Hearings

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Abstract

This article explores a constantly recurring procedural question: When is fact-finding improved by a live hearing, and when would it be better to rely on a written record? Unfortunately, when judges, lawyers, and rulemakers consider this issue, they are led astray by the widely shared—but false—assumption that a judge can best determine issues of credibility by viewing the demeanor of witnesses while they are testifying. In fact, a large body of scientific evidence indicates that judges are more likely to be deceived by lying or mistaken witnesses when observing their testimony in person than if the judges were to review a paper transcript of the testimony. Witness presence, in other words, may often harm, rather than improve, the accuracy of credibility assessments. The fact that legal actors value hearings for mistaken reasons does not mean that hearing have no value, but it does raise the concern that hearings will be employed when they are unneeded or even harmful, especially given the lack of available guidance on this question. In this article, I attempt to remedy this problem by providing a sound set of guiding principles concerning both the utility and the harms of live hearings.

Hearings will often, but not always, do more harm than good. In addition to the fact that demeanor cues generally impair, rather than aid, credibility judgments, there are a number of cognitive biases that may arise from having one’s first impressions of a witness be visual and auditory impressions. These include a persistent human tendency to trust or distrust witnesses based on their physical attractiveness, their social status,
their race, or other features that may make them similar to, or different than, the fact-finder. On the flip side, hearings may help a judge make sense of confusing evidence. In addition, live hearings often feel fairer to participants than paper-based decisions, due in large part to the desire to have expressive input in decisions that affect us. And occasionally, a live hearing may be preferable for reasons of cost or practicality.

In the end, it would be naïve to suggest that one procedure is preferable to the other in all possible circumstances. Instead, when deciding which procedure to favor, a decisionmaker should attend to the situational costs and benefits of each approach. To that end, I hope that the enumeration of relevant policy considerations in this article, and the application of those factors to a few demonstrative examples, may serve some use.
Introduction

In American civil procedure, some of our metaphors draw heavily on a shared cultural image: the civil jury trial. If we wish to say that a litigant has a right to exercise some personal control of the presentation of arguments and evidence in a proceeding that might affect her rights, we say that she has the right to her “day in court”\(^1\)—even though the vast majority of cases are resolved by settlement or by pre-trial motion, rather than by a trial.\(^2\) Likewise, when we refer to a person’s due process

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right to make arguments to a court, we say that he has a right “to be heard,” even though the litigant (and even his counsel) may participate in those proceedings by many other means than speaking to the court.

The language of procedure, it appears, is permeated with a presumption of presence—a default assumption that adjudication of a dispute requires the physical, visual, and aural immediacy furnished by a traditional trial environment. This assumption persists despite the fact that many case-resolutions occur due to motion practice or private settlement negotiations that deviate widely from the presence-based model of a trial. Once we have noticed this default assumption, a question should present itself: How well is the legal system served by a procedural mindset that automatically equates “in person” procedures with “fair” procedures?

I aim to explore that question in this article. It is a question that legal decisionmakers must answer implicitly on a nearly constant basis—to the extent that the question becomes a form of legal white noise. The litigating attorney must decide whether to ask for an evidentiary hearing; the judge must decide when to grant one; the rulemaker must decide what (if any) rules are necessary to guide the judge’s discretion. Each time, someone is relying on a set of assumptions about whether the presence of the parties, and the sights and sounds of live testimony, are a help or a hindrance. And precisely because legal actors must so often decide what value to place on in-person procedure, any defects in their decisionmaking in this area are likely to be magnified into large systemic effects when seen from a distance. Small introductions of error or dissatisfaction—aggregated across the entire system—may lead to large-scale inefficiencies or inequities.

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Despite the frequent affirmation of the value of presence in the fact-finding process by legal thinkers—sometimes metaphorically and sometimes directly—we shall see that hearings sometimes aid, but often hinder, the fair adjudication of disputes in legal forums. In the sections that follow, I aim to establish the following propositions. First, legal decisionmakers are regularly forced to decide whether a hearing is useful in a particular circumstance, or in a particular class of cases. But despite the ubiquity of this question, the utility of hearings is poorly understood by judges and under-theorized by academics. Most judges assume that hearings increase accuracy by adding the demeanor of witnesses into the informational environment, thereby increasing their ability to tell whether a witness is being deceptive or inaccurate. But in fact, demeanor cues are more likely to mislead judges than to edify them; demeanor, in other words, is a tool that liars use to make themselves appear more credible. Moreover, hearings introduce other sources of bias that may lead decisionmaking astray. Viewing a witness in person may encourage a judge to unconsciously credit or distrust testimony based on factors that have little to do with accuracy, including a desire to affiliate with high status or attractive witnesses or an innate tendency to trust witnesses who are members of one's own social in-group more than out-group individuals.

But this does not mean that hearings are without value. Despite the concerns expressed above, hearings can aid in accurate decisionmaking if they add factual information that would be absent from a paper record—such as through a successful cross-examination of a poorly prepared witness. Furthermore, hearings may sometimes be a lower-cost method of deciding a dispute, depending on the state of the evidentiary record when a decision must be made. And hearings also have “softer” values that the legal system cannot afford to ignore: They are part of a process that
signals to litigants that the legal system respects their dignity as persons even when it rejects their arguments. Such signals are an important way that the legal system projects an aura of legitimacy and thereby obtains public compliance with the law. To decide whether a hearing is useful in a given situation, we must weigh these concerns of objective accuracy, subjective legitimacy, and cost against each other. By doing so, we shall see that many of our standard assumptions about when hearings are useful and when they are not have little to recommend them.

This article will proceed in five parts. First, I will attempt to show the relevance of the question under discussion, by illustrating the ways that practitioners, judges, and rulemakers depend on their ability to accurately assess the value of hearings. Second, I will discuss the costs and benefits that hearings can impose on our ability to reach accurate determinations in the face of conflicting evidence. Third, I will examine the normative and practical factors that may counsel in favor of hearings, even when they might add inaccuracy or expense. Fourth, I will discuss the effect of hearings on litigation costs. Lastly, I will attempt to demonstrate how these concerns play out in several real-world situations in which judges must evaluate the utility of in-person procedures.

I: A Tale of Three Decisionmakers

The question explored in this article—whether a hearing will be an aid or a hindrance to decisionmaking in a given context—has relevance for participants at every level of the legal system. Lawyers must rely on a theory of hearings (even if it is an implicit one) in order to make many decisions regarding litigation strategy. Likewise, judges are often called upon to decide whether a hearing is valuable in the
context of a particular case, and procedural rulemakers must make more general
decisions about the utility of hearings for particular types of judicial decisions. Often,
the decisionmaker in question may not realize that a value-laden choice is being made,
in part because the decision is one that is made so routinely. But the very ubiquity of
the decision means that small errors in assessing the costs and benefits of hearings can
be magnified into substantial problems when viewed from a systemic perspective.

A lawyer must decide how much value she places on in-person procedure at the
very outset of litigation. For one thing, she must decide whether she wishes to
demand a jury trial, in cases in which one is available, within fourteen days of the last
relevant pleading.\footnote{See U.S. Const. Am. VII; FRCP 38(b).} In making this decision, one important consideration is the value
placed on a live trial. In bench-trial cases, courts will sometimes agree to reach a
decision based only on a paper record, dispensing entirely with a live trial.\footnote{E.g., Muller v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2003); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).} No
parallel practice exists with respect to jury-trial cases, however. So our hypothetical
attorney makes an implicit decision regarding the value of a hearing when she decides
whether or not to seek a trial by jury, and later in the case when she decides whether to
seek a paper trial.\footnote{To dispel any confusion, I must make clear that the value of in-person procedure is
only one of many factors that will or should bear on the jury-trial-waiver question. For example, in some cases, lawyers may believe that a jury will view their case more favorably
than a judge would—or vice versa. Likewise, lawyers may prefer a live bench trial over a live
jury trial for cost reasons, without regard to the possible availability of a paper-trial procedure.}

Furthermore, our lawyer will reprise this decision many times during her
lawsuit. The federal rules of procedure and evidence require judges to make many
non-dispositive findings of fact in advance of trial: For instance, judges may need to

\footnote{4}{See U.S. Const. Am. VII; FRCP 38(b).}

\footnote{5}{E.g., Muller v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2003); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).}

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decide whether to certify a class action,\(^7\) whether to admit scientific evidence,\(^8\) or whether to suppress evidence due to a violation of the Fourth Amendment.\(^9\) But because a court will often have discretion as to whether or not it needs to hold a hearing in order to make such decisions,\(^10\) an attorney has the option of seeking to have these decisions made either in person or on a paper record.

Judges, of course, are forced to address these concerns as well. In some cases, of course, the choice between hearing procedures and paper procedures will have been made for them. For instance, a judge has no discretion to deny a jury trial once demanded by a party in a proper case.\(^11\) Similarly, local rules or circuit precedent may constrain the ability of judges to decide pretrial matters in the manner of their choosing.\(^12\) But often, a judge will have no authority to rely upon, and instead he will be forced to weigh the costs and benefits of a hearing.\(^13\)

But judges may be relying on implicit assumptions about the value of live hearings even when the issue is not explicitly presented. Quite often, a judge might

\(^7\) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

\(^8\) See Fed. R. Evid. 702.

\(^9\) See U.S. Const. amend. IV.

\(^10\) See 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1785 (class action certification); Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 7.17 (Daubert inquiry); 1A Wright et al, supra n. ??, at § 194 (suppression hearings).


\(^12\) See, e.g., Merrill v. Southern Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that Fifth Circuit precedent requires District Courts to hold evidentiary hearings whenever a class certification is not “free from doubt”).

\(^13\) Compare Gingras v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 2007 WL 1052500 (N.D. Ill., 2007) (declining to try a case on a paper record despite the parties’ stipulation to such a procedure), with Migliorisi v. Walgreens Disability Benefits Plan, 2008 WL 904883 (N.D. Ill., 2008) (employing a paper-based decision procedure in a case involving credibility disputes).
find that a case falls within a zone of ambiguity when applying a rule that may either
dispose of that case, or allow it to proceed to a bench or jury trial.\textsuperscript{14} When legal
questions become close, policy judgments may begin to play a larger role in the
decisionmaking,\textsuperscript{15} so a judge in such a position might be influenced by her
assumptions as to whether the additional proceedings are likely to improve the
accuracy of the case’s outcome.

Similarly, judges regularly review the work of other judges and decisionmakers.
In this context, they must apply rules of deference, which instruct them to give extra
weight to decisions that followed a hearing.\textsuperscript{16} Such rules are necessarily
underdeterminative; they can tell judges to defer, but they cannot say exactly when
decference must give way to the reviewing court’s own judgment in a particular case.
The gap must necessarily be filled by recourse to judicial judgment, and that judgment

\textsuperscript{14} For example, summary judgment decisions may often hinge on whether a particular
dispute is characterized as a question of fact, which a court must view “in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party,” see Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009), or a
question of law, to which no such rule of restraint applies. Deciding whether a particular
dispute is one of fact, or law, or the application of law to fact will often involve a surprising
amount of practical judicial discretion, given that “the journey from a pure question of fact to a
pure question of law is one of subtle gradations rather than one marked by a rigid divide.”
Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd. 63 F.3d 1227, 1235 (3d Cir.
1995).

\textsuperscript{15} See Ward Farnsworth et al., \textit{Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal
Interpretation}, J. Legal Anal. (forthcoming 2010) (draft at 23-24) (noting that, when a legal text
may be read seen as “ambiguous” in some senses but not in others, interpreters may be
influenced by policy preferences when deciding whether to call it “ambiguous” or “clear”).

\textsuperscript{16} See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive” upon review in an
action in federal court to set aside the Commissioner’s decision); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(providing that, when a Court of Appeals reviews an immigration decision, “the
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (instructing “reviewing
court[s] [to] give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility”
and to affirm trial court findings unless they are “clearly erroneous”).
will be informed, either implicitly or explicitly\textsuperscript{17}, by the reviewing court’s impression of the value of the differing vantage point of the first court.

Finally, rulemakers (whether acting as rule drafters\textsuperscript{18} or when voting to approve or reject proposed rules\textsuperscript{19}) must wrestle with these concerns as well. In some instances, they take explicit stances regarding the value of hearings: For example, Civil Rule 52(a)(6) admonishes appellate courts to defer to trial-court findings of fact and pay “due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility,” which is, in effect, a codification of the assumption that in-person proceedings are likely to be more accurate than a review of the record.

In theory, rulemakers can require hearings, forbid them, or leave the decision to the discretion of judges. Most often, the rules say nothing with respect to whether hearings are preferred to paper decisionmaking, which is effectively an election in favor of the third option. By saying nothing, a rulemaker signals one of two things: Either the decision is not important enough to warrant a rule, or an ex ante rule is likely to be of lower quality than a contextualized exercise of judicial discretion. Either way, however, a committee making rules that govern the litigation environment must

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 788 (2008) (Easterbrook, J.) (providing an unusually nuanced assessment of the differing perspectives and capabilities of an immigration judge and an appellate court with respect to determinations of an asylum applicant’s credibility).

\textsuperscript{18} See Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 Va. L. Rev. ??? (forthcoming 2010) (describing the rulemaking process established by 28 U.S.C. §2073, which delegates the drafting of rules to advisory committees made up of delegates from the federal bench of bar, and noting that in practice, the drafting of rules often involves a dialogue between these advisory committees and the Federal Judicial Conference’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure, and Evidence).

\textsuperscript{19} See id. at ??? (noting that the proposed rules drafted by an advisory committee must pass through a number of veto gates, and that the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress all have the ability to stop a rule from going into effect).
constantly take some sort of stand as to either the value of presence specifically, or the superiority of judges in determining the best decisionmaking environment for each particular case-context.

