Peremptory Challenges: Preserving An Unequal Allocation and the Potential Promise of Progressive Prosecution

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COMMENTS

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: PRESERVING AN UNEQUAL ALLOCATION AND THE POTENTIAL PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION

Savanna R. Leak*

In the United States, the relative allocation of peremptory challenges afforded to the defense and prosecution is at once in a state of paralysis and flux. The federal system maintains an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges between the defense and prosecution in noncapital offenses, while many states have moved toward equalization of the number of peremptory challenges afforded to each side over the last few decades. Currently, only five states and the federal system have retained an allocation of peremptory challenges that affords the defense a greater number of peremptory challenges in noncapital offenses. Further, only nine states and the federal system maintain an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges in any capacity. This inconsistency strikes a chord fundamental to the fairness of our justice system, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s failure to eliminate the discriminatory exercise of the peremptory challenge in Batson. This Comment argues that, at this time, the federal system and remaining states should not move toward equalizing the number of peremptory challenges afforded to the defense and prosecution because allocating a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense best serves theoretical fairness in the justice system, including maintaining the community’s perception the justice system’s fairness. Additionally,

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allocating a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense serves actual fairness by reducing opportunities for prosecutors to use peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. Finally, this Comment takes the novel approach of considering how the "progressive prosecution" movement may justify movement toward equalization in the future, by shifting the community’s perception of fairness and by increasing actual fairness in the exercise of peremptory challenges.

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INTRODUCTION

The peremptory challenge, though not constitutionally guaranteed, has long been considered essential in ensuring that the accused is tried before an impartial jury, a right guaranteed to the accused under the Sixth
Amendment.\(^1\) At the same time, the history of peremptory challenges demonstrates their potential for abuse, as lawyers, and particularly prosecutors, have used peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of race and sex.\(^2\) Despite general agreement in the legal community regarding the importance of peremptory challenges and the need for oversight in how the prosecution and defense use them, the federal system and the states do not reach consensus on whether the defense should be afforded a greater number of peremptory challenges than the prosecution, or whether the two sides should have an equal number.

Instead, the relative allocation of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution is at once in a state of paralysis and flux. Since the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were promulgated in 1946, the federal system has maintained an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges that affords a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the prosecution in noncapital cases, despite repeated legislative attempts to equalize the number of peremptory challenges.\(^3\) However, legislative proposals at the state level to equalize the number of peremptory challenges for each side have been successful. Currently, only nine states maintain an equal number of peremptory challenges for each side.

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\(^1\) See Proposed Amendments to The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 54 (1977) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Richard L. Thornburg, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen.) (“Although nothing in the Constitution requires the Congress or the State to permit any peremptory challenges, nonetheless, the challenge, by virtue of its roots in English common law and its persistent use in this country dating from colonial to modern times in both the Federal and State criminal justice systems, has become established as a vital and necessary part of trial by jury.”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”); C.J. Williams, On the Origins of Numbers: Where Did the Number of Peremptory Strikes Come from and Why Is Origin Important?, 39 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 481, 483 (2016).

\(^2\) See Williams, supra note 1, at 483 (“Peremptory strikes are viewed as problematic and fraught with potential for abuse, but at the same time recognized as critical to seating fair and impartial juries.”).

\(^3\) Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure currently allocate a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the prosecution in noncapital felonies and an equal number of peremptory challenges to both sides in capital cases. Id. The most significant proposal to amend the Federal Rules to allocate an equal number of peremptory challenges to the prosecution and defense in noncapital cases occurred in 1977, but was rejected by the Judiciary Committee after three days of oral testimony by members of the legal community. See Hearing, supra note 1. This Comment does not focus on the distinction between capital and noncapital cases but rather focuses on the general resistance at the federal level to equalization in contrast to the trend among states toward equalization.
unequal allocation of peremptory challenges to some degree,⁴ and only five states afford a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the prosecution in noncapital offenses.⁵ This is a substantially different picture than in the mid-twentieth century, when twenty states allocated a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense for at least some offenses.⁶ The stark contrast between the federal system’s resistance to

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⁴ States adopt varying practices with respect to the peremptory challenge; some states afford a greater number of peremptory challenges for certain categories of felonies, but not others. See, e.g., N.J. R. GEN. APP. R. 1:8-3(d) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-1 (West 2020)) (allocating twelve peremptory challenges to the State and twenty peremptory challenges to the defense “upon indictment for kidnapping, murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, robbery, forgery if it constitutes a crime of the third degree as defined by N.J.S.A § 2C:21-1b, or perjury,” and allocating both the State and the defense ten peremptory challenges “in other criminal actions”).

⁵ Ark. Code Ann. § 16-33-305 (West 2020) (allocating ten peremptory challenges to the State and twelve peremptory challenges to the defense in prosecutions for capital murder and allocating six peremptory challenges to the State and eight to the defense in prosecutions for all other felonies); Del. R. Crim. P. Super. Ct. 24 (allocating twelve peremptory challenges to the State and twenty peremptory challenges to the defense in capital cases, and allocating six peremptory challenges to both the State and defense in noncapital cases); Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 4-313 (West 2020) (allocating the defense twelve and the State ten peremptory challenges in capital cases, the defense ten and the prosecution five in felonies carrying a sentence of at least twenty years, and four to each side in “other noncapital felonies”); Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02(6) (2020) (allocating nine peremptory challenges to the State and fifteen peremptory challenges to the defense in cases punishable by life imprisonment, and allocating three peremptory challenges to the state and five to the defense for any other offense); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 606:3 (2020) (allocating twenty peremptory challenges to the defense in capital murder trials, fifteen in first degree murder trials, and three in any other case; and allocating ten challenges to the State in capital murder trials, fifteen in first degree murder trials, and three in any other case); N.J. R. Gen. App. R. 1:8-3(d) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-1 (West 2020)) (allocating twelve peremptory challenges to the State and twenty peremptory challenges to the defense “upon indictment for kidnapping, murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, robbery, forgery if it constitutes a crime of the third degree as defined by N.J.S.A. § 2C:21-1b, or perjury,” and allocating both the State and the defense ten peremptory challenges “in other criminal actions”); N.M. R. Crim. P. Dist. Ct. 5-606 (allocating sixteen peremptory challenges to the State and twenty-four to the defense if the offense charged is punishable by death, eight peremptory challenges to the State and twelve to the defense if the offense charged is punishable by life imprisonment, and three peremptory challenges to the State and five to the defense in all other cases); S.C. Code Ann. § 14-9-200 (2020) (allocating three peremptory challenges to the State and five to the defense in all felony cases); W. Va. R. Crim. P. 24(b)(1) (allocating two peremptory challenges to the State and six to the defense in offenses punishable by imprisonment for more than one year).

equalizing the number of peremptory challenges for noncapital cases and the states’ widespread adoption of equalization is surprising, if not troubling. The peremptory challenge is an important component of jury selection. After jurors have been questioned and both the prosecution and defense have made challenges for cause, both sides may use their respective peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors without providing a reason for the strike. Accordingly, peremptory challenges serve as a kind of safety net at the end of jury selection, whereby parties can eliminate jurors they suspect might be biased or partial to the other side but who do not qualify for a challenge for cause.

However, many in the legal community consider peremptory challenges to be “fraught with potential for abuse” due to the subjective and potentially discriminatory nature of eliminating jurors without being required to provide an explanation. In 1986, the Supreme Court addressed this concern in Batson v. Kentucky. The Batson decision prohibited prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely based on race, requiring them to give a neutral reason for any strike. The Batson prohibition was later extended to the defense’s use of peremptory challenges and to discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge to strike jurors on the basis of sex. Despite Batson, however, abuse of the peremptory challenge allocation of peremptory challenges in some form. These states included Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Id.; see also id. at 1537 n.225 (“Since the 1970s, asymmetry has been abandoned in Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, and Tennessee.”).

8 Id. at 228.
9 Id. at 227, 230; see also Roberts, supra note 6, at 1512 n.67.
10 Williams, supra note 1, at 483.
12 Id. at 93–98. The Court established a three-step test to determine whether the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge for a discriminatory reason. Id. Batson’s first step “requires the objecting party to establish a ‘prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.’ Step two shifts the burden to the party attempting to exercise the peremptory to give neutral reasons that are ‘related to the particular case to be tried’”; step three “requires the trial judge to decide whether the reasons are pretextual.” Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1697 (2006) (citation omitted).
is not an ancient relic, and the Batson test is generally considered to be insufficient to rein in discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, particularly by the prosecution.14 A recent and poignant example of prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge is the 2019 Supreme Court case, Flowers v. Mississippi, where the Court found extraordinary evidence of discriminatory intent by the prosecution in its use of peremptory challenges.15 For these reasons, legislators, judges, and the academic community have long considered how peremptory challenge procedures may safeguard and balance the interests of defendants, victims, and the community, and better promote the fair administration of justice. Some have even called for the abolition of the peremptory challenge altogether.16

Given the importance of the peremptory challenge as well as its potential for abuse, the legal community should take note of states’ substantial departure from the federal system and consider which approach better serves fairness in our criminal justice system. One might be skeptical about the importance of the relative allocation of peremptory challenges at either the federal or state level, as the difference might involve only a handful of peremptory challenges that may or may not have a noticeable impact on the outcome of a trial. But this is a naïve view. Even one peremptory

14 See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (2014) (“[T]he Batson regime has proved spectacularly unsuccessful. It has not ended racial discrimination in jury selection . . . .”); Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson’s Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 633 (1994) (“Despite the Batson rule’s noble purpose, it cannot prevent clever lawyers from using peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors based upon impermissible rationales so long as they pretend to use other, permissible bases.”); Scott W. Howe, Deselecting Biased Juries, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 289, 293 (2015) (“[The] Batson doctrine does not adequately regulate [peremptory challenges].”).

