BOOK REVIEWS

THORSTEN SELLIN [Ed.]


Dr. Gault’s book deals with the relations of psychology to criminology. As editor of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology and as a psychologist, he gives the main emphasis to a relatively non-technical orientation among those chapters of the history of criminology and of psychology with which one should be familiar. In the preface the author affirms his belief that the criminal’s personality is “at least as much a product of social contacts as the professional disposition of the physician, e. g., the acquired attitudes . . . are probably the greatest sources of our behavior whether it be making professional visits upon the sick or robbing banks. These attitudes develop out of infinitely numerous reactions to our environment; reactions that are facilitated or retarded by reason of our native capacities, our prepotent reflexes, etc. Whatever agencies are set up, therefore, for dealing with the criminal must be examined as to their merits by reference to their suitability for developing appropriate attitudes among criminals and all others who come into contact with these agencies.”

After a chapter entitled “Introducing the Criminal,” the body of the text appears under two general headings: Part I, The Criminal Personality, pp. 17-272, and Part II, The Struggle Against Crime, pp. 299-406. The description of the criminal starts with a few sample records from Healy and Bronner and the Behavior Research group of Chicago. These few pages are followed by an outline of the history of Criminology: Some Origins and Founders—the primitive, the classic, the neo-classic, and the positive schools, and by a tribute to Goddard and Healy and Wigmore and Vollmer for their share in American criminological work. The chapters in the first part of the book devoted to the “Criminal Personality” perhaps do not furnish so much an analysis of criminals as an idea of what the psychologist means by personality, drives of the organism (instincts, complications of learning and dragging periods, prepotent reflexes, conditioned reflex patterns and the role of thinking and imagining), and emotion as seen in theory and in some special cases, criminal and other.

There follow chapters on “certain blocks of hypothetical indicators of the criminal character rather than ‘causes.’” A chapter on Criminal Physical Anthropology gives a review of Lombroso’s work and the revision of his conclusions by Goring, and of the work that is being done in these directions, without falling into the error of Schlapp and seeing in it and in endocrinology the real and sole solution of the problem. The chapter on Intelligence of Criminals returns to psychology and offers a review of the
history and methods and the relatively inconclusive data on the role played by mental deficiency. There follow discussions of the mental disorders: Dissociations and allied disorders are briefly treated as an introduction to the discussion of the elements of terms and concepts and symptoms and forms of mental disease. Psychopathic personality as seen in pathological lying, accusation, swindling, malingering and kleptomania has as its essential feature a fundamental unbalanced egocentricity, and is but one of the ingredients of some criminal natures. Epilepsy is next dealt with, also with warnings against generalization. The chapter on Race and Sex offers data that warn against prejudices and emphasize rather the acquired attitudes than native dispositions. The chapter on Age and Physical Health brings a review of Goring’s results and corresponding data and statistics of frequencies in American work. It points to incapacities as “in part a consequence of the enthusiasm of early life and in other part of a lack of broad experience such as normally breeds a sympathetic appreciation of the interrelations and interdependence of men and women everywhere.”

In view of the author’s preference for the recognition and study of attitudes (for which he also uses the less neutral term mechanisms) the most important chapter is undoubtedly the one with this heading (pp. 228-254). Evidently attitudes are what the author has faith in, and they are of sufficient inclusiveness to give a more life-like formulation of the case than most of the items so far discussed. In this chapter the discussion seems to get closer to the core of the individual or person and his susceptibilities and deeds. The grouping, the expression, the development of attitudes (and we might say plausibility); the fateful relation of the press to attitudes, suggestibility, mob action and the witchcraft mania; and alteration of attitudes make one realize the complexity of the topic, but also makes one a bit more hopeful that a need of discrimination will make itself felt, and a tolerance for the singling out of what really counts in the specific case and the rank and file. We may actually be allowed by Science with the capital S to recognize these facts as more important than the habitual topics and terms of the texts. We see here a development similar to that in the discussion of psychopathology. There are those who see only what is clearly beyond the pale of even a liberal definition of normality, and who then make of it something outside of common-sense consideration of life, as of old attributed to an extraneous kind of devil. There are today many whose main interest is to show that there is a devil in all of us and that the attitudes of the criminals are not so different from those of the average. The result is the common tendency to speak of everybody’s being more or less insane or criminal. It evidently will take some time before we shall see a free acceptance of the middle-of-the-road conception that there are no absolutes but that it is essential to recognize the distinction between casual lapses and socially and personally dangerous developments and personalities. There is no need of neglecting the emphasis of contrasts just because there are all kinds of transition types. In pathology we recognize the physiological (shall we say normal?) character of the principles of function and some of us will then focus on
the specific study of the actual complaint of the specific individual, recognizing special reaction sets of importance either by their frequency or, much better, by our ability to control them, and surrendering the habit of mechanization osteopathy-fashion or, what is just as bad, ostrich-fashion. As soon as we get to organized crime and epidemics of crime, we see the specific tendency magnified but calling for work on the sources and carriers and ways of handling them.

The chapter on Heredity takes us back to the non-specific unfortunately still poorly controlled issues which such apparently simple mechanical solutions as sterilization are still far from reaching. H. F. Osborn's plea for birth selection and less confidence in mere "birth control" of the contraception type is laudable but receives too little practical guidance and encouragement. Gault is of the conviction that criminality itself is not a heritable characteristic. He is anxious for attention to the cumulative effects of a bringing-up in unfavorable conditions. In the meantime he might take to heart the study of Lange on identical and different twins, which keeps the reviewer from being too positive in either assertion or negation. Fortunately, common-sense leads one to a way of meeting the potentialities in both heredity and environment by attending to each case on its merits.

The rest of the book, about 120 pages, is devoted to "the Struggle against Crime"—institutional, extra-institutional, the obtaining of evidence and improved judicial procedure, the available psycho-physical methods. The author is true to the ambitions of laboratory psychology, which should not be belittled but which would probably gain by an obligatory liberal cultivation of the best common-sense efforts to reduce each case to terms of an experiment of nature, a clear formulation and dramatization of each case, with all the means of critical determination of motivation we can attain in each specific case. Improvement of the judicial procedure, with more study of the case than haggling over witnesses and formal precedent and befogging of issues by partisan psychiatry is vital for any progress. The author offers an interesting review of present conditions and the attitudes they create. It is undoubtedly the most valuable focus of attack and Dr. Gault's presentation should be in the hands of all our officials and legislators.

