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Book Reviews

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Paraffin Test Inadmissible—*Born v. State*, 397 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1964). The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and appealed on the ground, *inter alia*, that the result of a “paraffin test” conducted by the police on the hands of the deceased was erroneously admitted into evidence because the reliability of such tests, like polygraph tests, had not been sufficiently established. In a split decision, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma agreed with defendant’s contention and reversed the conviction.

In 1954, the Supreme Court of Colorado held, in *Brooke v. People*, 339 P.2d 993, that the paraffin or dermal nitrate test “has not gained that standing in scientific recognition or demonstrated that degree of reliability to justify courts in approving its use in criminal cases,” distinguishing those cases which had upheld the admission of blood tests, urine analyses, intoximeter results and fingerprint tests on the ground that “one thing in common possessed by those tests is that they have proven irrefutably accurate.” In reaching this conclusion, the Colorado court relied upon the testimony of a police officer in the *Brooke* case who said that the “nitrate test, itself, is not specific for powder burns,” and upon the conclusions of Turkel & Lipman, *Unreliability Of Dermal Nitrate Test For Gunpowder*, 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 281 (1955), that “The paraffin glove test for dermal nitrates is neither sufficiently certain nor subject to such scientific accuracy as to justify its routine use in establishing whether a suspect or deceased did or did not fire a gun.” In agreeing with the conclusion of the Colorado court, the majority in *Born* held that such evidence should be excluded.

Dissenting in *Born*, however, Judge Bussey relied upon a 1935 F.B.I. Law Enforcement Bulletin which stated that when a “positive reaction” to the test is obtained, “the only conclusion that can be drawn is that some nitrate was present on the hand.” “The absence of nitrate” in this case, Judge Bussey reasoned, “tends to establish that the deceased’s hands and arms were not near the firearm when it was discharged,” and concluded: “...I am of the opinion that the results of the Dermal Nitrate Test are admissible in evidence for the purpose of determining the presence or absence of nitrate or nitrate derivatives, and that it is proper for the jury to consider the results and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the same manner as they are permitted to consider other circumstantial evidence.”

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**BOOK REVIEWS**


This is a study both of shoplifting and of selective processes operating through private police agencies that determine the character of both private and public criminal statistics. As to the latter, the author provides further evidence, if such is needed, that official statistics inaccurately reflect the amount of crime, the relative frequency of different types of crime and the personal characteristics of the law violator. The portrait of the by far most common shoplifter, the snatch, is in sharp contrast to that found in other lines of criminal activity, as well as that of the rarer professional thief who engages in shoplifting. Most frequently the apprehended shoplifter is an adult female from...
a respectable background without evidence of contact with a criminal subculture or of marked symptoms of psychopathology and who, once detected, rarely becomes a recidivist. Cameron’s explanation of this type of behavior contains some of the old and some of the new. On the social psychological level she borrows heavily from Cressey’s work on embezzlement. Shoplifters, like embezzlers and other peripheral (non-professional) thieves, employ theft in the course of their everyday legitimate pursuits to augment their attempts at achieving middle class goals. They are able to rationalize these acts in such a manner as to be consistent with their middle class values.

The structural distribution of the behavior is explained in the Ohlin and Cloward tradition with somewhat of a novel twist—even some of the middle class cannot achieve middle class goals through legitimate means. Unfortunately, this attempt is not entirely consistent with the position of Cohen, Ohlin, and Cloward, as well as others who have used the same argument to explain the assumed higher frequency of criminal and delinquent behavior in the lower class. Her explanation as to why the peripheral criminal has a low rate of recidivism once arrested is an interesting and fruitful application of self-theory. Because arrest and public exposure represent a severe threat to a self-conception that does not include the role of thief and to the network of relations that maintains this conception, the reaction is to strongly reject this role. In contrast, the professional or vocational thief experiences no such shock. He conceives of himself as a thief, and has ingroup support for this conception which is in no way threatened by the experience of arrest.