15 See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2245 (2019). Flowers is the most recent Supreme Court decision to consider Batson violations. The case is exceptional for several reasons, including that Flowers was tried for the same series of murders six times. In Flowers, Flowers appealed his sixth trial conviction, claiming that the lead prosecutor, Doug Evans, had used his peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner to strike five black prospective jurors. Id. In November 2019, the NAACP and other organizations filed a class-action suit against Evans, alleging that he and other prosecutors in his office had struck black jurors 4.4 times more frequently than white jurors. Mihir Zaveri, White Prosecutor, Doug Evans, Asks to Recuse Himself from Curtis Flowers Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/us/doug-evans-curtis-flowers.html [https://perma.cc/ZQ2U-PRBW]. Evans later asked to recuse himself from Flowers’s ongoing case. Id.

16 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 370–71 (1992); Marder, supra note 12, at 1714.
challenge provides potential for abuse on the basis of race or sex and may be “critical to seating fair and impartial juries.”17 And the defendant’s and community’s perception of the justice system may depend on the relative allocation of peremptory challenges. Accordingly, the legal community should monitor changes and trends in this area closely and consider whether an unequal or equal number of peremptory challenges for the prosecution and defense best serves the justice system.18

Arguments for and against equalizing at the federal and state level have in large part centered on theoretical and practical notions of “fairness.”19 For the purposes of this Comment, theoretical fairness encompasses arguments focused on the relative “rights” and “interests” of the defendants, victims of crime, and the community in an impartial jury, as well as how the community perceives the justice system.20 Practical, or “actual” fairness encompasses arguments considering empirical data on the parties’ abuse of peremptory challenges in jury selection. This Comment argues that the states’ trend toward equalization of the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the prosecution and defense is unwise because an unequal allocation best serves both notions of fairness, considering the arguments highlighted in the debates over the relative allocation of peremptory challenges throughout its history and the practical use of the peremptory challenge today. If, however, an equal number of peremptory challenges for each side is a worthy goal—a question explored further infra—this Comment argues that the progressive prosecution movement may justify equalizing the number of peremptory challenges between the prosecution and defense in the future.

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17 Williams, supra note 1, at 483.
18 Id. at 510–11 (“Whether each side receives the same number of peremptory strikes is a vital issue. Most state legislatures afford each side the same number of peremptory strikes in criminal cases, while the federal rules grant defendants more peremptory strikes in felony cases, but not in capital or misdemeanor cases.”).
19 See Roberts, supra note 6, at 1538–41; see also Note, Judging the Prosecution, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2121, 2131 (2006) (discussing peremptory challenges in the context of “two related considerations: the extent to which [criminal] process is perceived as being fair and just, and the extent to which [criminal] process is actually fair and just”). Though the author discusses abolition of the peremptory challenge, this framework is helpful for categorizing arguments regarding the proper allocation of peremptory challenges between the prosecution and defense as well.
20 Theoretical fairness includes, for example, arguments made by proponents of the Victim Rights Bill of 1995, which sought to equalize the number of peremptory challenges for noncapital federal felony offenses in order to protect victims’ rights relative to the defendant. See, e.g., Victim Rights and Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 1995, S. 1483, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995); see also 141 Cong. Rec. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
The notion that the states should maintain an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges is not new in legal scholarship. However, this Comment explores anew the bases for various allocations, which have shifted over time. Further, it takes a novel approach in considering how the progressive prosecution movement may shape the proper allocation of peremptory challenges and perhaps even justify the current shift toward equal allocation of peremptory challenges. Part I discusses the origins of the peremptory challenge and justifications for equal and unequal allocation of peremptory challenges. It considers the English roots of the peremptory challenge, the adoption of the peremptory challenge in the United States, the legislative history surrounding Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure—which governs the allocation of peremptory challenges—and state legislative history. Part II discusses the justifications for the right of both the prosecution and the defense to the peremptory challenge, considering arguments from legislative history and relevant case law, including Batson and its progeny. Part III discusses whether the trend toward equalization is wise, considering the justifications provided in Parts I and II. Finally, Part IV examines how progressive prosecution may change the current landscape of fairness in the peremptory challenge context to warrant an equal number of peremptory challenges for both sides.

I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FEDERAL AND STATE ALLOCATIONS OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

Peremptory challenges are limited in number, set in the federal system by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the states by statute.

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21 Scholars who have considered the proper relative allocation of peremptory challenges include Anna Roberts, Katherine Goldwasser, Richard Friedman, and C.J. Williams. For their perspectives, see, respectively, Roberts, supra note 6, at 1538–39 ("[A]symmetry [in the allocation of peremptory challenges] does not equate to unfairness and, indeed, has been a foundational component of efforts to create a fair criminal justice system … . [A]n asymmetrical allocation of peremptory challenge offers particular opportunities with respect to the difficulties of the Batson doctrine."); Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant’s Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 808, 808 (1989) (considering whether Batson-like restrictions should apply symmetrically to the defense as it does to the prosecution); Richard D. Friedman, An Asymmetrical Approach to the Problem of Peremptories?, 28 Crim. L. Bull. 507, 507 (1992) (considering the relative importance of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution and considering asymmetry in the allocation of peremptory challenges to both sides); Williams, supra note 1, at 481 (reviewing the bases for various allocations of peremptory challenges in the United States over time and arguing that the proper allocation must be determined through empirical study).

Currently, the allocation of peremptory challenges varies between the federal government and among the states. In the federal system, Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dictates the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the defense and prosecution in criminal cases.\textsuperscript{23} The numbers vary by severity of the offense.\textsuperscript{24} In capital cases, the defense and prosecution are each allocated twenty peremptory challenges.\textsuperscript{25} In noncapital felony cases, the defense is allocated ten peremptory challenges and the prosecution is allocated six.\textsuperscript{26} By contrast, most states allocate an equal number of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution in both capital cases and noncapital cases, with the absolute number of peremptory challenges increasing with the severity of the offense.\textsuperscript{27}

Some states, however, allocate an unequal number of peremptory challenges to the prosecution and defense, granting a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the prosecution. Even among these states, the peremptory challenge allocation varies. Minnesota, for example, grants a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the prosecution in cases involving life sentences and noncapital felonies.\textsuperscript{28} while Delaware grants a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the prosecution in capital cases, but an equal number of peremptory challenges to both parties in noncapital felonies.\textsuperscript{29} Maryland, on the other hand, maintains a sort of hybrid system of allocation: the state allocates a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense for capital felonies and for noncapital felonies that carry a sentence of twenty years or more, but it allocates an equal number of peremptory challenges to the state and defense in other noncapital felonies.\textsuperscript{30}

This Part traces the historical development of the peremptory challenge and highlights justifications for the relative allocation of peremptory challenges between the prosecution and the defense in the federal system and among the states. The origins of the peremptory challenge demonstrate an early concern with the relative allocation of peremptory challenges between the prosecution and defense. Further, legislative history surrounding proposed amendments to the Federal Rules and to state legislation demonstrates that proponents and opponents of equalization have primarily

\begin{footnotes}
\item[23] FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
\item[24] Id.
\item[25] Id.
\item[26] Id. This Comment does not examine peremptory challenges in misdemeanor cases.
\item[27] Roberts, supra note 6, at 1535; see also supra note 5.
\item[29] DEL. R. CRIM P. SUPER. CT. 24(b).
\item[30] MD. CODE, ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-420 (West 2020).
\end{footnotes}
focused on the notion of “fairness” in considering the proper allocation of peremptory challenges between the prosecution and the defense.

A. HISTORY OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE ALLOCATION: FROM ENGLAND TO THE UNITED STATES

Since the fourteenth century, jurists have viewed the peremptory challenge’s role in trial procedure with profound respect.\(^\text{31}\) Additionally, lawmakers historically appeared more concerned with the relative allocation of peremptory challenges—and the relative importance of the peremptory challenge as to the defense and the prosecution—than the absolute number of peremptory challenges.\(^\text{32}\) In England, peremptory challenges can be traced back to medieval times.\(^\text{33}\) Initially, the Crown had an unlimited number of peremptory challenges, which served as a symbol of the absolute power or “infallibil[y]” of the monarchy.\(^\text{34}\) In 1305, however, Parliament eliminated the Crown’s peremptory challenge in a step toward democratization, noting that a jury “selected by the Crown was ‘obnoxious to justice.’”\(^\text{35}\)

Although the Crown’s right to the peremptory challenge was technically eliminated, the Crown soon began to exercise its power to “stand aside” jurors. This practice allowed the Crown to strike jurors in much the same way the peremptory challenge did.\(^\text{36}\) The stand aside involved a prosecutor initially assigning a potential juror a challenge for cause without explanation.\(^\text{37}\) The court then instructed that juror to stand aside until all

\(^{31}\) See Morrison, supra note 14, at 10; Marder, supra note 12, at 1692 (“There are both powerful historical and practical reasons for preserving the peremptory challenge. Justice Stevens has [a] deep respect for history . . . [which] might lead him to maintain the peremptory [challenge] . . . .”)

\(^{32}\) See Judith Heinz, Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Comparison of Regulation in the United States, England, and Canada, 16 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 201, 207–08 (1993). Early changes in the allocation of peremptory challenges involved shifting or overhauling the allocation of peremptory challenges to increase or decrease the power of the government as to the defense, as well as promoting “the appearance of fairness to the accused.” Id. at 208–211; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 505–07 (suggesting that while the absolute number of peremptory challenges, historically, seems to lack logic or coherence, legislators’ concern with the relative number of peremptory challenges is reflected in legislative history).

\(^{33}\) Heinz, supra note 32, at 207.

\(^{34}\) Alexa B. Moeller, Has the “Last Petal” Fallen?: Beauty of the Modern Jury Trial and the Beast Known as the Peremptory Challenge, 63 S.D. L. Rev. 193, 196 (2018) (citation omitted).

\(^{35}\) Heinz, supra note 32, at 208.

\(^{36}\) Id. at 209.