The last chapter—Preventing the Development of Criminals—naturally depends on the incisiveness of the data of the previous chapters. There evidently are no panaceas. But the attitudes toward the home, society, schools, juvenile court, juvenile court clinics, and school and community clinics are given a wholesome guidance. The home is primary and controls in all these efforts, and every agency for education and for public welfare must be a cooperator with the home.

An appendix gives the topics presented in the United States Training School for Prison Officers in New York City; programs of Criminologic Research Institutes; Outlines of Police Training Courses; Program, Organization, and Equipment of Criminologic Institutes and Laboratories; and A Plan for a Crime Prevention Bureau.

The Index is important and valuable, but could be made even more helpful. The bibliographies going with each chapter had perhaps better be topically rather than adpha-
betically arranged and with some guidance in the form of annotations.

The book is remarkably free from the jazzy recommendations of so much of our literature. It is sure to find a wide reception and in its successive editions may readily obtain an even more comprehensive character, giving the common-sense demands and the special sciences their respective dues, in addition to giving the psychological approach its much needed recognition. When we learn to treat the domain of psychology as one of the sets of relationships of human function side by side with the other problems of human organization and function and with tolerance for what has to be settled by critical common-sense and a consensus of the people of average intelligence and integrity, we may hope for a liberalization of our jurisprudence and procedure and treatment including rather than extolling or belittling punishment. In the attempt not to be dogmatic or too systematic there is always a danger of loss of definition. In the further development of this book, teachers will be able to assist the author by reporting to him the extent to which the reader or student approaches crime and the criminal in a more effective and systematic and yet non-dogmatic way because of his familiarity with the book, and whether it will become possible to examine the reader or student for a degree of competence in this field. Will the judge or prison official, the police and the social worker develop an orderly and effective procedure and a fruitful mental attitude and goal? The book as it stands appears to be fit to stand such a practical test.

The reviewer would like to sum up his impression of the book and indeed of much of the trends of criminological discussion.

It is eminently gratifying that the psychological viewpoint is receiving growing attention. It looks, however, as if in a desire for a general scientific standard, the practical issues of dealing with crime and the criminal were being subordinated to attempts to be scientifically fair at the expense of practical discrimination and determination. The question whether one deals with a person willing to collaborate in an understanding and control of antisocial tendencies or unwilling or unable to do so appears too much in the background because of the fear on the part of "science" of what might demand a human judgment. The human problem cannot be met by sidestepping. Between the two errors, that of claiming too much and that of claiming too little for an aggressive constructive handling of crime and the criminal, the tendency to limit one's attention to a quasi-statistical neutrality creates a widespread malorientation in the attitude of public and educators and the law and legislation and criminological and penal practice, a wholesale sentimentality or rigidity, with too little concern for that peculiarly human need, a balance of concrete individual study also of the attitude toward reform and the arriving at generally valid conclusions. The capacity and willingness of the individual and of the group or society or state to be both fair and effective cannot be a negligible figure or replaced by attempts to eliminate the personal factor of the subject and the worker. What we need is a frank recognition of the human attitude of criminal, judge and penal official and scientist and the public. To give the "attitude" a
scientifically and practically useful
status necessitates a frank inclusion
of the individual equation and the
specific nature of the act and the
insight and the capacity and willing-
ness to cooperate in reform and
prevention of recurrence. These
points should not be obscured by
scientific accuracy under an ap-
parent urge to eliminate moral and
emotional "prejudice"; nor need we
give up because we cannot reach
perfection. What we want is fair-
ness and clearness with considera-
tion of the specific facts, and not
through ignoring of the vital issues
of responsibility, the person's capac-
ity to justify an assumption of de-
pendability. The science of man
will be eminently more scientific
through courage to face the human
factor, and that means an inclusion
of the capacity and willingness to
collaborate and to create a con-
sensus of generally intelligible
standards and contrasts between a
rolling stone and responsible human
beings.

ADOLPH MEYER.
Johns Hopkins University.

TRIBUNES OF THE PEOPLE. THE
PAST AND FUTURE OF THE NEW
YORK MAGISTRATES' COURTS. By
Raymond Moley. viii+272 pp.
Yale Univ. Press, New Haven,
1932. $2.50.

This admirable little book pre-
sents with commendable succinct-
ness the setting of the chief prob-
lems raised by these courts, the
problems themselves, and the sug-
gested remedies. The eminent
author's sense of perspective and
balance has enabled him to select
from a vast amount of evidence
and comment the material, and just
the right amount of it, to serve his
apparent purpose of interesting the
public while satisfying the student.

Readers of this Journal will be
chiefly interested in Mr. Moley's
views upon the following persistent
problems: the treatment of bail,
sex offenses, and probation; effi-
cient and fair prosecution, and pro-
vision of defense for the ignorant
or helpless; the selection of judges
and their staffs; the pressure of lo-
cal politics; and the organization of
courts.

Mr. Moley accepts the recom-
mendations of the Seabury Report
as to bail. The problem of bail is
the problem of the professional
bondsman; if he can be removed
there will be no problem. The way
to secure this is to make bail un-
profitable. This can be done by act-
ing on the evidence of statistics
showing that in all but serious
charges the defendant will appear
anyway. In lesser charges, then,
nominal bail of from five to ten
dollars is sufficient, and this bail
can be made payable in cash
to a court official. In the seri-
ous charges high bail should be re-
quired, but these charges are not
numerous and would reduce the
number of bondsmen to a few,
whom it would be easy to control.
This system works well in England.

A satisfactory treatment of sex
offenses implies recognition of the
fact that morality cannot be fur-
thered by coercion and that the line
beyond which repression creates
worse evils than it cures is to be
drawn at the point where public
order and public decency are
affected.

Mr. Moley's remedy for present
deficiencies in the probation system
is the provision of trained officers
adequately supervised, grouped in
one department of a "social clinic"
which should include also depart-
ments of investigation, health, voca-
tional guidance, and research. In other words the magistrates' courts are social agencies which need a modern social apparatus.

There has been a lack of efficient prosecution in the New York Magistrates' courts. It is nobody's job to prosecute. The Page Commission (1910) recommended that the district attorney have one of his assistants in each court, to the extent practicable, to provide a proper conduct of the prosecution and so to lessen the opportunity of shyster lawyers. The recommendation has been followed, but the assistants assigned have been political hacks who have done nothing for the prosecution, for defendants or for the magistrates. The police are not trained prosecutors. Defendants are at the mercy of shyster lawyers brought in by bondsmen aided by grafting court employees. Here, then, is a situation where both the state and the defendant are injured. Let us take up prosecution first.

