Anglo-American Philosophies of Penal Law

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What, then, is the end which we set before us? It is a threefold undertaking: to ascertain first, if possible, what it is that, roughly and in general, the vulgar mean when they talk of being responsible; to ask in the second place, whether either of the doctrines of Freedom and Necessity (as current among ourselves) agrees with their notions; and, in case they do not agree, lastly, to inquire in what points they are incompatible with them. . . . Amid all this “progress of the species” the plain man is by no means so common as he once was, or at least is said to have been. And so, if we want a moral sense that has not yet been adulterated, we must not be afraid to leave enlightenment behind us. We must go to the vulgar for vulgar morality, and there what we lose in refinement we perhaps are likely to gain in integrity.

I. Betaking ourselves, therefore, to the uneducated man, let us find from him, if we can, what lies at the bottom of his notion of moral responsibility. What in his mind is to be morally responsible? We see in it at once the idea of a man’s appearing to answer. He answers for what he has done, or (which we need not separately consider) has neglected and left undone. And the tribunal is a moral tribunal; it is the court of conscience, imagined as a judge, divine or human, external or internal. It is not necessarily implied that the man does answer for all or any of his acts; but it is implied that he might have
to answer, that he is liable to be called upon—in one word (the meaning of which, we must remember, we perhaps do not know), it is “right that he should be subject to the moral tribunal; or the moral tribunal has a right over him, to call him before it, with reference to all or any of his deeds.

He must answer, if called on, for all his deeds. There is no question of lying here; and, without lying, he can disown none of his acts—nothing which in his heart or his will has ever been suffered to come into being. They are all his, they are part of his substance; he can not put them on one side, and himself on the other, and say, “It is not mine; I never did it.” What he ever at any time has done, that he is now; and, when his name is called, nothing, which has ever been his, can be absent from that which answers to the name.

And he must account for all. But to give an account to a tribunal means to have one’s reckoning settled. It implies that, when the tribunal has done with us, we do not remain, if he were so before, either debtors or creditors. We pay what we owe; or we have that paid to us which is our due, which is owed to us (what we deserve). . . . In short, there is but one way to settle accounts; and that way is punishment, which is due to us, and therefore is assigned to us.

Hence, when the late Mr. Mill said, “Responsibility means punishment,” what he had in his mind was the vulgar notion, though he expressed it incorrectly, unless on the supposition that all must necessarily transgress. What is really true for the ordinary consciousness; what it clings to, and will not let go; what marks unmistakably, by its absence, a “philosophical” or a “debauched” morality, is the necessary connection between responsibility and liability to punishment, between punishment and desert, or the finding of guiltiness before the law of the moral tribunal. For practical purposes we need make no distinction between responsibility or accountability, and liability to punishment. Where you have the one, there (in the mind of the vulgar) you have the other; and where you have not the one, there you can not have the other. And, we may add, the theory which will explain the one, in its ordinary sense, will also explain the other; and the theory which fails in the one, fails also in the other; and the doctrine which conflicts with popular belief as to the one, does so also with regard to the other.

So far we have seen that subjection to a moral tribunal lies at the bottom of our answering for our deeds. The vulgar understand that we answer not for everything, but only for what is ours; or, in other words, for what can be imputed to us. If now we can say what is commonly presupposed by imputability, we shall have
accomplished the first part of our undertaking, by the discovery of what responsibility means for the people. And at this point again we must repeat our caution to the reader, not to expect from us either law or systematic metaphysics; and further, to leave out of sight the slow historical evolution of the idea in question. We have one thing to do, and one only, at present—to find what lies in the mind of the ordinary man.

Now the first condition of the possibility of my guiltiness, or of my becoming a subject for moral imputation, is my self-sameness; I must be throughout one identical person. . . . If, when we say, "I did it," the I is not to be the one I, distinct from all other I's; or if the one I, now here, is not the same I with the I whose act the deed was, then there can be no question whatever but that the ordinary notion of responsibility disappears. In the first place, then, I must be the very same person to whom the deed belonged.