This monograph compares favorably with other recent works in the field. The author is understandably limited by the character of her data, yet whenever possible she attempts to bring this data to bear on a number of significant issues in criminology. At points, she may be open to the criticism of attempting to present too neat a picture in support of her conclusions. On page 147 she concludes that those shoplifters included in the study were not slum dwellers, but that their residential distribution was approximately that of the Lost and Found claiments of Lakeside Company, a measure presumed to typify shoppers in that store. On page 97–100, however, we find that this approximation is only slight, at least for her store sample of shoplifting (coefficient of mean square contingency of .13). In fact, at this point she concludes that the shoplifter represents a somewhat lower socioeconomic group than Lakeside shoppers. Yet the point should not be lost that the socioeconomic distribution of these offenders is not markedly concentrated in the lower socioeconomic groups as is reflected in arrest or conviction statistics for most other types of offenses and, as she notes, for those prosecuted in the courts for shoplifting as well.

Like most recent monographs in criminology, this report is strong on theory and somewhat weak on facts, particularly the kind that would substantiate crucial points in the theoretical argument. This, of course, reflects the current trend in this area—considerable elaboration of theory to explain what are thought to be but certainly are not adequately demonstrated to be the facts.

This work does have considerable potential significance for the trend in current sociological explanations of crime. It may bring a number of theorists back to the significance of what has long been known, but appears to have been neglected in recent years. Law violating behavior is widely distributed in the social structure. Current structural strain theories of criminal and delinquent behavior which emphasize the criminality of the disadvantaged groups must be modified to handle this type of criminal behavior.

Carl W. Backman

University of Nevada


Prostitution is a subject which is approached most often with emotion, prejudice and preconceived notions. Hence, any study of it will be fraught with the difficulty of analyzing it intelligently with unbiased scholarship. Prostitution and Morality attempts to consider this problem, or if you will, situation, which has existed throughout the history of human society and which appears, almost certainly, never to be put out of business. The authors’ alleged purpose in producing this book is to emphasize the tremendous damage that is being done by our present policy towards prostitution. They point out (and quite correctly) that our practice of imprisoning prostitutes “never re-
habilitates any significant number, almost always results in their further alienation from society, and costs a tremendous amount of money while failing to eliminate prostitution or accomplish any other worthwhile objective.”

Dr. Walter C. Alvarez, in his introduction to the book, hits hard at the foremost theme of American criminal jurisprudence. He states what he calls the main message of the book thusly:

“. . . We in America, when we see an evil such as alcoholism, drug addiction, or prostitution, get our legislators to pass a law prohibiting what we do not like, and providing for the punishment of the persons who persist in selling alcohol or heroin or their favors to men.”

Many writers have substantiated this peculiarity of American law—our preoccupation with attempting to enforce private morals. The late Dr. Kinsey pointed out in 1953:

“Our present information seems to make it clear that the current sex laws are unenforced and are unenforceable because they are too completely out of accord with the realities of human behavior, and because they attempt too much in the way of social control.”

The mere enforcement of the existing laws concerning prostitution is all but impossible for a city police department. The authors suggest that a local attempt to combat prostitution “creates problems of law-enforcement with which no police force in a large city is able to cope without committing more and worse offenses than those it has been detailed to suppress.” It is in the field of vice control that we find the most flagrant violations of civil rights and human decency by the enforcing agencies: entrapment, illegal arrests, unreasonable searches and seizures, the use of stool pigeons, and wire-tapping.

The arrest and jailing of prostitutes, thirty, forty, and fifty times, is common in every large city. “Arrested again, they are jailed again,” point out the authors, “as if there were a chance that on the 51st occasion the jail sentence might persuade the prostitute to mend her ways!”

The obvious historical failure of primitive measures to abolish prostitution, the authors feel, suggests that this approach is not feasible. With the number of new victims of venereal diseases in the United States approaching 1500 per day, it is imper-}

1 Kinsey et al., Sexual Behavior in the Human Female (1953) 20.

Kingsley Davis, in an article appearing in 1937, asked a question which is still paramount today: “Why is it that a practice so thoroughly despised, so widely outlawed in Western civilization, can yet flourish so universally?” Mr. Davis answered the question in a manner worthy of repetition:

“. . . There is no likelihood that sex freedom will ever displace prostitution. Not only will there always be a set of reproductive institutions which place a check upon sexual liberty, a system of social dominance which gives a motive for selling sexual favors, and a scale of attractiveness which creates the need for buying these favors, but prostitution is, in the last analysis, economical. Enabling a small number of women to take care of the needs of a large number of men, it is the most convenient sexual outlet for an army, and for the legions of strangers, perverts, and physically repulsive in our midst. It performs a function, apparently, which no other institution fully performs.”