The Seabury Report merely urged that the district attorney put competent men in the courts. But Mr. Moley deems it hopeless to get them. He proposes police lawyers to assist policemen in presenting their evidence and to advise them generally on legal matters. To protect defendants, the Seabury Report recommended careful supervision of paid lawyers chiefly through affidavits as to the amount of compensation to be received, and called attention to the need of lawyers of character and ability to serve defendants who cannot afford to pay a lawyer. Mr. Moley has little faith in any system of supervision, and prefers the public defender to the casual volunteer.

Before we attempt to appraise these suggestions, let us mention also the “third degree”. The Wickershams Report to the contrary notwithstanding, Mr. Moley believes that the third degree is little used in the United States, but he does find that public belief in its existence hampers prosecution by causing juries to acquit when defense lawyers take advantage of the public sentiment to raise an issue of its use. Judge Seabury recommended that the police be required to take the prisoner direct to a magistrate for examination instead of first to the station house, but Mr. Moley points out that this suggestion fails to provide any substitute for the valuable unofficial interrogation by police before the prisoner has had an opportunity to concoct a defense. Mr. Moley wishes to have this interrogation conducted by one of the police lawyers already mentioned. He seems to think that their presence would prevent brutality and would yet permit the sort of questioning without counsel which is conducted by the juge d'instruction on the continent of Europe.

We agree with Mr. Moley that the police should have counsel to train them in presenting evidence, and that there should be a private examination of prisoners whereat constitutional guaranties are not in effect. We agree—of course—that this examination should be conducted by a lawyer, but the official who conducts it should represent the public, and not the police. To allow the police to prosecute is dangerous to liberty. Also, why have two preliminary examinations and two sets of officials to conduct them? Would it not be better to assimilate our present preliminary examination more to the continental model? A reaction against excessive protection to defendants is already noticeable, and public support
for the change should be obtainable if emphasis is placed upon the prevention of police brutality and upon the protection of the public from gang criminals and gang lawyers, and if provision can be made for men of high character and ability to conduct the examination. With such men and such a system the problems of prosecution and defense, as well as that of the third degree, would be largely solved. It seems more logical and more efficient to restore the magistrate's inquisitorial function than to keep his present function and set up a new official below him to do what he could do as well. The next stage—trial by jury or by the court—provides all the protection needed if the examining magistrate be competent and impartial. The public defender seems to us merely another institution set up to do work which belongs to but is not accomplished by existing institutions—the examining magistrate and the district attorney.

This brings us naturally to the next three problems: judges, politics, and court organization. Mr. Moley gives us a most interesting essay on "the search for better magistrates." He and Judge Seabury deal with the problem of selection correctly by asserting that the direction of improvement lies in getting away from local influences. This can be done, they say, by vesting the appointment of local judges in courts of state-wide, or of larger than local, jurisdiction. Such judges are not elected solely by the community whose local judges they would appoint, and local politicians are less able to control them. An additional advantage is obtained if—as would be the case in New York—the appointing bench has also the power of removal, for unification of the judicial system is thus aided.

Finally, judges know, or can more easily learn than others, who will make a good judge.

Consolidation of the magistrates' courts, the Court of Special Sessions, and the Children's Court, is favored both by the Seabury Report and by Mr. Moley. It is possible, we think, to prophesy that it will undoubtedly come. The history of court organization in New York City, and in our larger cities generally, shows slow but steady progress toward consolidation. Separate units—such as were originally the magistrates' courts—are first grouped in a larger unit and then two or more of these larger units are consolidated. Branches and divisions of a larger court replace independent tribunals. With such consolidation come larger administrative powers and more flexibility of organization. When all local courts have been consolidated we may next hope to see their integration with the appellate courts in one big court under capable administration, to promote cheap, speedy and impartial justice.

Philadelphia.

SPENCER ERVIN.


Ever since the publication of Lombroso's L'Uomo Delinquente (1876), criminologists, belonging to different schools, have been seeking to discover a "criminal type"; but the original crude conception of a fixed anthropological pattern, supposedly peculiar to criminals in general, has been gradually superseded by the theory evolved in the
studies of the criminio-biological school, that delinquent acts are the outgrowth of a rather complex interrelation of social, physiological and psychological factors which mould the personality of the individual offender, creating in him a predisposition to anti-social behavior. In the light of this doctrine Dr. Lorentz has undertaken an attempt to discover the major factors leading to the structuralization of the murder tendency. The material which is the basis of his inquiry is hardly sufficient, being confined to only 86 cases tried in the Bautzen and Leipzig Courts, and 200 cases analyzed by the Munich Kriminal-Biologische Sammelstelle. Accordingly, the scientific value of the author's classificatory speculation is somewhat doubtful, particularly because, in his generalizations, he pays little, if any, attention to the latest non-German criminological studies.

Boris Brasol.

New York City.


This is a collection in three well printed volumes of various papers, 1889-1931, by a very able and distinguished Italian criminologist, Professor of Criminal Law and Procedure in the University of Palermo. While naturally dogmatic and largely theoretic, the papers are candid and pelucidly clear.

The volumes are respectively titled La Fase Odierna (The Modern Phase); Diritto Sostantivo, Dottrina Generale (Substantive Law, General Principles); and Diritto Sostantivo, Studi Barii; Diritto Processuale, Dottrina Generale del Processo e Studi Varii (Substantive Law, Various Studies; Procedure, General Principles of Procedure and Various Studies).

It is wholly impossible in the space at my disposal to do more than barely indicate some of the treasures of this interesting collection, given to the world "with modesty and . . . . without pretense."

Perhaps the keynote of these interesting papers is to be found in the second, third and fifth in the first volume, dealing with the "Third School of Criminal Law," intended to supersede the classical or metaphysical school with its two branches, having differences but at the same time, much in common, inter alia, the founding of penal responsibility upon free will and the assumption that man lives under a moral law which should become juridical and effective. These concepts the third school dubbed as a priori, metaphysical, abstract, and insisted that criminal science should be held in close and constant relation with all other branches of science and especially with anthropo-

logy. Crime is not a formula, an index of malefic and antisocial pot-

tiality. The criminal should be the subject of dispassionate study, not disregardful of his affinity to primitive man, the modern savage, the lunatic, the epileptic—the evil effect of circumstances, from high temperature to alcoholism in himself or his parents, difference of race, evil education, all the internal and external intermingling factors of his organism from which he is formed. It is held easy to distin-

guish between the criminal and the honest man and between the different classes of criminal, which "take the place of the ancient categories
of crimes and upon them is based the new penal system." The Lombrosian School, the author thinks, has produced some useful results, but, in general, has so far failed in its task to diminish crime, largely because of the fundamental errors he enumerates and discusses with full quotation of authorities.

