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SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES AND CRIMINALITY

Michael Hakeem

A great deal has been said about the possible effects of military training and combat experience on the individual. One viewpoint that has been expressed now and then is that such training and experience may cause persons to become criminals. Mr. Hakeem has explored this notion, and he says that such a notion has not been proved. There is one major difference between the present treatment of the subject and others. The present article reports an investigation of the facts and shuns a priori reasoning. Mr. Hakeem makes modest claims for his study, and describes it as "an exploratory approach to the subject."—Editor.

Introduction

The contention has been made frequently that army conditioning, military training, and especially combat experience may give individuals a criminalistic orientation. The contention has not been embodied in a generalization yielded by a thorough investigation of a large number of cases. It has been made on an a priori basis, and occasionally it is made with the recklessness which characterizes a very large proportion of the material about members of the armed forces, the effects of military training on the personality, and the postwar behavior and problems of ex-servicemen.

While the notion that criminality may result from habituation to a mode of behavior inculcated and demanded by military service has not been derived as a valid generalization from a careful study of reliable data, this has not forestalled its use in explaining criminal behavior. In short, military training has been designated as a causative factor in crime. It appears that despite the disrepute into which the search for the causes of crime has fallen, any phenomenon which is of major current interest is seized upon as a factor explaining crime causation. This has been true of the attempts to explain crime in

1 This is in contradiction to another notion that military training develops in the individual such traits as "honesty," "good character," "dependability," "reliability," "ability to think for oneself," "integrity," and the like. It is sometimes held that military training and army life "make a man" out of the person who is subjected to them.

2 After a thorough and critical review of the researches on the causes of crime, Michael and Adler made the following evaluation: "The absurdity of any attempt to draw etiological conclusions from the findings of criminological research is so patent as not to warrant further comment." See Jerome Michael and Mortimer J. Adler, Crime, Law and Social Science, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1933, p. 169. Reckless has made the following statement on the subject of crime causation: "It is impossible in the existing state of criminological knowledge to say just what are the causes of crime. Anyone who attempts to do this is far transcending the bounds of definite knowledge. A presentation of a list of causes or a set of causative factors, consequently, would be only an exercise in unwarranted speculation. A list of causes, no matter how logical, could not indicate the degree of acceptance or the importance and the weight of any given causative factor, since no gen-
terms of endocrine dysfunction, feeble-mindedness, poor housing, and a host of other factors. The attempt has also been made recently to attribute the criminality of some individuals to the fact that they were rejected after examination for military service.

The argument that military service may render some persons more susceptible to a criminalistic orientation runs somewhat as follows: The army and the other branches of the armed forces have taken noncriminalistic, peace-loving, nonaggressive individuals from their homes and communities. These individuals have been taught to kill, to be aggressive, and to hate. When they return to their homes and communities they will continue to kill, to be aggressive, and to hate. If they are not to continue the type of behavior which they learned in the armed forces, they must be “readjusted” or “reconditioned” or “rehabilitated” for civilian life. There are some variations of this theme, and it is expressed in different ways, but the essential idea in all viewpoints is that there will be a transference to civilian life of the “aggressive drive” which has been activated and whetted by the exigencies of war. The restrictive point is sometimes made that an ex-serviceman will be particularly prone to exercise methods of aggressive self-assertion and self-protection in times of frustration and crisis.

Waller’s viewpoint on the possible relation between criminality and military training has been presented as follows:

Sometimes the veteran has been so completely alienated from the attitudes and controls of civilian life that he becomes a criminal. Why this should be so is almost too obvious to need statement. The soldier must kill, must make a study of the art of killing, and overcome all his inbred repugnance to the taking of life. Perhaps he comes to enjoy killing. Military experience also weakens the taboos which protect property and hedge about sexual indulgence. . . . For these reasons [and others such as mental shock, lack of a trade, etc.], many veterans become criminals. . . .

Wagley has given a rather alarming prospect in regard to the criminalistic potentialities of ex-servicemen, unless their attitudes are “reshaped and controlled.”

