
The present work presents the central concept of the legal philosophy of a famous European scholar, author of fifty published writings, including two weighty tomes translated into English, The Formal Bases of Law (1914), and Philosophy of Law (1953). The volume before us, however, contains barely sixty pages of text; the balance of two hundred twenty-one pages being largely filled with annotations, in fine print, illustrating views that parallel, and contrast with his own, from Plato to the present.

In view of this monumental conciseness, it will be necessary, even in a short review, to give an expanded paraphrase of some thematic sentences, rather than a summary, if we are to convey something of our author's thesis.

The kernel of Del Vecchio's conception of justice is found in what he calls alteritas, or "the consideration of the Other as a subject." (p. 77). The inner nature of justice is conceived as nothing but the inner nature of human consciousness, which is consciousness of the self in relation to an other-than-the-self. To become aware of oneself, Del Vecchio says, means not merely to become aware of a not-self, and thereby of a boundary between what is self and what is not-self. Of course, human consciousness necessarily involves the awareness of such a line, but it involves something more. For the self cannot define itself, to itself, in a merely negative fashion. It must see itself in another self, or he will never see himself.

Brutus must see Brutus through the eyes of Cassius, or he will never see Brutus. In Del Vecchio's terms, he must see himself as an Other, in order to see himself as a Self. To see himself as a self, however, means seeing that there are other selves, other possessors of subjectivity. Other selves, that is, can never be mere objects, because realizing the subjectivity of others is the very condition of one's own subjectivity.

Justice, then, according to Del Vecchio is nothing but "an objective consciousness of Self, whereby the subjective self becomes coordinated with other selves," This consciousness is posited a priori by the awareness of self. Like Kant, Del Vecchio admits that the phenomenal world does not allow us actually to know that another self exists; it is simply a hypothesis necessary to self-awareness. But it is a hypothesis so necessary and so convincing that we cannot in fact regard it as illusory.

Del Vecchio's universe of coordinated selves bears a remarkable resemblance to Kant's kingdom of rational beings, whom we must treat as ends-in-themselves because of their absolute worth as possessors of good wills. Del Vecchio, in Kantian vein, speaks of "the person ... (as) abstract entity ... (as) substance furnished with autonomy." Man, however, as distinct from "substance furnished with autonomy," is this person considered "in his actual modes of behavior." The abstract character of justice requires that we consider each person as a fungible entity, i.e. as equal to every other...
person because of his absolute worth. But in practical terms, justice requires that we evaluate the actions of others by the criterion of their respect for the absolute worth of the person. Substantially, these evaluations seem to result from asking whether the actions could have been in conformity with Kant's categorical imperative. Del Vecchio does, however, appear to differ somewhat from Kant. Although the punishment of offenders seems to be directed towards what Kant would call the removal of heteronomy from the will, so as to allow the person punished to act hereafter in accordance with the autonomy of his "real" will, Del Vecchio would seem to sanction a kind of Aristotelian prudence both in the prevention and the cure of criminality. Punishment, however, must never be of such a kind as to violate the dignity of the person, which is as inviolable in the criminal as in the saint.

