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to measure and whose full impact was not appreciated until the Gluecks’ volume, Physique and Delinquency, was prepared.

* * *

I have demonstrated that two basic criticisms of the research in Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency,

For validation studies and further developments see Axelrad & Glick, Application of the Glueck Social Prediction Table to 100 Jewish Delinquent Boys, 30 Jewish Social Service Quarterly 127–136 (1953); Thompson, A Validation of the Glueck Prediction Scale for Preness to Delinquency, 43 J. Crimi. L., C. & P.S. 451–470 (1952); Thompson, Further Validation of the Glueck Social Prediction Table for Identifying Potential Delinquents, 48 J. Crimi. L., C. & P.S. 174–184 (1958); Rexford, Schleifer, & Van Amerogen, A Follow-up of a Psychiatric Study of 57 Antisocial Young Children, 40 Mental Hygiene 196–214 (1956); Rexford, Antisocial Young Children and Their Families in Dynamic Psychopathology in Childhood, New York, Grune & Stratton, (Jesner & Favenstedt eds. 1959); Kramer, Predicting Juvenile Delinquency among Negroes, 48 Sociology and Social Research (1964); Craig & Glick, Ten Years Experience with the Glueck Social Prediction Table, 9 Crime and Delinquency 249–261 (1965); Craig and Glick, Application of the Glueck Social Prediction Table on an Ethnic Basis, 11 Crime and Delinquency, 175–185 (1965); Hodges & Tait, A Follow-up Study of Potential Delinquents, 120 American Journal of Psychiatry, 449–453 (1966); Trevvett, Identifying Delinquency-Prone Children, 11 Crime and Delinquency, 186–191 (1965); Fedow, Application of the Glueck Social Prediction Table to 50 Minor in the Puerto Rican Culture, (Ital. trans.) La Scuola Psitiva (Serie IV-Anno VIII, 1966); Elmering, Die kriminologische Frühpgrase:Überprüfung der Glueck’schen fünfpektigen sozialen Prognosetafel an Hand von hundert mit Jugendschrte bestrafen Jugendlichen, (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Law and Psychology at the University of Naples, 1901). The new analyses of the follow-up data and of the Unraveling data will have the benefit of the insight of the Gluecks and their thorough knowledge of the data and the area of delinquency. In addition I hope that the extension of the methods of analysis to include multivariate statistics and further utilizations of the resources of the modern computer will encourage the flow of findings and increase the amount of knowledge about a most crucial endeavor, Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency.


The major portion of this very slender book is devoted to reprinting (originally published in the United States in 1906) three lectures delivered by Enrico Ferri at the University of Naples in 1901. The lectures are preceded by an original introduction written by the editor of this volume and by a reprint of Thorsten Sellin’s article on Ferri which first appeared in the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science (1958).

Ferri (1856–1929) was a most unusual man who packed several careers into his productive life. Active as a trial lawyer, orator, politician, editor, professor and author, he is probably best remembered by contemporary criminologists as the leader and prime advocate of the positive school of criminology in the days when criminology was struggling for scientific recognition. But he was much more than a passionate advocate of the scientific study of the criminal. Among his major contributions, we must also include his pioneering work on crime causation, the classification of criminals, the objectives of penal sanctions, the
treatment of offenders, and reform of the legal
process. No less important, especially for American
criminology, was his belief that social defense is
the purpose of criminal justice and his proposal
for penal substitutes as the most effective means
of crime prevention. His emphasis on the role of
social factors in causing and preventing crime led
him to coin the phrase “criminal sociology,” a
choice which some believe to have influenced the
American tradition of placing criminology courses
in departments of sociology.

Lecture I, “Critique of the Classical School,”
represents Ferri’s attempt to discredit the classical
school of criminology as “nothing but a series of
reforms.” He brilliantly attacks the opinion that
crime involves a moral guilt because it results
from the individual’s exercising his free will and
choosing to engage in criminal rather than non-
criminal behavior. He is equally scornful of the
classical school’s attempt to suppress crime with
fixed doses of punishment. On the other hand, he
asserts, the positive school maintains that crime
is caused by an interplay of personal, physical,
moral and environmental conditions which deter-
mine individual behavior.