The first volume contains twelve papers dealing with the so-called Third School, its hopes, delusions and disappointments, the perfecting of the juristic methods and the fundamental conceptions of criminal law, the reform in criminal procedure, the sentiment of society in respect to crime and punishment. It ends with a discussion of the new Italian Criminal Code. To me the most interesting of these papers is the seventh, Lungo le scuole e oltre (1917) written it would appear in consequence of some criticisms of Lucchini and protesting against the prevalent practice of "speaking of Schools in our camp . . . of the ascetic and then moral in contrast with the political, of the absolute justice in contrast with the utilitarian, with the eclectic between the two, and so on."

The second volume has eight papers, dealing with general principles of criminal law, penal philosophy, rationale of punishment, judicial adjudication for the application of punishment, and international criminal law.

Very interesting and valuable is the paper on judicial discretion in which is discussed with insight and candor the question: "Is it possible to formulate a theory for judicial adjudication for the application of punishment?" Few there would be who at first sight would answer in the negative but the question is fully and acutely discussed—the conclusion is reached that at least a general sketch of such a theory can be made.

The third volume has in Part One, on substantive law ten papers, among them Abuse of Rights of Pasturage, Members of Parliament in regard to Criminal Law, and others of interest chiefly to Italians. Part Two on the law of procedure has twelve papers of varying importance and interest—all dealing with Italian procedure. Some of the suggestions might well be adopted in our English-speaking courts, but most of the discussion is so far as we are concerned wholly academic. The new Codes receive competent treatment—the author being a discriminating critic while a general admirer.

The mechanical make-up of these volumes is worthy of all praise—and their contents will acquaint the intelligent reader with most matters of importance in modern continental European penal theory.

William Renwick Riddell. Osgoode Hall, Toronto.


This volume contains the experiences and observations of the Bishop of Tromsoe, during the period he was chaplain of the prison at Oslo, Norway. It is out of the ordinary in the discussion of prisoners in that it gives a minimum of attention to externals and the major portion to the subjective experiences of his wards. It penetrates beneath the surface of routine prison life and deals with the soul life of the inmate.

Bishop Berggrav appears to be
fully acquainted with modern psychology and psychiatry in dealing with behavior problems, yet he avoids the use of technical terms. On the other hand, although entering deeply into the human and spiritual status of his subjects, his discussions are agreeably free from hackneyed religious phraseology.

The author fully appreciates the limitations of the State. "It may order somebody to give punishment, but it cannot order anybody to show love and confidence." Hence the varied effect of punishment upon prisoners differing widely in temperament, and the need of more individual attention to recovery than the mass treatment of the State can possibly give.

The hunger for human confidence on the part of the prisoner is as persistent as his appetite for food, no matter how consistently he may have forfeited such confidence. The prison staff, the writer believes, may do much to disarm the suspicion, engendered by loss of self-confidence on the part of the prisoner.

The direct effect of the artificial atmosphere of the prison, together with the release from responsibility, results in the manifestation, to a marked degree, of childlike and dependent traits. This release from self-preservation and self-reliance, to say nothing of absence of temptation, is a dangerous state unless it can be skillfully guided into channels of character building. Unless the prisoner can be taught to find himself, he is not likely to reach the higher hope of finding God.

Beyond the admission-crisis for the prisoner, which is temporary, and the period of readjustment, which is problematical, depending upon the treatment, there is the release-crisis, the most critical of all. Much here depends, not only upon the sensitiveness and the psychology of the prisoner, but upon the fairness of the public—upon ourselves. Must the man with a record be "stabbed when he is down," or handicapped during his period of convalescence, or will society receive him on the merits of his good conduct?

Thus the author concludes: "The prisoner's soul and our own—I do not think the difference is so very great. And if there is a difference, it does not give us a halo, but a responsibility."

F. EMORY LYON.
Chicago, Illinois.


Although the author of this work is very modest in discussing and describing it, it is much more important than he claims. In his introduction Dr. Plaut discusses the relative role and function of the psychological expert in criminal proceedings. A psychological expert seems to have a much more dignified and definite position in Germany than in this country where the psychologist is called on, if at all, to determine the intelligence level of some prisoners, his interpretation being evaluated by the psychiatrist. The chief exception to this procedure in this country recently has been the work of the psychiatrists in deception tests, but their work in this connection has not as yet been accepted in court.

It is important to consider the
background of the author in order to evaluate his work. Dr. Plaut is a co-author of a monumental work on lying Die Lüge and he has been intimately associated with Otto Lipmann and William Stern in their work for the past decade in connection with Aussage experiments. These psychologists have probably done more in this field than any group of scientists in any country. Much of it has been in the experimental laboratory in connection with the evaluation of testimony or Aussage experiments.

In this monograph, Dr. Plaut has shown that he was called in by the German courts in order to evaluate the testimony of subjects, thus giving the psychologist a definite legal status. He is a doctor of medicine, and a doctor of philosophy, and does not belittle the role of the medical expert but points out that the psychologist trained in this type of work in Germany is more capable of evaluating the stories and testimony of the subjects than the average school physician or clinician. Of course, where it is obvious that medical pathology is present, the court calls in other aid.

Dr. Plaut, in his interesting treatise, emphasizes throughout that it is important to deal with the individual case and not to generalize which is almost what is done in this country by the alienist in his responses to hypothetical questions. He accordingly discusses his investigation in eleven cases about which he was called into Court as an expert. In these cases he also studied the importance and the harm done by rumors and misinformation which increases in proportion to the number of individuals involved. He sifts and disentangles the reliable information from the distorted conceptions, incidentally evaluating the age and experience of the subject in relation to his testimony. Most of the cases are concerned with juvenile offenders in reference to sexual crimes. In three cases where Dr. Plaut said that the testimony of the witness would seem trustworthy, the defendant nevertheless was sentenced. In eight of the cases where he felt after careful analyses that the testimony of the witnesses was not reliable, proceedings were discontinued in five and no further action taken.