\(^{37}\) Id.
venire members had been examined by the defense and prosecution.\textsuperscript{38} Only once the “stood aside” juror was called again would the prosecutor have to prove the challenge for cause.\textsuperscript{39} Simply put, the government could have prospective jurors stand aside from jury selection and pass over that juror to the next before showing cause for removing them.\textsuperscript{40} The court only seated a stood aside juror thereafter if, after questioning remaining jurors, a jury could not be seated without him.\textsuperscript{41}

The lawmakers who created the stand aside in England did so with the perception that juries would be “too defense-oriented,” likely believing that jurists could “conduct[] trials fairly, even though the Crown controlled jury selection.”\textsuperscript{42} According to one scholar, the creation of the stand aside “marks the beginning of a conflict between confidence in the fairness of the prosecutor as an officer of the court versus a suspicion of placing too much power in the prosecutor as representative of the sovereign.”\textsuperscript{43} Nonetheless, the decision to allocate no peremptory challenges to the Crown and an unlimited number to the defense was symbolically significant, leading English jurists to consider the peremptory challenge a “defendant’s privilege.”\textsuperscript{44} After 1305, only defendants were permitted to exercise peremptory challenges.\textsuperscript{45} By 1530, parliament set a fixed number of peremptory challenges for the defense: defendants were allocated thirty-five peremptory challenges for cases involving high treason and twenty challenges in all other cases.\textsuperscript{46}

B. ADOPTION OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN THE UNITED STATES

Peremptory challenge practices in the United States initially mirrored the English common law.\textsuperscript{47} At the time of the United States’ founding, defendants were given thirty-five peremptory challenges in cases of treason and twenty peremptory challenges in cases of murder or other felonies.\textsuperscript{48} The prosecution was able to stand aside jurors, but it was not able to exercise any

\textsuperscript{38} Id.

\textsuperscript{39} Williams, supra note 1, at 489.

\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 488–89.

\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 489.

\textsuperscript{42} Heinz, supra note 32, at 210.

\textsuperscript{43} Id. at 210–11.

\textsuperscript{44} Id.

\textsuperscript{45} Id.

\textsuperscript{46} Id. at 211.

\textsuperscript{47} See Williams, supra note 1, at 502.

\textsuperscript{48} See id.
peremptory challenges.\textsuperscript{49} Although the Framers considered adding a constitutional guarantee to the peremptory challenge, “they decided this right was implicit in a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.”\textsuperscript{50} Instead, the Constitution granted to the defendant only the right to trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment, leaving peremptory challenges to be established at common law or by Congress.\textsuperscript{51}

In 1790, Congress passed an act implementing the first peremptory challenge allocation.\textsuperscript{52} That act granted the defense thirty-five peremptory challenges in cases involving treason and twenty challenges in all other capital cases.\textsuperscript{53} Following the English tradition, Congress allocated no peremptory challenges to the prosecution.\textsuperscript{54} In 1865, however, Congress passed a second federal statute allocating “a small number of peremptory challenges to the prosecution” and a greater number to the defense.\textsuperscript{55}

Congress continued to modify the absolute number of peremptory challenges allocated to the defense and prosecution over time. In 1872, Congress allocated the defense twenty peremptory challenges and the prosecution five peremptory challenges in capital cases.\textsuperscript{56} For any other felony, the defendant was entitled to ten peremptory challenges and the government was entitled to three.\textsuperscript{57} However, “there is nothing in the legislative history” of the Act that implemented the change explaining why these particular numbers were chosen.\textsuperscript{58} Then, in 1911, Congress increased the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the prosecution to six in capital cases, maintaining twenty peremptory challenges for the defense.\textsuperscript{59} Again, legislative history does not provide the reasoning behind this change.\textsuperscript{60}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{49} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Moeller, supra note 34, at 197.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 585–86 (1919); see also Williams, supra note 1, at 504 (citation omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{52} Williams, supra note 1, at 504.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Id. (citing 1 Stat. 119 § 30 (1790)).
\item \textsuperscript{54} Id. at 495.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Roberts, supra note 6, at 1534; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 504–05. Prior to the passage of the second statute, certain states had allowed the prosecution to exercise the “stand asides” employed by the Crown in England, but the practice received substantial criticism and was mostly given up with the 1865 statute. See id. at 491–94.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Williams, supra note 1, at 505.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Id.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Peremptory challenges in the state context followed a similar trajectory at first. After the country’s founding, states began to codify peremptory challenges in criminal trials.\(^61\) They typically allocated fewer peremptory strikes to the prosecution than to the defendant.\(^62\) Some states refused to allocate any peremptory challenges to the prosecution, allowing the prosecution to raise only for-cause challenges.\(^63\) Over time, however, state courts reduced the absolute number of peremptory challenges adopted from the English system.\(^64\) At the same time, state governments began to increase the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the prosecution and started to move toward an equalization of the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the prosecution and the defense.\(^65\) Scholar Anna Roberts notes that between 1854 and 1939, twenty-seven states moved from an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges to an equal number of peremptory challenges.\(^66\)

C. THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

In 1946, the first version of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was promulgated, and the allocation of peremptory challenges set at that time has not changed. The Rules provide the defense and prosecution with an equal number of peremptory challenges in capital cases and the defense with a greater number of peremptory challenges than the prosecution in noncapital felony cases.\(^67\) Notably, the first draft, which was proposed in 1941, allocated an equal number of peremptory challenges to the prosecution and the defense.\(^68\) The second draft, proposed a year later, maintained an equal

\(^{61}\) Id. at 503.

\(^{62}\) April J. Anderson, *Peremptory Challenges at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century: Development of Modern Jury Selection Strategies as Seen in Practitioners’ Trial Manuals*, 16 STAN. J. CRIM. & C.L. 1, 18–19 (2020) (“Although state procedures were hardly uniform, in general they reduced prosecutorial power in picking the jury, as compared either with common law procedures or with the challenges most states afforded defendants.”).

\(^{63}\) Id. at 19, 19 n.118.

\(^{64}\) Williams, *supra* note 1, at 502–03.

\(^{65}\) Id.


\(^{67}\) FED R. CRIM. P. 24(b); Roberts, *supra* note 6, at 1534.

\(^{68}\) During the drafting of the Rules jurists debated the allocation of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution, and the proposed equal allocation was ultimately rejected. Roberts, *supra* note 6, at 1534. In 1941, an advisory committee began drafting the Federal
number of peremptory challenges for each side—twenty challenges in treason and capital offenses and six challenges in noncapital felonies. The defense was jointly allocated ten peremptory challenges in noncapital felony cases if multiple defendants were to be tried.

The Advisory Committee received many proposals regarding the relative allocation of peremptory challenges throughout the drafting process. For example, in considering the Second Preliminary Draft in 1944, a representative for the Bar Committee for the Western District of Tennessee argued that a defendant should always be allocated a greater number of challenges than the government because “[t]he jury comes to know the government attorneys better than the attorney for the defendant, as the latter appears only in part of the cases,” and “the defendant’s attorney does not have the means to investigate the background of prospective jurors, and so must rely more on hunches than the government.” One United States Attorney argued that the government “could not object to the equalization of challenges,” but that the government had not felt disadvantaged in the past by the defendant’s greater number of challenges. Yet another individual argued that in cases of treason or capital offenses, the defendant should have twenty peremptory challenges and the government should have six peremptory challenges, but for all other offenses, the defense and government should both be allocated six peremptory challenges. Ultimately, the Advisory Committee settled on the current rule in its Final Report of the Advisory Committee of June 1944. In capital cases the defense and prosecution would each be allocated twenty challenges. For noncapital offenses, the government would have six challenges, but the defendant or defendants together would have ten. “If there was more than

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lester B. Orfield, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 44–45 (1962). The first draft of Rule 24—at the time, Rule 47—“was modeled quite closely on Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .” Id. See First Preliminary Draft of Fed. R. Crim. P. 47 (1941). The draft of criminal Rule 47 provided that “[t]he number of peremptory challenges which will be permitted to the defendant . . . and the number which shall be permitted to the attorney for the government shall be the same.” Orfield, supra note 68, at 44–45; see also Second Preliminary Draft of Fed. R. Crim. P. 47 (1942).

Orfield, supra note 68, at 45.

Id. at 44–45.

Id. at 52.

Id. at 48–49.

Id. at 53.

Id. at 53.

Id. at 43; see also Fed. R. CRIM. P. advisory committee’s final report on Published Drafts of the Rules at p. 47 (1944).
one defendant the court might allow additional challenges.”

Another major call for reform in the federal system came in 1977, when the House Judiciary Committee reviewed a bill to amend Rule 24. The bill sought to equalize and reduce the number of challenges afforded the prosecution and the defense. The debate regarding the change focused on “whether the proposed changes in Rule 24(b) are compatible with the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to an impartial jury” and would be wise, given practical use of the peremptory challenges by both parties. A substantial amount of testimony in opposition focused on the historical allocation of peremptory challenges, the greater interest of the defense than the prosecution in the outcome of a criminal case, and the practical advantage that would be afforded to the prosecution if the number of peremptory challenges were to be equalized.

Multiple constituents argued that a reduced number of peremptory challenges would not be sufficient to “enable the defendant to achieve a jury free of bias against the accused.” Jay Schulman of the National Jury Project cited the 1790 act of Congress allocating to the defense “a favorable ratio of four to one over the Government in capital cases” and the 1911 act allocating to the defense a favorable ratio of two to one in felony cases. Schulman also pointed to practical evidence that it was “the U.S. Attorney who is most likely to eliminate people from a particular group” whereas the defense was “more likely to take jurors from whence they come and to operate on whim or caprice.” He further pointed to research demonstrating that a substantial portion of the community believed an indictment was “tantamount to guilt,” citing surveys conducted by the National Jury Project. His testimony implied that the “advantages” to the defense of the presumption of innocence and the government’s higher burden of proof would not be enough to eliminate the risk that the community might view an indictment as indicative of guilt. Accordingly, those advantages to the defense would not be

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78 Id. at 53–54.
79 Id. at 57 (statement of Deputy Att’y Gen. Richard L. Thornburgh).
80 Id. at 3.
81 Id. at 3–5.
82 Id. at 4.
83 Id. at 9.
84 Id. at 3.
85 Id. at 6.
sufficient to warrant allocating an equal number of peremptory challenges to
the prosecution and defense. As another member of the American Bar
Association argued more simply, “The defendant is the one that goes off to
jail.” This sentiment was echoed by another testifier, who explained that
while the right to the peremptory challenge is important to both the
government and the defendant, it is more important to the defendant because
the defendant is “personally involved in the result of the trial.”