Benjamin and Masters have produced a book which answers many of the traditional questions concerning prostitution and asks many new ones. These are, in a democracy, questions which only the citizen can finally answer. Any questions raised with reference to morality are profound ones. It is apparent, however, that we have entered into many areas of penal regulation with too little reflection. The primary question can be phrased in this manner: Is it the proper function of the law to outlaw conduct that involves, in essence, both a willing seller and willing buyer? Or to put the question in a more basic sense: Should public law be used for the regulation of private, consensual morals?

In discussing our out-moded sex laws (and this could apply with equal relevance to legal sanctions directed at drug addiction and alcoholism) Dr. Kinsey opined:

“Somehow, in an age which calls itself scientific and Christian, we should be able to discover more intelligent ways of protecting social interests without doing such irreparable damage to so many individuals and to the

total social organization to which they belong.3

With our increased knowledge of human personality surely a more realistic approach to prostitution can be devised commensurate with our approaches to other social and political problems. Our present punitive approach is indeed, in the words of the authors, "inexcusably anachronistic."

DANIEL P. KING

Milwaukee, Wis.


When Professor J. W. Eaton took up the work of writing this book, he found himself confronted with a difficult but fascinating task. It is not easy for an American scholar to spend two months in another country and then prepare a document that is satisfactory to himself and the authorities in that country. The problem is not unlike the tail gunner in a plane who attempts to hit a moving target which he cannot see because of darkness. In spite of these conditions Professor Eaton has done a commendable analysis of the prisons in Israel.

The correctional system of Israel developed under most unusual conditions in point of time and circumstances. When the British High Command left Palestine on May 14, 1948, three years after the end of World War II, there was no plan for a penal system for the new nation. Under British rule Jews had been reluctant to enter the correctional service. Those few who did "collaborate" with the British authorities were members of the Haganah, the Jewish underground army who were more interested in aiding their own countryman than serving the British. Over against this was the fact that the majority of Israel's first cabinet members had a prison record either in the country before British withdrawal or in Northern Europe before or during World War II. Furthermore, the Jewish exiles who migrated from seventy European countries after the war "were underprivileged and uneducated, and some were criminals". This influx of vast numbers "led to maladjustment and delinquency among their youth". As a result, offenses "rose from nearly 17,000 in 1949 to over 56,000 in 1960" (p. 19).

When the time arrived to establish a prison system in Israel, the old installations in Acre and Jerusalem were not reopened because of the psychology image; under British rule a number of Jewish terrorists had been executed in these prisons. In setting up a new penal policy, disagreements arose between two groups of officials. The "military pioneers", who had been in the country and who engaged in guerilla warfare prior to 1948, stressed security, whereas the "human relations specialists", who came later with little or no military experience, stressed treatment. This did not imply that the "military pioneers" were "tough minded" but they were keenly aware that security was a prime factor for the new nation. As a result of these conditions, correctional innovations were "politically circumscribed". In spite of these conditions the new prison system had certain elements of "newism".

In the midst of the new operations, a mass prison break at Shatta on August 1, 1958 had a sobering effect on the "human relations specialists". "The break was the inescapable result of the indifference to the most elementary security rules." At present "security objectives are in ascendancy" (p. 44). Police officials now operate the six prisons housing about 1200 inmates. This does not mean that treatment and welfare programs have been abandoned but that priorities have changed.

In a book review quotations may not be considered proper but Judge Haim H. Cohn of the Supreme Court of Israel who wrote the Preface to Professor Eaton's book makes certain statements which aid in understanding the conditions. "As in most other countries, so in Israel, a considerable portion of administrative policy making is entrusted to officials who have had no special qualifications for their jobs. ... There is, however, no solution for this problem: the civil service jobs are not attractive—especially in prisons and with prisoners." In addition, there is "the shortage of manpower". "What I desire to stress here is that the emphasis on security... constitutes but a natural reflex to popular sentiment... I do not know that matters would be different if, instead of the 'military pioneers', the 'human relations specialists' were in power" (p. X).