Dr. Plaut has no uniform technique, his method of examination varying with the individual. One of the important procedures he has made use of is that of giving the direct question and answer verbatim. The nature of the work is such that one can best appreciate its importance and value by reading the monograph. One is impressed by the fact that Dr. Plaut has admirably crystallized his own work and that of his co-workers in this important field.

JOHN A. LARSON, M.D., Ph.D.
Assistant State Criminologist of Illinois.


This study of the amount and nature of crime among the Chinese and Japanese in California is based on official police records and on
the records of penal institutions in that state. It would, of course, be possible for any reviewer to prepare a severe bill of indictment of the intricate yet skillful use of table after table of census, police blotter and prison records to be found in this monograph. The author and his co-workers, however, are fully aware of the limitations which their material has placed upon them, so that in this respect all that need be done here is to call attention to the general regrettable situation with regard to the determination of the extent of actual as opposed to apparent criminality, and admit that in a chaos the student's choice of approach is to be criticized with temperance.

Since there is little reason to believe that the statistics of arrests and prison population for Orientals are biased so as to underestimate their serious offenses relatively to those of the white population, their evidence that in the area studied the common Chinese and Japanese crimes are not the serious ones such as murder, theft, arson, rape, and the like, assumes real significance. "For the larger part of their (the California Orientals) offenses are not of major importance. They are offenses classed as misdemeanors, part of them, at least, probably resulting from ignorance of the existence of such laws or from a lack of understanding of what is meant by them." (pp. 92-93) An interesting commentary on the cultural basis of crime is the observation that the rapidly assimilating Japanese have a markedly better record of law observance than the more segregated Chinese.

DONALD YOUNG.
Social Science Research Council


Arturo Rocco, Professor in the University of Naples and later in the University of Rome is considered to have founded and promoted a new school of criminal jurisprudence known as the "Indirizzo technico-giuridico" which has become dominant in Italy. A collection of some of his works was published in 1913. This book with the same title is a new edition, supplied with admirably full, accurate and instructive notes by professor Salvatore Cicala of Rome. It is substantially an examination and discussion of the question of how a crime is to be regarded. Whether as the violation, pure and simple of a juridical law or order; or as the violation of an individual or social interest; or as an offense or a peril against the conditions of the existence of Society; or as the violation of the minimum of the ethical conditions existing in Society; or as the violation generally of the rules of morality or civilized life. It will be seen that its purport is much the same as that of such works as Oppenheim's Die Objekte des Verbrechens.

The "soggetto" (subject) of a crime is defined as the human being who has been injured by the offense ("Neminem caede" is the quintessence of all law): and while the "soggetto", passive, must necessarily be the "oggetto" (object) it is considered proper to distinguish between subject and object in deter-
mining specifically and in detail, the species, the form, the modality of the various crimes that may be committed.

"Tutela" is protection—and "the object of a wrongful act and of juridical, penal, protection is . . . always, in particular, a good or interest of humanity, individual or social"—and what this good or interest precisely is is discussed at length.

And the conclusion of the whole matter is what we learned in our student days from Blackstone and his trenchant critic Jeremy Bentham—that the general scope of penal law is the security of the fundamental and indispensable conditions of life of man in society—the limitation of individual freedom of action by regard to the rights of others—and the decisive and final test of all criminal as of all other law is its efficiency in the conservation of these conditions. *Salus populi suprema lex esto.*

WILLIAM RENWICK RIDDELL.
Osgoode Hall, Toronto.

INSANITY AS A CRIMINAL DEFENCE.

Within the limits of a compact volume, the author has made a clear and readable statement of the law of insanity as a defence to criminal charges. In his preface, he ventures the hope that the book may be "useful to the practitioner as a reference to leading rules and cases," and that it may likewise be of some interest to the layman.

Most of the references are, of course, to Canadian and English cases, but one chapter is devoted to American practice, with a brief indication of the general classes as to burden of proof of insanity, irresistible impulse, and so on, into which the various jurisdictions of the United States fall.

In general, the author is uncritical; this is understandable, as the limits of space do not permit any extended discussion of the reasons for certain rules or of the arguments for and against change. He recognizes the fact, however, that there is room for improvement, and two chapters deal briefly with the criticisms of the McNaughten Rules. A number of cases are summarized, including the notorious one in which Ronald True was the defendant.

It is unfortunate that the author did not obtain the benefit of psychiatric advice in preparing his discussion of such topics as "The Meaning of Insanity," "Types of Mental Disease," and "Insane Impulse." Most of his references even in these medical chapters are to legal decisions, and his classification of mental diseases, even though evidently based upon the antiquated British classification, lacks much in informativeness and is in some portions positively misleading. An excellent opportunity of presenting to the legal profession and the laity some modern psychiatric concepts has here been missed.

The purposes enunciated in the preface have been met, and a distinct place is ready for the volume in the library of all who are interested in this absorbing though rather perplexing subject.

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STORIA DEL DIRITTO PENALE ITALIANO. [The History of Italian Penal Law.] By Ugo Spirito.
The lasting impression which remains with the reviewer after reading this book is that the author is a man with a supreme dissatisfaction. He is dissatisfied with the classical school because of its incredibly abstract juridical concept of the *tutela giuridica* and its utter disregard of the criminal as a human actor and mover (pp. 1-19, *et passim*). He scorns the positive school because it treats man as a phylogenetic being, and because it is "immoral" in that it does not put any spiritual leaven into its penalties and punishments (pp. 1-19, 154-161, 103-153). He is dissatisfied with the so-called *scuola terza* because it is an eclectic growth which combines the faults of both schools already mentioned (pp. 154-165), and is equally disappointed with that new school, *la nuova concezione tecnico-giuridica* (pp. 166-190).

Mr. Spirito doubtless has a "passion to reform the world" of penal law, but nowhere do we find him furnishing a new stone to build into the citadel of penal theories (excepting his Conclusion of twenty-two pages). And this is all the more regrettable, since the purpose of the book (see preface, p. 8) is to approach the study of penology from two aspects: (1) the historical, and (2) the constructive. The book is virtually all exposition, and criticism, very deft and excellently succinct exposition, and very telling and pointed criticism; but the fabric which he so successfully rends asunder he attempts to mend with a thin small thread.