And, in the second place, it must have belonged to me—it must have been mine. What then is it which makes a deed mine? The question has been often discussed, and it is not easy to answer it with scientific accuracy; but here we are concerned simply with the leading features of the ordinary notion. And the first of these is, that we must have an act, and not something which can not be called by that name. The deed must issue from my will; in Aristotle's language, the act must be in myself. Where I am forced, there I do nothing. I am not an agent at all, or in any way responsible. Where compulsion exists, there my will, and it accountability, does not exist. . . .

Not only must the deed be an act, and come from the man without compulsion, but, in the second place, the doer must be supposed intelligent; he must know the particular circumstances of the case. . . . A certain amount of intelligence, or "sense," is thus a condition of responsibility. No one who does not possess a certain minimum of general intelligence can be considered a responsible being; and under this head come imbecile persons, and, to a certain extent, young children. Further, the person whose intellect is eclipsed for a time—such eclipse being not attributable to himself—can not be made accountable for anything. He can say, and say truly, "I was not myself;" for he means by his self an intelligent will.

Thirdly, responsibility implies a moral agent. No one is accountable, who is not capable of knowing (not, who does not know) the moral quality of his acts. Wherever we can not presume upon a capacity for apprehending (not, an actual apprehension of) moral distinctions, in such cases, for example, as those of young children and some madmen,
there is, and there can be, no responsibility, because there exists no moral will. Incapacity, however, must not be imputable to act or willful omission.

No more than the above is, I believe, contained in the popular creed. There are points which that creed has never encountered, and others again where historical development has, to some extent, been the cause of divergences. If we asked the plain man, What is an act? he could not possibly tell us what he meant by it. The problem, In what does an act consist? has never come home to his mind. . . . And there are points again, where ordinary morality shows divergences of opinion. In the absence of intelligence and moral capacity, responsibility can not exist. A beast or an idiot is not accountable. But the vulgar could not tell us beforehand the amount of sense which is required, and, even in particular cases, would often be found to disagree amongst themselves . . .

To resume then: According to vulgar notions, a man must act himself, be now the same man who acted, have been himself at the time of the act, have had sense enough to know what he was doing, and to know good from bad. In addition, where ignorance is wrong, not to have known does not remove accountability though the degree of it may be doubtful. And everything said of commission applies equally well to omission or negligence.

II. We have found roughly what the ordinary man means by responsibility; and this was the first task we undertook. We pass to the second, to see whether, and how far, the current theories of Freedom and Necessity (better, Indeterminism and Determinism) are consistent with his beliefs.

Let us first take the theory which goes by the name of the Free-will doctrine, and which exists apparently for the purpose of saving moral accountability. We have to ask, Is it compatible with the ordinary notions on the subject? This doctrine, we are told, is the only one which asserts Freedom, and without liberty responsibility can not exist. And this sounds well: if we are not free to do as we will, then (on this point the plain man is clear) we can not be responsible. “We must have liberty to act according to our choice,” is this the theory? “No, more than that; for that,” we shall be told, “is not near enough. Not only must you be free to do what you will, but also you must have liberty to choose what you will to do. It must be your doing, that you will to do this thing, and not rather that thing; and, if it is not your doing, then you are not responsible.”

So far, I believe, most persons would agree that the doctrine has
not gone beyond a fair interpretation of common consciousness. . . .
On the whole, we are still at one with ordinary notions. To proceed,
we are free to choose, but what does that mean? “It means,” will be
the answer, “that our choice is not necessitated by motives; that to
will and to desire are different in kind; that there is a gap between
them, and that no desire, or complication of desires, carries with it a
forcing or compelling power over our volitions. . . . And all this
again, in the main, does not appear contrary to ordinary beliefs. . . .
What is then liberty of choice? “Self-determination. I determine my-
self to this or that course.” Does that mean that I make myself do
the act, or merely that my acts all issue from my will? “Making is
not the word, and very much more is implied than the latter. You
are the uncaused cause of your particular volitions.” But does not what
I am come from my disposition, my education, my habits? “In this
case, certainly not. The ego in volition is not a result, and is not an
effect, but a cause simply; and of this fact we have a certain and in-
tuitive knowledge.” . . . And so, reflecting on the theory, we see
that, in the main, it is only the denial of the opposite theory (i. e., of
Determinism). . . . The chief bearing of its conclusion is merely nega-
tive; and here, as we shall see, it comes into sharp collision with vulgar
notions of responsibility.