Professor Eaton's fifty-six page book is a valuable document because the author has portrayed the problems of innovations in a penal system in a new nation confronted with serious problems.

WALTER A. LUNDEN
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Outsiders is a valuable contribution to the analysis and understanding of deviant behavior. It is sociological throughout—as one would expect from Becker’s previous publications concerned with the use of marijuana—and committed to the social psychology of symbolic interaction. It is well written and its thesis is cogent for at least two reasons. It is very readable, being written in plain, straightforward English even when using sociological terms; and, the logic of the thesis is stated tersely.

The title of the book, Outsiders, emphasizes the postulate that deviation is most correctly and usefully conceived of as resulting from an interaction between conduct and the response to that conduct. Becker examines critically some competing conceptions in Chapter 1: deviation conceived statistically as a departure from some norm; and metaphorically, as analogous to a physical illness (it is then mental illness, psychopathy, or sociopathy), or analogous to a societal disease (it is then social disorganization, dysfunction, or anomie). These conceptions are rejected as being empirically and logically inadequate. Becker then discusses “deviance and the responses of others.” Here he presents “the central fact about deviance: it is created by society.” It is not created in the trite sense that “social factors” are responsible, but it is rather that “social groups create deviance by making rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying these rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders” (p. 9).

It follows that deviance is not a quality of the behavior in which one engages. It is a result of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an offender. Deviants, whether individuals, groups, or categories of individuals, are those to whom that label has been applied successfully. Deviant behavior is that which has been so judged in the process of interaction between the actor and the responding (i.e., judging) observer. In those cases in which there is no direct interaction the observer still renders to himself a judgment concerning the observed conduct. That conception has recently been applied to mental illness by Thomas S. Szasz and others, including this reviewer. “Mental illness” is behavior which, when observed and judged (usually according to middle-class and/or professional values), results in the actor being labeled “mentally ill.” The degree to which others will judge a given act deviant varies greatly (pp. 12–14).

Becker develops a sequential or developmental model in Chapter 2. There is a “natural history” discernible in individuals and groups learning deviant behavior. It is a process of symbolic or linguistic learning in which causal components are more influential during one phase than another. Rule enactment and enforcement are also aspects of the process, and are also developmental. Acts, not persons, and types of behavior, not types of people, are studied. One learns socially provided reasons for starting a type of activity as well as a rationale for continuing it. This is in accord with the social psychology of G. H. Mead, of Donald R. Cressey (the analysis of the “compulsive criminal” and the criminal violation of financial trust), of Alfred R. Lindesmith (opiate addiction), of Sykes and Matza (techniques of neutralization), and of many others.

The conceptual and methodological soundness of emphasizing the linguistic and social learning of techniques of action, values of the group, vocabulary of motives, and conceptions of self and other are revealed in Becker’s earlier work on the marijuana smoker and the dance musician (Chapters 3–6).

Individuals and groups classified as deviant may, and sometimes do, reject that classification. It is their condemners who, they may assert, are in fact deviant. This “condemnation of the condemners” has also been observed among prisoners, juvenile delinquents, and other types of outsiders. Both condemned and condemners nevertheless articulate with each other so as to keep a viable society in being. The thesis that the unity of society, especially modern society, does not consist of or require practical unanimity of conduct and values was developed by C. H. Cooley, in Social Organization. He said that not even the primary group is an undifferentiated whole (which may surprise many of today’s sociologists). “The differentiated unity of modern life” was social organization for him. Becker’s analysis of the interactional process of labeling deviance continues the position exemplified by Cooley’s work.