The first part of the book (pp. 23-100) traces the growth of the classical school and its ideals. Brief chapters are given to the exposition of the tenets of Beccaria, Filangieri, Pagano, Rossi, Carrara, etc. The second part of the book (pp. 103-201) contains, *inter alia*, a like treatment of the positive school. The discussion is too brief to approach scholarly completeness and too long to be a mere encyclopedic reference manual.

The second part of Spirito's work contains in addition a chapter on the *terza scuola*, another on the *Concezione tecnico-giuridica*, and still another on the *nuovo idealismo*. The so-called *concezione tecnico-giuridica* is a new growth in Italian concepts of penal law and penal theories which had its birth in a work by Arturo Rocco, published in 1913, "L'oggetto del reato e della tutela giuridica penale." Spirito's ironic criticism of this work is masterly.

In his conclusion (pp. 204-226) the author brings forth a model theory about which he thinks a new system of penology may be constructed. Briefly, it is this: The universe is essentially spiritual in nature, and marked by an "ethical oneness." We all partake of this spiritual reality of the universe, and each individual is but a concrete form of it (p. 213). Therefore, man must have a world-deep sympathy for his fellow-man. We may express it by saying that man is the microcosm of the spiritual macrosm, that vast spiritual reality we call the universe (p. 214). It follows that a crime committed by A. is not his solitary act; all A's fellowmen should feel as responsible for A.'s crime as A. himself. Therefore, in inflicting punishment upon A. we do not punish a stranger outside the social pale; and we should not be motivated by anger, revenge or other primitive feeling. We should, rather, feel that we are *redeeming*
the delinquent. But in redeeming A., man is redeeming himself, for we are all spiritual brethren living of the same reality. In short, when A. commits a crime, or sins, all mankind does likewise; in redeeming A. we too are redeemed.

BERNARD F. CATALDO.
University of Pennsylvania.


Whether one is interested primarily in the problems of crime, or in the welfare of children, or in the well-being of society at large, it is a challenging fact that about one per cent of the children of juvenile court age in the United States appear each year in that court. Moreover, it is obvious that these cases represent but a fraction of the total amount of maladjustment among our youth.

An analysis, both penetrating and provocative, of the problem of juvenile delinquency and its related manifestations, will be found in the volume under review. It contains the general report of the committee on delinquency, of the White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, the addresses relating to delinquency delivered at the Conference meetings, an appendix of materials utilized in the preparation of the report, and a bibliography of 384 references. The investigation on which the report is based was carried on by a number of sub-committees under the direction of the late Frederick P. Cabot, judge of the juvenile court of Boston. The final general report is attributed to James S. Plant.

In its general plan, the report outlines (1) the needs of the child, for security, for growth and development, its physical and mental life, and its emotional needs; and (2) the needs of social institutions, such as the family, state, municipality, school, church, industry, neighborhood, press, and organized associations, which impinge upon the child; with the conclusion (3) that these two sets of needs clash, and that as a result stresses, tensions and delinquencies appear.

The point of view of the report involves these principles: first, that "delinquency is a symptom, in that it is a rather naturally expected expression of some earlier, deeper or more pervasive maladjustment" (p. 24); and, second, that "it is the delinquent rather than the delinquencies which requires and merits study" (p. 24). From this it follows that the study of delinquency "inevitably leads us into the midst of all those human joys and sorrows, strivings and thwartings, dreams and disillusionments, which are caught up in the total that we call adjustment to life" (p. 19).

Perhaps the main contribution of the report, other than the large amount of information included, is its swing of emphasis upon the responsibility for delinquency of the adult and society. While we "still see the child himself as the key to our approach," we must recognize, nevertheless, "that he is chiefly the product or expression of the action and reaction between himself and his total milieu." Furthermore, the time has passed when the "buck can be passed" to specialized agencies, important though these are, and adequate and competent though they need be. Particularly emphatic is the insistence, repeated and implied many times, upon the importance of
the lives of the adults which surround the child. "It is only from an example of sincere living that a child finds the dynamic impulse for the development of his own life standards."

The book is well written. Also, it has a unity frequently lacking in reports which embody the findings of different groups. If, by way of criticism, reference may be made to a certain lack of specificity which, according to the reviewer's contention, is an outstanding need in behavior studies, that lack may be excused here on the basis of the purpose for which the report was prepared.

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD,
University of Pennsylvania.


This little book consists of a series of papers on the Thuringian prison system for males. It is written by a number of the leading officials of the system, with an introduction by Dr. Lothar Frede, who represents the ministry of justice and has direct supervision over the entire system. Four of the papers are on the institution at Ichtershausen, four on the prison at Untermassfeld, and one on the institution for juvenile males at Eisenach. An appendix gives sections of the regulations governing these institutions.

Thuringia's prison system, to use the phrase in a broad and general way, differs in some respects from those of the other German states. Thuringia is a small country with less than two million inhabitants. It is not a rich country. The institutions at Ichtershausen and at Untermassfeld, the one an old nunnery, the other an old castle, were both adapted as well as possible to the correction of offenders. In common with the prison systems of the other important German states—Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony—it has the Stufen, or grades of prisoners, and officers known as Fürsorgern, persons appointed to look after the personal development of the prisoners.

In these papers are described the new methods introduced into the German prisons after the Revolution at the close of the war, as worked out in Thuringia. Among these measures the outstanding features are (1) the Stufen, or grades into which prisoners are classified within the institution, (2) the attempt to study the personality of the prisoner, not by refined psychiatric techniques but by case history and close observation, (3) the Fürsorgern referred to above, (4) treatment inspired, not by the aim of punishment, but by the social development of the personality, (5) the use of a staff conference in which the results of the officials' investigations are pooled in an endeavor to diagnose the prisoner and decide on a plan for his treatment, and (6) the employment of trained men on the staffs of her prisons.

The Stufen are much more significant than our grades for the methods employed in each of the three grades are differentiated. In the first Stufe there is no organization into groups for the purpose of having group influence play upon the individual for his benefit, but rather individual investigation and treatment by the officials. In the
second, and still more in the third, there is emphasis upon group organization for leisure time activities. In the third Stufe an attempt is made to introduce self-government among the prisoners. Apparently in this grade the institution is trying to prepare the prisoner for a successful career after release.

These papers are a revelation to those who know nothing of the interesting experiments which the German prison authorities are making. They only hint at the challenging spirit one feels and learns about by a personal visit. These German approaches, while not so radical as some of the features in the new Russian system, are of the greatest significance to penology. The results are worthy of careful study. A new spirit is stirring in the penologies of Germany and Russia. America hitherto has been the pioneer in this field. Now these two European countries are pressing forward, reaching out beyond our often self-satisfied and conservative methods. We should study them.