The aggressive primitive urges expressed in hate, violence, destruction, and the need to kill have been encouraged in the fighting soldier throughout the period of his conditioning, combat training, and emotional development. General agreement on such matters has taken place between scholars and researchers in the field of criminology.” See Walter C. Reckless, Criminal Behavior, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1940, p. 163. Sutherland contends that “delinquency is adventitious when considered as a specific act of a specific person.” He further states that “it is not possible to explain adequately why one person commits a specific crime while another, with traits, experiences, and social situation almost identical, does not.” See Edwin H. Sutherland, Principles of Criminology, third edition, J. B. Lippincott Company, Chicago, 1939, pp. 3-4.

and fighting. All of these attitudes and conduct will have to be re-shaped and controlled. Our war psychology must be converted to a peace psychology immediately upon termination of the war. Failure to achieve this end will result in unrestrained patterns of beligerency, hate, violence, corruption, and plunder. Those who can't adjust may become involved in conflict with the law.4

A judge has proposed that the cases of veterans of World War II who are accused of committing crime (except murder) be handled by a special court established for that purpose. While there may be several motives behind such a proposal, it is usually made apparent that one of the motives is the impression that, somehow or other, the case of the veteran is a "special" case. Behind this reasoning may be the notion that the veteran is not fully responsible for his criminal deeds in the same sense as others are — "he has been made that way by his experience in the service."

While it is not clear if the following statement refers to soldiers only or to both soldiers and civilians, it is an illustration of the contention that "war ethics" may impose certain undesirable traits which may reassert themselves in times of peace. "Under conditions of war, then, behavior formerly called criminal, i.e., killing, is now considered good and commendable. When the war is over and man returns to the every-day civil competition of life, it is inevitable that war ethics should have left their mark upon him. The necessary conditions can call them into action again."5

Case Analysis Approach

Perhaps the most frequent application of the notion that military service may make a person criminalistic will be made in analyses of case histories. As a matter of fact, this has already been done. For illustrative purposes, a few facts culled from the case history of an ex-serviceman recently committed to a prison will be presented. Also, an appraisal which was made by one of the prison's professional classification staff members will be set forth. Following are some of the facts of the case:6

The subject is a twenty-one year old man who was committed to the penitentiary after conviction for assault to murder. He and a companion were absent without leave from the army. They were drinking and having a gay time in a tavern when the subject asked

6 The details and analysis of this case were culled from the actual case record. All identifying data have been deleted. Although some minor changes have been made in the wording for grammatical reasons, the original style, ideas, and tenor of the report have been presented accurately.
a girl to dance with him. Unknown to him, this girl was married, and her husband was present in the tavern. When the girl reacted to his invitation by saying nothing, the subject surmised that her companion was her husband, and he returned to his drinking without further comment. Presently, the girl's husband, who was intoxicated, and two of his friends assaulted the subject. He fled from the tavern, and his assailants pursued him and attempted to assault him again. At this point, the subject drew his army revolver (which he used on guard duty) and fired at his assailants several times. He shot (but did not kill) two of them.

The official version of the facts vary in some important details from the subject's version. Usually, it is almost impossible to unravel the tangled threads which result in a severe tavern brawl. From further interview of the subject referred to in the data presented above and additional official facts, however, it appears that the subject was much more aggressive and culpable in instigating the affair than he is willing to admit.

The appraisal which was made of this case is as follows:

This individual is a perfect example of the conflicts and tensions which many soldiers have gone and are going through. For nineteen years he had been taught to be a decent, friendly, subservient, peace-loving, industrious person, which he truly is. Finally, with the war, propaganda, etc., he found himself called upon to fight for his country. It was then that the army tried to make him into an aggressive, assaultive, war-loving individual, but without success in this case, as in many others. It is no fault of this man's whatsoever. It was impossible for him to change his personality from that of a decent, peaceful man to that of an aggressive, war-loving man. It is obvious that he tried hard enough, for he truly loved the army and tried to live up to their standards, but unfortunately without success. He had been absent without leave eight times. He had never had a fight in his life until he was in the army, and then, he states, he had two prior to the one which resulted in the crime for which he was committed. Each time he fought, someone had attacked him first, and he had to stand up and fight like a "good soldier." In this instance, one could see his real personality, his weakness, his dependency, and his love of peace, for he immediately fled from the scene when he sensed the impending fight. When it was impossible to continue the fight, he seized his gun (which practice he had learned from the army), and he began firing. The subject has no previous criminal record.