Because so many actors, at so many levels of the legal system, must regularly refer to a theory of hearings, even a small upgrade to their ability to accurately weigh the relevant costs and benefits can have large consequences when aggregated across the litigation system. Unfortunately, however, such decisions are often made unreflectively and from the gut, and (in part because of the relative silence of rulemakers) without much guidance from authoritative sources. As a result, we have little reason to be confident that the average legal actor's concept of a hearing's advantages and disadvantages is well tuned. Indeed, as we shall see, close attention to this question shows that judges and rulemakers regularly rely on intuitions that are at best dubious, and at worst factually false, when thinking about these questions.

II. **Objective Fairness: The Accuracy Value**

Few values are as fundamental to our system of adjudication as accuracy—the interest in reaching outcomes that correctly describe events in the real world. For this reason, when a judge or rulemaker must decide whether to permit hearings on a particular topic, the focus is often on the degree to which a hearing is likely to produce a more accurate decision. Unfortunately, some of the intuitions on which the legal system relies regarding the relationship between hearings and accuracy are not sound.

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Although it is often presumed that hearings generally make a decision more accurate, the reality is that a hearing will sometimes promote accurate decisions, and sometimes undermine decision quality, based on case-specific factors.

*Judicial Intuitions Concerning the Value of Demeanor Evidence*

One of the most commonly stated intuitions regarding the utility of in-person procedures is that they aid fact-finders in determining whether witnesses are testifying credibly. This assumption has a long history in the law. At one time, the superiority of visual examination seemed so obvious that many courts refused to seat blind people as jurors: “[S]urely,” reflected one court, “no one who cannot see the expression of faces, nor observe deportment and demeanor, can justly weigh testimony.”\(^\text{21}\) Dean Wigmore, in his treatise on judicial proof, endorsed a similar principle: “[N]o intentional derogation from the truth can take place without a tendency to muscular contractions or expansions, phenomena of inhibition or excitation.”\(^\text{22}\)

This belief has gained wide purchase in American law.\(^\text{23}\) One author, discussing the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, noted that “[t]here is . . . a secondary advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the witness: the judge and the jury are enabled to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness’ deportment while testifying . . . .”\(^\text{24}\) Such views persist today: The Supreme Court has suggested that a witness, when facing a live defendant, may be “confound[ed]” and

\(^{21}\) Rhodes v. State, 27 N.W. 866 (Ind. 1891).

\(^{22}\) Wigmore, Principles of Judicial Proof 493 (2d ed. 1931) (quoting G.L. Duprat, Le Mesonge: etude de psychologie (2d ed. 1909)).

\(^{23}\) *But cf.* Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 788 (2008) (Easterbrook, J.) (providing what may be the only significant counterexample to the judicial trend approving of the probative value of demeanor evidence as a credibility signal).

\(^{24}\) Wigmore on Evid. § 1395 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974).
reveal his deceptive intent through visual cues such as “studiously” avoiding the defendant’s gaze.\textsuperscript{25} Guided by such considerations, the Second Circuit has suggested that the right of confrontation is impaired when jurors cannot see a witness’s eyes, but that such defects can be mitigated if they can at least observe a witness’s “body language.”\textsuperscript{26}

Similarly, courts have focused on a witness’s appearance as a guide to accuracy as well as sincerity. In rejecting expert testimony regarding the relationship between a witness’s confidence regarding an eyewitness identification and the reliability of that identification, the Second Circuit noted that “assessing witness credibility” was a fundamental part of a jury’s role, and that in order to assess the reliability of an identification, a jury should consider “a witness’s demeanor on the stand, including his or her confidence.”\textsuperscript{27}

This view is articulated most directly when judges consider whether it is appropriate to hold a “trial on the papers” by the consent of the parties. In his article advocating an expanded use of this device, Magistrate Judge Denlow issued a word of caution: “In an instance when a credibility determination is at the heart of the case, a waiver of the right to bring in live witnesses does not make sense” because “a judge . . . can best decide credibility by seeing the witnesses.”\textsuperscript{28} This view has been echoed by other judges: In a case where the “parties place great weight on the credibility of their


\textsuperscript{26} Morales v. Artuz, 281 F.3d 55 (concluding that a witness could testify while wearing dark sunglasses without violating the Confrontation Clause, so long as the jury could observe other aspects of her demeanor).

\textsuperscript{27} U.S. v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).

own doctors in contrast to the alleged bias of the other party's physicians,” one district court judge decided to hold a hearing despite the fact that both parties preferred a paper trial, stating that “it simply is not possible for the Court to make the credibility determinations the parties argue are necessary by reviewing only the paper record.”

The Reality: Demeanor Evidence Undercuts the Accuracy of Credibility Judgments

Unfortunately, the widespread assumption that fact-finders can improve their credibility assessments by attending to demeanor is false. In fact, demeanor evidence is a poor tool for detecting either deliberate deception or mistaken recollection. Rather, a substantial body of social science evidence indicates that visually observing witnesses at best contributes nothing to aid a credibility determination and at worst increases the likelihood of credibility-determination errors.

Studies consistently show that the average person's success rate in detecting a lie while watching the liar is little better than chance. Nor is this situation greatly changed by expertise: Law enforcement officials, mental health professionals, and (most pertinent to the current investigation) judges can detect a lie based on visual cues at levels only slightly exceeding chance.

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30 Charles F. Bond & Bella M. DePaulo, *Accuracy of Deception Judgments*, 10 Personality & Soc. Psych. Rev. 214, 229-30 (2006) (concluding, in a meta-analysis of over 200 deception studies, that both experts and non-experts have an accuracy rate below 55%, with no significant gain being realized by expertise); Paul Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan, *Who Can Catch a Liar*, 46 Am. Psychologist 913, 916 (1990) (examining a number of occupations, including judges, polygraphists, police detectives, Secret Service agents, and psychiatrists, and finding an accuracy rate of approximately 55% for all groups except the Secret Service, who had a slightly higher accuracy rate of 65%). Ekman and O'Sullivan later conducted a study that purported to show that experts could achieve heightened levels of accuracy; this study selected groups of experts (including psychologists, judges, and law enforcement investigators) who had “special interest and expertise” in detecting deception and who had attended special workshops on detecting deception. See Paul Ekman, Maureen O'Sullivan, & Mark G. Frank, *A Few Can Catch a Liar*, 10 Psych. Sci. 263, 263–64 (1999). This study found accuracy rates as high as 73% (among federal officers with special deception-detection
At first blush, this information may seem counterintuitive to many. It may seem natural to assume that we are good at detecting liars. Indeed, we depend upon this skill to a great extent in our everyday lives, in that we assume we would be able to tell the difference if we were being deceived. The problem, however, is that liars can easily introspect on the cues that they would look for to determine sincerity, and fake them. Simply put, the average person is a better feigner of sincerity than detector of sincerity. One pair of researchers, summarizing a meta-analysis of existing studies, framed the problem as follows:

[While] laypeople believe that certain nonverbal behaviors are strongly associated with deception, these beliefs are actually diametrically opposed to those observed to be indicators of deception in experimental studies. For example, although people generally believe that deception is accompanied by an increase in hand movements as well as in foot and leg movements and nodding, these behaviors actually decrease when people are lying. . . . [Although] people assume that blinks, illustrators, and postural shifts increase when people are lying, . . . there seems to be no association with these behaviors in this meta-analysis. Only for some behaviors do beliefs match the direction of the associations observed—perhaps a decrease in (genuine) smiles. Nonetheless, even with these behaviors, the magnitude of the association is assumed to be much stronger than it actually is . . . .

experience who had attended a day-long workshop on the topic), and other deception-interested groups who had attended such workshops also showed detection rates above 60% (local sheriffs, federal judges, and clinical psychologists). Id. at 265. Subsequent investigators have cautioned, however, that the “results of training studies are mixed,” with some studies showing a training improvement, others showing no effects, and still others showing that training actually impairs lie detection. Albert Vrij, Criteria-Based Content Analysis, 11 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 3, 22 (2005); see also Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 Psych. Sci. in the Public Interest 33, 38 (2004) (describing studies in which training lowered the quality of deception judgments while raising the confidence of the trained subjects that their judgments were correct). The overall picture appears to be consistent with the DePaulo & Bond meta-analysis: Neither lie-detection training or professional experience with lie-detection are reliably associated with accuracy improvements.

In short, most of us do not know what to look for to visually detect deception, and we have not yet developed reliable training methods that overcome this limitation.

The story is likewise grim when we consider testimony that is not outright deceptive, but rather mistaken. “Numerous studies have [shown] that subject jurors are unable to do better than chance in distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identifications, and that the jurors accord inappropriate weight to witness confidence.”

Simply stated, the problem is that people tend to over-rely on witness confidence as a proxy for witness accuracy. Unfortunately, confidence appears to be poorly correlated with accuracy in testimony, so this reliance leads us astray.

**Addressing the Demeanor-Evidence Problem**

Scholars who have confronted this disparity between judicial assumptions and cognitive reality have mainly fallen into two camps. Some have attempted to find ways to minimize the degree of error induced by reliance on demeanor from the hearing process. Jeremy Blumenthal, for example, urges that the problem could be partially overcome by hiding witnesses behind screens, or else by instructing juries to

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32 Olin Guy Wellborn III, *Demeanor*, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1075, 1089 (1991) (collecting studies); see Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, *Judging the Jury* 128 (1986). Nor does the situation improve when real attorneys are recruited to subject the mistaken witnesses to cross-examination. In one study, 178 participants viewed mock trials in which accurate and inaccurate witnesses were subjected to the full panoply of examination, cross-examination, and redirect examination, without time limit. The results were unsettling: Accurate eyewitnesses persuaded 68% of mock jurors to convict the identified person of a “crime,” but mistaken eyewitnesses were slightly more convincing, leading 70% of mock jurors to support conviction of the mis-identified person. *See id.* (reporting the results of R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells & Fergus O’Connor, *Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses*, 13 Law and Hum. Behav. 333 (1989)).

33 See Weingardt et al., *Viewing Eyewitness Research from a Metacognitive Perspective*, in *Metacognition* 157, 164 (Metcalf & Shimura eds., 1994) (reporting that “much research on eyewitness identification has consistently found very weak correlations” between witness accuracy and witness confidence).
base credibility judgments on what a witness says and the way in which they say it, but not on how they appear while speaking. But this advice has limited utility for two reasons: First, Blumenthal relies significantly on the assumption that tone of voice is a “leaky” channel, which will betray deceptive intent despite a liar’s attempts to conceal his emotional state. But a meta-analysis of deception-detection studies indicates that judges who rely on audio recordings in trying to detect lies do not significantly out-perform those who rely only on transcripts. There is no reason to think, therefore, that the vocal presence of witnesses will make a trial-behind-a-screen more accurate than a trial-on-the-papers. Second, by focusing almost entirely on the jury trial environment, Blumenthal looks at a context that is both limiting (because the Seventh Amendment and tradition constrain decisionmakers from dispensing with presence) and rare (because very few cases are disposed of by jury trial in the modern system). So he does not ask the question explored here: Do the limits of demeanor evidence undercut the accuracy rationale for holding a hearing altogether?

To date, two scholars have addressed this question, although both have focused primarily on the trial environment, rather than the wider variety of situations in which a hearing might be employed to help a court reach a decision. Max Minzner responds to the demeanor deficit by noting that “while liars do not give off demeanor cues, they do tell stories that are less logical, less consistent, and contain fewer details than those of truth tellers.” This claim finds some support in the experimental literature.

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34 See Blumenthal, supra n.??, at 1201-02.
35 See Bond & DePaulo 2006, supra n. ??, at 225.
36 See Galanter, supra n. ??, at 482-84; Hadfield, supra n. ??, at 730.
Indeed, the field of Statement Validity Analysis has responded to the experimental evidence by shifting an investigator's focus from demeanor cues to content-based cues, with judges relying on transcripts produced by an initial interview, and has produced higher (although far from stellar) rates of accurate lie detection. Minzner therefore concludes that juries may be fairly accurate when they rely on contextual cues or well-calibrated prior probabilities that a witness is lying, even if they will sometimes generate unreliable decisions by relying on demeanor. But although this reasoning undercuts the fear that the legal system will never be able to distinguish truths from lies due to the unreliability of demeanor evidence, it does not give a reason to prefer in-person to absent procedures.

Olin Wellborn is the only scholar who has directly argued that in-person procedures are superior to absent ones despite the problem of demeanor evidence. In his view, the fact that “live testimony does not enhance credibility judgments does not imply that a trial with live testimony is not the best kind of trial.” He suggests several alternative values to live trials: Such proceedings may “deter dishonest witnesses . . . who would lie in a deposition [but who] may balk at lying in public, in a courtroom, in

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38 See, e.g., Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to Deception, 129 Psych. Bulletin 74, 102 (2003) (finding that “liars were generally less forthcoming than truth tellers, . . . [that] their tales were less compelling” to listeners, and that they “provided fewer details than did truth tellers”).

39 See Vrij, supra n. ??, at 24 (finding, in a meta-analysis of relevant studies, an average accuracy rate of 73% for detecting truths, and 72% for detecting lies). Cf. Bond & DePaulo 2006, supra n. ??, at 229 (both experts and non-experts have below a 55% accuracy rate in discriminating between truths and lies when viewing a video sample that includes demeanor cues).

40 See Minzner, supra n. ??, at 2578.

41 See Wellborn, supra n. ??, at 1092. He argues that recognition of the demeanor problem should lead instead to a modest reduction in the deference that appellate courts apply when they review trial-court fact-finding, as well as to a liberalized use of deposition evidence at trial, among other recommendations. See id. at 1094-99.
the physical presence of the opponent, judge, and the jury." He also notes that live testimony may be necessary for the perception of accurate adjudication even if it does not further actual accuracy—a point we shall return to later.