The significance of Becker’s analysis can be seen in contrast with deviant theories of deviance. The deviant theories depend on metaphor rather than direct analysis, particularly the analogy with physical medicine. Becker’s analysis deals literally
with interpersonal and intergroup processes and relationships, and with linguistic learning. The deviant theories psychiatrize the individual and the group, and society in general. They are presented as mentally ill, psychopathic, sociopathic, socially pathological, and anomic. They are, in short, held up to public gaze as miserable creatures undoubtedly needing the good that the upper-class professional worker would like to do to them. The deviants in Becker's work, by contrast, are normal participants in the normal functioning of normal sociocultural processes that produce both deviant and nondeviant persons. They are not faceless and anomic in a lonely crowd. They have friends and relations, and tend, as numerous studies show, to live largely on the basis of primary relations. In short, they have connections, in the long established meaning of the term.

Juvenile delinquents may actually enjoy themselves in their delinquency. An extensive literature, from J. Adams Puffer through Shaw and McKay, Frederic Thrasher, Healy and Bronner, James F. Short, David Bordua, and Walter E. Miller attest to this. No one, I hope, will infer from this statement that I am trying to revive the romanticization of juvenile delinquency in which Thrasher sometimes indulged.

Some who may agree with the above statements may protest that they surely cannot apply to mental illness. My reply is that they can and do, with one exception. That exception is the now infinitesimal proportion of the mentally ill that is diagnosed as psychotic (I will be silent concerning the demonstrated unreliability and invalidity of psychiatric diagnosis). The estimate of the psychotic among the "mentally ill" ranges from about 1 per 100 adults to about 1 per 10,000 adults. The remainder are people whom Szasz describes as "having problems in living." Space prevents a discussion of this matter, but it can be said the Szasz's thesis has been found cogent by many people.

Outsiders, in summary, takes its place in a long and distinguished line of empirical and theoretical publications in sociology and social psychology. Its position within that nexus sustains and helps to confirm its thesis.

Frank E. Hartung

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H. J. Eysenck is a British psychologist who is perhaps best known to American readers for his attacks on psychoanalytic psychology. According to Eysenck there is no evidence of cure of behavioral disorders by means of traditional therapy. His works include, among others, Behaviour Therapy and the Neuroses, Handbook of Abnormal Psychology, and Uses and Abuses of Psychology. Dr. Eysenck is head of the psychological laboratories at Maudsley Hospital in London.

Eysenck is a strong advocate of scientific experimental psychology in place of clinical psychology. In his book Crime and Personality he argues that the serious behavioral disorders of our society can be solved only if we use the procedures of a laboratory science. Eysenck is an expert on classical Pavlovian conditioning. He begins by noting that psychology is the science of human behavior, not a science of the mind. The scientist studies that which is observable, and he cites the behavioral tradition of Pavlov, Watson, Hull, and Mowrer. (Somehow Thorndike and Skinner are ignored in this exploration). According to Eysenck, all behavior is either learned or conditioned. Learned behavior is that behavior which occurs because it is reinforced; conditioned behavior is that behavior which occurs because a stimulus and a response are paired. This distinction between learning and conditioning is related to the physiological structure of the organism: conditioning is based on the autonomic nervous system involving smooth muscles and glands, such as are involved in the digestive organs and blood vessels; whereas learning involves the striated muscles controlling the skeleton. Eysenck views the process of conditioning as much more important than that of learning. His psychological system is based on the autonomic nervous system and its division into sympathetic and parasym pathetic. The sympathetic system increases the heart beat and rate of respiration and the flow of blood and adrenalin, and it stops digestion. The parasym pathetic system is an inhibiting rather than activating system; it slows down the rate of heart beat and respiration, and it aids digestion.
According to Eysenck, people are given at birth a biological propensity towards excitation or inhibition. He divides personality into two types—introverts and extraverts. The extravert is low on excitation and high on inhibition; the introvert is high on excitation and low on inhibition.

The process of conditioning is related to body type in the following way: the introvert conditions very easily whereas the extravert does not because the former ranks high on excitation and low on inhibition.

Next Eysenck asks why so many individuals are law-abiding, and finds the answer in a conditioned reflex which is the basis for conscience. When a person is punished for behaving in a given way he develops a conditioned fear response. The act is thus associated with an unconditioned stimulus (punishment) which produces an unconditioned response (pain). Criminals are psychopaths and extraverts who do not condition readily. Eysenck then quotes the studies of Lange, Sheldon, Hooton, and the Gluecks to support his argument that criminals have certain constitutional makeups which predestine them to criminal behavior. He ignores the critics of this position, such as Sutherland and Montagu.