In this bearing, Free-will means Non-determinism. . . . Freedom
means chance; you are free, because there is no reason which will
account for your particular acts, because no one in the world, not
even yourself, can possibly say what you will, or will not, do next. You
are “accountable,” in short, because you are a wholly “unaccountable”
creature. We can not escape this conclusion. If we always can do
anything, or nothing, under any circumstances, or merely if, of given
alternatives, we can always choose either, then it is always possible
that any act should come from any man. If there is no real, no rational
connection between the character and the actions (as the upholder of
“Freedom” does not deny there is between the actions and the charac-
ter), then, use any phrases we please, what it comes to is this, that voli-
tions are contingent. In short, the irrational connection, which the Free-
will doctrine fled from in the shape of external necessity, it has suc-
cceeded only in reasserting in the shape of chance.

The theory was to save responsibility. It saves it thus: A man
is responsible, because there was no reason why he should have done
one thing, rather than another thing. And that man, and only that
man, is responsible, concerning whom it is impossible for any one, even
himself, to know what in the world he will be doing next; possible only
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to know what his actions are, when once they are done, and to know that they might have been the diametrical opposite. So far is such an account from saving responsibility (as we commonly understand it), that it annihilates the very conditions of it. It is the description of a person who is not responsible, who (if he is anything) is idiotic.

But here we have not to investigate the doctrine, but to bring it into contact with ordinary life. Let us suppose a man of good character, innocent of theoretical reflections. Our apostle of Freedom would assure him of his responsibility, and our plain man would welcome and emphasize the statement. Our apostle would inform him, that the secret of man's accountability was in his possession. But, when he advanced, and began to explain that such freedom of choice must mean, that, before a man acted, it was never certain how he would act, then, I think, he might get for an answer, "that depends on what sort of man he is." Perhaps at this point he might appeal to his hearer's consciousness, and put it to him, whether he was not aware that, no opportunities rising for the foulest crimes, he could not only do these acts if he would, but also that it was quite possible, in every case, that he should do them. Such a question, if asked, would be answered, I doubt not, by an indignant negative; and should a similar suggestion be made with respect to a friend or relation, the reply might not confine itself to words. What sayings in life are more common than, "You might have known me better. I never could have done such a thing; it was impossible for me to act so, and you ought to have known that nothing could have made me?"

The doctrine of Free-will, then, does not square with popular views; and, bearing in mind that, of "two great philosophies," when one is taken, but one remains, it is natural to think that Necessity, as the opposite of Free-will, may succeed in doing what its rival has left undone. Is this so? Nothing is clearer than that the plain man does not consider himself any less responsible, because it can be foretold of him that, in a given position, he is sure to do this, and will certainly not do that; that he will not insult helplessness, but respect it; not rob his employer, but protect his interests; and, if this be admitted, as I think it must be, then it will follow that it can not be all his actions, to the prediction of which he entertains an objection. So much being settled, we must ask, Is there no prediction then which he does find objectionable? I think there is. I believe that if, at forty, our supposed plain man could be shown the calculation, made by another before his birth, of every event in his life, rationally deduced from the elements of his being, from his original natural endowment, and the
complication of circumstances which in any way bore on him—if such a thing were possible in fact, as it is conceivable in certain systems, then (I will not go so far as to say that our man would begin to doubt his responsibility; I do not say his notions of right and wrong would be unsettled; on this head I give no opinion) I believe that he would be most seriously perplexed, and in a manner outraged. . . . The prediction which is not objected to, is mere simple prediction founded on knowledge of character. What is the prediction which is objectionable? Would it be going too far, if we said that the ordinary man would not like the foretelling of any one of his conscious acts, unless so far as they issued from his character? I do not think it would be. . . . If Necessity meant no more than the regularity of his volitions, the possibility of telling, from his character, his action in a given position, then, I believe, no objection would we made to it. But if Necessity means the theoretical development of the characterized self, then Necessity collides with popular morality. . . . The vulgar are convinced that a gulf divides them from the material world; they believe their being to lie beyond the sphere of mere physical laws; their character, or their will, is to them their thinking and rational self; and they feel quite sure that it is not a thing in space, to be pushed here and there by other things outside of it. And so, when you treat their will as a something physical, and interpret its action by mechanical metaphors, they believe that you do not treat it or interpret it at all, but rather something quite other than it. . . .