Ferri goes into greater detail regarding crime
causation in Lecture II, “Causes of Criminal
Behavior.” Here he divides causes into three
groups, anthropological, telluric, and social,
arguing for the necessity of interaction among
these conditions. He is adamant in his conclusion
that no one set of conditions is sufficient to explain
criminality, stating that even the “born criminal”
(another phrase he coined) may remain law-
abiding if his environment does “not offer him any
temptation to commit crime.”

In Lecture III, “Remedies,” Ferri offers some
of his most original and memorable ideas about
crime prevention and control. He argues for
victim compensation, indeterminate sentences,
rehabilitation of prisoners and, above all, sub-
stitutes for punishment. The latter is a form of
social prevention which gets to the roots of crim-
inality by altering those conditions which give
rise to it in the first place.

The reader of this book will be struck by the
parallels between Ferri’s ideas of seven decades
ago and contemporary thinking in criminology.
He has had a profound impact upon the discipline
and to a large extent has influenced the very
nature of the field. The reader will surely want to
explore Ferri’s work further upon completion of
this volume since it merely serves to whet one’s
appetite. One must not rely upon these lectures
for an understanding or appreciation of Ferri,
since they represent a somewhat superficial treat-
ment of his ideas. Obviously, the very nature of a
lecture prevented anything more. Instead, the
lectures have merit and deserve to be read be-
cause “… in a few words the driving spirit and
the dedicated commitment of the Positive School
are clearly captured.”

Frank R. Scarpitti
University of Delaware

Causes of Delinquency. By Travis Hirschi.
Pp. 309. $8.95.
The dust jacket of this book claims that it may
mark a turning point in the study of deviancy.
This claim is not overstated, for this is a large
scale and significant contribution to delinquency
theory and research.
The book deals with the Richmond Youth
Project, carried out in 1965. Most of the data
 came from a detailed questionnaire administered
to a representative sample of over 3600 boys out
of 17,500 junior and senior high school students
in Richmond, California, an industrial city in the
San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan area.
Information was gathered from the youths on their
relationships with parents, school adjustment,
peer group attachments, recreational activities,
occupational and educational aspirations, and
their beliefs. Data about the youngsters were
also gathered from school and police records.
Involvement in delinquency was measured
principally by a six-item self report questionnaire
section dealing with theft of items of varying
value, using a car without permission, banging up
something, or beating up someone.

A social control theory informed this study,
rather than currently popular strain or cultural
deviance notions. Strain theories see the delinquent
as “driven” by feelings of social hurt or perceived
discrepancies between aspirations and expecta-
tions, while cultural deviance theories view mis-
conduct as positive conformity to an oppositional
set of subcultural norms. By contrast, control
theory avers that “…delinquent acts result
when an individual’s bond to society is weak or
broken” (p. 16). Hirschi identifies attachment,
commitment, involvement, and belief as elements
of the bond to society. In snort, the closer the
linkage of the person to conventional others, conventional lines of endeavor, and the like, the lower the likelihood of delinquency. One major finding was that of no socioeconomic relationship to delinquency, as measured by father’s occupation and education. Class-oriented theories receive no support in this study, although a small group of individuals at the bottom of the economic heap did appear to be most heavily delinquent, while the children of professionals and executives were least delinquent. Negro youths were somewhat more delinquent than whites. Hirschi attributed part of this difference to differential actions of police, but he also noted that black youngsters were disproportionately bunched together in the poor academic achievement group from which all lawbreakers were most common.

The most delinquent youths also were inadequately supervised by parents, in less intimate communication with them, and had less affectionate ties to them. The offenders also had low aptitude test scores, performed poorly in school, and were indifferent to school. Parental ties and school attachment interact, such that those who were on poor terms with their parents were also most likely to be doing poorly in school and be involved in misconduct.