Eysenck argues that behavior that is motivated by reward can be deterred by punishment (theft, fraud, kidnapping), whereas behavior motivated by frustration (sex crimes, murder) cannot be controlled by punishment. Inmates must be divided by personality and body type before treatment is undertaken.

Eysenck points to the several difficulties in the use of legal punishment—the time span between the act and the consequences, the uncertainty of punishment, the certainty of reward when a crime is committed, and so forth.

Eysenck recommends conditioning therapy for behavioral disorders, using the work of Wolpe and Mowrer as examples of successful therapeutic procedures. He also devotes a chapter to drug therapy, wherein drugs are used to alter behavior, or to change extraverts to introverts and vice versa. Stimulant drugs will change extraverts to introverts, and depressant drugs will change introverts to extraverts.

Eysenck does a superb job of handling the critics who claim that free will and responsibility must be retained in a system of justice. He points out that legal and religious controls as now used are based on a conditioning process wherein the behavior is altered by the consequences. Behavior is always determined, especially by the law as an agent of social control. Eysenck observes that the criterion of goodness or badness of values lies in the consequences of behavior. He also observes we have spent millions for construction of atom bombs, but not for human engineering. He closes his book by saying “Society will have to replace unreasoning ways of dealing with offenders by rational scientific methods firmly founded on observation and empirically based theory.”

Several major criticisms may be made of this work. First, the notion that criminality has a biological base has been refuted by American criminologists, and this aspect of Eysenck’s work is not likely to receive widespread acceptance. Eysenck does point to two areas in which major future breakthroughs to understanding human behavior will probably be made: physiological psychology and psychopharmacology. It is obvious that the relationship between a stimulus and a response is rooted in the physiological nature of man; however, the evidence used by Eysenck is not only poor psychology; it is poor physiology. Eysenck could have reviewed the evidence that human behavior is learned behavior without resorting to his argument concerning personality and physical type.

In the second place, Eysenck differentiates between learning and conditioning, and regards criminal behavior as conditioned rather than learned behavior. This is unfortunate since his own examples of criminal behavior are those of learned behavior. Conditioned behavior involves the smooth muscles and glands, whereas learned behavior involves the skeletal system. Rape, theft, and murder involve the skeletal muscles, not the smooth muscles. Eysenck, in equating behavior with conditioning, ignores or underestimates the obvious fact that conditioning explains very little social behavior since it deals with eye blinks and galvanic skin responses.

The major contribution which he makes to criminology is contained in his notion that a scientific approach to behavior is a basic prerequisite for the future development of the field. The future of criminology may certainly rest on laboratory procedures rather than on psychoanalytic procedures. The control and prediction of behavior now being carried out in the laboratories could be applied to the control of delinquent behavior. If in the future modern learning theory is
applied to the alleviation of behavioral disorders the volume by Eysenck may well rank as one of the most significant contributions to the field in this decade.

Schwitzgebel's book is similar to Eysenck's in that the former also uses modern learning theory as a basic approach to delinquency; it is different in that Schwitzgebel uses operant procedures (Skinner and Thorndike) in place of conditioning procedures (Pavlov). Schwitzgebel also argues that a science of behavior must be established in the laboratory before the problem of delinquent behavior can be dealt with.

The basic principle of Skinnerian psychology is that a response which is rewarded is more likely to occur in the future, given similar conditions, than if it is not rewarded. Rewarding a response will increase the rate of responding. Schwitzgebel relates his work to that of Charles Slack who paid subjects to talk into a tape recorder concerning their behavioral problems.

Schwitzgebel used a store front office in the slum area of Boston for interviewing delinquent subjects. Social workers objected to this procedure since they felt that subjects are supposed to seek therapy for its own sake. Schwitzgebel walked the streets looking for delinquents to hire as experimental subjects. The delinquent became the expert on delinquency, and the experimenter became not a therapist but an observer of behavior change.