Del Vecchio's argument concerning the nature of justice is a resolute reaffirmation of philosophic absolutism, as against the pervasive relativism of the twentieth century. Although predominantly Kantian, it is an attempt to supply the defects of the purely formal Kantian ethics with elements of the scholastic and Aristotelian tradition, instead of going "forward" along the path marked out by Hegel and his successors. Del Vecchio's attempt deserves the greatest respect, but one cannot help wondering whether Kant was not a better judge of the limits of a formal ethics. For Del Vecchio is Kantian in the purely formal character of the abstract system of co-ordinated selves which is his ultimate norm. Yet he is Aristotelian, in that the awareness of justice springs from a movement within the soul in virtue of which it attains consciousness. Yet consciousness, in the Aristotelian-scholastic psychology, is conceived ultimately as understanding, i.e. self-consciousness in the strict sense is identical with self-knowledge. And self-knowledge, like all knowledge, means knowledge of the natures of things, i.e. knowledge of the intelligible necessity which constitutes the cause or causes of all things. Now is it precisely this kind of knowledge which Kant rejected as an impossibility. But it is difficult to see why consciousness should be regarded as good, and therewith the cause of a sense of obligation or duty. In fact, it seems to me, Del Vecchio supplies consciousness with a content from "experience," which is eventually indistinguishable from "historical experience." Whereas Aristotle would say that justice depends upon friendship, and friendship means, ultimately, partnership in the quest for eternal verities, Del Vecchio says that justice depends upon self-consciousness, and self-consciousness upon recognizing the subjectivity of others. However, the impulse to self-consciousness seems to come from the impulse to become conscious of the experiences we can share with others by recognizing the "rights" of others. "If this reading of Del Vecchio is correct, his argument is enclosed within a circle, and does not actually supply a transcendent norm by which to judge the justice or injustice of collective historical action. In short, it seems to me that Del Vecchio is exposed to all the objections that have been made to Kant and Hegel, and which have led to the relativism and historicism against which his work is a protest."

HARRY V. JAFFA
Ohio State University


In Other People's Money, Donald Cressey propounds his theory of the social psychology of embezzlement, from the vantage point of thorough orientation in the literature on criminology, legal formulations, and first-hand case studies. The materials for the volume were collected by him and his staff at the Illinois States Penitentiary at Joliet, Illinois, the United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, and the California Institution for Men at Chino, California.

Cressey abandons legal concepts of embezzlement and develops two criteria for classifying a person as an embezzler in this study: (1) The person must have accepted a position of trust in good faith, and (2) he must have violated the trust by committing a crime.
According to Cressey's theory, trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as having a financial problem which is non-shareable. This concept is a central factor throughout the book. Although non-shareable problems precede criminal violations of financial trust, many different situations produce these problems, all are related to status-seeking, or status-maintaining behavior. Conditions or problems are significant in explaining a criminal trust violation only if they produce a non-shareable financial problem for the trusted person.

Merely having a non-shareable problem, however, is not enough to explain the trust violation. Mr. Cressey's investigation attributes the violation of a trust not to a single event, but rather to a series of events or a process. There must be a "conjecture of events" including the non-shareable financial problem, the opportunity to violate the trust, and the skills and rationalizations necessary to complete the act. Rationalizations, in the sense Cressey uses the term, means that the trust violator must arrive at a state of mind which will enable him to violate the trust and, at the same time, to look upon himself as a non-violator and in no sense a "criminal".

Most of the literature on criminology, Cressey points out, has developed as a by-product of attempts to apprehend, control or reform the embezzler. He finds this literature full of crude concepts and imperfect methods, and makes clear his desire to be a "pure scientist." The assumptions on which he states his research is based "are that a scientist must seek to formulate generalizations which permit the discernment of exceptions, thus making possible the perfecting or refinement of the generalizations. . . . The theory which we have presented," he concludes, "has few practical implications either for prevention and detection of trust violation or for treatment of apprehended offenders." He hopes that although his theory is at present in conclusive, it will be tested further by other investigators and revised in the light of exceptions to his theory.

It would be difficult to determine, through study of Cressey's book, a method for checking the material he has collected. He presents no carefully worked out statement of methodology or detailed case material. The "cases" he offers are merely paragraph comments. Thus his report contributes little if anything new to methodology.

Mr. Cressey is to be commended for his objectivity toward an important social problem, for his restraint in reaching conclusions, and for his flexibility in revising his point of view in the light of new facts. Too many professional workers, including judges and probation officers, give little attention to critical appraisal of either their clinical work or the complexities of the social problems with which they deal.

The further testing of Cressey's theory, which he invites, should not be considered the exclusive province of the "pure scientist,"—the researcher. To verbalize like a physical scientist when discussing the complexities of human problems, is confusing. The trained and skilled practitioner, imbued with a scientific attitude, is in a more favorable position to contribute to fact-finding and critical analyses, given the time for proper recording, than many researcher specialists. If Cressey's work can stimulate a desire in those who handle our criminal population to learn while "treating," his efforts will not be in vain.