Wellborn’s first point—that hearings may enhance accuracy even if they do not aid credibility determinations—deserves further development. His argument from witness deterrence is at best speculative, because we have little data on the degree to which witnesses who are willing to lie on an affidavit or while being deposed would refuse to repeat the performance in front of a judge. Moreover, this argument has little purchase in the many cases where deception is less of an obstacle to fact finding than unintentional gaps or errors in witness memory. Indeed, we might question whether a witness with a faulty memory is likely to be more persuasive in a hearing setting than in a deposition, due to increased preparation and rehearsal of testimony before the more formal proceeding.43

But leaving deterrence of deception aside, there are other ways that live testimony may contribute to accuracy. Deception is most likely to be detected by reference to the content of a witness’s claims, and by comparison of that content to

42 See id. at 1092.

43 See Weingardt et al., supra n. ??, at 183 (noting that witnesses who are exposed to false information after an event “consistently demonstrate overconfidence” when recalling their perceptions). In the study reported, many witnesses exposed to contradictory information following an observed event expressed certainty regarding their recollections, even though their actual rates of accurate recollection were below chance. Id. at 177; cf. id. at 178 (noting that witnesses who were not exposed to inaccurate information had high rates of calibration between confidence and accuracy, with “certain” witnesses being correct approximately 90% of the time). As a result, those witnesses who have developed false recollections as a result of contamination by other sources or attorney suggestion during testimony preparation may exploit the “confidence equals accuracy” decisionmaking heuristic, and thereby seem more credible than they should. As confidence is likely to be a more salient characteristic in a live hearing, and as confidence is likely to increase as testimony is rehearsed before such a hearing, this concern becomes especially significant in that setting.
other evidence. Several features of live examination can further this process. First, a relatively unprepared witness can be encouraged to commit himself to one version of a fabricated account, only to be subsequently confronted by contradictory information. Such tactics, when employed in investigative situations, have sometimes been able to produce a high rate of deception detection by inducing and probing inconsistencies in fabricated accounts. But there is an important caveat to this account: This “evidence confrontation” strategy relies on the witness being surprised by the direction taken in the examination. If a witness is well-prepared for the encounter and can anticipate the questions that the investigator is likely to ask, it is doubtful that the confrontation strategy will be as useful.

We should therefore be wary of presuming that cross-examination adds significant value for deception detection when a witness has had an opportunity to prepare for the encounter and knows the questions that are likely to be asked. This means that the advantages of hearings for detecting deception will vary situationally; questions asked of an unprepared witness before the two sides have exchanged significant discovery may be very revealing. On the other hand, if a witness has previously been deposed, and has been prepared for the encounter by an attorney who can easily anticipate the directions that questioning is likely to take, the encounter may

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44 See Minzner, supra n. ??, at 2569.

45 See id. (noting that this effect relies upon an “informational advantage” on the part of the interrogator); Chris William Sanchirico, “What Makes the Engine Go?”: Cognitive Limits and Cross-Examination, 14 Widener L. Rev. 507 (2008) (noting that “[c]onstructing testimony on the fly is considerably more difficult” than preparing for questions in advance, and that unanticipated questions are the hardest for insincere witnesses to answer without giving up the game); see also DePaulo et al. 2003, supra n. ??, at 103 (noting that planned presentations of deceptive testimony are generally harder to detect).

46 See Sanchiro, supra n. ??, at 521 (urging that it is “crucial” that cross-examination questions be unanticipated if we desire to place insincere witnesses in a situation where they are likely to slip up).
reveal little. Indeed, the earlier deposition transcript may be more revealing than the subsequent examination; the witness may have since crafted explanations of earlier inconsistencies that make deceptive content harder, rather than easier, to detect.

Even when live testimony is unlikely to aid in the detection of deception or error, however, it may increase the accuracy of decisions in a different way. Decisionmaking can be limited not just by inaccurate or deceptive evidence, but also by confusing evidence. Available depositions or affidavits may dodge important questions, or presume an understanding of contextual information that a judge does not in fact possess. At a hearing, a judge can interpose her own questions, pinning down a witness on an important point or requiring a lawyer to explain a complex transaction. Likewise, the additional preparation that may occur before a hearing may allow parties to find ways to communicate complex information in more digestible ways. So hearings have an accuracy benefits that are unrelated to deception or witness error: They allow the clarification of a confusing record through interaction between the judge and the witnesses and advocates, and they allow advocates to present complicated information in ways that may be more intuitive and understandable for generalist judges.

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47 See id.; Robert P. Burns, A Theory of the Trial 65 & n.83 (1999) (noting that a witness’s ability to resist the impulse to be led by a cross-examining attorney into what appear to be self-serving contradictory statements is a central means by which the witness can appear credible, and that witness preparation is a key means of ensuring that this consistency is produced).

48 See Fed. R. Evid. 614 (permitting a court to conduct its own examination of witnesses sua sponte, whether those witnesses were called by a party or by the court itself).

49 See Federal Practice Manual for Legal Aid Attorneys 148 (suggesting that oral arguments may be particularly useful when a case “hinges on complicated concepts”).

50 See Steven Lubet, Modern Trial Advocacy: Analysis and Practice 379-80 (2004) (describing the ways that advocates can employ devices such as models, maps, diagrams, graphs, and charts to clarify spatial relationships, complicated timelines, or financial information).
The Biasing Effects of Witness Appearance

Finally, however, there is one more cost we must weigh in the accuracy balance: In addition to distorting fact-finding through the introduction of unreliable demeanor evidence, hearings may impede accurate fact-finding by introducing biases for or against particular witnesses. Two forms of bias are particularly worrisome in this context. The first is the innate human tendency to associate one type of positive trait with other positive traits that a person might possess, and to do likewise with negative traits. The second is the human impulse to view members of our social in-groups favorably while seeing members of out-groups in a darker light.

The first form of bias—often referred to as the “halo effect”—invokes our innate “tendency to assume that like goes with like” so that “[s]alient information (such as height or attractiveness) activates positive or negative associations that color how people process everything else they learn about an individual.”\footnote{Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1252, 1266-67 (2005).} Early impressions of a person can induce us to like or dislike an individual, and those mental attitudes may color many of our subsequent evaluations of that person.

In one early study, for instance, a researcher provided study participants with a list of characteristics possessed by a hypothetical individual. Each participant read a list containing the same overall mix of traits, but some lists described the favorable characteristics before the negative ones, while other lists fronted the bad news. Simply varying the order in which people read these traits generated a “considerable difference” in the participants descriptions of the hypothetical person: Starting with positive traits resulted in an impression of a “predominantly . . . able person who possesses certain shortcomings which do not, however, overshadow his merits,” while
reversing the order led to the person being perceived “as a ‘problem,’ whose abilities are hampered by his serious difficulties.” So the mere fact that certain information is learned before other information can radically affect the final picture we will arrive at even when the differently ordered information is identical.

One way to account for this tendency is as an example of confirmation bias, our tendency to “seek information that . . . support[s] [our] . . . existing beliefs and to interpret information in ways that are partial to those . . . beliefs.” Especially when looking at ambiguous evidence, we are likely to draw inferences in favor of the view we currently think is most likely. This “primacy effect” leads us to “form an opinion early in a process and then evaluate subsequently acquired information in a way that is partial to that opinion.” To the extent that our initial impressions rest on a shaky foundation—such as the mental tendency to relate positively valued surface characteristics, such as beauty or social status, with valuable underlying characteristics, like intelligence or honesty—we may skew our resulting judgments of witness credibility or party culpability based on irrelevancies.

52 Solomon Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. Abnormal Psych. and Social Psych. 258, 270 (1948).


54 Nickerson, supra n. ??, at 177.

55 Another way to characterize the conflict between initial impressions and fair evaluations of witness credibility may be drawn from persuasion theory. In one model of social informational processing, known as the “Heuristic-Systematic Model,” people have two overlapping cognitive systems that can be employed in order to evaluate the credibility of a message. “Systematic processing” involves a “comprehensive analytic” attempt to “evaluate the validity of an advocated position by scrutinizing the persuasive information and relating this information to their previous knowledge of the persuasion issue.” Alexander Todorov, Shelly Chaiken, & Marlone D. Henderson, The Heuristic-Systematic Model of Social Information
A number of characteristics might activate the primacy effect in a way that would cast doubt on the accuracy of fact-finding. Perhaps the most studied form of the halo effect is the physical appearance bias: In study after study, people who form impressions of others based on photos presume that physically attractive people possess other desirable qualities as well; we unconsciously link traits such as kindness, intelligence, and honesty with beauty. This leads to a skew in fact-finding, documented in many contexts. “Unattractive litigants receive higher sentences and lower damage awards in simulated legal proceedings, while attractive litigants have an advantage.”

Physical attractiveness is unlikely to be the only source of bias introduced by Processing, in The Persuasion Handbook: Developments in Theory and Practice 195, 197 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds. 2002). When people engage in “heuristic processing,” by contrast, they take a less analytic approach, focusing on easily accessible information that “enables them to use simple decision rules or heuristics” to decide whether to trust a message. Either cognitive system may be invoked in a particular situation, depending on the context in which a person hears a message. Two such contextual factors are most relevant here: To the degree that a message is ambiguous (that is, it neither clearly supports nor clearly contradicts a conclusion) and to the degree that a source is initially perceived as credible, a person evaluating that message becomes more likely to rely on heuristic processing. See Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 460, 469 (1994). As a result, the initial credibility judgment is more likely to control the final view of message validity (due to a “trustworthy source = trustworthy message” heuristic), in part due to a partial substitution of heuristic reasoning for a systematic evaluation of message content, and in part due to a biasing effect of the initial heuristic judgment on the systematic reasoning process itself. Applied to the context of hearing-based decisionmaking, this suggests that a decisionmaker who receives a favorable initial impression of a witness’s credibility due to surface features may subsequently give lowered scrutiny to the coherence of the witness’s message and may be biased towards a pro-credibility finding to the extent that the content is actually analyzed.


Deborah Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1038 (2009) (collecting studies); cf. Patry, Attractive but Guilty, 102 Psych. Reports 727, 728 (2008) (noting the general effect, but adding the caveat that defendants who “used their attractiveness in the execution of a crime” may be punished more harshly than otherwise-similar, less-attractive defendants).
hearings, however. Other socially valued attributes may create a similar “halo effect” and induce a fact-finder to credit one witness more than another. Indicators of high social status, including a witness’s race, gender, clothing, level of grooming, occupation, and style of speech, increase the likelihood that a fact-finder will view a witness as credible.  

Although it may be hard to totally conceal social status from a factfinder—we can expect a judge to learn such information from the sound of a witness’s voice or even from the information that can be gleaned from a written record—we may still be concerned that the primacy effect will amplify the power of such information in particular settings. Social status may be gleaned from a written record, but it is unlikely to be the first thing a judge will encounter; in a hearing, such information may be conveyed long before a witness takes the stand. So, while realizing that we can never avoid halo effects entirely, we should nevertheless number them as among the factors that could make hearing-based fact-finding less accurate than a paper-based process.

The other form of bias that might concern us is the tendency to favor in-groups over out-groups. “In intergroup contexts people generally behave so as to gain or maintain an advantage for their own group over other groups in terms of resources, status, prestige, and so forth.” Over time, we develop schema for particular groups, which color our subsequent interactions with those groups. The ways such schema may influence factfinding is as varied as a list of the factors that constitute our personal

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58 Tanford & Tanford, Better Trials Through Science, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 741, 750 (1988); Hans & Vidmar, supra n. ??, at 137 (noting that “we evaluate a person’s credibility by her or her speech style” and that styles of speaking are often associated with the sex, social class, or ethnic background of the speaker).


identities.

Factors such as race provide noteworthy examples of problematic in-group bias. In testing designed to probe unconscious associations between a defendant’s race and his innocence, participants “held implicit associations between Black and Guilty,” and those associations “predicted judgments of ambiguous evidence as more indicative of guilt.”\textsuperscript{61} Note that although this effect might be explained to some extent by the halo effect—whiteness may be a marker of high status that induces positive associations for white and black people alike—the use of implicit association tests shows a more mixed picture, in which, although Caucasians generally associate whiteness with positive characteristics (because the halo effect and the in-group effect reinforce each other), black people have more mixed results, with some individuals associating blackness with badness and others reversing the association.\textsuperscript{62}

Similar effects might be expected for other traits. Female judges, for instance, are more likely than male judges to rule in favor of (predominantly female) sex discrimination litigants.\textsuperscript{63} Likewise, we might worry that fact-finders will favor those who hold similar social or political views.\textsuperscript{64}

It is important to qualify the significance of these sources of bias. Judges may be

\textsuperscript{61} Levinson et al., \textit{Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias}, Ohio St. J. Crim. L. (forthcoming 2010).

\textsuperscript{62} Rachlinski et al., \textit{Unconscious Racial Bias}, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1195, 1199-1200 (2009); \textit{see also} Hans & Vidmar, \textit{supra} n. ??, at 137-38 (noting that in close cases, race can be a factor in decisionmaking, but that the direction of the effect may vary depending on whether the jury members are of the same or of a different race than the defendant).

\textsuperscript{63} Schneider, \textit{The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation}, 59 Rutgers L. Rev. 705, 769 (2007). In-group bias is only one possible explanation for this data, of course. It is also possible that differing life experiences influence men and women to form different estimates of base rates of sexual discrimination and harassment.

able to suppress innate impulses towards stereotyping in decisionmaking to varying degrees, at least some of the time.65 We should be wary of placing complete trust in judicial self-control, however; judges are as human as the rest of us, and there is evidence suggesting that they will rely unconsciously on inadmissible information when it is a salient element of a case.66 This is not to say every decision will be the product of a halo effect or in-group bias; oftentimes the evidence may be one-sided enough that these effects cannot exert a significant influence, and in other cases, varying forms of bias may cancel each other out. But to the extent that avoiding a hearing lowers the salience of various markers of a party's or a witness's identity, such avoidance might also lower the risk that a judge's evaluation of evidence will be skewed by these forms of bias.