Such an analysis of a case has a number of objectionable features. The general tenor of the report is rather emotional and probably betrays a bias in favor of the subject. Considerable credence is given his own recital of details leading up to the crime. The analysis contains flagrantly contradictory assertions. For example, the point is made that the army was not successful in making the subject an "aggressive, assaultive, war-loving individual," nevertheless, it is then indicated that his gunfiring is a practice that he had learned in the army. Several dogmatic, unverified, and unwarranted statements are made. The impression that the subject is a "decent, friendly,
subservient, peace-loving, industrious person" represents a vague and indefinite opinion, and it has not been substantiated by extensive and competent investigations (as community and neighborhood investigation in regard to the subject's reputation and adjustment). The contention that the subject had never been in a fight prior to his army experience has not been verified, and it would be impossible to verify such a contention. The subject is said to have "seized his gun (which practice he had learned from the army), and he began firing." In the instance under discussion, however, the subject "seized his gun" in order to settle a tavern brawl. It is certain that the army does not train individuals for such behavior. It would be rather alarming if the training to kill, the overcoming of the repugnance to the taking of life, and the development of the person into an aggressive, assaultive, war-loving individual were to continue to operate in civilian life and to dominate the ex-serviceman in that area.

Even if the case analysis were free of the defects which have been rehearsed above, there would still be no valid basis in the case record for relating the subject's crime to his army training. Assuming that the examiner knew all the details of the crime except details which would reveal that the subject had been in the army, it is almost certain that the examiner could not have "determined" that the subject's crime was attributable to army training. There is nothing unusual about the case which has been cited. Similar cases have occurred frequently. Many individuals, with no previous criminal record and with personal and social characteristics (but lacking military training) similar to those of the subject referred to in the case presented above, have been committed to the penitentiary for an identical crime committed under comparable circumstances. Those crimes have not been satisfactorily explained. In those cases, army conditioning could not be designated as the agency which carried patterns of criminal behavior to the perpetrators. These criticisms do not mean that the subject referred to may not have experienced some mental conflict and some difficulties of adjustment upon being separated from his home and compelled to undergo the army routine. They mean rather that it cannot be demonstrated from anything in the case record that it was the subject's army training that led him to resort to the firing of a revolver in the crisis of a tavern brawl. There is no objective basis at all for making such a contention. The tendency in the case study method has been to select any outstanding factors in the case (short stature, visual defect, red hair, crooked nose, broken home, or one or more of a host of other personal and social characteristics) and to designate them as the important factors in crime causation. The designation of military
service as a causative factor is merely an extension of this practice.

**Purpose and Method of the Present Research**

The present research was undertaken in order to explore the notion that criminal behavior may result from training in the ways of battle. The research represents a very modest and limited project, and it was not undertaken to derive definitive conclusions.

Data in regard to the problem are still very limited. Sutherland has made the following appraisal of the data which throws light on the criminality of ex-servicemen after World War I:

The report on prisoners for 1923 gives the only general statistical information available on this point [relation between military service and crime]. This report does not show the proportion of ex-servicemen who have become criminals, in comparison with those who did not have war service. It shows merely that when ex-service men are committed to prison, they are most likely, in comparison with those who have not had war service, to be committed for fraud, embezzlement, and nonsupport and least likely to be imprisoned for homicide, violating liquor laws, carrying concealed weapons, rape, burglary, and assault. Robbery is the only offense of the more violent type for which ex-servicemen have more than their expected proportion of commitments. This, of course, does not prove that ex-servicemen are not disproportionately criminal, for they may exceed the men who have not had war service in every type of crime, but only that when they are imprisoned they, in comparison with persons who were not in war service, are more likely to be convicted of the less violent crimes.

The method used in the present research involves the comparison of certain factual data culled from the prison case records of ex-servicemen with the data secured from the records of prisoners who have never had military service. All cases of subjects committed to a state penitentiary for the first time during a two-year period ending June 30, 1945 were selected for study. All material for the research was from prison case records. This included correspondence from the particular branch of the armed forces in which the ex-servicemen had served. This correspondence gave some information in regard to the ex-servicemen’s disciplinary record while in the service, the type of discharge received, the date of induction, and the date of discharge from the service.