III. Let us see, then, what punishment means first for the vulgar, and, next, for the believer in Necessity. Let us see for ourselves if the two ideas are incompatible; and then inquire wherein they are incompatible, in case they are so.

If there is any opinion to which the man of uncultivated morals is attached, it is the belief in the necessary connection of punishment and guilt. Punishment is punishment, only where it is deserved. We pay the penalty, because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever, than because it is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice, an abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be. . . . Why then (let us repeat) on this view do I merit punishment? It is because I have been guilty. I have done "wrong." I have taken into my will, made a part of myself, have realized my being in something, which is the negation of "right," the assertion of not-right. Wrong can be im-

*The reader must not consider me anxious to prove against a theory what it is ready to admit; but if we do not see the facts for ourselves, we shall not find the reasons.
Punishment is the denial of wrong by the assertion of right, and the wrong exists in the self, or will, of the criminal; his self is a wrongful self, and is realized in his person and possessions; he has asserted in them his wrongful will, the incarnate denial of right; and we, in denying that assertion, and in annihilating, whether wholly or partially, that incarnation, by fine or imprisonment or even by death, we annihilate the wrong and manifest the right; and since this Right, as we saw, was an end in itself, so punishment is also an end in itself.

Yes, in despite of sophistry, and in the face of sentimentalism, with well-nigh the whole body of our self-styled enlightenment against them, our people believe to this day that punishment is inflicted for the sake of punishment; though they know no more than our philosophers themselves do, that there stand on the side of the unthinking people the two best names of modern philosophy.

We have now to see what punishment is for the believer in Necessity. And here the Necessitarian does not leave us in doubt. For him, it is true, "responsibility" may "mean punishment," or rather the liability thereto; and perhaps he would not mind saying that guilt deserves punishment. But when we ask him, what is to be understood by the term "desert," then we are answered at once, that its meaning is something quite other than the "horrid figment" which we believe in; or, lost in phrases, we perceive thus much, that the world we are
For our Necessitarian, punishment is avowedly never an end in itself; it is never justifiable, except as a means to an external end. "There are two ends," says the late Mr. Mill, and he means there are only two ends, "which, on the Necessitarian theory, are sufficient to justify punishment: the benefit of the offender himself, and the protection of others."

And (p. 597), "If indeed punishment is inflicted for any other reason than in order to operate on the will; if its purpose be other than that of improving the culprit himself, or securing the just rights of others against unjust violation ('justice,' the reader must remember, may be for him, and Mr. Mill, two different things), then, I admit, the case is totally altered. If anyone thinks that there is justice in the infliction of purposeless suffering; that there is a natural affinity between the two ideas of guilt and punishment, which makes it intrinsically fitting that wherever there has been guilt pain should be inflicted by way of retribution (the reader will not forget that for him, besides that of justice, there may also be other spheres, and possibly higher; what is merely just need not be intrinsically fitting); I acknowledge that I can find no argument to justify punishment inflicted on this principle. As a legitimate satisfaction to feelings of indignation and resentment which are on the whole salutary and worthy of cultivation (the figments are not 'horrid' to Mr. Hill; he seems willing even to encourage them), I can in certain cases admit it; but here it is still a means to an end. The merely reritive ('merely' is misleading) view of punishment derives no justification from the doctrine I support." Punishment to Mr. Mill is "medicine"; and, turn himself aside as to might from the issue (p. 593-4), he could not avoid the conclusion forced on him by the "Inquirer," that if rewards carried with them the benefits of punishment, then I should even deserve rewards, when, and because, I am wicked.