One type of situation might require a different analysis than that offered above: When a judge is already strongly biased against a disputant, it is possible that being visually confronted by that person might act as a counterweight, inducing empathy that could serve to mitigate that bias. As an example, imagine that a judge was faced with deciding whether a man who had repeatedly committed violent sexual crimes was so dangerous that he should be placed in preventive incarceration even after he has served the entirety of the sentences due to his prior crimes.67 Perhaps, a judge might reason, viewing the potential detainee can only help; after all, the presence of this person in the flesh might mitigate the bias produced merely by knowing his

65 Rachlinski et al., supra n. ??, at 1202-04.

66 See Wistrich et al., supra n. ??, at 1331.

67 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 354 (1997) (considering due process issues in connection with the indefinite detention, under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, of a person who had engaged in a "chilling history of repeated child sexual molestation and abuse").
There is an important kernel of truth in this suggestion. In some cases, a judge may be able to move past initially unjust impressions of a defendant in part due to the emotional impact of seeing and hearing the other person in a live encounter. But this approach should be viewed with appropriate caution, at least in cases where the judge already has a strongly negative view of a party or witness. First, because of the initially negative impression, a judge might well end up evaluating ambiguous demeanor cues as more “confirmation” that the witness should not be trusted; as in the Asch experiment, first impressions may dominate over subsequent information. What is more, in seeking to move from one strong emotion (antipathy) to a place of neutrality, by harnessing a countervailing emotion (empathy), we create a real risk: Experiencing empathy towards someone we have previously disliked is often an unpleasant feeling, and the cognitive dissonance involved in holding two such opposing states in the mind is unpleasant, so that people experiencing such states “are

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68 See Kenworthey Bilz, We Don’t Want to Hear It: The Moral and Psychological Legitimacy of Exclusion in the Law, Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010) (draft at 31) (noting that “inducing empathy . . . predictably inspires an emotional response of sympathy and compassion” and can lead to a “softening of attitudes toward the wrongdoer”); see also id. at 33 (noting that feelings of empathy can help reduce “correspondence bias,” in which we assume that others’ behaviors are a product of immutable personality traits rather than of their circumstances”).

69 See id.; Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 573, 592-94 (2008) (describing high-profile cases in which the mild or contrite appearance of the defendants may have garnered the sympathy of jurors); Burns, supra, at 134-35 (noting that the “aural medium” has a socializing influence, making it harder for a jury to treat the case “simply as a stereotype of a certain kind of controversy”).

70 See Asch, supra n. ??, at 270; Levenson, supra n. ??, at 594-96 (relating how, in the trial of Timothy McVeigh, the jury interpreted his “bland” clothing and stoic demeanor as evidence that McVeigh was a “cold, heartless, and calculating killer” who felt no remorse).
motivated to reduce [the conflict].” The urge to return to a non-conflicted mental state may produce some benefits—such as greater attention to conflicting evidence—but it may also encourage rash or impulsive decisions. As a result, the ambivalent attitudes may “become polarized, resulting in exaggerated positive attitudes if exposed to positive information about the person, and exaggerated negative attitudes when exposed to negative information”—a process that can also lead to extreme actions toward the subject of the ambivalence. Many might regard this possible “solution” to the problem of initial bias to be worse than the problem it addresses. Given the conflicting possible results that can arise from the use of demeanor as a debiasing tool, one thing seems clear: The visual and aural presence of disputants and witnesses creates a significant risk of bias based on appearance, social status, and in-group affiliation, and the danger of these factors is not obviously outweighed by any bias-correcting function when a fact-finder has an initially negative impression of a particular party to the dispute.

As we have seen, the conventional judicial wisdom fails to provide a fruitful foundation for a theory of hearings because it is premised on a faulty intuition; neither people in general, nor judges in particular, are good at catching deception or

71 See id. at 29 & n.78 (collecting psychological sources on the motivating effects of cognitive dissonance).

72 See id.

73 See id. at 29-30.

74 To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that activating empathy in general provides no value in the fair resolution of cases. Rather, I am urging only that empathy is unlikely to help correct an initially negative bias against a party in a way that returns a decisionmaker to a more neutral state of mind. Cf. Jody Lynee Madeira, Lashing Reason to the Mast: Understanding Judicial Constraints on Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 137, 142 (2006) (describing the personal injury trial as a forum in which “painful sights and sounds” provide “a forum for negotiation between narratives” as parties vie for the empathy of jurors).
inaccuracies of memory from demeanor cues, and in fact such cues are more likely to lead a fact-finder astray than to aid her. Some scholarly critiques have pointed out this concern, but they have failed to supplement it with a holistic consideration of the accuracy costs and benefits of live procedures as opposed to a decision on a written record. Now that we have surveyed some of the concerns at stake in such a decision, we have seen the following things:

• **First**, hearings will rarely add value in detecting deception. When they do help, it will not usually be through useful demeanor cues. Rather, a witness’s deception may be unearthed through surprises at cross-examination that reveal inconsistencies in the witness’s story. Such surprises are most likely to occur when a witness has not been well-prepared for the cross-examination. Successful cross-examination is therefore most likely to occur when a party’s opportunity to woodshed a witness is limited by either lack of information or financial resources. Once the witness is well-prepared to testify, however, the primary effect of a hearing on a credibility determination will be to add misleading demeanor evidence into consideration, which will tend to lower the quality of credibility findings.

• **Second**, hearings may nevertheless increase the accuracy of decisionmaking by clarifying vague or ambiguous evidence. Judges may find deposition transcripts and affidavits opaque on the points where they need clarity in order to reach a decision, and the opportunity to ask follow-up questions of witnesses at a hearing may be a useful way to resolve these questions. Likewise, in very complex cases, a live hearing may allow provide parties with an opportunity to explain complex scientific or economic evidence to a greater extent than a paper briefing would allow.

• **Third**, hearings may induce or worsen certain forms of decisional bias. Specifically, live procedures may emphasize cues as to the attractiveness, race, and social status of a witness that will encourage a fact-finder to affiliate with some witnesses and distrust others on the basis of factors that bear little relation to accuracy. Thus, to the degree that a judge has not already had the opportunity to form a personal impression of the parties or witnesses, a decision on a written record may be shielded from certain forms of bias.

So, in short, the benefits of hearings are most likely to accrue when the witnesses are not prepared for cross-examination or when the evidentiary record is either vague or technically complex. Hearings will have significant accuracy costs, however, when the dispute centers on the credibility of well-prepared witnesses or
when the hearing will allow a judge to form first impressions of witnesses based on their appearances.

III. Subjective Fairness: Making Paper-Focused Litigation Palatable

Although the accuracy concerns described above are central to any consideration of the utility of hearings, they do not tell the whole story. A theory that attends heavily to how accurate legal decisions are, but pays no attention to how acceptable those procedures are to the people who are subject to them, ignores the fact that the law requires public acceptance and cooperation if it is to meaningfully guide the conduct of the citizens it governs.\(^{75}\) One useful label for these concerns is “subjective fairness”: Unlike the accuracy concerns described above, which relate to the ability of judicial decisions to accurately describe historical events\(^ {76}\) and can therefore be said to involve a fairness that is separate from the preferences of either party, subjective fairness focuses on “whether participants and neutral observers believe that procedures and outcomes are fair, rather than whether the procedures or outcomes were fair in some objective sense.”\(^ {77}\)

As we shall see, the decision to resolve legal disputes without a live hearing may come at a cost from the standpoint of subjective fairness, even if (as discussed above) they are in fact making those decisions more accurate. Subjective fairness, in other words, does not always correspond with objective fairness. Nevertheless, in


\(^{76}\) Cf. Alvin I. Goldman, *Knowledge in a Social World* 59-68 (1999) (defending the notion that a statement is true if it successfully describes events in the world).

those cases where there are significant accuracy gains available from using a paper-trial decision procedure, the subjective fairness costs of such a procedure often can be minimized to the point where they will be outweighed by the procedures’ objective accuracy advantages.

At the outset, there is a potential objection to this line of inquiry that is worth addressing. One type of reader, when informed that procedures may involve a trade-off between objective accuracy and subjective experiences of fairness, may feel that there is no trade-off at all. After all, such a reader would say, the goal of legal procedures to “get it right,” and we should not sacrifice that goal in the pursuit of making litigants “feel” better. Indeed, it might even seem to represent a form of disrespect to give litigants a “dumbed down” form of justice that feels satisfying but is in fact less reliable. In this framing, procedures that have high ratings of subjective fairness but lower levels of objective accuracy are like junk food: a satisfying experience, but nonetheless bad for the people who enjoy it.

There are several reasons why this objection is less weighty than it might seem. One response is to fall back on democratic assumptions; if people, by and large, prefer certain types of legal procedures, perhaps that provides enough of a reason to make such procedures accessible. Under such a theory, taking the preferences of the public into account when designing litigation procedures can be justified on the grounds that to do otherwise would be paternalistic; just as we allow people to eat candy bars even if they may suffer bad consequences from doing so, we should not presume to choose

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in their stead that they should prefer one type of litigation procedure over another.\textsuperscript{80} Unfortunately, this response can only take us so far: Although it might seem relevant when people have the choice between a number of different procedures for dispute resolution—as in, for example, the arbitration context—the legal system acts both as a “default rule” for situations where no private choices have been made and as a backstop when those other options have broken down.\textsuperscript{81} To continue the analogy, it is one thing to say that people should be free to buy candy bars if they want them, but another to make candy bars the only option provided to poor children who depend on school lunch programs. The first option respects private choice, while the second imposes what may be an unhealthy choice on a population of people who are ill-suited to judge between different options for themselves and who may be unable to select another option in any event.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{80} See Tyler, supra, at 871-72.

\textsuperscript{81} See Solum, supra n. ??, at 261 (noting that litigants are often unable to freely chose the procedures that will apply to their cases, and may indeed be forced to play according to a particular set of rules or suffer a default judgment).

\textsuperscript{82} The candy analogy can, of course, be taken too far. It might justly be said that to compare the preference of citizens for procedures that allow them to voice their grievances to a preference for junk food is to minimize very real expressive and moral values that are at stake in such a setting. This concern becomes especially compelling when we recall that the public generally places relatively little confidence in legal authorities, including courts, which suggests that legal institutions may be failing to provide the public with the type of justice it desires. See Tyler, supra n. ??, at 872. Moreover, it may be inappropriate (depending on one’s ethical assumptions) to describe the desire to participate in legal proceedings and to be treated with dignity by public officials as a “mere” preference, like the desire for sugary foods. Some commentators insist vigorously that procedural preferences of this type have deep moral foundations. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in Handbook of Justice Research in Law 65, 67 (2001) (“People’s attitudes are . . . important in their own right, because a central tent of democratic government is that people should be able to accept the solutions reached by those in power.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 45-49, 162-63 (tracing the source of our constitutional right to be heard by a decisionmaker to our moral right, as autonomous beings, to be treated as ends rather than as a means to someone else’s ends, and urging that connecting procedural rights to such dignitary values has an “intuitive plausibility”).
In the end, the value of respecting individual preferences for particular types of procedures might be overcome if we had reason to think that those preferences placed individuals in danger of significant harm. As one author has noted, the powerful effects of perceived procedural fairness can put “[s]cience . . . at the service of authority,” helping to “mobiliz[e] consent” to official action. \(^{83}\) The danger then arises that authorities will abuse this information to “construct[] procedures that give people the opportunity to be heard while, at the same time, systematically denying them just outcomes.”\(^ {84}\) In the procedural justice literature, this concern is often described as the problem of “false consciousness”: “If people are satisfied with objectively poor outcomes because they believe they were generated by a fair process, this may reflect a false consciousness which is not desirable.”\(^ {85}\) In a condition of false consciousness, citizens may be satisfied when they should not be, relying on a system’s perceived neutrality but ignoring its tendency to produce unfair outcomes.\(^ {86}\)

Despite this concern, the harm resulting from employing objectively accurate procedures that feel substantially unfair may sometimes be great enough to justify sacrificing small amounts of accuracy for large gains in public acceptance. To see why, we must look at the system from a large-scale perspective and consider the role of individual case outcomes in accounting for compliance with legal rules.\(^ {87}\)


\(^{84}\) *Id.* at 658-59.

\(^{85}\) Tyler, *supra* n. ??, at 111.


\(^{87}\) See Tyler & Lind, *supra* n. ??, at 66 (“[F]or the law to be effective, people must obey it.”).
perspective, we see individual cases as a “behavioral message” through which society attempts to “influence individuals’ conduct” by “forg[ing] a link between . . . wrong and liability.”

When we focus on deterrence, the role of subjective assessments of fairness takes on a great deal of importance. In a classic study, Professor Tyler surveyed a large number of Chicago residents both before and after their encounters with law enforcement and the courts. In analyzing the responses to his surveys, he found that those citizens who viewed legal procedures as fair were more likely to have a positive view of legal authorities and the legitimacy of the legal system. Having a favorable view of legal authorities and the legitimacy of the judicial system, in turn, made the individuals more likely to comply with the commands of the law. One implication of this finding is that even if legal procedures are very accurate, the willingness of people to obey the law may decline if those people view those procedures as unfair. The significance of this effect is not overwhelming—many other factors bear on legal compliance, so a modest increase in subjective dissatisfaction will not immediately lead

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88 Nesson, supra n. ??, at 1359.
89 Tyler, supra n. ??, at ??; Lind & Tyler, supra n. ??, at 80.
90 Tyler, supra n. ??, at ??. The effect on legal compliance can take several different forms. First, dissatisfied litigants may be less likely to obey specific judicial orders, such as the obligation to follow probation conditions, satisfy a judgment debt, or pay child support. To the extent that litigants experience procedures as unfair, compliance with such orders is likely to decrease. See Tyler, supra n. ??, at 872. This problem becomes particularly worrisome when we confront the reality that sanctions alone are often insufficient to compel compliance with judicial orders. See id. at 873. Second, a negative view of the legal system’s legitimacy may lead as well to a lowered willingness to comply with the law when it clashes with individual preferences or moral beliefs; in other words, lowered views of systemic legitimacy may undermine the law’s ability to produce general deterrence of illegal activity. See id.
91 Lind & Tyler, supra n. ??, at 80.
to a strong upswell in lawbreaking— but it is still a factor that should be considered before we decide to ignore public reactions to changes in judicial procedures solely on the ground that the new procedures are more accurate. In the end, it seems inappropriate to ignore either concept of fairness: Increasing subjective satisfaction through procedural changes that cause large decreases in accuracy would seem subject to the false consciousness objection, but modest increases in accuracy that come at the cost of large decreases in perceptions of fairness may harm the cause of deterrence more than they help it.