**Comparison of General Data**

There were 510 first admissions to the penitentiary during

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7 The problem with which this research deals should be distinguished from other problems such as the relative increase or decrease of the crime rate during the war period or in the period after the war. Specifically, this research is concerned with the question of the relationship between training in the armed forces and the commission of crime by persons who have undergone such training.

8 Edwin H. Sutherland, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
the two years under consideration. Of these, 125 (24.5 per cent) had been in the armed forces, 80 having been in the army, 35 in the navy, seven in the Marine Corps, and three in the Coast Guard. Of the 125 ex-servicemen, 15 had been in combat service overseas, nine of these having been in the navy and six in the army. Two of the 15 men had been wounded in action, but they were in good physical condition at the time of their commitment to the penitentiary. The modal age of the ex-servicemen at the time of commitment was 21.7 years, and the modal age of the 385 men who had no record in the armed forces was 19.8 years. The age range and distribution was similar for both groups. Of the men who had no military experience, 42.1 per cent are Negroes and 57.9 per cent are white; of the military group, 29.1 per cent are Negroes and 70.9 per cent are white. Both groups (the group having military training and the group having no such training) had a comparable distribution of intelligence scores. A comparison of the following factors for the two groups showed no significant differences: family structure (number of siblings, ordinal position of the subject, and absence of one or both parents), schooling, work record (regularity and type of work prior to induction into the armed forces), and marital status. It is not necessary to present details in regard to all these factors. In regard to each of them, there was surprising similarity in both groups, and the similarity was sufficiently close to enable one to regard the cases of ex-servicemen as being representative of all first admissions to the particular penitentiary during the two-year period under consideration.

The adjustment of the 125 subjects in the armed forces was determined through correspondence with the particular branch in which the subject had served. In general, the adjustment of the subjects was characterized by frequent disciplinary actions for infractions of rules and regulations. For example, 51 (40.8 per cent) of the subjects had been punished for being absent without leave one or more times. Nine (7 per cent) had escaped at least once from detention for punishment. There is no readily available criterion by which to judge whether this compares favorably or unfavorably with the disciplinary record of the average run of servicemen, but the suspicion is strong that this represents an excessive proportion of disciplinary cases. With the exception of 35 cases for whom data are lacking, information was available in regard to the reason for discharge from the service. In 15 cases the subject received a medical discharge; in 5 cases discharge was because of psychoneurosis; in 25 cases the subject received a "bad conduct" dis-
charge; in 11 cases discharge was because of fraudulent enlist-
ment; and in 34 cases discharge was because of “conviction by
civil authorities.” Over 40 per cent of the subjects committed
the crime which led to the penitentiary commitment after their
discharge from the service, about 50 per cent after absenting
themselves without leave, and about 9 per cent while on fur-
lough.

In regard to the method by which the ex-servicemen had en-
tered the armed forces, the following distribution was revealed:
by enlistment (voluntary), 21 (16.8 per cent); by draft, 104
(83.2 per cent). There were no perceptible differences in the
disciplinary record between the enlistment group and the draft
group while in the armed forces.

**Comparison of Data on Previous Criminal Record**

The most crucial data for the purposes of the present study
are the data which have to do with the past criminality of the
ex-servicemen, that is, their criminal record prior to induction
into the armed forces, and the nature of the crime which led
to conviction and the subsequent commitment to the peniten-
tiary. The designation “previous criminal record” will be
used to refer to the criminal record of the subject prior to in-
duction into the armed forces and, it will refer only to officially
recorded offenses. In regard to the cases of subjects who had
no military training, the previous criminal record included all
officially recorded crimes prior to the offense which led to the
penitentiary commitment. Only those crimes for which a sub-
ject was penalized in some way were considered as part of the
official previous criminal record. For example, if a subject had
admitted a crime which was not officially recorded on the re-
ports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or of other official
sources, it was not included in the official previous criminal
record because such admissions are not consistently secured.
Such admissions are mentioned below, however. Crimes which
were officially recorded but for which the subject was not prose-
cuted, or in regard to which he was found “not guilty,” were
disregarded.