The most delinquent children were also ones with delinquent friends, but these companions did not seem to be a solidary grouping of the most fit and able children, united by their shared hostility toward a frustrating social system.

The most delinquent boys were non-strivers who smoke, drink, and date frequently. They did not have college aspirations, they studied little, and in these and other ways, they appeared to be “also-rans,” somewhat afloat and adrift in the age period before they become absorbed into the occupational structure. Finally, they exhibited disrespect for the police and for laws, although Hirschi found little supportive evidence of lower class “focal concerns” or for the view that offenders reject middle class standards of conduct.

These findings cast considerable doubt upon many of the romanticized versions of delinquency and its etiology. The offenders did not emerge as the finest products of society, frustrated by an unjust social system. Thus, these results should cause considerable consternation among those who are attuned to the romantic picture.

In casting about for some bases on which these findings might be rejected, thereby preserving some alternative conceptions of delinquency, one can find some deficiencies to attack. For one, little is said about the overall socioeconomic character of Richmond, which happens to be, relatively speaking a working-class community. It might be contended that the findings are consistent with the argument that the extent of misconduct within social classes in any particular community is influenced by its general social class character. In a predominately working-class city, lawbreaking may be more frequent at all class levels than in a predominately middle-class city. Also, one might cavil with the delinquency measure used here, arguing that some other items might have turned up social class differences, but this is a fairly weak criticism. Finally, it might be said that some doubt should be entertained about claims concerning family relationships and the like which are based on reports of the boys. Perhaps those who are close-mouthed about their relationships with family members, school authorities, and so on, are the “cool” youths who are also most delinquent, but who say otherwise on questionnaires. However, in my view, while doubts of this kind ought to be noted, it also must be conceded that this is a highly significant piece of research which provides a serious challenge to the popular wisdom in criminology regarding delinquency.

DON C. GIBBONS
Portland State University


The sensationalism of this journalistic history of organized crime is suggested by its title, Captive City: Chicago in Chains. While Demaris’ thesis is that the city of Chicago has always been “systematically seduced, looted and pilloried by an aeonian horde of venal politicians, mercenary businessmen and sadistic gangsters,” he fails to provide a sufficiently credible body of evidence to support that belief. This is not, of course, to pass judgment on the validity of the thesis but only to indicate that the evidence provided is inadequate to test the belief.

Among the weaknesses of the book are the author’s continual hyperbole and his lack of documentation. Not a single footnote appears in the entire volume. His approach is descriptive rather than analytical and his reports are obviously those of a journalist rather than those of a social
scientist. One reads, for example, of a "bald, beady-eyed, silk-suited gangster [who became] a full-fledged, girl-chasing international playboy," and learns that "gambling in Chicago makes Las Vegas look like a Saturday night crap game in the rear of Schultz's Delicatessen." The "Antisocial Register" of gangsters, vitae which constitutes the Appendix contributes little to the volume and nothing to scholarly knowledge.

An unfortunate consequence of these weaknesses is that on one hand the book does not constitute a source of reliable data and on the other it may mislead by over-simplifying the subject with which it deals. While the volume is essentially irrelevant to existing sociological and criminological theory and research, it does provide fascinating and enjoyable reading.

DAVID J. HANSON
State University of New York
College at Potsdam


The first thing that must be said about this book is that it is terribly difficult to read. I have attempted to analyze the reasons for this and conclude that they arise from two basic sources; first, Professor Silving's sentence structure is one giving rise to the impression that English is only one of several languages in which she is fluent and does not appear to be her native tongue; and second, her efforts at exactness lead to a tortuous stringing together of adjectives and adverbs that confuse rather than clarify. If this is not enough, there is the added burden of reading new terminologies for old ones.