This brings us to the central question of this section: Will individuals respond more favorably to procedures that employ hearings than those that rely on briefing alone? If so, decisionmakers who must decide between the two procedures might sometimes be faced with a hard choice, at least in cases where presence is a hindrance to good factfinding rather than an aid. They might choose to dispense with a hearing, gaining more accuracy in factfinding at the cost of making the litigants unhappy and possibly worsening their view of the legitimacy of law. Or alternatively, they might employ a hearing in order to keep the litigants happy and thereby lose some measure of confidence in the accuracy of the final result.

This is not an idle concern; although this precise question has not been studied, people who respond to surveys regarding their views of what make procedures fair often express preferences that would ill-accord with a widespread adoption of hearing-

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92 See id. at 80-81; Tyler, supra n. ??, at 59-60 (finding, in a regression analysis of survey data from numerous Chicago residents, that compliance with the law correlated most strongly with views that the law’s commands were morally just, that the legitimacy of legal authorities played a modest but measurable role in compliance, and that deterrence and peer opinion played a smaller but still significant role).
less decision procedures.\(^3\) One such preference—a litigant’s desire to control the manner in which her case is made to a court—deserves sustained attention in this context.\(^4\)

It is fairly clear that litigants value what has been called “process control”—meaning “control over the opportunity to state one’s case” to a decisionmaker.\(^5\) People value process control for a number of reasons. Some of its value is as a means to an end; to some extent, parties want to control the evidence and arguments presented to a court so that they can make sure that a persuasive case is made and thereby maximize their chances of winning their cases.\(^6\) The decision to hold hearings or not should have little impact on this value in most cases because the attorney, in either case, is ethically obliged to consult with his client regarding the means by which

\(^{3}\) See generally Tyler, supra n. ??, at 137-38.

\(^{4}\) Other factors that are often enumerated are the degree to which people perceive decisionmakers to be “unbiased, honest, and principled,” the degree to which decisionmakers seem “benevolent and caring,” and the degree to which decisionmakers treat disputants with “dignity and respect.” See Michael O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 407, 421 (2008) (adding these three factors to the case-control and expressive concerns described above). It seems doubtful that the decision to employ a paper trial would significantly affect the neutrality interest in having an unbiased decisionmaker, given that it treats all parties in a similar manner. Likewise, to the extent that the reasons for employing a non-hearing procedure are explained to litigants and the court and then explains the reasons for its decision in a way that shows that it has considered the parties’ arguments, it is unlikely that the interest in having a decisionmaker seem to care about your rights will be greatly affected. See id. at 429 (noting that “[p]erceived trustworthiness is enhanced when the authorities demonstrate that they have actually considered the information offered during voice opportunities”). The final factor, which relates to an individual’s desire to be treated with respect by the court system, will be discussed infra.

\(^{5}\) Id. at 115.

\(^{6}\) See John Thibault & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 541, 550-52, 556 (1978) (urging that, because procedural control gives parties the ability to introduce “possibly important contextual factors” that a neutral investigator would overlook, it will maximize the chances that the result will be an “attainment of distributive justice between the parties).
the client’s litigation objectives are to be pursued. There may, no doubt, be situations in which the client’s control over the strategic or tactical litigation choices will be impaired in the absence of live proceedings. If a client lacks the means to monitor his attorney’s conduct by perusing the lawyer’s written submissions—perhaps due to a lack of legal sophistication—the visual observation of the lawyer’s performance at a live hearing might be the best available indicator of the quality of the lawyer’s efforts on his behalf. There may, indeed, be cases where this value becomes paramount, due to the combination of a particularly unsophisticated client and a lawyer whose poor performance calls out for client monitoring. But unless the hearing in question would occur early in a case, it may be too late for the process to add much value in terms of the client’s ability to control the content of the case presented by his lawyers. So overall, this instrumental value of process control will not be greatly affected by the decision to hold a hearing or refrain from holding one.

The instrumental value of process control does not tell the whole story, however; litigants derive significant value from expressing themselves to a decisionmaker even in the absence of a clear connection between such expression and a plausible change in the case’s outcome. Although this fact might seem surprising, it has been documented in a number of studies that giving litigants opportunities to control the presentation of their case matters even when the decisionmaker openly gives very little weight to the litigants’ arguments. Indeed, this effect can persist even when the decisionmaker openly announces that the litigants’ views will have no effect on the decision: In one study, the experimenter “announced his decision” regarding

97 See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2
98 See Tyler, supra n. ??, at 116.
99 See, e.g., id. at 132; Lind, Lissak & Conlon 1983.
the workload of participants, making it clear that the decision “was final and not subject to change,” and then invited some of them to offer comments anyway. The participants who were permitted to offer comments rated the procedures as significantly fairer than did those participants who were not provided with such an opportunity.

This non-instrumental process control value—what we might call the value of self-expression in procedure—seems more likely to be infringed by hearing-less procedures. The risk is that judges who decide cases without holding evidentiary hearings may seem like bureaucratic black boxes, in part because the process of considering and weighing evidence is hidden from the parties. Parties may therefore feel as if they have not been able to express their point of view to the judge, which in turn will lead to a decline in assessments of procedural fairness. What is worse, this problem may be magnified in the very cases in which hearings are most likely to be objectively unfair: As discussed above, hearings pose a particular risk to the accuracy of judgments when the dispute centers around the credibility of the disputants, due to the misleading effects of demeanor evidence and the biasing effects of party appearance and behavior. But, at least on an intuitive level, it is in these cases—cases in which the decision must necessarily discredit the honesty or accuracy of one party’s story—that the denial of an opportunity to address the decisionmaker is most likely to feel fundamentally unfair to those parties. And this problem may be exacerbated by the fact that the flaws that a non-hearing procedure is attempting to avoid—that is, our

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100 MacCoun, supra n. 2, at 192 (describing the study reported in E. Allan Lind, Arbitrating High Stakes Cases: An Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration in a U.S. District Court (RAND 1990)).

101 Id.

102 See Part II, supra.
cognitive limits in assessing the likelihood of deception when demeanor is in play—cut against the grain of our everyday intuition that we can tell when someone is lying to us. 103

This dire picture can be improved, however, if we pay closer attention to the possible ways that a judge might choose to employ a non-hearing procedure to reach a decision. For one thing, the “black box” characterization depends on the assumption that the non-hearing process, and the reasons for it, are not transparent to litigants. But if the court explains the reasons for using a non-hearing procedure, casting the overall goal as one of fairness and the avoidance of bias, the likelihood that the parties will lose confidence in the fairness of the overall process should be reduced. 104 Moreover, the parties’ perceptions that the court will hear and consider their arguments may be increased by an explanation of how the court has reached its decision, with an emphasis on its consideration of all the evidence that the parties have submitted. Finally, this is one situation in which the non-instrumental component of the voice value may be exploited to positive effect without causing undue concern for the overall fairness of the system. Much like the Lind study described above, a court might allow the parties to personally summarize their cases in open court at the time it announces its decision. 105 Although this procedure will likely be viewed less favorably by the parties then one in which it is clear that their arguments can impact the outcome of the case, 106 it might still reduce their discomfort with an accuracy-enhancing procedure to an

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103 See Sporer & Schwandt, supra n. ??.

104 See Bone, supra n.??, at 234 (noting that litigants already accept some loss of voice due to existing non-party preclusion rules and that giving “reasons” for such preclusion may affect their willingness to regard such rules as legitimate).

105 See Lind, supra n. ??, at ??,

106 See id.
acceptable level.

One more factor is worth noting with respect to the litigant’s interest in controlling the manner of case-presentation: As will be discussed in more detail below, non-hearing procedures may save significant litigation costs for parties. This cost-reduction might well make the parties to a dispute more likely to seek a judicial determination of the merits of their dispute rather than settle their case. This means that the relevant process-control comparison will not always be between a live hearing and a paper trial, but instead may be between a paper-trial and a settlement negotiation. The arbitration context presents a similar scenario, in that the lowered costs of arbitration make it more likely that parties will press their claims in such a forum than they would if they could only obtain relief in court. Arbitrating parties, on average, experience greater process satisfaction than those whose cases are confined to the court system, and this may stem, in part, from the fact that arbitrations “give[] litigants something that they want . . . : an opportunity to have their cases adjudicated.” To the extent that non-hearing procedures can realize a similar cost reduction, we might expect a similar gain in overall satisfaction, especially if the process is designed in a transparent way.

One final consideration must be mentioned before we conclude our discussion of subjective fairness issues: the role of dignitary considerations in procedural justice.

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107 See Part IV, infra.

108 See Lind, supra n. ??, at 63 (noting that the lowered costs of arbitration hearings have this effect).

109 Id.

110 Id. at 45.

111 Id.; see also O’Hear, supra n. ??, at 425 (noting that parties value voice even when they are engaging in a process of negotiation in which they have strong decisional control).
To some extent this factor overlaps with the process control consideration discussed above—after all, few of us feel like we are treated with dignity or respect if decisions that affect us are made without our input—**but it goes farther, encompassing our broader desire to be treated with **“politeness”** and **“respect.”** Such considerations play a weighty part in our evaluations of the fairness of judicial procedures: When authorities **“giv[e] disputants their due”** with respect to such issues, those disputants view the overall procedures as fairer.

The steps outlined above for keeping a hearing-less procedure from unduly unsettling a disputant’s preference for self-expression should go a long way towards ensuring that such procedures are also seen as respectful of those disputants’ social standing. After all, if the judge explains the benefits of such procedures, emphasizes its consideration of the parties’ arguments and gives them an opportunity to speak before announcing its decision, it is hard to see how such procedures show disrespect for the litigant’s dignity. But there are a few additional steps that a court could take in order to ensure that a hearing-less decision process is as gentle as possible. First, a court should obtain the parties’ consent before finding facts without a hearing whenever possible; to the extent that litigants perceive the process as a product of their own choices, it seems less likely that they will view it as coercive or unfair. Second, to the extent that a court must impose the procedure against the parties’ will, it would do

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112 See Tyler, supra n. ??, at 150 (noting that “being ignored” is not conducive to the production of self-esteem).

113 See MacCoun, supra n. ??, at 182 (noting that such factors are a central part of our need to have our social standing affirmed by others).

114 Lind & Tyler, supra n. ??, at 109; see also Tyler & Lind, supra n. ??, at 76 (noting that “when people deal with third-party authorities they focus on judgments about the nature of their social relationship with society and social authorities” and seek to be reassured that they “are . . . equal member[s] of society” through the way they are treated).
well to emphasize those benefits that accord well with everyday intuitions of fairness—such as maintaining a level playing field and encouraging a focus on the substance of the evidence rather than the style of its presentation—rather than a focus on its advantages in detecting deception. Implying that the parties are likely to be lying seems calculated to produce resentment and distrust, and this argument is likely to be viewed with suspicion by litigants, given that it runs against the grain of common sense.

IV. Other Pragmatic Considerations: Cost, Delay, and Agency Concerns

In assessing the value of hearings, cost is a variable that we cannot ignore.115 Relying on values such as accuracy and subjective fairness alone, we would develop a warped theory; this is easiest to see in the simple example of a case in which the “outcome . . . includes a damage award that reflects an accurate application of the substantive law to the facts,” but the “plaintiff who was entitled to prevail had to pay more in attorneys’ fees than the value of the judgment.”116 Nor is cost only relevant in such extreme circumstances: High litigation costs for defendants (even if less than the amount in controversy) can incentivize strike suits even when those defendants are innocent of wrongdoing.117 And higher litigation costs generally encourage parties to settle claims rather than pursue them to trial; if we are concerned about the lack of authoritative adjudications of claims (perhaps due to the potential stagnation of the law or the secrecy of resulting settlement amounts), then this is an additional downside

115 See also Marilyn J. Berger et al., Pretrial Advocacy 2 (1988) (warning lawyers that their advocacy will always be constrained by their client’s cost concerns).

116 Solum, supra n. ??, at 185.

Moreover, the effect of litigation costs on settlement decisions produces a secondary cost: As discussed above, parties who are pushed towards settlement are likely to feel deprived of an opportunity to present their case to a decisionmaker, and to view the overall procedure as less legitimate. Finally, absent any other effects, any unnecessary costs—that is, any costs not offset by an increase in accuracy or subjective satisfaction with the litigation process—are simply a deadweight loss.

The balance between fairness considerations and litigation costs cannot be formulated in simple mathematical terms, however. The problem is that most of the key variables are subject to significant uncertainty. As we have already seen, the use of hearings in a decisionmaking process is not likely to consistently improve accuracy or reduce it; rather, the impact will depend on a number of case-specific factors, including the degree to which the dispute hinges upon credibility, the degree to which the parties or witnesses on one side of the dispute may gain an advantage due to biasing appearance factors, the amount of preparation that has occurred before the hearing, and the amount of confusion inherent in the existing record. The problem is exacerbated because we lack existing data on the degree of bias that hearings may induce, or the amount of clarity they may provide, either in general or in the relevant subsets of case-types. So although we can easily articulate a goal—that we would like to balance the benefits of hearing procedures against their costs—we can do so only in

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119 See Lind, RAND Study; see also Discussion, supra at Part III.