On the other hand, supporters of the amendment argued that the
prosecution has an equal right to an impartial jury. For example, the standing
Attorney General argued that the government, as the representative of the
public, “is entitled no less than the defendant to a fair trial;” for this reason,
he argued it was “appropriate to permit both the Government and the
defendant to exercise, at least initially as a matter of right, an equal number
of peremptory challenges.” He stated, “[T]he inequality that exists . . . is
not justifiable in terms of any apparent policy embodied in the rule itself.”

Ultimately, however, the amendment was rejected. The Judiciary
Committee explained that it would be “unwise” to reduce the number of
peremptory challenges allocated to each side because testimony
demonstrated that prosecutors used peremptory challenges to systematically
exclude classes of people more often than the defense.

In 1995, proponents of the Victim Rights and Domestic Violence
Prevention Act unsuccessfully sought to amend the Federal Rules and
equalize the number of peremptory challenges between the defense and
prosecution for noncapital felony offenses. The goal of the bill was to
“strengthen the rights of domestic violence victims in Federal court and
hopefully set a standard for the individual states to emulate.” With respect
to the peremptory challenge, proponents of the bill sought to “level [the]
playing field” between the defendant and the victim. Proponents explained,
“Violence in our society leaves law-abiding citizens feeling defenseless . . . .
Federal law currently gives the defense more chances than the prosecution to
reject a potential juror. [This] bill protects the right of victims to an impartial

89 Id. at 134.
90 Id. at 216.
91 Id. at 57.
92 Id. at 57–58.
93 Id. at 278.
94 Id.
A similar argument was made by another proponent of the Victim Rights Bill. The proponent stated, “[W]e should give victims an impartial trial, jury, and a fair shake. To do that, I think we need to give both the prosecution and the defense simply the same number of peremptory challenges. It only seems right, and it only seems fair.”

D. STATE ALLOCATIONS OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

States that amended their peremptory challenge rules to provide for equality between the prosecution and defense have also done so on the basis of victims’ rights, arguing that there is no justification for granting the defense an advantage in the selection of an impartial jury, and also on the logic of saving courts time and resources. As scholar Anna Roberts explains, “State legislators and members of the executive admit to ignorance about the historical picture and bafflement about the current need for [an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges].” In particular, states have proven more open to victims’ rights arguments, as advocates have successfully argued that victims’ rights warrant an equal allocation of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution, whereas victims’ rights justifications have failed at the federal level. For example, Oregon adopted equality of peremptory challenges pursuant to its Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights. The Bill relied on the notion that “victims of crime are entitled to fair and impartial treatment in our criminal justice system” to justify an equal allocation of peremptory challenges. Further, in Georgia, another state that adopted an equal allocation of peremptory challenges, a member of the legislature explained that a system that granted the defense a

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100 See Roberts, supra note 6, at 1538 (“Efforts to equalize the allocation of peremptory challenges are explained on the basis that there is no apparent justification—other than attempting to give an unfair advantage to the defense—for maintaining asymmetry.”). Roberts also explains,

On the issue of rights . . . the notion that constitutional rights are accorded to the defendant, and not to either the prosecution or the alleged victim, is frequently obscured. One does not have to look further than the discussions about moving toward symmetrical allocation of peremptory challenges to see examples of a notion that rights not only exist on both sides but also are equal on both sides.

Id. at 1547. This argument is present in the victims’ rights supporters’ claims. Id. at 1547–48.
101 Id. at 1538 (citation omitted).
102 Id. at 1548.
103 Id.
greater number of peremptory challenges than the prosecution gave “more rights to the defendant than to the victim.”\textsuperscript{104}

Multiple states that maintain an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges have considered reforming the number and allocation of peremptory challenges as well. One example is the State of New Jersey. Currently, the state allocates the defense twenty peremptory challenges and the prosecution twelve peremptory challenges in cases where a defendant is charged with offenses carrying more serious penalties, such as murder, sexual assault, and arson.\textsuperscript{105} For “other criminal actions,” the defense and the state are each entitled to ten peremptory challenges.\textsuperscript{106} In 2000, New Jersey assembly members introduced Bill A727 for review by the legislature, which sought to equalize the number of peremptory challenges in the “serious crimes” listed above, and to reduce the absolute number of peremptory challenges allocated to both sides.\textsuperscript{107} The Bill proposed that the state and the defense would each receive eight peremptory challenges if the defendant was tried alone and six per defendant if defendants were tried jointly.\textsuperscript{108} The purpose proffered for the Bill was to “reduce the number of peremptory challenges afforded the prosecution and defense in order to reduce the disparity between the two sides and to decrease the delay in the progress of these criminal cases.”\textsuperscript{109} However, the Bill never progressed past the New Jersey Assembly’s Judiciary Committee.\textsuperscript{110}

In 2005, the Special Supreme Court Committee on Peremptory Challenges and Jury Voir Dire produced a report to the Supreme Court of New Jersey recommending changes to peremptory challenges and voir dire.\textsuperscript{111} The Committee recommended eliminating the distinction between “serious” offenses and other offenses, and reducing the absolute number of peremptory challenges afforded to both parties.\textsuperscript{112} However, the Committee emphasized that there should continue to be a greater number of peremptory challenges allocated to the defense compared to the prosecution.\textsuperscript{113} The

\textsuperscript{104} Id. at 1547–48.
\textsuperscript{105} N.J. R. GEN. APP. R. 1:8-3(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:21-1 (West 2020).
\textsuperscript{106} Id.
\textsuperscript{108} Id.
\textsuperscript{109} Id.
\textsuperscript{112} Id. at 3, 7.
\textsuperscript{113} Id. at 52–53.
Committee, echoing arguments against equalizing peremptory challenges at the federal level, explained that despite significant changes in the criminal justice system, “there remains some residual advantage to the State in a criminal trial.” Therefore, “in recognition that the right to trial is a right possessed by the criminal defendant,” the Committee concluded that the defense should have a greater number of peremptory challenges than the state. However, as noted above, the state today only maintains an unequal allocation of the number of peremptory challenges between the prosecution and defense for the more serious offenses listed above and not in “other criminal felony” cases, despite the fact that in its recommendation, the Committee suggested an unequal allocation of eight peremptory challenges to the defense and six peremptory challenges to the state in all criminal cases. Currently, the state allocates ten peremptory challenges to each side in “other criminal” felonies.

II. Justifications for the Defense and Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge

In the United States, judges and scholars have defended the peremptory challenge as instrumental in seating an impartial jury, a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, despite the fact that the peremptory challenge itself is not constitutionally granted to either the defense or the prosecution. However, acknowledgement that the peremptory challenge may be used unfairly or discriminatorily is almost as old as the peremptory challenge itself, as evidenced by the 1305 decision in England to eliminate the Crown’s right to the peremptory challenge. Thus, consideration of whether peremptory challenges should be allocated to the prosecution at all is warranted. This Part will consider the various justifications for both the defense and prosecutorial right to the peremptory challenge, as well as Batson’s impact on these justifications.

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114 Id. With respect to changes in the criminal justice system, the Committee referenced the “provision of counsel for indigent defendants,” shifting societal attitudes, and the “expansion of the jury pool.”
115 Id. at 53.
116 Id. at 50–52.
118 See supra Part I.
119 See Heinz, supra note 32, at 208.
A. THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the accused the right to trial by an impartial jury. Although not itself constitutionally guaranteed, the peremptory challenge has long been viewed as a guarantor of this right, and therefore an important, if not indispensable, facet of trial procedure.

The notion that a defendant has a right to the peremptory challenge is more deeply ingrained in the psyche of American jurists than the prosecution’s right to the peremptory challenge; however, the right of both parties to use this tool is commonly accepted. As discussed, when the practice began in the United States, peremptory challenges were granted only to the defendant. Since then, most jurists have staunchly supported the defendant’s right to the peremptory challenge. For example, in its 1965 decision Swain v. Alabama, the Supreme Court noted the peremptory challenge’s historic significance, describing it as “one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused.” Further, the dissent in Swain stated: “How necessary it is, that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him; the law wills not that he should be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice . . . .” Jurists who opposed an equal number of peremptory challenges during debate surrounding the 1977 proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure invoked similar sentiments.

However, in other decisions, the Supreme Court has made clear that the state also maintains an important interest in this tool. In its 1887 Hayes v. Missouri decision, for example, the Supreme Court explained, “The public prosecutor may have the strongest reasons to distrust the character of a juror offered . . . and yet find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal objection to him. In such cases, the peremptory challenge is a protection against his

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120 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
121 Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (“Experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury box from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge.”); see also Goldwasser, supra note 18, at 827; Williams, supra note 1, at 483 (“Peremptory strikes are . . . recognized as critical to seating fair and impartial juries.”).
122 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 21, at 513, 510 (noting that “[p]rosecutors’ peremptories stand on weaker ground than do the accused’s” and that “historical background suggests . . . [that] . . . peremptories] exist principally for the benefit of criminal defendants”).
123 See supra Section I.B.
125 Id. at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marder, supra note 12, at 1692.
126 Swain, 380 U.S. at 242.
127 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 1, at 3–4 (statement of Jay Schulman).
being accepted." Additional decisions have highlighted the same point. For example, in Commonwealth v. Soares, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted: “While we have highlighted a defendant’s right to be protected from the improper use of peremptory challenges, we recognize the Commonwealth’s interest in prosecutions that are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result.” That court held that the prosecution was “equally to be entitled to a representative jury, unimpaired by improper exercise of peremptory challenges by the defense.” States’ reform of the peremptory challenge based on the victims’ rights bills discussed above also support this view.