All of this is disheartening when one is eagerly seeking new solutions to the "insanity" problem—one that has plagued the common law since Bracton introduced us to "intent" some seven hundred years ago. Nevertheless, Helen Silving does have something to say. Her Introduction should be required reading in any study of criminal justice, be it in connection with sociology, psychology, psychiatry or law. It is a valiant attempt to ascertain the meaning of "meaning"—to strip the vague generalities from the reified metaphors we too often use as substitutes for "thinking". The discussions of the problems of interdisciplinary communications, of the concepts of "guilt", "dangerousness", "responsibility" and "labels" need constant reiteration if we are ever to solve the problems arising from the verdict of "Not guilty by reason of insanity".

Three related essays follow the Introduction: (1) Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law; (2) The Criminal Law of Mental Incapacity and (3) Intoxicants and Criminal Conduct. In all three the common law is explicated, compared to relevant Civil Law jurisdictions and her conclusions, unlike the body of the book, are stated fairly clearly and succinctly. Unhappily, in the first two essays her conclusions are of the "ought" kind. On "mental incapacity" as a defense, the author says, "A rational mental incapacity exemption should be based on a conscious policy guided by a clear notion of the ends of punishment and the conditions under which those ends are not applicable". (Emphasis ours). The objection here is that no solution is really given and, what is more important, as long as we use the word "punishment", we can forget about the whole thing.

In the second essay, dealing with trial procedure, evidence and the handling of persons acquitted by reason of insanity and incompetency to stand trial, Silving decries the absence of a clear policy "setting forth the legitimate objectives of law in a differential discriminatory manner". Here again is a call for change without specifics. Nevertheless, her discussions of the topics in both essays, if one can wade through them, are definitive, sound and scholarly and worth the effort.

The last essay on Intoxicants and Criminal Conduct is the most readable and most immediately applicable to law reform. The reasons for this are clear with such cases as Easter vs. District of Columbia and Robinson vs. California upon which to hang one's hat—cases in which organic causes of social dysfunction are much more obvious and generally less difficult to prove. Silving appears to have no basic disagreement with the criminal law in this area. What she does fear is a paternalistic social policy that says, in effect, that if addicts and alcoholics are not criminally liable, they are still subject to the power of the government to "treat" because they represent a "health and welfare problem"—like it or not!

In conclusion, Silving's concept of the test of "insanity" approaches, but never quite reaches the rapidly emerging concept of "role theory" in cultural psychology; a theory more explicit, of easier definition and application, and one
which may yet be a "breakthrough" in the problem of "insanity". In the procedural and evidentiary discussion in the second essay, the author attempts to tread the morass of "predictability" with the same lack of success as other lawyers, judges, psychologists and psychiatrists in the past and probably in the future. The last essay should have been placed first in this collection if only to emphasize the contrast in legal solutions to two problems that are basically identical.

It is easy to criticize. Helen Silving has courageously, and with scholarly and intellectual integrity, brought out new approaches to nagging legal and social problems; that she has not achieved the "final solution" is not to derogate from one of the better discussions this reviewer has been privileged to read.

ROBERT H. DREHER
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Southern Illinois University


For a long time research on delinquency has had a practical undergirding. The research began when sociology was making efforts to demonstrate its then dubious legitimacy as a science. These efforts often were in the form of empiricism and quantification with a forked end of theory building and practical problem-solving. Discovery of the single or variegated "cause" of delinquency surely would, it must have seemed, herald the stability of the field. It would supply both knowledge and a base for action. However the search for causality has continued up to the present, surprisingly little helped, sometimes even hampered by quantitative research.

In Delinquency Research Travis Hirschi and Hanan Selvin evaluate a portion of the delinquency research. It is not a portion meant to be representative. Most of the research directly or indirectly aims at the problem of causality, and most of their critique is one of causal analysis. They suggest no changes in the end of research, but rather only attempt to unfetter some workable means. Even though they say "there is indeed more to research than the demonstration of causality" (p. 44), they later comment:

... in these studies... the idea of causal analysis is always implicit in the analyst's thinking, for what after all, is the purpose of a description that does not lead to greater understanding of causal relations? (p. 49)

While only slightly over a third of the book nominally falls under the category of causal analysis, at least a half in fact falls directly there.