121 See Discussion, supra at Parts II and III.
a general way, without being able to do any explicit balancing.

The foregoing also assumes something that is far from clear: That holding a hearing necessarily makes litigation more expensive. To some extent, such an assumption is implicit in the many legal rules that allow judges to dispense with live procedures when deciding issues that are legally frivolous.¹²² Hearings, in this framing, should be dispensed with in easy cases but used in hard ones. Those who rely on this framing seem to assume two things. The first assumption is that hearings will either improve, or have at worst have no effect on, the accuracy of a resulting decision; we therefore are obliged to use them whenever the outcome of a case is in doubt. The second assumption is that hearings are more expensive than alternative decisionmaking methods; we therefore should dispense with them in cases whose outcome is clear. As we have seen, the first assumption is flawed because hearings may reduce the accuracy of decisions where a case is close due to a difficult credibility contest. The second assumption is likewise flawed: Hearings will sometimes add costs to decisionmaking, but will sometimes be less expensive than a decision on a paper record.

The Court’s Perspective

First, we must consider the ways in which a decision between a hearing and a paper-based procedure impacts a court. A judge, as well as other court employees, must take time away from other business in order to sit and hear evidence. The relevant unit of expense, for our purposes, is time; most court staff, including judges, are salaried personnel who must allocate a limited budget of time between a number of competing cases. Nor is the concern merely for the work-satisfaction of government employees; a backlog of court-time can result in a lengthy queue for case consideration.

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Such queues, in turn, give rise to social distress: Litigants who must wait many months or years for a decision may become embittered or be hindered in their ability to plan their future conduct due to lingering uncertainty, and members of the general public may lose respect for a judicial system that imposes lengthy delays between questions and answers.\textsuperscript{123}

In some circumstances, a judge can save court time by holding a hearing. One such situation would occur when the evidence in the record is confusing or ambiguous. Imagine that a key witness has been vague on an important point in his affidavit or deposition testimony. Rather than slowly puzzle through the record, comparing this problematic testimony with other, possibly conflicting evidence, a judge might chose to hold a hearing. By doing so, she can ensure that the witness will be pinned down on the presently vague point, either through cross-examination or, if necessary, by the judge’s own questions.\textsuperscript{124} Similarly, a court may be able to economize by holding a hearing when a record is complete but still very complex or hard to follow. Imagine, for instance, a case in which the key evidence is scattered through numerous documents and depositions, and in which the parties’ briefing has failed to give a coherent guide through the maze.\textsuperscript{125} By requesting a hearing, a judge may force advocates to winnow down a scattershot presentation into a smaller number of key

\textsuperscript{123} See Civil Justice Reform Act, PL 101-650, December 1, 1990, 104 Stat 5089, at § 102 (finding that “[t]he courts, the litigants, the litigants’ attorneys, and the Congress and the executive branch, share responsibility for cost and delay in civil litigation and its impact on access to the courts, adjudication of cases on the merits, and the ability of the civil justice system to provide proper and timely judicial relief for aggrieved parties”); cf. Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 624.

\textsuperscript{124} See Fed. R. Evid. 614.

arguments. And even if the advocates themselves are unable or unwilling to offer a coherent presentation at a hearing, a judge can use focused questioning to pin down a recalcitrant attorney, forcing them to either make their claims clear or risk waiver.

In practice, these cost savings will interact with the accuracy advantages of hearings discussed in the preceding section. To the extent that a judge is dealing with a confusing record, a decision on a paper record may involve a choice between accuracy and cost: A careful parsing of the record may reveal all the information that would be sought in a hearing, but only at the cost of a large expenditure of court time. Likewise, the cost-savings described above can be avoided by making a decision following a relatively brief review of the written submissions, forcing the parties to bear the accuracy costs of vague or confusing submissions. The advantage of hearings in such a circumstance, strictly speaking, is not that they necessarily either save costs or reduce error rates, but rather that they avoid a trade-off between these two quantities. Likewise, this analysis is subject to the caveat that some judges may be able to economize when deciding a case on a paper record by relying more on the work of law clerks; hearings, by contrast, cannot be effectively delegated. But to the extent that the judge will ultimately wish (or need) to carefully consider the relevant evidence personally, hearings may be the more efficient solution in cases involving either highly complex information or under-performing advocates.

126 See Lubet, supra n. ??, at 464 (advising attorneys to “do everything they can to shorten” their opening statements during a bench trial, eschewing repetition in favor of giving “a clear picture of the occurrences” in the case); Fed. Prac. Manual for Legal Aid Atty’s at 148 (advising advocates that their oral presentations should be brief and should not assume that the judge has comprehended all the material in the briefings).

127 This strategy is not, however, without its own dangers. Past a certain point, simplification might leave out crucial details. A court, therefore, should be more reluctant to pursue this strategy if the case seems complex despite, and not because of, the written advocacy.
By contrast, in many cases these benefits will not be present. Many simple civil cases involve a relatively clear dispute that can easily be gleaned from a paper record: Imagine, for example, a car-crash case in which the dispute centers on conflicting testimony about whether a motorist signaled before entering a lane. If the parties and witnesses have been effectively deposed, a hearing may merely repeat information that can easily be gleaned from a few short deposition excerpts.

Add to this a factor not previously addressed: Not all hearings involve the same degree of requisite formality. For instance, although bench trials will generally be more streamlined than a full jury trial, they will often be more complex than a run-of-the-mill pretrial hearing, incorporating opening statements, case-presentations by each participating party, and possibly final argument. So the cost-variable depends, in part, on what law, tradition, and the participants will find to be an acceptable hearing procedure. In the car-crash example, this variable means that a judge offered the chance to choose between a paper-trial and a bench-trial may find that the added formality of a “trial” counts against it when the expense of the two modes of proceeding are at issue.

So, from a court’s perspective, the cost equation boils down to answering the following questions: First, how long will a hearing take: Can it be a short, simple affair, or will a lengthy process be necessary? Second, how hard will it be to decide a case on a paper record: Is the briefing easy to follow and the evidence clear, or complex and hard-to-follow? Finally, will the hearing make it possible to cut through ambiguous factual disputes with focused questions, or pin down advocates on

Lubet, supra n. ??, at 463-65 (bench trials sometimes, but not always, include opening statements and final arguments, although judges tend to prefer that such presentations be shorter in the absence of a jury).
disputed facts?\textsuperscript{129}

The Litigant’s and Witness’s Perspective

The court is not the only relevant actor, however; we must also assess the impact of hearing procedures on the parties and witnesses. The witness perspective is perhaps the easiest to inhabit: Courts rarely travel to hold hearings, but lawyers often travel to conduct depositions, so a hearing will often involve the time and expense of traveling to court in order to testify. Likewise, lawyers may often feel the need to prepare witnesses more intensely for cross-examination in court than for a deposition, so a witness may find the deposition-preparation more congenial. And of course, if the question is whether to hold a hearing after a witness has already been thoroughly deposed, the cost equation for the witness is clear: paper procedures are preferable to hearings.

To some extent, the witness’s concerns might be partially mollified by a modification of hearing procedures, rather than by an elimination of hearings. If a hearing can be conducted telephonically, for instance, the travel burden for a witness might be reduced. In the end, however, such adjustments cannot make hearings a favorable bargain for witnesses in most cases. Courts may often be reluctant to modify

\textsuperscript{129} The perspective of a rulemaker is not discussed in detail in this section, but a few points may usefully be added. First, rulemakers will often be concerned with minimizing costs to both courts and parties. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (instructing courts to interpret the federal rules of civil procedure to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”) (emphasis added). Beyond a direct concern about costs, rulemakers may also have preferences regarding the frequency with which cases should be resolved via settlement or via judicial decision. Compare, e.g., Owen Fiss, \textit{supra} n. ??, at 1085-87, with Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a) (permitting courts to order pretrial conferences for several purposes, one of which is “facilitating settlement”). To the extent that one type of decision procedure has a higher cost to parties than another, parties may be given an extra incentive to settle their claims in order to avoid the higher-cost procedure. So if rulemakers generally wish to incentivize settlements, this may be viewed as a silver-lining to the higher-cost procedure.
the formal presentation of a bench trial to allow for telephonic testimony, and even if they are not, the additional desire of attorney’s to prepare witnesses to testify directly to a court may involve preparation burdens that make even telephonic testimony a bad bargain. So, from the perspective of a non-party witness, a paper procedure will normally be preferable to a hearing.  

For parties, the answer is less obvious. For parties who are financing their lawsuits personally (rather than via a contingent fee arrangement), one obvious interest is in limiting the extent of attorney’s fees. Paper procedures have some advantage in this regard: Lawyers working in firms may be willing to delegate the taking of depositions to younger associates, but they are likely to be reluctant to delegate in-court witness examinations. Likewise, even in complex cases, law partners regularly delegate motion-writing and exhibit-collection tasks to younger and cheaper attorneys, but insist on practicing and then presenting their own in-court arguments. This cost-savings may be counterbalanced, to some extent, by the court-perspective discussed above: Courts may save time in complex cases by having attorneys and witnesses present in court, where they (hopefully) present streamlined arguments and testimony and where the judge can ask follow-up questions. The court, in other words, can save time in complex cases, but at the cost of imposing more expense on the parties, who are likely to end up paying higher fees to finance the simplified

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130 If the witness is testifying as an expert, however, the costs will be shifted to the party paying the expert witness fees. See Thomas A. Mauet, Pretrial 357 (5th ed. 2002) (noting that these costs “can be substantial since medical and other technical experts usually command hourly rates comparable to that of lawyers” and that such expenses are further exacerbated if the expert witness needs to be flown in).

131 See also id. (noting a five-day case, requiring five days of preparation time, can easily cost $10,000 in attorney’s fees alone, exclusive of other costs).
Hearings may introduce burdens for parties that are not so counterbalanced, however. One additional concern that a litigant may have when an issue will be decided following a hearing is an increased chance of waiver of a legal or procedural right by his attorney during a hearing. When appearing in-court, lawyers are subject to a substantial cognitive load: They must advance the goals of their client, keep a great deal of information organized in their head, respond to changing circumstances, and remain alert for potential violations of evidentiary or procedural rules that may worsen their client’s litigation position. Moreover, the ability of lawyers working together on a team to solve problems collaboratively is reduced by the necessity of nominating one advocate at a time to conduct the presentation of arguments and the examination of witnesses, as well as by the necessity of confining communications between team members to scribbled notes and whispers. Under such conditions, it is sensible for a client to worry that her lawyer may, through a lapse of attention or through not possessing the knowledge or insight of another team member, inadvertently waive the client’s rights to object to evidentiary errors or procedural violations. Hearings, in other words, may reduce the ability of attorneys to be the best

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132 As discussed supra at Part III, such higher costs may also have collateral consequences for the parties’ subjective assessments of procedural fairness if they push parties into settling claims rather than pursuing them to a judicial decision. Because people generally value the opportunity to voice their grievances during a dispute resolution process, they may find the overall process less satisfying if they are pushed to settle their cases, to the extent that the negotiation process does not incorporate opportunities for voice. See Lind, supra n. ??, at ??; O’Hear, supra n. ??, at ??.

133 See also L. Ronald Jorgeson, Motion Practice and Persuasion 22 (2006) (noting that an important goal during trial-court proceedings is to preserve issues for appellate review and that useful appellate arguments are often “seemingly minor legal issues tucked away in the record,” in contrast to the evidentiary arguments that seem important during a hearing or trial).
possible agents for their clients. This difficulty might result in increased litigation costs, as clients hire higher quality, but more expensive, counsel in an attempt to prevent such lapses from occurring. It might also result in a loss of control by the client over the litigation, as lawyers fail to operate in the manner that the client would prefer. In either event, a litigant would view the hearing as having worsened his position.\footnote{It is possible, and indeed likely, that some advocates will not suffer such a “live procedure” performance deficit. Indeed, advocates whose time is spent primarily doing in-court work may be more effective in court than they are on paper. \textit{Cf.} Robert Mosteller, \textit{Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence}, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 45 (2010) (noting that some court-appointed lawyers are better paid for in-court time than out-of-court time, and have a corresponding incentive to minimize pretrial work and to seek trial time instead). This is mostly likely to be true for lawyers who specialize in fields that involve a relatively large proportion of trial time; the majority of lawyers, by contrast, spend far more time out of court than in it, and so are unlikely to have developed such lopsided skill sets. \textit{See} Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, \textit{Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor Within and Between Law Firms}, 25 J.L. Econ. & Org. 339, 345 (2009) (showing that those lawyers who on average spend more than 10 days a month in court—working in the fields of personal injury, divorce, and criminal law—make up less than a quarter of the total population of lawyers, based on census data).}

So in the end, a number of financial factors will make parties and witnesses tend to favor paper procedures to hearings: The costs of travel, the costs of preparing for live testimony, the added cost of lawyer preparation time (due to the likely involvement of more senior counsel when a presentation will be made to a court), and the increased risk of inadvertent waiver due to the cognitive and emotional stress of the hearing environment. The concerns must be weighed against the cost savings that courts may achieve by holding a hearing in cases where doing so will result in a simplified or clearer picture of the dispute. In some cases the party and witness concerns might be minimized: The witnesses might be local or be able to be examined telephonically, the attorney might be a solo practitioner with a reputation as a skilled oral advocate and a preference for live presentation, and the client might have faith in
the attorney’s ability to faithfully protect his interests in that environment. But in many cases, the general intuition that hearings add costs will be accurate: The evidence may be clear on the existing record, witness travel may be necessary, the live procedure may draw more senior (and hence more expensive) counsel to the case and result in more elaborate witness preparation, and the live environment may lead to an increased risk that attorneys will unwittingly waive their clients’ rights.