B. BATSON, ITS PROGENY, AND ITS FAILURES

The Supreme Court has recognized that abuse of the peremptory challenge, particularly by prosecutors, disserves defendants, the broader community, and the justice system as a whole. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that prosecutors’ use of the peremptory challenge to exclude jurors on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that case, the Court lowered the incredibly high burden Swain v. Alabama placed on the defendant to prove that the prosecution had discriminatorily used its peremptory challenges. The Court in Batson articulated a three-part test—a defendant could make a prima facie showing of discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) he was a member of a distinct racial group; (2) the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove venire members of the defendant’s race; and (3) the evidence raised an inference of discrimination by the prosecutor. Batson’s prohibition has been extended to prohibit discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the defense and to prohibit discriminatory use of the peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of gender.

Unfortunately, many scholars and jurists argue that Batson and its progeny do little in practice to prevent the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, due to the high evidentiary burden placed on a party claiming a

128 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
129 387 N.E.2d 499, 517 n.35 (Mass. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130 Id.; see infra Part I.C.
131 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986); see also Morehead, supra note 14, at 629.
133 See id. at 96.
Batson violation and the ease with which a party can concoct a race-neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for striking a potential juror. As one justice argued in his dissent in Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, the Batson prohibition on race-based peremptory challenges is “effectively nullified by evidentiary requirements that virtually insulate a prosecutor’s use of the peremptory challenge to exclude jurors.” Once a party brings a Batson challenge, the challenged party must “develop a record in voir dire to defend the peremptory challenges used against a claim of discrimination” while the challenging party must develop a “similar record to argue that the peremptory challenges were racially motivated.” Then, a Batson challenge requires a court to “sift through counsel’s words for patterns or pretexts of discrimination.” Additionally, once a Batson challenge is made against a lawyer, the lawyer need only provide a neutral reason for striking the juror. This is an easy bar to meet, as “lawyers [can] offer absurd pretexts for their discriminatory use of peremptory challenges and, in doing so, evade Batson’s protections.”

Researchers considering North Carolina’s Batson record over the past three decades have echoed this concern. Tellingly, “in all the 114 North Carolina appellate Batson cases involving minority jurors decided on the merits since 1986, the courts have never found a substantive Batson violation where a prosecutor has managed to articulate even one reason, however fantastic, for the peremptory challenge.” The researchers also cited orders issued by North Carolina Judge Gregory Weeks in 2012 as further evidence demonstrating “the regularity with which North Carolina prosecutors offer pretextual reasons for [discriminatory] peremptory strikes,” which were often “thinnly-disguised.” For example, prosecutors might provide neutral reasons for their challenges such as “lack of eye contact, air of defiance, arms folded, leaning away from questioner, and evasive.” Additionally, many appellate courts are deferential to trial courts in reviewing Batson challenges,

135 Morehead, supra note 14, at 633–34.
136 546 A.2d 1101, 1113 (Pa. 1988) (Nix, C.J., dissenting); id. at 634.
137 Id. at 636.
138 People v. Bolling, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring); see also Roberts, supra note 6, at 1511.
140 Roberts, supra note 6, at 1512.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1980.
144 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
meaning that failures of trial courts to “adequately [] police peremptory challenges” are often left undisturbed.\textsuperscript{145}

In light of Batson’s failures, scholars have suggested a number of approaches to prevent discriminatory abuse of the peremptory challenge. These include substantially limiting the absolute number of peremptory challenges, as well as the more drastic approaches of abolishing the peremptory challenge for the prosecution or abolishing the peremptory challenge entirely.\textsuperscript{146} Despite these proposals, the right of both parties to use peremptory challenges seems to be guaranteed, at least for now. One scholar cites the 2005 ABA Principles for Juries and Jury Trials as an example of “lawyers’ unwavering support for the peremptory challenge” for both parties.\textsuperscript{147} While the ABA’s proposal was “cutting-edge in many ways” with respect to jury procedure, it largely “preserve[ed] the status quo” with respect to the peremptory challenge, dictating that the peremptory challenge should be available to both parties.\textsuperscript{148}

Further, in the 1990s a committee of jurists in Arizona, a “state at the vanguard of jury reform,” conducted a study of the jury system and voted to retain peremptory challenges for both parties.\textsuperscript{149} The committee reasoned that peremptory challenges are necessary “if jury selection [i]s to be fair in fact and seen to be fair by the litigant, who would see that he or she had some degree of control over an otherwise random selection process.”\textsuperscript{150} Additionally, in a study conducted in 1995 to assess federal district court judges’ views on the importance of peremptory challenges in criminal cases, judges overwhelmingly believed that on balance, peremptory challenges in their current state contribute positively to the justice system.\textsuperscript{151} Less than sixteen percent of district court judges supported eliminating the peremptory challenge entirely.\textsuperscript{152} Further, most of the judges who would retain the peremptory challenge “would also retain current rules and practices” in the

\textsuperscript{145} Roberts, supra note 6, at 1512.
\textsuperscript{146} See Williams, supra note 1, at 483–84; Broderick, supra note 16, at 369.
\textsuperscript{147} Marder, supra note 12, at 1685–86; AM. BAR ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS (2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/american_jury/principles.authcheckdam.bna.com/bnabooks/ababnalannual/2005/023.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8RZ-REKB].
\textsuperscript{148} Marder, supra note 12, at 1686.
\textsuperscript{149} Id. at 1687–88.
\textsuperscript{150} Id. at 1689 (quoting B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 285 (1996)).
\textsuperscript{151} Christopher E. Smith & Roxanne Ochoa, The Peremptory Challenge in the Eyes of the Trial Judge, 79 JUDICATURE 185, 186–87 (1996).
\textsuperscript{152} Id. at 188.
federal system. Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the judges were split along political lines with respect to their view on problems associated with peremptory challenges. When asked which of multiple factors was problematic in the context of peremptory challenges, “Republican appointees were more likely to view the unequal number of challenges allocated to each side as creating an unfair advantage for criminal defendants,” while Democratic appointees were more likely to consider peremptory challenges problematic because they are “a vehicle for producing discrimination in jury selection and composition.”

Overall, the consensus appears to be that the right of both parties to the peremptory challenge is so ingrained in the jury system that it will not be eliminated for either side in the near future. Thus, we must consider how the peremptory challenge system can be improved without completely eliminating the right and with a legal doctrine that is insufficient to root out discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge in practice.

III. THE WISDOM OF EQUALITY: FROM THE THEORETICAL RIGHT TO THE PRACTICAL EXERCISE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

The origins and legislative history of the peremptory challenge demonstrate that the legal community has considered the somewhat esoteric concept of “fairness” between the parties as central to the allocation of peremptory challenges to the prosecution. However, notwithstanding the theoretical “right” of each side to an impartial jury, arguments in legislative history also make clear that if the practical exercise of peremptory challenges results in a favorable advantage to one side, an equal allocation of peremptory challenges is not warranted. As highlighted in testimony given during the 1977 effort to reform the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant is the subject of the trial, and thus the consequences of a biased jury directly affect his freedom and potentially whether he lives or dies. To this end, defense counsel is charged with “zealously” advocating on behalf of her client. On the other hand, the prosecutor represents the interests of victims of crime and the community at large, and must, as a “minister of justice,” seek justice in the legal system. The view that victims have an interest

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153 Id.
154 Id. at 187.
155 Id.
156 See infra Part I.C.
157 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
158 Id. r. 3.8 cmt. 1. Similarly, scholar Maureen Howard has commented on the prosecutor’s peculiar role: “[D]espite the theoretically adversarial nature of our system, the
equal to that of defendants to a fair and impartial jury was highlighted in the 1995 proposal to equalize the allocation of peremptory challenges as part of the Victim Rights and Domestic Violence Prevention Act, for example.\textsuperscript{159}

If viewed in a vacuum, only an equal allocation of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution would be “fair.” This notion, however, discounts the importance of how the defendant and community at large view the fairness of the justice system. Further, this view is premised on the assumption that the exercise of peremptory challenges is not shaped by factors that allow an inordinate opportunity for peremptory challenges to result in a jury partial to the government, thereby undermining the fairness of a technically equal system.\textsuperscript{160} This Part argues that allocating a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than to the prosecution better serves theoretical and actual fairness.

A. THE THEORETICAL RIGHT TO THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE & PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS

The notion of fairness is at the heart of the argument to equalize the number of peremptory challenges, especially when argued on a victims’ rights basis. However, for a number of reasons, the defendant’s and community’s perception of the justice system’s fairness is best served by maintaining an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges, notwithstanding victims’ rights.\textsuperscript{161}

prosecutor is among the most important arbiters of justice’ due to her discretion in investigating and resolving criminal matters, thus elevating her to a ‘quasi-judicial’ role.” Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 407 (2010) (quoting Alan M. Dershowitz, Foreword to JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, at ix (1985)).


\textsuperscript{160} See Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Jay Schulman).\textsuperscript{But see Williams, supra note 1, at 511–12 (“Ultimately, this is a policy question . . . . If Congress determines that criminal defendants need more peremptory strikes than the government to ensure a fair jury, then logically, criminal defendants should always be afforded more peremptory strikes than the government. In other words, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be changed to provide the defendant more peremptory strikes in all types of cases: capital, felony, and misdemeanor. If, on the other hand, the legislatures conclude the government has an interest equal to a criminal defendant in seating a fair jury, then the number of peremptory strikes afforded each side should always be equal. It is difficult to rationally justify the inconsistent distribution of peremptory strikes currently in place under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). This Comment disagrees with this view by considering more holistically the values served by an unequal or equal allocation of peremptory challenges.

