor in the four (4) disciplinary barracks approximated that of the total sample, but the average for the Disciplinary Barracks B cases was 4.68 months less than the average for Disciplinary Barracks C and the average length of service for Disciplinary Barracks B failures was 17.44 months compared with 26.12 months for Disciplinary Barracks C, with a critical ratio of 3.07. Hence, while there were no significant differences between success and failure as to length of service, the men from Disciplinary Barracks B, especially the failures, had less service than those of the other three commands and significantly less than the Disciplinary Barracks C.

Again, there was a greater percentage of non-rated men in

the Disciplinary Barracks B group than the others. For the entire sample there was a significantly greater percentage of non-rated failures than successes and a greater percentage of such failures at Disciplinary Barracks B than at either Disciplinary Barracks C or D. This situation, coupled with the relatively short length of service of the Disciplinary Barracks B group as compared with the other three commands, suggests that there was a greater degree of inexperience among the Disciplinary Barracks B men. It is also possible, although there are no data except informal surveys, that there may have been other reasons, such as lack of ability and lack of motivation that might account in part for the discrepancy in rate held.

In the same pattern, fewer of the Disciplinary Barracks B men had previous duty aboard ship than the men from the other three disciplinary barracks. Disciplinary Barracks C had a significantly higher proportion of men with previous ship-board duty than the total "disciplinary barracks" sample and the number of such men in the Disciplinary Barracks C successes was significantly greater than the same factor among the Disciplinary Barracks B successes. There was a statistical tendency for the same difference to appear in comparison with the Disciplinary Barracks A successes and, to a lesser extent, with the Disciplinary Barracks D successes. These differences in favor of the two West Coast commands is thought to be due to the fact that at the time there was no West Coast Retraining Command to which there would have been sent the most likely prospects for restoration to duty. The import of the situation that existed in favor of Disciplinary Barracks D and C, particularly, is apparent from the conclusion previously indicated that men whose last duty was aboard ship tend to be better risks for restoration to duty than those who have not had that experience.

Finally, the Disciplinary Barracks B men were serving significantly longer sentences than the men from Disciplinary Barracks C and D. The length of sentence awarded was not based so much on the severity of the offense or needs of the offender for discipline and training as on fortuitous variation in the sentencing practices of the different naval districts. This alone accounts for the differences in the average length of sentence for the four commands. Notwithstanding, the differences in the average sentences of the successes and failures were too slight to be meaningful.

Consideration of the manner of commitment to the command and the actual length of time served in confinement at the activity produced no statistically significant results bearing on ultimate success or failure, despite the fact that there was considerable variation in the number of men committed by

transfer from some other confinement activity and that the average length of time at the command varied from 3.30 months to 4.49 months.

Follow-up data relating to the number of activities passed through between date of release and date of reporting to first permanent duty approximated the pattern of the "disciplinary barracks" group of the total sample. The one exception was Disciplinary Barracks D. Similarly, the four commands did not differ significantly from each other except Disciplinary Barracks D where there definitely were fewer men restored to duty through no intervening activity and significantly more through one or more activities. This was due to the fact that 36% of all Disciplinary Barracks D restorations were via the Receiving Station-Ship-Receiving Station sequence, as will be shown. The differences between success and failure for each command showed a significantly greater percentage of failures than successes restored to duty through no intervening activities. This was the result of so many failures committing offenses culminating in failure before they reached their first assigned duty. Likewise, significant ratios between success and failure appeared for each command in the proportion of success who were restored through one or more activities. In this respect, the four commands differed from the total sample where there was no such difference.

As regards the types of activities passed through to the first permanent duty, the majority of men were restored to duty via Receiving Stations and their equivalents. The notable exception again was Disciplinary Barracks D where significantly fewer were restored through Receiving Stations and significantly more were restored through the Receiving Station-Ship-Receiving Station category. A critical ratio of 2.99 was found in the case of Disciplinary Barracks A where 12.25% more men than in the total "disciplinary barracks" group were restored through Receiving Stations, indicating the existence of a probable significant difference. In the "Receiving Station" category differences between success and failure for any particular command showed only that Disciplinary Barracks A had a significantly greater percentage of successes than failures restored to duty through this medium. In the case of Disciplinary Barracks C this situation was reversed. The reason for this is not known. The "Receiving Station-Ship-Receiving Station" group showed a significant difference for Disciplinary Barracks D in favor of the successes but, while a tendency for the same difference to appear in the other commands was noted, significant ratios were not found. Significantly more failures than successes went through no intervening activities, as indicated above.

With respect to the length of elapsed time between date of release from confinement and date of reporting for first permanent duty, it was found that the Disciplinary Barracks C average was significantly less than the average for the "disciplinary barracks" group of the total sample, as well as the average for each of the other three commands and that the Disciplinary Barracks D average was significantly higher. The reasons are that, in the case of Disciplinary Barracks C, nearly all of the men were restored to duty directly via the adjacent Receiving Station with little lost time, whereas most of the Disciplinary Barracks D men were restored via the Receiving Station-Ship-Receiving Station sequence and reported to their first assigned duty after a considerable lapse of time. Because of the latter, Disciplinary Barracks D was the only command that showed a significant difference between success and failure, wherein the average elapsed time for successes was 30.80 days greater than the average for the failures.

In terms of such positive follow-up data as were available for analysis, it was found that more of the Disciplinary Barracks C men were on duty in the various battle zones long enough to qualify for the campaign area ribbon than the men from the other three commands and that significantly more of the Disciplinary Barracks C men were subsequently advanced in rate. (Exception: Disciplinary Barracks D with a critical ratio of 2.08.) There is demonstrated here again the tendency of favorable factors to concentrate in the West Coast commands which was caused partially by the absence of a West Coast Retraining Command at the time. The relative preponderance of rate advancements for the Disciplinary Barracks C men may have derived in some degree from the Disciplinary Barracks C practice of assigning large numbers of men to ships upon the specific request of the ships' commanding officers.