Causal analysis of delinquency may but barely open either practical or theoretical doors. As methods have developed sufficiently to allow causal statements to be made, the required assumptions about the relation between mathematical models and empirical reality are increasingly but necessarily debatable. The assumptions required for Hirschi and Selvin's notion of causality are of a lower order, but some will not consider their model sufficient to generate truly causal statements. For instance it is not as "developed" or "sophisticated" as path analysis. Furthermore, causal questions about delinquency clearly are not the only questions that might inform sociological theory. It is one thing to ask what are the causes, quite another to ask what is the social organization, the experience, or the impact of delinquency. At the time when they wrote the book, quantified knowledge about delinquency that had to do with anything other than causation was scarce. Thus their book could not help but appear skewed now. Delinquency Research arrived when sociology was beginning to turn its back on the traditional questions about the causation of deviance.

Nevertheless, at least for those engaged in digesting existing research literature or for those setting out to add onto that body of research, the book is essential. What is more, even to an investigator whose substantive interest does not lie in the field of delinquency, the book contains many valuable guidelines for analysis. It is impossible to recount its rich and fertile detail here. Also, it is a book difficult to summarize since it is a set of almost independent though consistent essays. Many of the pitfalls and directives for analysis that the authors present have been discussed elsewhere, but ordinarily neither so compactly nor simply. Whether one agrees with their stands or does not, the book provides clear arguments on a set of controversial issues, e.g., the criteria of causality, prediction as against description or explanation, and the restricted usefulness of significance tests. They also range over the issues of interpretation, specification, explanation,
interaction, and conceptualization. It is still broader, containing a chapter that places previous critiques of research in perspective.

The chapter on tabular analysis is commendable in its stunningly brief explication of some serious shortcomings of this method: one cannot know whether he repeatedly explains the same variations; the cases rapidly dwindle to a number insufficient for close analysis, and so on. Because of such shortcomings the authors direct investigators to regression analysis, recounting certain of its innate though not always realized capacities.

In a diffuse manner the authors quietly protest the hegemony of statistics and methods. This they achieve by a repeated emphasis on the importance of the interpretation and analysis of tabulated or statistically manipulated findings. No computer or statistic can be a fill-in for sophisticated thinking. They display a concern for the articulation of theory and research, even though they seem to assume that these tasks lie in different hands. Empirically they are correct about this split. The body of knowledge about delinquency might be fatter if they were not. It would also be fatter if investigators were exposed to and subsequently understood this critique of empirical research, even given seeming over-emphasis on causal analysis.

MAUREEN MILESKI

Yale Law School


Writers differ substantially in the way to approach understanding a phenomenon. Unfortunately, sometimes, approaches and assumptions may be so divergent as to block appreciative consideration. I am afraid that is the case in my attempt to review Violent Men by Hans Toch. I am confident there is much of value in his book, yet find myself unable to dwell on anything but the fundamental disagreement. Such a stress is somewhat unfair to an author. My only defense is that in choosing to approach violence through men instead of institutions—Toch's explicit and sustained preference—and in systematically neglecting the relations between the two, the author has provided a very one-sided view. In 1970, more so perhaps than any other year in recent American history, the priority of violent institutions over men has come into focus. Since there has been little else to be thankful for, the illumination provided by the dismal events of the last few years should hardly be ignored or squandered.

Early in the book, Toch poses the problem of approach. He asks, "what are the data best studied if we wish to understand violence, and if we wish to prevent it?" He answers:

It seems most productive to study those people who become recurrently involved in acts of violence. These violence-prone men can be expected to reflect and personify the individual and social forces that produce violence. And these men constitute the bulk of our problem. For statistically, few people in our society are violence-prone; the rest of us lead lives relatively free of major physical strife. The problem of violence thus primarily revolves around the identity and conduct of Violent Men.