It is so startling as to be almost a reproach to us that among the writers of these ten papers no less than eight have the doctor's degree. All of them are on the staffs of these prisons in the small, poor country of Thuringia. The "high-brow" is not despised in the prison service of that country. Last summer I found the same thing true in the prisons of three other German states.

John Lewis Gillin.
University of Wisconsin.

Government by Judiciary. By
Louis B. Bourdon. 2 vols. Wil-

These two admirably printed and bound volumes with impeccable proofreading, are the work of a busy practitioner in New York and exhibit great industry and legal capacity. The purpose is avowedly to present an analysis of the real workings of the judicial power of the Supreme Court at Washington and a true history of its rise from small beginnings to practical omnipotence. How far this purpose has been achieved is not here discussed, the present concern being only with criminal law.

A few instances of the actions of the Court in criminal cases may be referred to—these will be sufficient to indicate the value of the work.

In the last decade of the 18th century, when Britain was engaged in the life-and-death struggle against the supremacy of France, the people of the United States were divided in sympathy, the greater part probably favoring the French—substantially the anti-Federalist party, Washington issued his well-known Proclamation of Neutrality. Notwithstanding, privateers were fitted out, amongst them the famous Sloop Betsy and the Citizen Genet. An indictment drafted by Hamilton was found in Philadelphia against one Gideon Hedfield for acting as prize master of the latter ship—two Justices of the Supreme Court, Wilson and Iredell, sat with Mr. Justice Peters in the district court, and the former charged the jury that Hedfield's act was a crime punishable in the Federal courts, even though not so declared by Congress. The extraordinary interest taken in this case is evidenced by the facts that Attorney-General Randolph appeared with U. S. Attorney William
Rawle for the prosecution, and that two Supreme Court Justices sat with Judge Peters.

This case as well as the Sloop Betsy case really turned on the question whether the Common Law of England, and particularly the criminal part of it was part of the law and cognizable in the courts of the United States—which question was answered in the affirmative by the Federal courts.

This doctrine is quite exploded and it is now recognized that Congressional legislation is necessary to make criminal law for the United States—the author makes the statement baldly that it has been “established authoritatively by the United States Supreme Court itself that the entire judiciary of the United States from the Chief Justice down (Ellsworth, C. J. is meant) were during this entire period (the First Decade of the Constitution), enforcing a whole body of laws, including criminal laws, without the slightest warrant or authority either in the Constitution or in the laws of the United States,” “a system of law . . . introduced into this country by the Federal Judiciary without warrant in the Constitution.” The decision in U. S. v. Hudson and Goodwin (1812) 7 Crande, 32, answered in the negative the question “whether the circuit courts of the United States can exercise a Common Law jurisdiction in criminal cases” and this is considered as authoritatively and finally settled by U. S. v. Coolidge et al. (1816), 1 Wheaton 405.

On the trial of Aaron Burr before Marshall, his counsel obtained a subpoena summoning President Jefferson as a witness. The latter flatly refused to obey, asserting that its issue was unconstitutional. His position is now universally acknowledged as sound. In this case Jefferson is considered as striking Marshall as severe a blow as the latter struck him in Marburg v. Madison.

The curious case of Cohen v. Virginia (1820) 6 Wheaton 264, should be mentioned. The City of Washington under power given by Congress instituted a lottery. The appellants sold some tickets in Norfolk, Va., notwithstanding the fact that the law of Virginia made the sale of lottery tickets a criminal offence. They were fined by the courts of Virginia and their appeal to the Supreme Court was entertained but not successful.

The grand jury cases are of extreme importance, Hurtado v. California, 100 U. S. 516, decided that though the Grand Jury system of trial by jury was understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution to be a fundamental right, it might be abrogated by any State. This was followed in Maxwell v. Dow (1900) 176 U. S. 581, which also held that a petit jury might be of less number than 12. “Trial by jury has never been affirmed to be a necessary requisite of due process of law.” The Ku Klux Klan cases, too, receive due attention.

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The present work seems to have been a doctoral thesis, approved in 1925 by the law faculty of the University of Leipzig. It is dedicated to Dr. Rudolf Steiner and appears to have been crowned in 1927 by
the *Rudolf Steiner Vereinigung*. After an introductory part the book proceeds to consider various legal theories of punishment, the nature of human acts and of crime, and concludes with a psychological discussion of punishment.

The book has a striking cover drawing showing a Janus head. The author makes much of it, contrasting the two faces by the opposed propositions, "Recht zur Strafe" and "Recht auf Strafe." The state has a right to inflict punishment but the criminal in turn has a right against the state to punishment as a means to his reformation.

His practical program for the treatment of crime consists of two features—social prophylaxis which is barely mentioned without discussion of details, and criminal therapy to bring the criminal back to a sound state of mind.

The ideas advanced have no particular novelty nor does the author make the claim. We have rarely read a book more surcharged with textual quotations. Sometimes it is a little difficult to know which author is speaking. Among the authors who chiefly contribute to the anthology of quotations are Steiner, Laistner, Richard Schmidt, Saldaña, and Salovieff, most of whom, we believe, are not especially known to criminologists on this side of the Atlantic. The book probably was intended for lay, rather than scientific circles and for that purpose can be commended. It serves the object of making clear the lack of thought which enters into the foundations of punishment, demolishes the retribution theory, and emphasizes the need of attention to the abnormality of the offender himself. The author's reliance on philosophical notions such as Karma and Reincarnation, while consistent with the teachings of his master, Steiner, and while, perchance, even having a foundation of truth, are in the present era somewhat too romantic to carry conviction or to support ideas otherwise sound and interesting. The author is an idealist and also an optimist—idealist in his approach to the solution of his problem and optimist in his confidence that much more is known of the etiology and cure of crime than, for example, of cancer.

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**DARTMOOR FROM WITHIN. By Convict No. . . . . . 250 pp. George Newnes, Ltd., London, 1932. 2/6.**

The author entered prison envenomed against society and public officials; but, after long years of assimilation to prison routine, his attitude changes, bitterness dissolves, and he develops a kindly feeling for the governor or warden, chaplain and guards.