Now against this theory of punishment I have nothing here to say. The great and ancient names, which in punishment saw nothing but a means to the good of the State or the individual, demand that we treat that view with respect. . . . We need not dwell on the point. If, on the one side, punishment is always an end in itself, whatever else it may be, and if, on the other, whatever else it is, it never can be an end in itself, we may take it for granted that between the two there is no agreement.

But if, as we saw, to understand punishment is to understand responsibility, and not to know the one is to be ignorant of the other,

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*Hamilton, p. 592.*
and to hold opposite theory on the one, is to hold, as a consequence, one opposite theory on the other; if "responsibility means punishment," and punishability is the same as accountability; and if, further, the teaching of the Necessitarian with respect to punishment is in flagrant contradiction with vulgar opinion—how, if he were so minded, is he to assert that his teaching on responsibility is not so also? How is he to deny that accountability is a "figment"; and that his moral world is, in everything but names and phrases, not the moral world of the vulgar? If, to repeat, on the theory of Necessity I am not punishable in the ordinary sense, then (for we saw that the two went together) I am not responsible either.

Our result so far then is this: We have seen what punishment for the vulgar and for the Determinist respectively are; and to see that is to see that they are altogether incompatible; and so in like manner the responsibilities, which correspond to them, are not the same. And our conclusion must be, that neither the one nor the other of our "two great philosophical modes of thought," however excellent they may (or may not) be as philosophies, each by itself and the one against the other, does in any way theoretically express the moral notions of the vulgar mind, or fail in some points to contradict them utterly. . . .

Our interest is mainly to see wherein it is that Necessitarianism fails to interpret the popular belief. It fails in this, that it altogether ignores the rational self in the form of will; it ignores it in the act of volition, and it ignores it in the abiding personality, which is the same throughout all its acts, and by which alone imputation gets a meaning. A man (to express what the people believe) is only responsible for what (mediately or immediately) issues from the act of volition; and in that act his will is present, his will being himself, and neither a part of himself nor a certain disposition of elements not in a self, but the whole self expressing itself in a particular way, manifesting itself as will in this or that utterance, and, in and by such manifestation, qualifying the will which manifests itself. The will must be in the act, and the act in the will; and as the will is the self which remains the same self, therefore the act, which was part of the self, is now part of the self, since the self is that which it has done. . . .

We said that our Necessitarians ignored the self, both as willing self and as self-same will. . . . Not only in the act of "I will" does Determinism entirely lose sight of the "I," and hence fail to recognize the characteristic of the will; not only does it hold by a will that wills nothing, and misses thereby an element involved in responsibility; but also, it ignores or denies the identity of the self in all the
acts of the self, and without self-sameness we saw there was no possibility of imputation.

On this important point it is simply impossible to state the vulgar belief too strongly. If I am not now the same man, the identical self that I was; if the acts that I did are not the acts of the one and individual I which exists at this moment, then I can not deserve to be punished for that which myself has not done. For imputation it is required that the acts, which were mine, now also are mine; and this is possible only on the supposition that the will, which is now, is the will which was then, so that the contents of the will, which were then, are the contents of the self-same will which is now existing. On this point again repetitions are wearisome, and words are wasted; without personal identity responsibility is sheer nonsense; and to the psychology of our Determinist's personal identity (with identity in general) is a word without a vestige of meaning.