V. Theory Restatement and Applications

Having examined three critical concerns that are implicated when a decisionmaker must choose between hearings and paper-based procedures—accuracy, subjective fairness, and costs—we can now place these concerns side by side and examine how they interact in actual case scenarios. By doing so, it will become apparent that many traditional uses of hearings and paper-based decisions make a great deal of sense, even if the traditional justifications for one or the other were founded on mistaken notions about the utility of demeanor evidence. In this section, we will examine four examples in which a judge might have the discretion to choose either an evidentiary hearing or to find facts on a paper record: A preliminary-injunction decision, an automobile negligence case in small-claims court, a toxic-tort case, and a bench trial in a civil rape case.

Theory Restatement

Before we consider these examples, however, it may be useful to restate briefly

135 For the purpose of simplification, we shall assume that these cases are arising either in a forum where there is no right to a jury trial, or that the parties have elected to try their cases to the bench.
some of the considerations that may help us choose between live and paper-based procedures:

**Detecting Deceptive and Erroneous Testimony:** Demeanor evidence is unlikely to aid the court in making credibility determinations. In some cases, cross-examination may be useful in this regard, but that utility will be limited to the extent that witnesses have had significant opportunities to rehearse their testimony with lawyers who are aware of the likely subjects of cross-examination.

**Avoiding Unnecessary Appearance-Induced Bias:** If a hearing will introduce the court to parties or witnesses for the first time, it is likely that a court’s view of the evidence will be colored by irrelevant factors arising from having visual and aural contact with witnesses. These concerns include the biasing effects of witness attractiveness, social status, and educational level, as well as in-group/out-group effects based on the similarities and differences between the judge and the witnesses.

**Clarifying Complex or Confusing Evidence:** Hearings may induce parties to offer a simplified portrait of the issues before the court. They can also give the court an opportunity to pin down vague or confusing witnesses through *sua sponte* witness-interrogation by the court.

**Subjective Perceptions of Fairness:** All other things being equal, hearings may be more satisfying to parties who have the opportunity to testify during the proceedings, given the value people place on voicing grievances in connection with dispute resolution procedures. This concern may be minimized if the hearing will be significantly more expensive than a paper-procedure because of the increased likelihood of a voice-less settlement negotiation if an expensive hearing is the only option. This concern may also be partially mitigated by a court’s efforts to explain the accuracy and fairness benefits of paper-based procedures to parties and to justify its
decisions by reference to the arguments actually offered by those parties. Finally, parties’ desire for voice may also be partially satisfied by opportunities to speak that occur after the court has reached its decision.

**Court Costs:** Employing a paper procedure will sometimes save valuable court time, helping a court to maintain an efficient pace in moving through its docket. When a case involves a large amount of technical evidence, the court may end up reviewing documents no matter what, and a hearing may simply be a duplication of time. Paper-based decisions may also allow a court to delegate more of the effort to law clerks, which may sometimes provide efficiency advantages. On the other hand, when the evidence in a case is vague or hard to follow, hearings may save court time by allowing a court to ask its own questions.

**Other Costs:** Witnesses will generally prefer paper procedures, at least if they will need to travel to attend a hearing. Parties who find it difficult to monitor their counsel’s performance may appreciate having an opportunity to observe their efforts in court. But oftentimes, parties will find this advantage outweighed by the added attorney costs that arise from preparing for a hearing—including the likelihood of being billed for the time of more senior attorneys and the increased agency costs that arise in a high-pressure hearing environment.

*The Preliminary Injunction Motion*

For our first example, let us consider a motion for a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, which is a classic example in which the district court often has nearly unfettered discretion to choose between live and paper-based fact-finding procedures. Parties usually seek such an injunction in order to preserve the status quo until the case can be definitively resolved by settlement, pre-
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trial dismissal, or a trial on the merits. Following a long tradition of federal equity practice, district judges generally have broad discretion to grant or deny such injunctions, and the rule is silent regarding the methods of proving the facts necessary to determine whether an injunction is appropriate. District courts may therefore decide for themselves, in many cases, whether to rely on affidavit evidence or employ an evidentiary hearing. To the degree this discretion is constrained, it is by the traditional view of American courts that oral hearings are necessary when the credibility of conflicting testimony must be decided; in such cases, some courts of appeals (but not all) will find that the failure to hold a hearing constituted an abuse of discretion, unless both parties have consented to an affidavit-based decision. For the purposes of this discussion, however, let us assume that the

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136 See Penn v. San Juan Hospital, Inc., 528 F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1975); Charles Alan Wright et al., 11A Federal Practice and Procedure § 2947.

137 See 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2947. Courts will typically weigh a number of factors in concluding whether a preliminary injunction is in the interest of justice, including: “the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff if the injunction is not granted,” the amount of harm the injunction would cause the defendant, the likelihood that “the plaintiff will succeed on the merits,” and “the public interest.” Id. § 2948.

138 See Fed. R. Civ. P. § 65(a). Unless the parties’ stipulate all relevant facts or unless the losing parties’ arguments are insufficient as a matter of law, some fact-finding will be necessary, as district courts will not rely on the unproven allegations in a pleading to justify injunctive relief. See 11A Wright et al., supra n. ??, § 2949 & n.12 (collecting cases).

139 See, e.g., San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Kennedy, 412 F.2d 541, 546 (9th Cir. 1969).

140 See, e.g., Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281, 1287 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that, in some cases, the use of a paper-trial to decide fact disputes relating to a preliminary injunction motion was within a district court’s discretion, but that an oral hearing is preferable whenever there is doubt that a party can fairly present its case via affidavits).

141 See 11A Wright et al., supra n. ??, at § 2948 (collecting cases and discussing this rule); but see, e.g., Kennedy, 412 F.2d at 546 (applying contrary Ninth Circuit rule).
district court sits in a circuit, like the Ninth, where it can freely choose between hearings and paper-based procedures, so as to focus on the underlying question of policy.

In most cases, the theory of hearings outlined above would suggest that an evidentiary hearing is more useful at this stage of the case than a decision that relies only on affidavits, at least if the factual disputes are reasonably complex. Although some point to a need to consider demeanor evidence to resolve fact conflicts in this setting, this argument is relatively weak given that such evidence is more likely to decrease the accuracy of credibility calls in this setting than it is to increase it. But many other factors do weigh in favor of a hearing.

First, there are the other accuracy considerations. Although the demeanor problem exists as much here as in other cases, it is counteracted to an extent by the increased utility of cross-examination at this relatively early stage. Witnesses will likely receive less coaching, and have less access to the other side’s evidence and arguments, in preparation for such a hearing, so cross-examination may be more likely to usefully ferret out fabrications and mistakes in their testimony. This advantage becomes more apparent when we consider that the alternative is usually to rely on affidavit evidence rather than depositions: Affidavits, which do not require a witness to answer questions put forth by opposing counsel, may paper over the gaps in an account rather than probe them. The availability of cross-examination therefore takes on special importance here. Furthermore, the judge may have little familiarity

\[142\] Id.

\[143\] See supra at Part II.

\[144\] See Lee T. Gesmer & Jay Shepard, Employee Non-Competition Agreements, II Mass. Emp. L. § 20.7.2 (2009) (noting that lawyers often have only “a few days” to prepare for preliminary injunction hearings).
with the facts of the case at this early stage, so the ability to ask follow-up questions may be particularly helpful.

Second, there is the question of subjective fairness. As we have already seen, the desire of litigants for voice can be furthered by giving them an opportunity to testify in court. The countervailing possibility—that the cost of the hearing will be high enough to force a settlement, thereby reducing voice opportunities—does exist in this context, but to a lesser degree than in other cases, given that preliminary injunction hearings will usually be shorter—and involve less preparation—than trials.\(^\text{145}\) So, on balance, a hearing procedure will seem fairer to the litigants involved.

Finally, there is the question of cost. Some of the above defects in the efficacy of a paper procedure could be cured, no doubt, if we allowed more extensive discovery (especially deposition practice) before a preliminary injunction hearing. But such discovery would be impractical, given that the necessary delay would clash with the “haste that is often necessary to preserve the relative positions of the parties and to protect the movant from irreparable injury.”\(^\text{146}\) Given these time constraints, there is less reason to worry about the intense level of witness preparation that normally adds to the cost of live hearing procedures. Moreover, the less-formal nature of preliminary injunction hearings makes it more likely that the judge will allow cost-saving devices like the telephonic testimony of remote witnesses.\(^\text{147}\) Finally, a hurried briefing schedule may make it more likely that written submissions will have gaps or

\(^{145}\) See Discussion, infra. See also Gesmer & Shepard, supra n. ??, at § 20.7.2; Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 Rev. Litig. 495, 507 (2003) (noting that such hearings are less formal than trials on the merits, and involve the presentation a smaller quantity of available evidence).

\(^{146}\) Denlow, supra n. ??, at 507.

\(^{147}\) See id.
ambiguities; thus, it might save the court time to have a live hearing at which these
gaps can be filled in, rather than having to puzzle over cryptic submissions in
chambers. All in all, the preliminary injunction hearing is a situation in which the
judicial instinct favoring live hearings is sound, even if the demeanor-focused
reasoning underlying that instinct has little to recommend it.

The Case in Small Claims Court

Next, let us consider a setting in which cost considerations become paramount:
the small-claims court. Every state has a forum in which relatively minor disputes,
involving low amounts-in-controversy are handled using “expedited and simplified”
procedures. In this setting, “traditional rules of evidence and court procedures” do
not apply, and the use of attorney representation is rarely cost-effective—and
sometimes, it is not permitted. One such simplified procedure is to use highly
simplified pleadings, followed by an oral evidentiary hearing at which the pro se
parties may testify and introduce witness testimony or other evidence.

In such a setting, the live hearing procedure is clearly the only sensible choice

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148 Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 315, 317 (2003). The lowest jurisdictional limits for small claims courts in the United States are set at $1,000 (Virginia), while “the highest limits are in Georgia and Tennessee, with limits of $15,000.” Id. at 318. The mean limit is $4,504. Id. at 320.

149 Id. at 316.

150 Id. at 319, 327; see Scott Sabey & Tim Shea, Small Claims Court: A Conversation with Scott Sabey and Tim Shea, 2006 Utah Bar J. 32, 34 (2006) (noting that even after Utah raised its jurisdictional limit to $7,500, “relatively few” parties in small claims court were represented by counsel).

151 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 116.320 (only requiring a plaintiff to plead the names and addresses of the defendants, the dollar amount of the claim, and a simple description of its basis); see Zucker & Her, supra n. ??, at 326 (describing the California process); accord Sabey & Shea, supra n. ?? at 33 (describing similar Utah process).

for dispute resolution, even if the dispute centers on a simple credibility dispute. First, the accuracy consequences of potentially misleading demeanor evidence are less severe; due to the amount-in-controversy limits, the fiscal loss resulting from a mistaken decision is contained to relatively tolerable levels. What is more, the accuracy advantages of hearings may be more likely to show themselves in this context: Any briefing would be prepared by inexpert pro se parties who do not know the relevant law and would likely be confusing, so that a judge’s own questions will take on a special utility. Furthermore, the likelihood that witnesses will have been carefully prepared for cross-examination is at its lowest in the small-claims setting, and even if the parties lack the skill to effectively cross-examine the witnesses, the judge can provide some credibility-probing questioning of his own. These clarity-producing factors might outweigh the accuracy losses we can expect due to the impact of demeanor evidence on credibility determinations and the appearance-bias problem.

When we place the remaining factors on the scale, the answer is even clearer. As we have seen, litigants gain satisfaction from expressing their views to a decisionmaker. Nor is there any concern here that the added cost of a hearing will force parties into low-voice settlement negotiations: If anything, the cost equation runs the other way. In proceedings in which discovery is almost non-existent and lawyers rarely assist litigants, the preparation of an adequate record for a paper-based decision

\footnote{Note that to say this is not to suggest that the financial consequences of a mistake in a small case do not matter to the parties. But from an economic perspective, an increased chance of losing a smaller amount of money is always preferable to a similar chance of losing a larger amount.}

\footnote{See Steve Averett, Small Claims Courts, 16 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 179, 183 (2001) (noting that in Utah, a small claims judge will be responsible for questioning witnesses); Gerald Lebovits, Small Claims Courts Offer Prompt Adjudication Based on Substantive Law, 70 N.Y. St. Bar J. 6, 10 (1998) (in New York, small claims judges “take[e] active charge of the proceedings and examining witnesses”).}
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presents very high cost obstacles for litigants; adding the necessary deposition practice and requiring the drafting of lengthy briefs might deter many parties from suing at all, due to the expense of hiring a lawyer or the information costs of learning how to handle such tasks personally. Oral hearings, therefore, turn out to be a clearly superior method of resolving very small claims.