The book presents a strong, realistic picture of what those years of incarceration did to the lives of persons who represent different types of our criminal structure; the author describes with vividness what took place in his own prison life. It is not the realism with which the story has been presented—the reshaping of broken lives, the picturization of the sordid aspects of imprisonment—that makes the book attractive reading, but the candor and simplicity which the author employs to give a wide panorama of his experiences.

The author cultivated a dramatized version of himself, as revealed by snatches of memories recalling his service as an Army officer, com-
manding, leading, riding in luxurious pullmans, being served fancy dishes, and hiring the very types of men with whom he is imprisoned to work for him.

The last chapter is a serious indictment of prison conditions, but the author does not criticize the personnel of the officers. He does, however, condemn the administrative system, although he states that there was an improvement in the management. He says that prison did nothing to improve his rehabilitation, and it is apparent that the adjustments made were due to his superior intelligence.

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Joliet and Stateville, Illinois.


In readable form Professor Perkins presents five statistical studies. All are more or less integrated and are to a degree mutually supporting. The scope of the several studies and the degree of integration are best shown by listing them.

1. Twenty-Five Counties, 1927. All indictable offenses (Iowa makes no procedural distinction between felonies and misdemeanors) which reached the grand jury in the district and municipal courts of twenty-five selected counties during 1927. Number of cases, 2,209. Unit of counting, the number of defendants against whom indictments were asked. Offense classification, similar to that recommended by the Committee on Crime Records of the Association of Chiefs of Police and to the U. S. Census classification but differing somewhat from both. This is the most detailed study of the five.

2. Thirty-Year Study of Johnson County. All indictable offenses which reached the grand jury in Johnson County (population, 1930, 30,276) between 1901 and 1930. Number of cases, 1,161. Unit of counting, as above. Offense classification, as recommended by the police chiefs with one exception.

3. State-Wide Study, 1931. All indictable offenses which reached the grand jury during 1931. Number of cases, 9,342. Unit of counting, as above. Offense classification, as in the Johnson County study.

4. Offenses known to the Police. Offenses reported to the U. S. Department of Justice by the police of twenty-eight Iowa cities during 1931. Number of cases, 9,485. Unit of counting, offenses. Offense classification, as recommended by the police chiefs, without exception.

5. The Supreme Court. Criminal appeals in the Iowa Supreme Court between 1927 and 1931. Number of cases, 421. Unit of counting, number of appeals. Offense classification, none used.

The study of twenty-five counties is presented in considerable detail. Many readers will be interested in the differing degrees of success which the State experienced in establishing guilt in prosecutions for various offenses. For example, sixty-seven per cent of the forgery charges were established and only thirty-three per cent of the embezzlement-fraud group. Apparently it is somewhat more difficult to establish guilt for offenses against the person (aggravated assault, sex offenses including rape, murder, man-
slaughter: thirty-nine per cent) than for offenses against property (forgery, robbery, burglary, larceny, embezzlement-fraud, non-support: forty-nine per cent). Also interesting are the data on the time during which a case is pending. The meantime between the beginning of the prosecution and the closing of the case was found to be 87 days and the median time thirty days.

The final chapter contains certain general conclusions based upon the entire group of studies. The conclusions are conservative and well-considered. They include: (1) substantially more than half of the prosecutions result in establishing guilt; (2) mistrials are negligible in number; (3) the number of definite trends attributable to the urban or rural character of the population is small; (4) prosecutions are increasing in number; (5) the jury is responsible for the elimination of but few cases.

The lack of complete integration among the several studies in unfortunate but was unavoidable. Some students will regret the extensive use which is made of the figures and percentages for other jurisdictions in comparison to those for Iowa. Among other jurisdictions compared are Connecticut, California, Michigan, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Indiana, New York and Illinois. The degree to which such comparisons are apt is doubtful. Especially is this true when the figures relied upon from other jurisdictions are based upon felony cases while the Iowa study contains both felonies and misdemeanors.

Professor Perkins has removed the detailed tables to the end of the text and carried them as an appendix. This treatment makes the text far more readable to the casual student than the usual statistical study with its dreary recurrence of heavy statistical tables throughout the text. Better still, with complete candor and sound discretion, Professor Perkins has been willing to point out to the reader where he believes his data insufficient. While probably of greatest interest to those Iowans who have not yet deserted to Los Angeles, the studies should be of interest and should constitute persuasive authority elsewhere.

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BEHIND THE DOOR OF DELUSION.
By "Inmate Ward 8." 325 pp.

The author of this volume is said to be a newspaper editor, obviously an intelligent and acute observer, who, in an attempt to recover from a chronic alcoholism had himself committed to a mental hospital. He was himself, apparently, not psychotic, and his production is a description of what he observed rather than of his own mental processes.

The state and hospital, like the author, are nameless—out of consideration for the state, the reviewer hazards no guess, except to say that from certain remarks of the author the standards in force then appear not to be quite up to those generally accepted in state hospitals.

The account of the care given to the patients, the attitudes of the physicians and attendants, and the problems of the patients themselves, is in general sympathetic and fair,
and is presented in an interesting and readable manner.

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"A real library," says Miss Jones, "is not merely a collection of books placed on shelves in a room. It is a collection of books sufficiently well-rounded to meet the reasonable demands of the community whose readers it serves, supported by funds which permit regular and adequate accessions, using a technique which makes the process of acquiring, classifying, cataloging and circulating books efficient and expeditious, employing devices and methods which stimulate, guide and serve the readers' interest, and staffed with a personnel that is not only versed in technique but is also capable of carrying on the more difficult work of getting the right book to the reader" (p. 10). The Handbook serves as a guide to those who wish to place as many as possible of these ideas into operation in the prison library, which by its nature must serve as a component part of the educational program of the institution. In view of that fact it is interesting to note the attitude taken toward the vexing problem of censorship. A judicious handling of books with a strongly stressed sex theme is recommended, since such books may "play havoc" with prisoners. Popular as crime mystery and detective fiction is, this type book, it is claimed, should be kept down to the minimum, although "it seems certain that books cannot tell prisoners any more lurid crime stories than they can hear any day in the prison yard." It is recommended that books dealing with modern gangsters and racketeers be barred.

T. S.


This book describes the work of the Cook County Juvenile Court, its jurisdiction, and its methods of administering the juvenile court law under which it operates. It should be of value to social workers, attorneys and others, who have occasion to resort to the services of this particular court and of interest to the student of judicial administration and comparative law.


A collection of all Portuguese laws and decrees dealing with juvenile delinquency and covering the period 1871-1930.