\textsuperscript{161} See Friedman, supra note 21, at 511–12. Friedman explains the importance of the defendant’s perception of fairness in the justice system with respect to peremptory challenges.
First, it is important that the defendant view the process by which he is tried as just. As one scholar explains, “[g]iven the nature of a criminal trial, in which the state attempts to deprive an individual of liberty (or even of life), increasing not only the actuality of fairness but also the accused’s perception of fairness is a crucial goal.”\textsuperscript{162} While victims’ perception of justice is important, the broader community’s perception of justice is also better served by an unequal number of peremptory challenges, given the reality that prosecutors may be better able to use their peremptory challenges to strike a class of people from the jury and other imbalances in the criminal justice system. Notably, some argue that improper use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution, such as striking jurors on the basis of their race, harms the community’s perception of justice by delegitimizing the justice system.\textsuperscript{163} In this view, minority constituents are symbolically harmed when minorities are discriminatorily struck in open court, and the court environment gives the appearance of the American government’s seal of approval on such behavior.\textsuperscript{164} Further, there is evidence that members of the public in fact expect that prosecutors further justice and are concerned with the means by which prosecutors secure convictions.\textsuperscript{165} This community concern was recently reflected in the public outcry in response to \textit{Flowers v. Mississippi}.\textsuperscript{166} In November 2019, the NAACP filed a class action lawsuit and implies that this goal may be even stronger than actual fairness. He goes so far as to argue that “even if an asymmetrical rule on peremptories led to a substantially greater number of errors in favor of the accused as compared to those that would be yielded by a symmetrical rule . . . , that would not be enough to condemn the asymmetrical rule.” \textit{Id.} at 519.

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Id.} at 512.

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{See Note, Judging the Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits the Dangers of Prosecutorial Discretion}, 119 HARY. L. REV. 2121, 2137 (2006) (“Peremptory challenges do indeed occasion symbolic and localized harms—both to defendants and to communities of jurors—by permitting the exclusion of minorities from juries.”); Alafair S. Burke, \textit{Prosecutors & Peremptories}, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1475–76 (2012) (“Prosecutors also represent a diversely constituted public. As such, they are in essence lawyers for the very communities disenfranchised by race-based peremptory challenges.”); Marder, \textit{supra} note 12, at 1696.

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{See Marder, supra} note 12, at 1696 (“The exercise of peremptories takes place in open court, beneath the American flag, the judicial seal, the watchful eye of the judge . . . .”)

\textsuperscript{165} Burke, \textit{supra} note 163, at 1475 (noting that the public expects that prosecutors will not only convict but also further justice, and that people are “more likely to comply with legal authority when they perceive it to be legitimate, thereby creating a more enduring form of compliance . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{166} 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019); \textit{see also supra} note 15.
against the prosecutor in that case for his discriminatory use of peremptory challenges “on behalf of every potential Black juror in the district.”

Additionally, the notion of fairness does not depend on equality of rights between the prosecution and defense in other areas of the criminal justice system. Indeed, inequalities in these other areas of the system actually strengthen the community’s perception of the system’s fairness. Most fundamentally, this inequality is represented in the presumption of innocence of the accused that the prosecution must overcome beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, due process requires that the prosecution disclose certain evidence to the defense, while the defense has no corresponding duty.

Furthermore, strong procedural safeguards for the accused provide broad assurance that he or she will not be improperly convicted, serving the community’s perception of fairness in the criminal justice system. In 2005, the New Jersey state committee promulgating recommendations on the proper allocation of peremptory challenges explained in its memorandum that the state “represents ‘the people,’ including, in a broad sense, the jurors.” However, because the right to a trial by jury “is a right possessed by the defendant, the Committee determined that defendants should receive more peremptory challenges than the State.” Further, the Committee explained that a limitation in the absolute number of peremptory challenges along with an unequal allocation of peremptories between the defense and prosecution would not “adversely affect the interests of fairness and...

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167 Kira Lerner, Civil Rights Groups Sue Mississippi Prosecutor for Illegally Striking Black Jurors, APPEAL (Nov. 18, 2019), https://theappeal.org/civil-rights-groups-sue-mississippi-prosecutor-for-illegally-striking-black-jurors/ [https://perma.cc/5AZF-JPX2]. The lawsuit stated, “The honor and privilege of jury service is a defining feature of what it means to be an American citizen . . . When state or local officials bar a citizen from service because he or she is Black, that discriminatory act is no mere indignity. It is an assertion that the prospective juror is inferior—a second-class citizen who cannot be entrusted with the responsibilities of full citizenship.” Id.

168 See Goldwasser, supra note 21, at 822 (The constitutional scheme “does not envision an adversary proceeding between two equal parties. Rather, it recognizes [the] awesome investigative and prosecutorial powers of the government and is designed to redress . . . [that] advantage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Roberts, supra note 6, at 1539–40 (noting that other aspects of the criminal justice system are “asymmetrical,” including “greater access than the prosecution to pretrial discovery, including a right to the production of favorable material; greater ability to appeal the outcome of a criminal case . . . and, because of the federal unanimous verdict requirement, an ability—not shared by the prosecution—to ‘win’ on the basis of just one juror vote”).

169 See Goldwasser, supra note 21, at 822.

170 Id.

171 N.J. SPEC. COMM. ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES, supra note 111, at 8.

172 Id. at 53.
justice.”

In fact, the Committee expected that this arrangement would “enhance in the eyes of the public the credibility of our system of administering justice.”

B. PRACTICAL EXERCISE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AND ACTUAL FAIRNESS

Actual fairness concerns whether the defense and prosecution actually use their peremptory challenges in a nondiscriminatory manner. Certain studies that have considered both the prosecutorial and defense use of peremptory challenges shed light on whether an equal or unequal allocation of peremptory challenges is more likely to produce impartial juries. In one such study, David Baldus and his colleagues examined the use of peremptory challenges in capital cases in Pennsylvania to determine the extent of discrimination in their use. The study found that: (1) discrimination on the basis of race and sex by prosecutors and defense attorneys is widespread; (2) nonetheless, prosecutors are “considerably more successful than defense counsel in their attempts to control jury composition”; and (3) the prosecution’s “advantage” in the use of peremptory challenges increases the probability of death sentences for defendants, increases “discrimination in the application of the death penalty,” and “denies defendants a trial by a jury that includes at least one of their ‘peers.’” Further, Baldus’s study found that the prosecution “disproportionately strik[es] black venire members and defense counsel disproportionately strik[es] non-blacks.”

The study also indicated that “most of the adverse impact of the current system on jury decision making flows from the aggressive use of peremptories by prosecutors against blacks and defense counsel against non-blacks.”

Importantly, one theory Baldus considered was the “canceling out” theory of prosecutorial and defense peremptory challenges, which hypothesizes that each side’s peremptory challenges tend to offset the effects of the other side’s. The study suggested that this theory was relatively valid.

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173 Id. at 8.
174 Id.
175 Note, supra note 163, at 2131.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 121–22.
179 Id. at 130.
180 Id. at 96.
if “viewed in the aggregate.”  

In other words, across all cases, the efforts of the two sides could reasonably be described as canceling each other out, and the defense may even have the upper hand. This is because “defense counsel use[d] a larger proportion of their peremptories” than did the prosecution, resulting in a higher strike rate for the defense. However, the study demonstrated a key prosecutorial advantage. Because the prime targets of the prosecution were “substantially smaller in number than were defense counsel’s prime targets,” the prosecution was more effective in depleting members of the target group. The study found, for example, that when two “prime [prosecution] targets, young black men and women, were present in a venire, they were completely eliminated 78% and 67% of the time, respectively . . . .”

The authors also touched on the practical incentive structure that shapes the prosecution’s discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges, namely, the importance of obtaining convictions. Specifically, they discussed Philadelphia, where for years prosecutors abided by a jury selection model set forth in a 1986 training video, the McMahon Tape. The video, which focused on how prosecutors could obtain more criminal convictions, provided instructions on how to select a “conviction prone” jury. The tape explained that “the worst jurors . . . are ‘blacks from the low-income areas’” because they have a “resentment for law enforcement [and] . . . for authority.” Similarly, in connection with a survey he was conducting on North Carolina’s Batson cases, a North Carolina trial judge “found that in the 1990s North Carolina prosecutors circulated and used a ‘cheat sheet’ of approved reasons for minority strikes that included such reasons as ‘lack of eye contact,’ [and] ‘air of defiance’ . . . .” Prosecutors continue to use similarly illegitimate reasons to strike jurors today, and a convict at costs

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181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 See id. at 125.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 100.
187 Id. at 11.
188 Id. at 41.
189 Id. at 42 (quoting videotape transcript: Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, DATV Productions) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law).
190 Id. at 42 (quoting Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, supra note 189).
culture persists in many offices around the country.\textsuperscript{192} Thus, not only are prosecutors more successful in eliminating their target groups, but the pressure to secure convictions can also encourage prosecutors to utilize peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, degrading both perceived and actual fairness.

To conclude, in \textit{Batson v. Kentucky}, Justice Marshall argued that only complete abolition of the peremptory challenge would prevent prosecutors’ discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.\textsuperscript{193} He explained that abolition of the peremptory challenge for both the prosecution and the defense would be fair because it would apply to both the prosecution and defense equally, much like the argument that equalization would be fair because it would apply equally to the prosecution and to the defense.\textsuperscript{194} However, the history of the peremptory challenge and debates that have followed calls for reform demonstrate that abolition will likely continue to be opposed and may be impossible to implement in the near future.\textsuperscript{195} Further, it is questionable whether abolition of the peremptory challenge would even lead to fairer results.\textsuperscript{196} At the very least, an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges is necessary to serve the goal of fairness. Inequality in the peremptory challenge context promotes both the accused’s and the community’s perceptions of fairness and mitigates the prosecution’s practical incentive to secure convictions by eliminating its target groups from the jury.

\textsuperscript{194} See \textit{id.} at 107–08.
\textsuperscript{195} See, e.g., Marder, \textit{supra} note 12, at 1686 (“Even though [groups seeking jury reform] recognize that the peremptory challenge has been difficult to police and has led to juries that are less diverse than they might otherwise be, they have been unwilling to recommend the elimination of the peremptory.”).
\textsuperscript{196} See Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner & Broffitt, \textit{supra} note 176, at 129 (“[O]nly a few criminal law practitioners appear willing to counter the strong and widespread belief on both sides that peremptories are critical to protect their clients’ interests. Judicial abolition, therefore, seems unlikely, as the United States Supreme Court and most state and federal courts appear content with the symbolic compromise they have created. The prospects of abolition by State legislatures seem equally unlikely.”); Richard Gabriel, \textit{Thank and Excuse: Five Steps Toward Improving Jury Selection}, JURY EXPERT (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.thjuryexpert.com/2015/08/thank-and-excuse-five-steps-toward-improving-jury-selection [https://perma.cc/NVL3-MEQ9] (“The elimination of peremptory challenges would, in fact, harm the rights of the parties to obtain a fair and impartial jury and is a wrong-headed solution to a very real problem that does exist in today’s jury selections across the country.”).
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: THE POTENTIAL PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION

This Comment has, until this point, primarily considered arguments that have already been offered by commentators regarding whether the relative allocation of peremptory challenges between the prosecution and defense should be equal or unequal. One influence on the justice system that may limit the need for an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges is “progressive prosecution.” This Part describes the emergence of the progressive prosecution movement and considers whether the movement can serve perceived and actual fairness, making an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges unnecessary. It posits that if equality in the number of peremptory challenges is a worthy goal—to provide victims of sexual violence with a sense of recognition of their rights and experiences, for example—then the progressive prosecution movement may provide a solution by increasing the broader community’s perception of fairness and by providing a check on the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in practice.