Other People's Money is a provocative document. Your reviewer enthusiastically recommends it, not only to social investigators but to judges, social workers, probation officers, clergymen or to any layman seeking light on an important social problem.

If the book had begun with the chapter on "The Role of the Non-Shareable Problem in Trust Violation" and the material in the present Introduction and Section I put in an appendix, it would have been more readable.

JESSE A. JACOBS
Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry
Chicago, Illinois

MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE.

Readers familiar with the parent work (Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law—1933)
will be surprised and pleased at the vastly increased scope and sharply contemporary nature of the present volume, which is much more than a revision of the original material. It is a sound and thoughtful attempt to compare, contrast, and integrate the concepts and procedures of psychiatry and law. The breadth of content and wealth of factual material of pinpoint specificity are approached in very systematic fashion, so that the volume is valuable both for its exposition and as a reference book.

The types of mental disorder occupy the first section of the book in order to familiarize nonmedical readers with the terminology used in further sections. In particular, treatment of the portion on the "Psychopathic Personality" is excellent since it leans away from the somewhat archaic theory of constitution, although the statement that the behavior of the psychopath is not "purposeful" is somewhat misleading. It is pointed out that this group of individuals is the largest single offender of our social codes, but the point is not made clear that in no state are they considered legally ill, while they are considered psychiatrically, psychologically, and medically ill, and hence occupy a position which makes for extreme difficulty in removing such a burden from society.

The next section concerns itself with the historical development of legal tests of irresponsibility and their present status. However much one may be displeased with the contemporary tests used, this material is thoroughly covered and presented in unbiased fashion.

A valuable section follows on disorders which either do not fall within the law, or which are "borderline" cases. Here again the case of the sexual psychopath is taken up and legislative procedures discussed which are in existence in a number of states. But, again the point is missed that relatively few psychopaths are sexual psychopaths (within the framework of legality at least) and that there is no provision for a "garden variety of psychopath".

Sections follow on proof, expert and nonexpert testimony, pleadings and procedures, and the presentation of findings to the courts of opinions regarding sanity or insanity. The section on pleadings and procedure is particularly valuable as a reference since the method of pleading, commitment, form of verdict, procedure on acquittal, and the procedure for release are given state by state.

The section on testimony of witnesses and their examination and cross-examination is invaluable for the individual who might be called upon for such testimony. Of course, any book which attempts to encompass such a mass of material is subject to inadvertent error of omission on occasion—for the reason of publication lag if no other—and such is the case in discussing privileged communication, where it is stated that psychologists are not extended this right legally while physicians and psychiatrists are. In at least one state; possibly more; the converse is true. In Tennessee, psychologists have the legal right of privileged communication while physicians do not. It is, however, a minor point among several others throughout the book.

On the whole, this book fills a gap in the field of forensic psychiatry and forensic psychology, or if it does not really fill the gap, it presents the material in clearer and sharper fashion than has previously been done.

A. STANLEY WEBSTER
Knoxville—State Hospital


This book is addressed to the general medical practitioner and the medical specialist in fields other than psychiatry. The author's thesis is the integration of psychiatric knowledge to the everyday practice of medicine. Physicians, though recognizing this need, usually have too little background in psychology and psychopathology.

Not that the author wishes to make psychiatrists out of physicians not attached to psychological schools! But he does feel that the physician "can diagnose and treat psychophysiologic illness without a thorough comprehension of the conflicting theories of psychopathology."

The author preferred "psychophysiologic" to such terms as psychosomatic, because of the misleading "overtones."
The author divides his work into two portions, the first containing a manual for practitioners and the second containing materials not so much for the purpose of evaluating what is being done by psychiatrists, as it is to give the non-psychiatrist physician a background and orientation in psychiatric literature. Dr. Ziskind thinks that the "busy practitioner" may be interested in the former rather than the latter portion, whereas the "inquisitive physician" may find stimulating the latter portion of the book.