The assumption was made that if the overwhelming propor-
tion of ex-servicemen had no previous criminal record, as com-
pared with the group which had no military service, and that
this discrepancy were not due to sampling defects, there would

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10 The ex-servicemen who had been absent without leave or dis-
charged from the service were at large for varying periods of time before
committing the crime which led to their penitentiary commitment. Dur-
ing that time, some of them had committed crimes and had been placed
on probation, committed to a jail or workhouse, and in two cases, com-
mitted to a reformatory. The criminality of this period is not dealt
with in this study. In about 37 per cent of the cases, the subjects had
committed crimes during the period to which reference is made.
be some basis for considering more seriously the hypothesis that military training may be related to criminality. That certainly would not constitute conclusive evidence that there was such a relationship, however. Numerous other approaches to the problem would have to be considered, and an examination of many other possible influences would have to be undertaken. For example, separation of some men from stable home and community environment and their placement in the army may have had some disorganizing influence upon them, and it may have resulted in their association with delinquents. If their experiences led to criminality, then Sutherland's theory of "differential association" could just as well be suggested as the explanation of their delinquency, rather than the fact of their military training per se.\textsuperscript{11}

It was found that of the ex-service men, 85 (68 per cent) had a previous criminal record. Forty (32 per cent) had no such record. Of the group with no military service, 235 (61 per cent) had a previous criminal record, and 150 (39 per cent) had no previous criminal record. In only five cases was the previous criminal record of the ex-servicemen restricted to crimes for which the penalty had been a fine. The comparable figure for the subjects with no military training was seventeen cases. In all other cases, the previous record of the subjects showed that each had been placed one or more times under one or more of the following forms of peno-correctional treatment: probation, jails and workhouses, short-term correctional institutions other than jails and workhouses, boys' correctional schools, reformatories, and prisons. In regard to the ex-servicemen, the previous criminal record was restricted to only one conviction in 50 (40 per cent) of the cases, while in 75 (60 per cent) of the cases the subject had been convicted two or more times. Similar analyses of the cases of those having no military training show a comparable distribution of data with no significant variations being observable.

In regard to the cases of ex-servicemen, a further investigation was made to determine if those who had no official previous criminal record had engaged in criminality (not officially recorded) at any time prior to induction into the armed forces. In the cases of 40 (32 per cent) of the ex-servicemen with no official previous criminal record, six (15 per cent) had admitted such criminality to the professional correctional workers who routinely interview all new inmates in the penitentiary. In all such instances admitted, the crime was one for which the subject most likely would have been convicted if he had been prosecuted. A similar analysis was made in regard to the cases of subjects who had no military training, and it was found that

\begin{flushright}\footnotesize\textsuperscript{11} Edwin H. Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 4-9.\end{flushright}
27—(18 per cent) of those who had no officially recorded previous criminal record had admitted offenses for which they doubtlessly would have been convicted if they had been prosecuted.

It may be concluded, then, that the group of ex-servicemen contained a very large proportion of men who were not novices in the commission of crime at the time of their induction for military service. In regard to previous criminal record, furthermore, the ex-servicemen were representative of all first admissions to the penitentiary during the period under consideration.

Comparison of Data on Crime Resulting in Penitentiary Commitment

If military training were related to criminality through the activation of the “aggressive urge” and the “wish to kill,” it is logical to assume that the preponderant proportion of the crimes of ex-servicemen would be of an aggressive, assaultive sort, usually crimes against the person. But the data do not support such a logical assumption. The distribution of the types of crimes committed by ex-servicemen does not differ in any important way from the distribution of the types of crimes for which the subjects with no military service were convicted. In the data which were cited by Sutherland it should be noted that the ex-servicemen who were committed to prison had been convicted for the less violent types of crime more often than those who had had no military service.