A. BACKGROUND ON PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION

Prosecutors, as relatively free agents in the justice system, have the ability to exercise substantial discretion. For this reason, some scholars have called on prosecutors to voluntarily waive their peremptory challenges or to put in place “voluntary reforms” to minimize the government’s exercise of racially-focused peremptory challenges. One scholar notes that “prosecutors themselves have the institutional ability to transform prosecutorial culture and incentives from the inside.” Further, scholars have argued that rules of ethics and the possibility of disciplinary sanctions

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197 See, e.g., Howard, supra note 158.
198 Burke, supra note 163, at 1471–73 (“In light of Batson’s failure to alter a stubborn pattern of using peremptory challenges in racialized ways, scholars have repeatedly called for the abolishment of peremptory challenges. But, despite criticism of the practice, every jurisdiction in the country continues to employ peremptory strikes. . . . Doctrinal change, rules of ethics, and disciplinary sanctions would not be necessary, however, if lawyers abated racialized jury selection through their own voluntary conduct.”); see also Howard, supra note 158, at 372 (“The unique litigation role and ethical responsibilities of criminal prosecutors, however, make them particularly suited to a cost-benefit analysis of peremptory challenges.”);
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Stephen R. Greenwald, Harold Reynolds & Jonathan Sussman, Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 1365 (2009) (“Ethical prosecutors, perhaps, are in the best position to prevent egregious misconduct by other attorneys. Thus, prosecutor offices can evaluate methods of training and supervising lawyers, and when a violation occurs in a specific office, that office should reassess its training.”).
199 Burke, supra note 163, at 1473.
may be successful in reducing discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge. These arguments express confidence in individual lawyers to abstain from violating Batson and, in simple terms, control themselves. However, other scholars are more wary of placing faith in the individual prosecutor. Some argue that the view in various Supreme Court decisions that prosecutors use peremptory strikes “fairly” and to “secure an impartial trial,” rather than to manipulate jury composition in order to obtain a conviction, is “unfounded.” Others lament the fact that “the stereotypical attitudes that have guided the use of the peremptory challenge have been difficult to change.”

While change at the level of the individual prosecutor or prosecutor’s office may have previously seemed overly optimistic, with the emergence of the “progressive prosecution” movement, there is reason to believe that self-regulation could become the norm. Since 2015, many prosecutors running for District Attorney, State’s Attorney, and similar positions across the country have professed a commitment to “reducing mass incarceration, eliminating unwarranted racial disparities [in the criminal justice system], and seeking justice for all, including the accused.” Progressive prosecutors, who tend to come from more diverse backgrounds, typically emphasize that “the criminal justice system is failing to promote fairness” and promise to pursue justice rather than convict at all costs.

This movement has gained widespread support from many in the legal community and has brought a sense of hope that prosecutors “hold the key”

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200 Id. at 1472.
201 Heinz, supra note 32, at 215.
202 Morehead, supra note 14, at 633.
205 Seema Gajwani & Max G. Lesser, The Hard Truths of Progressive Prosecution and a Path to Realizing the Movement’s Promise, 64 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 69, 72 (2020); see Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3479165 [https://perma.cc/GEM7-CEYW] (“Bazelon makes a strong case that the new wave of prosecutors, not legislators, governors, police, or judges, ‘hold the key to change.’”) (citing EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION xxvii (2019)); Davis, supra note 203, at 1 (“[I]n recent years, a number of incumbent district attorneys have been challenged and defeated by individuals who pledged to use their power and discretion to reduce the incarceration rate and eliminate unwarranted racial disparities in the criminal justice system.”); see also John Terzano, Changing the “Convict at All Costs” Culture of Prosecutor’s Offices, HUFFPOST (March 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/charging-the-convict-at-a_b_367864 [https://perma.cc/7RSP-NV9V].
to changing the justice system for the better.\textsuperscript{206} Some support for the movement centers on prosecutors’ ideology and professed commitment to fairness and reducing racial bias.\textsuperscript{207} The shift in mindset away from focusing on convictions or being “tough on crime”—or rhetoric suggesting such a shift—inspires confidence that these prosecutors will be committed to implementing real policy and procedural changes while in office.\textsuperscript{208} Other supporters offer a hopeful view of prosecutors’ status as discretionary agents who can implement change faster than judges or legislators.\textsuperscript{209} For example, Emily Bazelon argues that reform-minded prosecutors can change the justice system more effectively than any other actors in the near term, given that they can regulate their own conduct and to some extent the conduct of other prosecutors.\textsuperscript{210} She explains, “While it would be nice if lawmakers and the courts threw themselves into fixing the criminal justice system, in the meantime, elections for prosecutors represent a shortcut to addressing a lot of dysfunction.”\textsuperscript{211} Supporters have cited policies that prosecutors have implemented, such as reforms to cash bail systems, reduced sentencing recommendations, and plea bargaining, as evidence that the movement has enjoyed success.\textsuperscript{212}

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\textsuperscript{206} Bellin, supra note 205, at 4 (citing Bazelon, supra note 205, at xxvii).
\textsuperscript{207} See Davis, supra note 203, at 2 (“[I]n recent years, a number of incumbent district attorneys have been challenged and defeated by individuals who pledged to use their power and discretion to reduce the incarceration rate and eliminate unwarranted racial disparities in the criminal justice system.”); Gajwani & Lesser, supra note 204, at 72; Terzano, supra note 205.
\textsuperscript{208} See Del Quentin Wilber, Once Tough-on-Crime Prosecutors Now Push Progressive Reforms, L.A. TIMES (Aug 5, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-08-02/once-tough-on-crime-prosecutors-now-push-progressive-reforms [https://perma.cc/HP3X-EJS4] (“This is a real movement that could have real consequences, and this new crop of progressive prosecutors are looking at the job in a very different way.”) (quoting Professor Angela J. Davis); Davis, supra note 203, at 2, 3. Additionally, Professor Davis explains that in Berger v. United States, “the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor’s ‘interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done,’” a perspective that has shaped the progressive prosecution movement and has been echoed by so-called progressive prosecutors. Id. at 2, 5 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
\textsuperscript{209} See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6) [https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542792] [https://perma.cc/27VZ-HVZD] (“[R]ather than attacking prosecutorial discretion as a structural ill in need of a cure, many commentators and reformers have come to argue that replacing the discretionary actors (and their ideology) might be the best way to begin dismantling the carceral state.”).
\textsuperscript{210} Bellin, supra note 205, at 5; see also Bazelon, supra note 205, at xxvi–xxvii.
\textsuperscript{211} Bazelon, supra note 205, at xxxi.
\textsuperscript{212} See generally, e.g., Davis, supra note 202 (discussing various progressive prosecutors’ criminal justice reform policies, the success of those policies in those prosecutors’ districts, and support of the movement).
However, skeptics have important concerns. First, while head prosecutors run for election on promises of reform, line prosecutors—who make up the bulk of prosecutors at trial—are influenced by institutional and personal factors and need not worry as much about oversight or liability for their actions.® Regardless of head prosecutors’ promises to pursue justice rather than convictions, line prosecutors operate within an adversarial system and are interested in succeeding in their careers.® Further, line prosecutors do not have their District Attorneys sitting over their shoulders watching them prosecute trials, and thus prosecutorial accountability is low. Because incentives other than the vision of reform with which newly elected progressive District Attorneys enter office shape line prosecutors’ conduct, “there is significant potential for noncompliance from those on the lower rungs of the hierarchy due to a lack of buy-in to the goals of the head prosecutor.” Accordingly, implementing the reforms of a head prosecutor may require line prosecutors to “restrain themselves in an environment in which they have access to nearly unlimited leverage over defendants and face a near-zero probability of legal liability for malicious acts.”