What makes this book different and better than others in the field? Does it fill a gap? And will the practitioner take to it? Actually, few general practitioners have given much attention to the emotional aspects of their patients' illness and here Dr. Ziskind is desirous of presenting a non-systematized point of view or, as he states to this reviewer, "free of commitment to any school of psychiatric thought," in which increased emphasis is given to sociocultural factors.

Needless to say, since this is not a text of psychiatry, much of the material had to be oversimplified and the author seems to have been well aware of the danger in doing this. This is particularly true when he discusses the various schools of psychiatry. He devotes twelve pages to Freud and "classical" psychoanalysis, 8 pages to Adler, 6 to Jung and 5 to Rank, whereas Horney, Sullivan, and Fromm fare, relatively, better with 12 pages to their credit between them, and Adolf Meyer gets a whole chapter to himself, amounting to 5 pages. However, the author does not infer that more pages were allotted to the Neo-Freudians than to Freud. Actually, a good deal of material in other chapters, such as the one on the "Mental Mechanisms," and the chapter on "Diseases Commonly Called Psychosomatic," deal with Freudian theories, too. In addition, in the descriptions of all the non-Freudian schools, comparisons are made to the Freudian theories. There are, probably, very few places in the literature where one can find a short comparison of the schools which highlight the fundamental theories and the concept of neuroses in each. This book is one place where the non-specialist can get such a comparison without reading a whole book on the subject, especially since most students in the fields of psychiatry and psychology will find it impossible to read all, or most, of the important works of each school!

Even psychiatrists will be surprised to find an entire chapter devoted to social factors surrounding a patient's background. The late Professor Earle Young and his wife, Pauline Young (whose book, Social Treatment in Probation and Delinquency, is a classic in social sciences), assisted the author in writing this chapter. Studies of cultural or institutional influence are all too rare even among psychiatrists, let alone physicians. This will, indeed, assist the readers in understanding their patients.

The various therapies are discussed summarily, of necessity. The chapter of great value to the non-psychiatrist is one on the differential diagnosis of mental syndromes. This chapter in particular should be of considerable value to all non-psychiatrists in whatever associated disciplines, since Dr. Ziskind finds it so even in his training program for resident physicians in psychiatric techniques; the aids suggested for this deficiency should be of value to the kindred disciplines of sociology, criminology, and social work, who usually are lacking in this orientation.

HANS A. ILLING
Los Angeles


Among the post-W.W. II test books on German Criminal Procedure which have come to the attention of the American Student of comparative law Professor Peters' work takes the leading place. The author is a man who worked for the progress of the German law even during the years of greatest chaos in the German legal system, when many others lacked the courage to think of tomorrow. (Werendes Jugendstrafrecht published 1947) Strafprozess reflects deep knowledge, strong convictions and great love of the subject. Peters places the
technical steps of pleading and procedure in their proper sociological surroundings. Prosecutor and defendant appear as human beings, not as mere objects of the legislator's code sections. The intricate structure of the German Court Constitution Law (GVG) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) are analyzed and presented with great clarity.—Unfortunately, criminology as such found little mention in this volume which is the only regrettable aspect of the work.

GERHARD O. W. MUELLER
University of Chicago. Law.

THE VAN WATERS CASE. By Thomas H. Eliot.
The Inter-University Case Program. Cases in Public Administration and Policy Formation. ICP Case Series; Number 22. Published and distributed for the ICP by University of Alabama Press; University, Alabama, 1954. Pp. 50. $0.60.

The author has done a most commendable job in skillfully presenting a variety of involved and detailed material in a readable manner. While at times one may gain the impression that the writing is becoming somewhat cumbersome—the fact remains, it is not the writing per se which is the problem—but rather, the content of the subject is a most perplexing and realistic composition.

At midnight on January 11, 1949, Dr. Miriam Van Waters was removed from a position which she had held for seventeen years by the State Commissioner of Correction. Dr. Van Waters was (and still is) the Superintendent of the Reformatory for Women at Framingham, Massachusetts.