Findings related to subsequent offenses committed by the successes from the four commands were not statistically significant. Analysis of the type of duty to which the successes were assigned at the end of the six-month follow-up period showed that a significantly larger number of Disciplinary Barracks D men were assigned to ships than men from the other commands. This probably was due in part to the length of time it took these men to reach their first permanent duty and partly to the fact that these men were placed aboard ship in the forward areas rather than in United States ports.

Although the number of failures differed considerably among the four commands, the reasons for failure, the time of failure and the ultimate disposition of the cases showed no statistically significant differences either from the "disciplinary



barracks" group of the total sample or between the four commands.

#### CONCLUSIONS

This study has presented factors relating to the successes and failure of 926 Navy general court-martial prisoners restored to duty under war-time conditions during the month of March 1945. The data was based entirely on performance records, the follow-up period was of only 6 months' duration, the number of cases included from certain activities was too small to be statistically significant, and certain data, such as psychiatric findings, psychometric data and social cases histories, were not available for analysis. The conclusions may be summarized as follows:

1. A greater percentage of men restored to duty from Retraining Commands succeeded than those restored to duty from other types of confinement activities. This probably was due in part to such selective factors as attitudes and the nature of the program at the command (which items were not available for analysis) rather than such factors as age, education, length of service, etc.
2. Men whose last duty was aboard ship tend to be better risks for restoration to duty than those who have not had such duty. This factor also accounts in part for the relatively high rate of success among men restored to duty from Retraining Commands.
3. Length of sentence has no bearing on eventual success or failure. Despite this, it is believed that there is a critical minimum below which a sentence would be completely ineffective. The study undertaken was limited by the fact that the length of sentence and conditions of release were predetermined without reference to the adjustment potential of the individual concerned.
4. The nature and extent of previous delinquency is a definite factor in success or failure. The nature of delinquency also tends to fall into a pattern as evidenced by the fact that in this study unauthorized absence was the predominant delinquency in previous offenses, current offense and reasons for failure.
5. The length of time between date of release from confinement and date of reporting for first permanent duty was not a causal factor for failure. Neither were the number or types of intervening activities passed through to first permanent duty significant factors in success or failure.
6. Most of the men who failed did so through unauthorized absence again and over half of them failed before they reached their first assigned duty.
7. A disappointingly small percentage of the men were on

duty in a campaign zone long enough to qualify for the award of a campaign area ribbon. Even fewer participated in actual engagements. From the standpoint of existing policy more men should have been assigned combat duty.

8. About 25% of the men were advanced in rate within 6 months after being restored to duty, indicating that former general court-martial prisoners are not discriminated against with respect to opportunities for advancement.

9. Approximately 13% of the successes became involved in subsequent offenses for which they were not punished by revocation of probation or awarded another general court-martial.

10. There was considerable variation in the success and failure of men restored to duty from the same type of confinement activity. This was due partly to the nature of the population with respect to such factors as length of service, whether the men were non-rated and whether they had previous duty aboard ship. The manner of restoring men to duty is also significant, *e.g.*, the Disciplinary Barracks C policy of assigning men to ships at commanding officers' requests and the Disciplinary Barracks D sequence of Receiving Station-Ship-Receiving Station which provided little opportunity or incentive for subsequent unauthorized absence.

The study was undertaken not only to determine as closely as possible what happened to a group of general court-martial prisoners who were restored to duty but to ascertain whether there might be developed one or more postulates which might be helpful in evaluating the confinement program and suggest means of improving techniques and procedures. These postulates seem to be indicated:

1. That more prisoners should be sent to Retraining Commands for confinement. This suggestion derives from the fact that the percentage of success of those restored to duty from Disciplinary Barracks ranged as high as 74.50%. At Disciplinary Barracks the opportunities and facilities for specific restoration training are exceedingly limited. At prisons and other places of confinement they are virtually non-existent.

With respect to the consideration of future cases for restoration to duty greater weight should be placed on the following factors: whether the offender has a record of previous offenses for unauthorized absence, the cumulative effect of his prior delinquency, and whether he has had previous duty aboard ship.

3. In restoring men to duty they should either be assigned ships in accordance with the Disciplinary Barracks C plan described, or, if this is impossible, they should be placed aboard ship for immediate transportation overseas for further assignment to duty after they reach an outlying Receiving Station.

The analyses and conclusions of this study are scarcely more than a scratch on the surface of the data that must be evaluated sometime if a total comprehension of the myriad influences and conditions which mark the difference between successful adjustment and failure is to be sought. Yet, the conclusions reached here should be sufficient to refute numerous popular concepts as to why some men fail where others succeed. Some of these errors in thinking are: that length of service, alone, (possibly because of some obscure indoctrinational value) determines in the majority of cases whether a man has sufficiently learned his responsibilities to the service to be a continued asset rather than a liability; that the majority of men "go over the hill" from Receiving Stations, especially after being restored to duty following confinement, because they are held for uncertain periods of time in these activities awaiting assignment to permanent duty; and that efforts to "rehabilitate" men who "reach the general court-martial stage" are useless.

The need for further research is apparent. Future studies should include such qualitative data as psychiatric and psychometric findings, social case history material, and specific measures of the nature and conditions of confinement, as well as several factors relating to the administration of the program. Not the least value of the present undertaking will be the suggestions it may contain as to the nature and direction of additional researches in the same problems.

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