The Toxic Tort Bench Trial

Now, let us turn our attention from preliminary or low-value matters to a high-stakes situation in which the decision between live and paper procedures will be much more challenging: The resolution of a tort claim premised on exposure to allegedly dangerous chemicals. Such cases involve many added wrinkles beyond the “ordinary” trial; most significantly, from our perspective, a plaintiff will often have to establish, using scientific expert testimony, a causative link between exposure to a particular substance and infirmities suffered many years later.\(^{155}\) Let us presume, for the sake of simplicity, that the parties have consented to a bench trial, and that they are willing to consider the use of a paper-procedure in order to conserve costs. So the question is presented squarely to the court: Is a paper-trial the best way of resolving this case?\(^{156}\)

Here, it will be hard to clearly decide between the procedures on the basis of accuracy criteria. For the sake of analysis, we can break down our hypothetical case into two important things that a plaintiff must prove: First, was she exposed to a chemical produced by the defendant, and second, did that substance cause her


\(^{156}\) See also Gingras v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 2007 WL 1052500 (N.D. Ill., 2007) (considering whether a paper trial was the best way of resolving a dispute even though all parties had consented to the procedure).
The first issue mainly involves historical proof—subject to significant uncertainty in the large subset of cases that involve a long latency period—with the same concerns we normally have regarding demeanor and appearance bias. The second issue, however, involves very little focus on the plaintiff’s credibility, and instead requires a lengthy excursion into the arcana of scientific evidence. In such a setting, the risk that paper briefing will be confusing or vague becomes more significant, and the value of judicially imposed questions rises. To a large extent, then, the accuracy inquiry will depend on which aspect of the case predominates: In some “mature” types of toxic torts, causation might be clearly established by precedent, so that the main question is whether the plaintiff was exposed to the substance as a result of the defendant’s actions. Other cases, however, might involve a single supplier of a substance and little dispute on exposure, with the inquiry turning entirely on the scientific causation question.

What then of the other factors? Given the complexity described above, it should not be surprising that toxic tort cases often last longer than the typical trial, nor that the use of testifying scientific experts makes these long hearings even more expensive.

To the extent that a paper trial can reduce the need for lengthy witness-preparation

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157 Veron, supra n. ???, at 648.

158 See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 337, 380 (providing modern asbestos claims as a paradigmatic example of such a “mature” toxic tort).

159 See Young K. Lee, Note, Beyond Gatekeeping: Class Certification, Judicial Oversight, and the Promotion of Scientific Research in “Immature” Pharmaceutical Torts, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1905, 1907 (2005) (describing the “immature” tort category, in which claims of scientific causation are novel and undeveloped in previous cases).

sessions, decrease the need for expensive court days, and shift some of the lawyering labor to lower-cost associates, we might plausibly expect it to create significant cost economies as compared with a live trial.\textsuperscript{161}

By reducing the incentive to settle, the paper trial may increase voice opportunities as well.\textsuperscript{162} In some cases, the issue of voice will be of reduced significance, in particular in cases where the plaintiff would not be testifying even in a live proceeding.\textsuperscript{163} In others, a court will need to weigh the extent of possible cost reductions and their impact on likely voice opportunities, as well as any concerns about difficult credibility judgments being undermined by demeanor and appearance bias, against the clarity gains that a live hearing might provide to the scientific causation questions. To the extent that the parties are stipulating to a paper-procedure, a court might decide reasonably that the cost factors are quite significant and that the

\textsuperscript{161} One cost in particular where a significant economy could be realized is in the area of expert witness fees. For one thing, merely paying such witnesses to travel can be a significant burden. \textit{See} Thomas A. Mauet, \textit{Pretrial} 357 (5th ed. 2002) (noting that the travel costs of expert witnesses can be substantial). Moreover, expert witnesses will already have prepared a written summary of their findings in most cases, \textit{see} Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), making the additional costs of testifying duplicative of an already-prepared written submission.

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{See} Discussion, \textit{supra} at Part III.

\textsuperscript{163} Testimony will be unlikely, for example, if the defendant has stipulated the issue of exposure and damages, or if these issues have already been resolved in the first half of a bifurcated proceeding. \textit{Cf.} Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (giving the District Courts discretion to try issues separately). On the flip side, however, we should not necessarily discount the importance of voice on the defendant’s side, even if the defendant party is a corporation that cannot “speak” in a literal sense. Although the nominal defendant may not have feelings or expectations that can be violated in a low-voice condition, it is nevertheless made up of individuals whose experiences should be counted in the procedural justice calculus. \textit{Cf.} Citizens United v. FEC, 2010 WL 183856, at *52 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (urging that “the individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons,” even if the form of association is a business corporation). Indeed, to the extent that the perceived legitimacy of the proceedings implicates decree-following and law-compliance concerns, society’s interest in encouraging such compliance may be \textit{heightened} when the party at issue is a powerful corporation.
voice opportunity favors a paper decision over no decision, which could indicate that a paper trial is preferable. But, in the end, it is the court that has to render a decision that will depend on a clear understanding of the scientific dispute in the case. So if the court finds itself significantly troubled by the difficulty of comprehending the scientific issues on briefs alone and by the inefficiencies of trying to do so without an opportunity to interact with the experts themselves, the call might reasonably go the other way.

*The Civil Rape Bench Trial*

Finally, let us consider an example in which the accuracy interest and the subjective fairness interest collide with unusual severity: a civil rape trial.\textsuperscript{164} Victims of sexual assault appear to be raising such claims with increasing frequency,\textsuperscript{165} often suing both the claimed assailant and third-party defendants who, they allege, failed to employ reasonable precautions to prevent sexual assaults on their property.\textsuperscript{166} In such suits, the ability of a victim to voice her complaint in an authoritative forum takes on particular importance, especially in light of the underwhelming success of the criminal justice system in obtaining convictions in rape cases.\textsuperscript{167} If police or prosecutors do not

\textsuperscript{164} Once again, for the sake of avoiding doctrinal complexities and focusing on the underlying policy question, we will assume that the parties have consented to a bench trial and are willing to consider a paper-trial procedure.

\textsuperscript{165} See Ellen M. Bublick, *Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Court: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms, and Constituencies*, 59 SMU L. Rev. 55, 58-59 (2006) (reporting a ten-fold increase in reported state-court appellate opinions on this subject between the early 1970s and the early 2000s).

\textsuperscript{166} Id. at 61.

\textsuperscript{167} See Joan McGregor, *Introduction to Symposium on Philosophical Issues in Rape Law*, 11 Law & Phil. 1, 2 (1992) (noting that “the likelihood of a rape complaint actually ending in conviction is generally estimated at 2-5%”); see also David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, *Rape in the Criminal Justice System*, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1194, 1209 (1997) (“The relatively few cases that proceed to trial often end with an acquittal or a hung jury.”).
consider her case to be worth pursuing, a civil court may be the only forum in which the victim can express her grievance and seek an official declaration that she was wronged.\textsuperscript{168}

On the flip side, however, the factual dispute in civil rape cases will often boil down to a simple swearing contest between the alleged victim and the alleged perpetrator.\textsuperscript{169} In many cases, the victim and the assailant will be acquaintances or intimates, and the defense will be that the sexual contact was consensual.\textsuperscript{170} The trier of fact will therefore be making a decision that hinges on whose account is more credible: The alleged victim or the alleged assailant?\textsuperscript{171}

Unfortunately, this is exactly the sort of case in which the live procedure is most likely to bias fair inferences regarding witness credibility. Nervousness and discomfort at testifying might result in a hesitant delivery that appears deceptive,\textsuperscript{172} while a well-rehearsed, confident witness may inspire an amount of trust that is ill-deserved. Likewise, the possibility that judgments of credibility may be skewed in favor of those parties who are attractive, high-status, or who happen to share salient characteristics

\textsuperscript{168} See Bublick, supra n. ??, at 68.

\textsuperscript{169} See also Jeanne C. Marsh et al., Rape and the Limits of Law Reform 21, 35 (1982) (reporting data showing that less than half of the criminal sexual conduct cases studied involved charges that the defendant either employed actual force or threatened force involving a deadly weapon). In the absence of injury, many rape cases will necessarily rely on competing testimony about conduct and apparent consent.

\textsuperscript{170} See Jennifer Temkin and Barbara Krahe, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude 11 (2008) (noting that, in a majority of the most severe sexual assaults reported in the British Crime Survey, the victim and perpetrator were intimates); Susan J. Lea et al., Attrition in Rape Cases, 43 Brit. J. Criminology 583, 590 (2003) (noting that the victim and perpetrator are intimately related in 25\% of reported cases and that they are acquaintances in 50\% of the cases).

\textsuperscript{171} Temkin & Krahe, supra n. ??, at 167.

\textsuperscript{172} Id. at 129 (describing the ease with which defense barristers can undermine a nervous rape complainant’s credibility).
with the fact-finder is deeply troubling, suggesting a danger that the system will subtly but systematically privilege powerful people with the right to sexually victimize the less-fortunate.\textsuperscript{173} Combine this with the relatively simple factual inquiry at hand in such cases—which makes confusion due to evidence complexity or outsized litigation costs less of a concern—and we are faced with a true dilemma: Our desire to create a public forum in which a victim can voice her complaint, which is grounded in our desire to respect the parties’ dignity and to adjudicate the dispute in a way that will seem fair to both participants and observers—might be highly unsuitable when viewed in terms of its ability to render objectively just decisions.

Such a situation does not admit of easy answers, but perhaps a compromise is possible. As outlined above,\textsuperscript{174} the negative voice effects of paper-based procedure can be minimized via a number of methods. First, the court can try and provide alternative avenues for party expression, even if those opportunities do not directly contribute to the evidentiary basis of the decision. If trying to maximize parties’ trust in a paper-based procedure, a court could first encourage them to participate in a non-binding form of alternative dispute resolution—such as a summary jury trial\textsuperscript{175}—in which they would be able to voice their disputes without biasing a decisionmaker who would issue a binding judgment in their case. If the parties do not settle after this initial

\textsuperscript{173} Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, \textit{Judging Innocence}, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 66 (2008) (noting that members of ethnic minority groups are “overrepresented . . . among rape . . . convicts,” and also that they are more likely to be exonerated for their crimes than is the norm among rape convicts).

\textsuperscript{174} See supra at Part III.

\textsuperscript{175} A summary jury trial is “a non-binding abbreviated trial[] by mock jurors who are chosen from the jury pool.” Donna Shestowsky, \textit{Improving Summary Jury Trials: Insights from Psychology}, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 469, 470-71 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). The goal is to have the summary jurors issue a verdict that can “provide the starting point for settlement negotiations.” \textit{Id.} at 471.
exploration of their dispute, the court can explain the need for an absent procedure and seek the parties’ explicit consent, thus explicitly tying the procedure to a desire for fair adjudication. This may reduce the likelihood that the parties will perceive the court’s desire to dispense with a hearing as a signal of disrespect for the parties or as an indication that the court does not take their dispute seriously. Next, after it has reached a view of the merits of the case based on the written submissions, the court could permit the parties’ to briefly articulate their claims in open court before announcing that decision. This will allow the parties to get further subjective voice experiences while minimizing the likelihood that their expressive opportunity will decrease the accuracy of the decision. Finally, when announcing its decision, the court should summarize the parties’ main arguments and testimony and explain its reasons for accepting one account and rejecting the other account, thus clearly indicating that it considered their written accounts with care. With such an approach, a court can assure that the decision is as accurate as possible while minimizing any loss of legitimacy that might arise from the use of a paper-based procedure in such a delicate setting.

With these examples, a few things have hopefully become clear. Although the demeanor-evidence rationale for preferring live adjudication as a means of resolving evidentiary disputes has little to recommend it, there are many situations in which a live hearing is nevertheless the best way to proceed. Indeed, at early stages of a lawsuit and in low-stakes cases, hearing-based procedures will usually be preferable to

\[176\text{ Note that the concern discussed above—that settlement would harm parties by excluding voice opportunities—could be mitigated here, if the summary jury procedure was modified to incorporate opportunities for the parties to testify briefly. Cf. id. at 472 & n.13 (noting that live witness testimony is normally not employed at a summary trial, but that it is an option that lawyers sometimes elect); Thomas R. Mulroy, Jr. & Andrea B. Friedlander, Trial Techniques: A Discussion of Summary Jury Trials and the Use of Mock Juries, 24 Tort & Ins. L.J. 563, 564 (1989) (noting that lawyers can chose to present live witness testimony “in abbreviated form”).} \]
paper-based ones. But in higher-stakes disputes with a well-developed record and an incentive to extensively prepare for a hearing, both accuracy and cost considerations start to favor paper-procedures, and the overall decision becomes more nuanced. In some cases, if credibility is of less importance but the need of the court to comprehend complex evidence is a more pressing concern, a hearing may still be preferable. But in cases in which credibility is a central concern and a great deal rides on the accuracy of the outcome, it may be best for courts to employ paper-based procedures if they are available, in order to avoid the biasing effects of witness demeanor and appearance, while attending carefully to the consequences of such an approach on participant and observer assessments of procedural fairness.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the conventional wisdom regarding live evidentiary hearings—that they increase the accuracy of decisions by allowing fact-finders to use witness demeanor to make better credibility calls—is flat wrong. In fact, the live appearance of witnesses has a much larger downside than judges or commentators have previously appreciated; in addition to the fact that demeanor cues generally impair, rather than aid, credibility judgments, there are a number of cognitive biases that may arise from having one’s first impressions of a witness be visual and auditory impressions. These include a persistent human tendency to trust or distrust witnesses based on their physical attractiveness, their social status, their race, or other features that may make them similar to, or different than, the decisionmaker.

But the fact that live hearings rarely aid credibility judgments does not make them useless. Sometimes live presentation allows for more effective witness
examination—although this opportunity will grow less likely if a witness is well
prepared to rebut cross-examination questions. More commonly, a hearing provides a
forum in which a judge can interact with witnesses, enabling her to cut through
confusion or evasion with her own questioning. In addition, live hearings often feel
clearer to participants than paper-based decisions, due in large part to the desire to have
expressive input in decisions that affect us. And sometimes a live hearing may be
preferable for reasons of cost or practicality.

In the end, it would be naïve to suggest that one procedure is preferable to the
other in all possible circumstances. Instead, when deciding which procedure to favor,
a decisionmaker—whether it be a lawyer deciding what to ask for, a judge exercising a
discretionary choice between alternatives, or a rulemaker trying to guide or constrain
that discretion—should attend to the situational costs and benefits of each procedure.
To that end, I hope that the enumeration of relevant policy considerations in this article
may serve some use.