So conceived, the phenomenon of violence may be located—as it is by Toch—in the activities, transactions, perceptions, and propensities of men in prison who have a history of assault and among some apparently over-zealous and violence-prone policemen. Lest we wonder about the omission of some of the world’s most patently violent men, Toch, later in the volume, distinguishes between soldiers who are violence-prone and those who merely kill and maim. Only the former (a minority, presumably) are to be comprehended in Toch's conception of the phenomenon of violence. He writes:

In battle, violence is committed because the individual's military vocation demands it. The soldier is instructed to follow destructive routines... and he largely complies because he has learned to do so, because he respects his superiors and because he accepts his role as defined for him. Typically, he gains no [intrinsic] satisfaction from violence... There are soldiers, to be sure, who seek out blood and gore beyond the call of duty... It is within the ranks of soldiers such as these that we find our violence-prone persons... And it is these individuals—praiseworthy though they may be from the viewpoint of the military—who must be monitored and eventually resocialized for membership in the civilized community.

Dr. Toch hardly does justice to the military, who are a more integrated part of civil life than apparently he acknowledges. The soldier who is animated by killing, those who "seek out blood and gore" are not praiseworthy from the military viewpoint. It is the other soldier, the one who
can pass easily into and otherwise consort with civilian institutions after carrying out “destructive routines”, who receives the applause of both the military and what may jokingly be referred to as “our civilized community”. It is this sharp division between routine and lusty violence, between vocational and unordained violence, between martial and civic sectors that restricts Toch’s vision of the relation between institutions and men.

Some glaring events might further illustrate the basic point of contention. A few years ago, former Secretary of Defense, McNamara, was surrounded by a hostile group of Ivy League SDSers and other radical students, and was jostled some. It is reported that he sternly lectured them on the virtue of being civilized and the pitfalls of violence. The same year, former President Lyndon Johnson spoke eloquently on the roots of violence and—sounding very much like some “social scientists”—located them in hunger, poverty and illiteracy. Furthermore, he expressed great sympathy with the plight of backward nations, and their tendency, understandable though regrettable, to use violent means to ameliorate a dismal condition. Thus it was that the two men who headed among the most violent institutions in human history magically joined the ranks of the non-violent—and that is exactly where they would remain in the approach taken by Dr. Toch. No need for them to be “monitored and eventually resocialized for membership in the civilized community”. They are the civilized community, and for very good reasons. Increasingly since 1914, the “civilized community” exists already drawn into it institutions of destruction, a toleration of massive violence, a capacity for denying brute facts and a penchant for crying “self-defense” that would evoke laughter in any court. Once such massive violence is instituted, taken for granted, obscured and alienated to Historical Necessity, we may of course “scientifically” study the piddling and thus more manageable antics of the shadow of these developments, “Violent Men”. But aside from the question of whether a proper sample has been drawn—something methodologists can worry their heads over—is there not a more crucial difficulty? To comprehend violence outside the context of conquest, war, and martial institutions is like trying to understand theft apart from the institution of property. That criminologists have spent most of the last century trying to do the latter is no reason, at this late date, to attempt the former.

We need not repeat the errors of the past, especially since the resemblance and connection between war and violence is so much more patent than that between property and theft.

At a certain level, Dr. Toch might agree with some of these observations, despite the fact that all of his analysis points in another direction. On the last page of the book, he writes, “Men who press explosive buttons or who sign bloodthirsty orders are entrepreneurs of violence, and they set the stage for lone operators. The same holds for individuals who coldly plan for inconceivable contingencies, or who produce and disseminate means of destruction.” The trouble is that as “a final word”—248 pages too late—such remarks unmistakably take on the character of literary flourish. There, they cannot—and did not—serve as part of the guiding imagery and conceptual framework for comprehending the nature of violence. Those words must be taken very seriously; otherwise, we might join Dr. Toch in conjuring the incredible prospect of America mounting what he calls a “War Against Violence”.