Claiming her right to a hearing before a special impartial commission appointed by the Governor of Massachusetts, Dr. Van Waters waited for the final decision to be made. On March 12, 1949 she was reinstated to her position. The commission found that some of Commissioner McDowell's charges were not substantiated and that the remainder, even if true, did not constitute just cause for Dr. Van Water’s removal.

The public interest, the psychology of the people involved and the dynamics of the entire case are excellently handled by the author. A service is also rendered to inmates and former inmates of Framingham through the use of fictitious names. Last, but not least, the case is presented in an impartial manner and highlighted by pertinent background material of each of the main people involved in order to point up relevant considerations.

This is a worth-while contribution to the field of public administration and policy formation.

ARTHUR LERNER
Los Angeles, California


No writer of fiction could desire more fascinating and unprincipled characters than the late William Roughead has taken from an almost two hundred year romance of British roguery. As the Scottish playwright, the late James Bridie, says in his preface to Classic Crimes, Roughead is a “student of the bad,” regarding with an almost affectionate patrimonial interest the careers of those real-life British criminals who would be “nane the waur o’ a hangin’.”

Since truth is stranger than fiction, some of Roughead’s twelve profiles seem all but incredible in the reading, however much the teller of the tales has underplayed his stories for the aficionados of old crimes. Few whodunit carpenters can match Roughead’s chapter on the Ardlamont Mystery or the Bravo poisoning case; few psycho-thrillers can top the sheer factual horror of the ghoulish West Port Murders or the strange riddle of Constance Kent; and Hollywood itself would be hard put to invent the sagas of the bold Deacon Brodie and the arrogant Dr. Pritchard. Nothing of unpleasant dullness or pedantry clings to the derring-do, local color, and attractive authenticity of such prize puzzles of British criminal jurisprudence as the cases of Oscar Slater, Jessie M'Lachlan, and John Donald Merrett.

In his introduction to the episode of the impassioned Madeleine Smith and the mystery of Blythewood Square, William Roughead offers the opinion that “one cannot have too much
of a good murder.” If the judicial drama were unfolded by the fluid pen of the late Mr. Roughhead, this reviewer would be in emphatic agreement with the statement.

Harold M. Helfman
Air Research and Development Command
Baltimore, Maryland


This book is the second in a series of publications growing out of the annual Isaac Ray Awards for the most valuable “contribution to the improvement of the relations of Law and Psychiatry.” (The first, previously reviewed here, was also published by Harcourt, Brace and Company: The Psychiatrist and the Law by Winfred Overholser, M.D.)

To this reviewer, Dr. Zilboorg’s contribution is a valuable one, even if the title is ill chosen. For what the author actually examines are the differences and similarities between criminal law and medical psychology and, moreover, why the differences exist and, better, should not exist. One of the finest chapters, concise and hitting the nail on the head, is the third on “Some Differences in Professional Psychology,” which should be required reading for every judge, attorney, and criminologist. True, the author sees things from the psychiatrist’s point of view in calling attention to the continuing serious shortcomings in the legal student’s training, but his points seem well taken; one especially: all professions dealing with people are training their students to handle people while in training, except the legal, whose student is buried in books instead of visiting jails, taking case histories and comparing them with the court and probation officers’ records, etc. Dr. Zilboorg feels that, while the jurist should not become a psychologist in his own right, he should, on the other hand, not attempt “to combat and eliminate people as if he (the lawyer) were the sanitary tool of some super-sociological housecleaning department.” On the contrary, people should be disposed in such a manner that they “would be preserved and rehabilitated in their totality.” Dr. Zilboorg constantly counsels both parties, the jurists and the psychiatrists, to hold that every criminal is ill and every crime the result of psychological pathology. However, the point he wishes to drive home is that every profession has its psychology and, while the lawyer or the doctor has his foci which often tend to “tinge his social hostility,” the hostility between the professions of jurisprudence and psychiatry could be decreased considerably, if “both the lawyer and the psychiatrist could meet at the crossroads and make the crossroads common ground.”