Schwitzgebel outlines the three steps in his procedures for gaining cooperation from the subjects: (1) the initial contact for which the delinquent is paid for considering a job with the project, (2) the establishment of reliable attendance at the laboratory, and (3) the obtaining of participation in laboratory procedures. The laboratory was part of the experimental psychology program at Harvard University.

The major laboratory activity consisted of interviewing the subjects. These interviews were conducted by an educator, a psychologist, and a social worker. The educator used a philosophical approach, the psychologist used a psychoanalytic approach, and the social worker used a psychiatric casework approach. There was also a priest who used a religious approach.

The educator focused upon the revolt of the interviewee against the norms of society. The subjects went through stages of apathy, anger, despair, insight, and transformation. The psychologist focused upon experimenter-subject therapy wherein a transference of positive feeling occurred. He used standard analytic concepts. The social worker emphasized the adjustment of the subject to his immediate environment.

Each of these orientations produced different responses from the delinquent subjects, which demonstrates that verbal behavior is conditioned by its consequences. Since different interviewers rewarded different verbal statements from the subjects, differential verbal responding developed.

The secondary activities of the project included programming a Driver's Handbook in order to enable the subjects to secure drivers' licenses. It was observed that the possession of a driver's license was a great deterrent to auto thefts. The project also engaged in multiple interviewing, interviewing in a church setting, building electronic equipment, and playing cards with delinquent subjects.

The basic philosophy of an experimental approach to behavior is outlined by Schwitzgebel as one which considers delinquency as a variety of behaviors which may be scientifically modified through experimental procedures. An experimental approach must meet three conditions: (1) The result must be measured in terms of change in delinquent behavior. (2) The procedures must be clearly defined so others can repeat the experiment. (3) The procedures and techniques must be available to other investigators. The author observes that "to the extent that psychoanalysis assumes that the unique interaction between patient and therapist is crucial to the outcome it is not an experimental procedure but rather a technical art." (p. 92).

In order to use an experimental approach the investigator must (1) define the final desired behavior in measurable units, (2) determine the present repertoire of the subject's behavior, (3) determine the reinforcers available to alter the behavior in the desired direction, and (4) apply reinforcers and modify the application according to the results. (p. 94). Reinforcers used include money, group prestige, and feelings of accomplishment.

Schwitzgebel devotes attention to the ethical issues involved in human engineering, and he notes the opposition of the community to any new approach to delinquency control.

A statistical evaluation of the results of the project revealed that the experimental group showed a significant reduction in the number of arrests and in the number of months of incarceration.
tion, but not in the number of persons incarcerated in prison.

The reviewer feels that modern learning theory has adequately demonstrated that behavior can be predicted and controlled if experimental procedures are used. However, one has the feeling that Schwitzgebel utilized about 5 per cent of the potential of behavioral psychology. He uses operant techniques basically to gain cooperation, after which he shifts to therapeutic interviewing. He certainly demonstrated how verbal behavior can be maintained and altered; he has not demonstrated how changing verbal behavior is related to changing delinquent behavior. It is suggested that such techniques might be used to develop other than verbal behavior, such as are involved in reading, mathematics, science, social science, and vocational skills. The problem of motivation, which is a major stumbling block in any dropout or vocational training project, is handled by behavioral psychology. At a time when the federal government is investing millions in poverty and delinquency programs, an analysis of behavioral change as outlined by Schwitzgebel is surely needed if any demonstrated change in behavior is to be made. As one surveys these huge demonstration projects, one is struck by the lack of scientific methodology as a built-in aspect of such projects. Schwitzgebel has demonstrated how, with a few subjects and a few dollars, behavioral change of a significant type can be achieved. One wonders what the results would be if ten million dollars were invested in a scientific program dealing with the behavior of subjects who are part of the anti-poverty and anti-delinquency movement now underway in this country.

The Schwitzgebel book is not as theoretical or scientific as Eysenck's, and its major contribution might be to furnish interested parties with a new technique for dealing with delinquency. If anything can be said against the book it is that it oversimplifies the problem of behavioral control, leading one to believe that people working with delinquents may use the techniques without having adequate training or understanding of the principles involved. This certainly is not what Schwitzgebel intended.

Readers who are interested in the application of modern psychological principles to crime and delinquency will find the above books timely and stimulating.

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