... While we are still in Vietnam?

DAVID MATZA

University of California, Berkeley

THE TASKS OR PENOGY


These dozen articles first appeared in a 1966 issue of the Nebraska Law Review, and are republished now by two of its former editors, who add a preface by Nebraska’s Senator Hruska and their own introduction.

The first two essays are for those enamored by the purely hortatory. Psychiatrist Karl Menninger exaggerates both prison ailments and psychiatric remedies, as in his book The Crime of Punishment. Ex-prisoner Nathan Leopold oversimplifies penal purposes, and proposes improvements largely identical with those urged by most wardens. However, he recommends a somewhat greater role for inmates in prison government than most wardens would accept, and he stresses graduated release and economic assistance less than they would.

This book becomes more instructive with Gerhard Mueller’s richly historical and internationally comparative perspective on the actual and potential interaction of abstract judicial objectives, criminal law and penal practice. In this he incidentally criticizes Leopold’s chapter.
Federal Prisons Director Myrl Alexander extends the Mueller analysis with more detail on the history of corrections. The Federal prisons legal counsel, Eugene Barkin, surveys appellate decisions expanding the rights of prisoners. Frank Loveland, former assistant director of federal prisons, traces the history of international conferences on crime and corrections from the first meetings in 1846 to the 1965 United Nation’s Congress in Stockholm. He provides a particularly elaborate report on the latter’s concerns and conclusions.

A shift to more current history occurs with Judge Theodore Levin’s account of the organization of a Sentencing Council, to reduce disparate sentencing practice among judges within the Detroit federal judicial district. He also reports the duplication of this council in other multi-judge courts. Judge Luther W. Youngdahl then traces the development and accomplishments of Sentencing Institutes, designed to reduce discrepant sentencing practices among different federal districts.

The book concludes with reports on new ways of carrying out sentences. Mitchell Wendell, of the Council of State Governments, recounts the development of intricate interstate cooperative arrangements in correctional activity. Laurence Carpenter, then Warden of the Federal Correctional Institution of Seagoville, Texas, describes one of the truly major advances in penology, the federal work release program. Delyte W. Morris, President of Southern Illinois University, discusses a much smaller enterprise, the university’s role in prison education. Finally, correctional researchers J. Douglas Grant and his wife Joan, propose and illustrate what is, unfortunately, even more minute, the employment of offenders in correctional research and administration.

While the contents of most collections are not uniform, this one reaches an extreme in diversity of topics, styles and ostensible purposes. All of the articles achieve fairly well that which they attempt, for the type of reader that the authors seem to have in mind, but almost every author appears to be addressing an audience with interests and sophistication different from those with which most of the others are concerned. Most readers will find a few articles of appreciable appeal here, but will have little interest in at least a third of the book.

Daniel Glaser
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey


Flirtations between psychiatry and criminology were discussed by an inter-disciplinary panel at the 1965 meeting of the American Psychiatric Association in Atlantic City. The discussion was held with a view “towards ascertaining whether it (the ‘marriage’) was a legitimate union.” The union was approved (as one might expect), but questions did arise about hypothetical offspring.

Two contributions to the 1965 symposium are especially impressive. Seymour Halleck, in a forthright, well-reasoned argument, examines ethical dilemmas of psychiatrists operating at various junctures of the criminal justice process. Sometimes, their problems are viewed as insoluble. For instance, “medical involvement in issues of criminal responsibility” is held “without scientific basis,” “socially impractical,” and harmful “to society and to the psychiatric profession.” At other junctures, issues are raised and aired for discussion. For example, there is the matter of the prison psychiatrist, who “is an agent of a system which creates mental suffering, yet (who) is dedicated to the alleviation of mental suffering.” What is the solution to such role problems? Halleck suggests that “perhaps it is time to take a more careful look” which “may provide the profession with a consistent ethical code.”