Other important chapters are the ones on “Aggression and Transgression” and “Some Sources of the Drive to Punish.” Especially in the latter, Dr. Zilboorg deplores the fact that “a present-day criminal trial is not an investigation after truth but an adversary proceeding; in other words, it is a fight between adversaries each of whom is actuated only by the personal desire to win.” The “drive to punish,” then, is directed toward an accused who is an “adversary” as well. Few will dispute the author’s thesis and, so it seems to this review, even fewer may lend a hand to correct this age-old problem, already visible in Biblical and, later, in the Roman courts!

Dr. Zilboorg does not prescribe a remedy. Perhaps there is none, save every individual’s effort to work toward a “common ground.” One thing seems to be certain, that we need books of this kind badly and we need more of them: short and concise and pulling no punches. With the help of such books the audience will grow in size and eventually will bring about needed improvement in our legal proceedings and in the law.

Hans A. Illing
Los Angeles


“Heresy” deserves to be read by all who are seriously interested in our civil liberties. It will also stimulate a passion for sharp and logical discussion.

In Professor Hook’s view, we are threatened
by two groups, the “cultural vigilantes,” and the “ritualistic liberals,” Hook stating that both groups flourish on each other’s misapprehension and their outrages have drowned out the voice of intelligence.” The “voice of intelligence” is supplied ably by the author.

HANS A. ILLING

Los Angeles


This book, a revision, addition, and abridgment of the author’s 1938 work—The Backward Child—is intended as a “practical rather than theoretical” consideration of the problems surrounding the inability of children to progress at the usual speed through school. The revision was designed for “the ordinary teacher”.

Following a history of child study the author’s methods of investigation are applied in turn to the environmental, physical, intellectual, emotional, and moral factors influencing “backwardness”. It is at the very beginning of the historical summary that doubt begins to creep in as to the applicability of this book to a teacher population in this country. Unless there is a wide difference in teacher training between the two countries, it seems unlikely that there is sufficient theoretical background in our own teacher population to cope with the Hippocratic school, the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration, or Kretschmerian body types. Aside from this point, and the fact that the history cited is entirely English, further doubt arises concerning the differences between Commonwealth and United States populations of children. For example, hypermetropia (far-sightedness) is cited as a cause of backwardness—a very serious one and “far more important than ordinary short sight”. This is certainly not the case in this country where myopia is by far the more serious, and in fact, hypermetropia is normal and usual; and not expected to be a cause of symptomatology other than in extremely severe cases. These cases, however, are apparently as rare as diphtheria has now become. It is difficult to account for the differences between a population where hypermetropia is normal in children, and one where it is not. The further one goes in the book, the more marked do the differences appear to be between the populations.

More positively speaking there are excellent sections devoted to method of teacher-treatment of backwardness, viz., the means by which lefthandedness may be corrected. It is, however, most questionable as to whether such methods should be undertaken by teachers, if indeed there is any need for changing at all—from the standpoint of propriety as well as that of legality.

The point must be emphasized again, and finally, that cultural differences between the two English-speaking populations make the methods advocated in this book questionable as to their application in this country. That there are some excellent methods cited cannot be doubted, but the differences already mentioned seem to vitiate their application in this country by teachers who use this book.

A. STANLEY WEBSTER

Knoxville, Tenn.

BREAK DOWN THE WALLS. By John Bartlow Martin. Ballantine Books, 1954. Pp. $3.50 (hard) 0.50 (paper)

The author has tried to appraise the theories of crime and the criminal. But much more interesting are his 200 pages in which he discusses the prison system. What are we to do about it now that it has failed to do what we have wanted it to do. A respective volume of our prison population, he believes, must be isolated from the general population. We needn’t think we are through with prisons. But their population could be reduced, he believes, by 50 percent—advantageously to the prisoners and to all others concerned.

On pages 279 and 280 the author sets out his legislative program as follows:
1. To provide more and better paid parole and probation workers.
2. Money for numerous prison farms and camps, and for a few medium security institutions.
3. Provide for razing our great maximum security prisons and substituting small institutions for them.