And I am far from saying that in the regions of philosophy their doctrines are not right. For on these matters I advance no opinion at present; and, for anything I have to say here, their conclusions may be the correct ones. We are right, it may be, here again to apply to the self the methods, or what are said to be the methods, of all physical inquiry, to view through the glass of an accurate introspection this nebula of the ordinary vision, till it breaks into points, which laws, not their own, move hither and thither in the limited space which once seemed to be fulness. I do not assert that the self is not “resolvable” into coexistence and sequence of states of mind. I am far from denying that the I or the self is no more than “collective,” than a collection of sensations, and ideas, and emotions, and volitions swept together with one another and after one another by “the laws of association”; though I confess that to a mind, which is but little “inductive,” and which can not view the world wholly a posteriori, these things are very difficult even to picture, and altogether impossible in any way to understand.

We have dwelt too long on this matter. If the self is ignored in the psychology of our Determinists, or recognized in a sense which is not the vulgar sense, then responsibility and punishment and all the beliefs intellectual and moral, which hang from (as we have seen) and involve in their being the reality of the vulgar sense, with the non-reality thereof, fall and are destroyed; or survive, at most, in a form and a shape which, whatever and however much better it may be, is absolutely irreconcilable with the notions of the people. A criminal (in that view) is as “responsible” for his acts of last year as the Thames
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at London is responsible for an accident on the Isis at Oxford, and he is no more responsible. And to punish that criminal, in the vulgar sense, is to repeat the story of Xerxes and the Hellespont. It may be true that, by operating on a stream in one place, you may make that stream much better in all places lower down, and possibly also may influence other streams; but if you think that, because of this, the stream is punishable and the water responsible in anything like the way in which we use the words, then you do most grossly deceive yourselves. And our conclusion must be this, that of "the two great schools" which divide our philosophy, as the one, so the other stands out of relation to vulgar morality; that for both alike responsibility (as we believe in it) is a word altogether devoid of signification and impossible of explanation.

If the drawing of morals be not out of the fashion, it would seem that there are several morals, which here might well be drawn.

And the first is the vulgar one, that seeing all we have of philosophy looks away (to a higher sphere doubtless) from the facts of our unenlightened beliefs and our vulgar moralities, and since these moralities are what we most care about, therefore we also should leave these philosophers to themselves, nor concern ourselves at all with their lofty proceedings. This moral I think, on the whole, to be the best; though in our days perhaps it also is the hardest for all of us to practice.

And the moral which comes next is, of course, the philosophical one, that, seeing the vulgar are after all the vulgar, we should not be at pains to agree with their superstitions; but since philosophy is the opposite of no philosophy, we rather should esteem ourselves, according as our creed is different from, and hence is higher than theirs. And this moral, as for some persons it is the only one possible, so also I recommend it then as their certain road to an unmixed happiness.

But there remains still left a third moral, which, as I am informed, has been drawn by others; that if we are not able to rest with the vulgar, nor to shout in the battle of our two great schools, it might then be perhaps worth our while to remember that we live in an island, and that our national mind, if we do not enlarge it, may also grow insular; that not far from us there lies (they say so) a world of thought which, with all its variety, is neither one nor the other of our two

1 ["Two great philosophical schools." An ironical reference to Intuitionism and Empiricism, with the implication unfair that the one must stand for the Free-will doctrine and the other for Necessitarianism.—Fas.]

2 ["A world of thought . . . a philosophy which thinks, etc. . . . a philosophy, lastly, which we have all repudiated, etc."; i. e., the German Critical Philosophy, or Critical Idealism.—Ebs.]
philosophies, but whose battle is the battle of philosophy itself against two undying and opposite one-sidedness; a philosophy which thinks what the vulgar believe; a philosophy, lastly, which we all have refuted, and, having so cleared our consciences, which some of us at least might take steps to understand.

"Two undying and opposite one-sidedness;" i.e., Dogmatism and Scepticism ("Commonplace materialism"). The pursuit of Metaphysics, Mr. Bradley elsewhere maintains (Appearance and Reality, p. 5), will be justified so long as man is in danger of becoming a slave "either to stupid fanaticism or dishonest sophistry."—Eds.