For purposes of the present study it was deemed advisable to divide the crimes committed by the subjects into two categories: (1) crimes against property, and (2) crimes against the person. In this study, crimes against property include larceny, larceny of motor vehicle, forgery, and burglary. Crimes against the person include unarmed robbery, armed robbery, rape, assault to rape, murder, manslaughter, and assault to rob. In regard to the ex-servicemen, 87 (69.6 per cent) of the subjects committed crimes against property, and 38 (30.4 per cent) committed crimes against the person. Following is the distribution of the crimes against the person committed by the 38 subjects: armed robbery, 15; unarmed robbery, 16; murder, one; rape, three; manslaughter, one; assault to rob, one; and assault to rape, one. Of the 15 men who had combat service overseas, all were convicted for robbery, larceny, or burglary, with the exception of one who had been convicted for rape. The rape in which the subject was involved appears to have been a non-vicious affair in which he had sexual relations with an intoxicated companion with whom he was making the rounds of the taverns. It is highly questionable if the subject
forcibly compelled his companion to have sexual intercourse with him. In regard to the men who had no military service, 282 (73.2 per cent) committed crimes against property, and 103 (26.7 per cent) committed crimes against the person. The crimes against the person were distributed in the following manner: armed robbery, 38; unarmed robbery, 40; murder, one; rape, seven; manslaughter, five; assault to rob, seven; and assault to rape, five. The cases in which there was a crime against the person were scrutinized minutely in regard to several details. A comparison was made in regard to the techniques used in the perpetration of the crime, the circumstances leading up to the crime, and the extent of violence in the crime, but no differences were found to exist in these respects between the cases of ex-servicemen and the cases of those subjects who had no military training.

An examination of the data presented above does not reveal that the crimes of ex-servicemen are of the violent type more frequently than would be expected. The crimes of both groups, those of the ex-servicemen and those of the men with no military training, show similar distribution among the various types of crimes. Qualitative appraisal of certain aspects of the crimes against the person committed by the ex-servicemen show no differences when compared with the same type of crimes committed by prisoners who have no record of military service.

Summary and Conclusions

The purpose of the present research was to explore the question whether there is a causal relationship between military training and criminality. The notion that as a result of military training some persons become more aggressive and may even develop a criminalistic orientation has been expressed in various ways. It was pointed out that probably the most frequent application of this notion would be made in case-history analyses. One such analysis was presented and criticized.

A summarization of a mass of data in regard to two groups of subjects was next presented. One group was made up of ex-servicemen who were admitted to a penitentiary and the other group consisted of persons who had no military training and who were admitted to the same penitentiary during the same two-year period. With a single exception, comparisons covering a wide range of factors yielded no significant differences between the two groups, and in regard to every factor examined, the two groups consistently showed remarkable similarity. The exceptional factor is race. A smaller proportion of Negroes than would be expected was found among the ex-servicemen. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the two groups showed great similarity in regard to previous criminal record
and in regard to the type of crime which led to the penitentiary commitment. The ex-servicemen had not been novices in the commission of crime at the time of their induction into the armed forces. Furthermore, the ex-servicemen's crimes were not particularly violent, and they did not perpetrate crimes against the person to a greater extent than would be expected.

On the basis of the limited data of the present study, it would not be possible to support the hypothesis that military training tends to give some individuals a criminalistic orientation. The suspicion is strong that the ex-servicemen who were committed to the penitentiary would have found their way there even if they had not been inducted into the armed forces.

It is likely that it is too early yet to make a definitive study on the subject of the present research. Data are still very limited. The number of cases used in the present study is certainly not sufficient to make anything but an exploratory approach to the subject. A sufficient number of ex-servicemen who saw actual combat service has not been included. Presumably it is those men who have had their "aggressive instincts" and their "urge to kill" whetted. Supposedly, it is they who may become criminals if their attitudes are not "reshaped and controlled." In any adequate study of the criminality (reference here is to other than purely military offenses) of ex-servicemen, incidentally, it would be necessary to include in the sample subjects who were prosecuted by the military authorities as well as those who were prosecuted by the civil authorities.

The commission of a sensational crime by an ex-serviceman, that is, a crime which is characterized by unusual brutality, peculiar behavior, or bizarre circumstances, is regarded as prima facie evidence of "what the war has made out of" the individual. A sudden, impulsive murder committed in civilian life by an ex-serviceman at a time of frustration or difficulties in personal relations is regarded as a symptom of the murderer's re-evaluation of his regard for human life. He is assumed to have developed a lesser appreciation of the worth of human life as a result of military training, and "he is quick to kill." Sensational crimes and sudden, impulsive murders, however, have been committed and are being committed by persons with no military training. The attempts to explain these crimes have failed. Similarly, an acceptable explanation of the crimes of ex-servicemen has yet to be given.

The point being made is not that military training, army life, and combat experience may not have some relationship to criminality. The point is that such a relationship has not been exactly formulated, demonstrated, and proved and that something other than logical assumptions and a priori reasoning will be needed to prove the existence of such a relationship.