Jurist Jerome Hall provides a succinct summary of legal reasoning, and raises questions about psychiatry’s premises in approaching law. At times, he skillfully turns tables on his audience. He quotes Freud, for instance, who maintained that “culture must be defended against the individual” by institutions such as law. Hall delves into the psychiatric literature, pointing up inconsistencies in definitions of the unconscious and of its role.

He shows that there are propagandistic aspects to the downgrading of cognitive functions in legal-psychiatric dialogues. Hall asks the assembled alienists whether they apply deterministic analysis to their own problem-solving, and he thereby illustrates the need for more diverse analytic frameworks than those applied to clinical studies. Lastly, Hall cites examples of some legal problems that can benefit from behavioral research.

Bernard Diamond, a third panelist, argues convincingly for interdisciplinarity in psychiatric criminology. His paper is entitled “the psychiatric view,” but it is an argument for expanded criminological concerns and for penological reform.
The symposium includes a fourth presentation and two discussants' papers. The remaining panelist is Albert Cohen, who presents a sociological view of psychiatry. Rather than taking a purely negative stance to clinical reasoning Cohen presents an alternate model, in which he views deviant acts as game-participation. He also lobbies for attention to self-definitions of criminals.

A second sociological contribution is Marvin Wolfgang's discussant's paper, which raises questions about specific points made by the contributors. Wolfgang's perspective is not sectarian. He takes Cohen to task, for instance, for throwing out the ego with the bathwater of its connotations. The final discussion is by Fredric Wertham, who argues for greater eclecticism in psychiatry, and for increased adaptability in transactions with law. One problem with Wertham's paper is a tendency to continually cite Wertham as authority, both as writer-theorist and as sadder-but-wiser practitioner.

The symposium is short—eighty-two printed pages in all—and may raise questions as to value for money. Its purchase would benefit two groups: there are those who missed the 1965 panel discussion and wish to make up for the omission, and there are those who were there and may want a memento of their experience.

HANS TOCH

Professor of Criminal Justice
State University of New York
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The purpose of the research reported in this volume was to "determine whether criminal homicide exhibits any definite pattern or regularity which hopefully could be utilized to assist in reducing the ever-increasing and shocking homicide statistics." Acknowledging Wolfgang's noted contribution in this area, the commission presented the data in tables similar to those employed by Wolfgang in Patterns in Criminal Homicide.

Unfortunately, there are basic methodological weaknesses in this report. Although the percentages of victims and offenders by race, sex, and race and sex are presented, rates calculated according to the population base are not given. While this is not a major omission, the comparisons between Baltimore and Philadelphia in the percentages of male victims, nonwhite victims, and so on, are of limited utility because the data were not standardized to control for differences in the age, sex, and racial composition of the respective populations. Without standardization the possibility remains that some or all of the observed differences are a function of demographic differences in the populations under comparison. Finally, the data obtained in Baltimore are frequently compared with Wolfgang's findings in Philadelphia in terms of statements such as the following: "These figures are to be contrasted with the Philadelphia study which reflected that;" "... is in general agreement with Wolfgang's findings..." These comparisons need to be tested statistically to determine the significance of any differences between the two analyses of criminal homicide.

In addition to these methodological weaknesses, the report leaves much to be desired because its only contribution is that it makes available some fascinating data on criminal homicide. There is a noticeable lack of effort to explain the observed differences in criminal homicide in Baltimore and Philadelphia. Furthermore, the authors did not attempt to interpret the available data concerning such factors as the disposition of the cases and the parole of the offenders; analysis of these data would have been a contribution to criminological knowledge.

In summary, if the reader wants to know about criminal homicides in Baltimore in the years 1960 to 1964, then this is a first-rate source; however, if the reader is in search of more generalized knowledge concerning the patterns in criminal homicide, then there are better sources available.

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