A second problem stems from the various political dynamics across jurisdictions, along with the fact that turnover from elections can dampen progressive prosecutors’ ability to make widespread and lasting change, as

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214 See David E. Patton, A Defender’s Take on “Good” Prosecutors, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 20, 23 (2018) (explaining that prosecutors are likely influenced by ego and ambition); Kirchmeier, Greenwald, Reynolds & Sussman, supra note 198, at 1384 n. 317 (citing Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutor Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1140–41 (2005)) (“[T]he adversarial system often encourages prosecutors to focus on winning the case for the prosecution rather than seeking justice and also ensuring defendants’ rights are protected.”); Madison McWithey, Taking a Deeper Dive into Progressive Prosecution: Evaluating the Trend Through the Lens of Geography: Part One: Internal Constraints, 61 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I-32, I-39 (2020) (“Young line prosecutors seeking trial experience may be less likely to buy in to their chief’s progressive agenda.”).
215 See Note, supra note 213, at 758. The author explains, “Ironically, the Court’s rationale for narrowing the scope of prosecutorial liability includes a ‘public interest’ concern—too much liability would ‘prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty.’” Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976)).
216 Id. at 760 (“While line prosecutors must run many charging decisions by their bosses, not every decision they make or interaction they have is supervised.”). Additionally, line prosecutors may enjoy immunity for their indiscretions. See id. at 758 (“[T]he Court’s rationale for narrowing the scope of prosecutorial liability includes a ‘public interest’ concern—too much liability would ‘prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty.’”) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427).
217 Id. at 762.
more conservative prosecutors may take their place.\textsuperscript{218} According to Bazelon, approximately twelve percent of the population lives in a community with a District Attorney who could be considered progressive.\textsuperscript{219} While this is significant, not every jurisdiction welcomes progressive prosecution ideology.\textsuperscript{220} For example, prosecutors who ran for District Attorney on a progressive ideology in Sacramento and San Diego, California, lost to incumbent District Attorneys in those districts by a significant margin.\textsuperscript{221} To some, these failures “provide[] an early warning sign that the progressive prosecution platform may hold little currency with voters outside of a limited number of cities.”\textsuperscript{222}

On the other hand, progressive prosecutors have won elections in more conservative districts. For example, five progressive District Attorneys were “elected in major cities in Texas,” including Dallas and San Antonio.\textsuperscript{223} For example, in 2016, Kim Ogg was elected as District Attorney in Houston.\textsuperscript{224} Once in office, Ogg supported bail reform and declined to prosecute minor drug offenses.\textsuperscript{225} She successfully “implemented a review system that seeks consensus among [prosecutors in her office] before levying capital charges.”\textsuperscript{226} Further, she “dismissed thirty-seven prosecutors from her office [and] hired a progressive defense attorney as her chief of staff.”\textsuperscript{227} Still, the progressive prosecution movement relies primarily on voters, who are “notoriously fickle.”\textsuperscript{228} For this reason, some argue that progressive prosecutors should not be viewed as a “one-way ratchet toward leniency,” as

\textsuperscript{218} Levin, supra note 209, at 3 (“[T]he realities of jurisdictions, municipalities, and offices mean that one progressive prosecutor might arrive on the job casting one type of figure, but bend into another as she swims in the political dynamics around her.”).

\textsuperscript{219} Bellin, supra note 204, at 4 (quoting BAZELON, supra note 205, at 290).

\textsuperscript{220} Note, supra note 213, at 766–67.

\textsuperscript{221} See id. at 767.

\textsuperscript{222} Id.


\textsuperscript{225} Bazelon & Krinsky, supra note 223.


\textsuperscript{227} Davis, supra note 224, at 10.

\textsuperscript{228} Note, supra note 213, at 766.
voters may be swayed by an uptick in crime or other external events to seek a return to the prosecutor who promises to be tough on crime.229

B. PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION & THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

Despite its limitations, the progressive prosecution movement could greatly reduce the discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge and could therefore justify the states’ trend toward an equal allocation of peremptory challenges between the prosecution and defense. There are two main reasons for this. First, progressive prosecutors have committed to reducing racial biases in the criminal justice system and have the potential to increase the community’s perception of fairness in criminal procedure, lessening the need for a lower number of peremptory challenges for the prosecution. Second, the movement has resulted in policy changes that have made criminal procedure fairer. If extended to exercising peremptory challenges in a nondiscriminatory way, these changes could lessen the need for the safeguard of the defendant’s additional peremptory challenges.

First, regarding the community’s perception of justice, progressive prosecutors have greater potential than their predecessors to increase perceived fairness. This not only applies with respect to the criminal justice system as a whole but also with respect to demonstrating a commitment to non-discrimination in criminal procedure. These prosecutors are not only making promises of procedural fairness—their promises are being conveyed directly to the public. In this way, the progressive prosecution movement has brought transparency to one of the least transparent electorally accountable positions in government.230 As journalist Sam Reisman explains, “[T]he rise of the progressive prosecutor represents new voter awareness about the roles prosecutors play in assessing what charges to bring, whether to incarcerate, negotiating plea deals and recommending sentencing.”231 Further, data on

229 Id. at 767.

230 See Press Release, ACLU, Americans Overwhelmingly Support Prosecutorial Reform, Poll Finds (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/americans-overwhelmingly-support-prosecutorial-reform-poll-finds [https://perma.cc/2LSL-4BNU] (“Prosecutors are the most powerful, unaccountable, and least transparent actors in the criminal justice system.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Davis, supra note 202, at 6 (“[T]here is very little transparency in the prosecutorial function. Prosecutors’ most important and consequential duties, charging and plea-bargaining, are performed behind closed doors. It is impossible to hold prosecutors accountable without knowing how they carry out these important functions. Second, most people pay very little attention to prosecutor races.”).

these prosecutorial decisions, which some progressive prosecutors have voluntarily elected to make public, “may be used to identify patterns of constitutional violations and disparate treatment of defendants and/or victims.”

Awareness surrounding the progressive prosecution movement has also been fueled by outside forces, including educational programs by organizations such as the ACLU. As a result, there appears to be a greater awareness among various communities about prosecutorial elections, progressive prosecutors’ goals and policies, and how they are implementing change in the system. Prosecutorial transparency and a greater awareness of prosecutors’ commitment to ending discriminatory conduct is important in the context of peremptory challenges because it can increase the community’s confidence in and perception of prosecutorial fairness at the trial level. If prosecutors can be trusted to engage in conduct that is nondiscriminatory, then the need, at least from an “optics” standpoint, for a lower number of peremptory challenges than that granted to the defense is lessened.

It is important to note that prosecutors have not explicitly addressed the issue of peremptory challenges, at least not outwardly to the public. However, there is evidence that progressive prosecutors have successfully implemented safeguards that might reduce racial biases in other areas of criminal procedure, which suggests that prosecutors may also have success in limiting the abuse of the peremptory challenge. For example, some prosecutors’ offices have recently added or expanded conviction integrity units that check line prosecutors’ work. This would hopefully include prosecutors’ jury selection and Batson records. As another example, Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner has said, “We are not going to overcharge . . . . We are not going to try to coerce defendants. We are going to proceed on charges that are supported by the facts in the case, period.” To that end, Krasner requires prosecutors “to get his approval on any plea

232 Davis, supra note 203, at 9.
233 Id. at 6.
234 Reisman, supra note 231.
235 See Davis, supra note 203, at 10, 19. Davis discusses Cook County State’s Attorney Kim Foxx’s conviction integrity unit, specifically noting: “[Foxx’s] Conviction Integrity Unit dropped charges against some defendants who claimed they had been wrongfully convicted, including dismissing charges against eighteen individuals on November 16, 2017 . . . .” Id. at 10.
offer” that carries a prison sentence of greater than fifteen to thirty years.\textsuperscript{237} Krasner’s efforts have had real results: the office filed “18 percent fewer cases than in 2017, including 25 percent fewer misdemeanors.”\textsuperscript{238} Further, prosecutors in his office opened 6,500 fewer cases in the year after he was elected to District Attorney than they opened in the previous year.\textsuperscript{239} Similarly, Kim Foxx “issued guidelines to the prosecutors in her office, ordering them to proactively ask for pretrial release in appropriate cases,” among other reforms.\textsuperscript{240} A year after Kim Foxx entered office, “the Cook County jail population had decreased by more than 1,000 people.”\textsuperscript{241}

Further, two principles proposed by \textit{The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook}, a guide for progressive prosecutors to navigate the difficulties of implementing change in their offices,\textsuperscript{242} address \textit{Batson} violations—one directly and one indirectly. These principles indicate that progressive prosecutors can implement concrete policies to eliminate abuse of the peremptory challenge.\textsuperscript{243} For example, the author warns that progressive prosecutors “[should not] countenance jokes about evading \textit{Batson}” and should make clear to line prosecutors that procedural fairness is expected.\textsuperscript{244} The author also suggests that progressive prosecutors hire diverse line prosecutors and supervisory prosecutors, as offices with a more diverse makeup are less likely to tolerate racism, “coded or explicit.”\textsuperscript{245}

Further, many progressive prosecutors themselves are racially and ethnically diverse or come from diverse backgrounds, and many have implemented policies to address diversity.\textsuperscript{246} For example, Kim Foxx is the first African-American woman to serve as District Attorney for Cook County, Illinois.\textsuperscript{247} Additionally, Larry Krasner, a former public defender, launched a nationwide effort to recruit more diverse Assistant District

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\textsuperscript{237} Davis, supra note 203, at 12.\\
\textsuperscript{238} Id.\\
\textsuperscript{239} Id.\\
\textsuperscript{240} Id. at 9.\\
\textsuperscript{241} Id.\\
\textsuperscript{242} See David Alan Sklansky, \textit{The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook}, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 25 (2017).\\
\textsuperscript{243} Id. at 40.\\
\textsuperscript{244} Id.\\
\textsuperscript{245} Id.\\
\textsuperscript{246} See, e.g., Mark Berman, \textit{These Prosecutors Won Office Vowing to Fight the System. Now, the System Is Fighting Back.}, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/these-prosecutors-won-office-vowing-to-fight-the-system-now-the-system-is-fighting-back/2019/11/05/20d863f6-afc1-11e9-a0c9-6d2d781f3dastory.html [https://perma.cc/C9Z8-N778].\\
\textsuperscript{247} Davis, supra note 203, at 8.
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Attorneys. Upon taking office, Krasner “fired 31 of the office’s prosecutors” and “immediately began recruiting and filling the open positions with lawyers who share his vision of criminal justice reform.” This effort included recruiting public defenders and law students from historically black law schools. Diversity among lead and line prosecutors can serve the perception of the justice system as fairer for the community, and particularly for diverse members of the community.

Ultimately, closer examination of empirical data will be required to determine whether the movement can present a solution that serves as a compromise between those who support an unequal number of peremptory challenges and those who believe the number should be equal. Thus, an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges should be maintained in the federal system and among states that have not equalized the number of peremptory challenges allocated between the prosecution and defense while awaiting evidence that progressive prosecution can justify equalization.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the peremptory challenge is a revered, yet perplexing, and in some corners detested, facet of the American criminal justice system. It is unlikely that peremptory challenges will be abolished any time soon, and thus, we are left to determine how to properly use and allocate them while maintaining fairness for the accused, victims of crimes, and the community at large. The arguments supplied in the 1977 debates that resulted in the federal system declining to allocate an equal number of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution remain relevant to the federal system and states today, notwithstanding the failures of Batson. At this time, allocating a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense is necessary to maintain both the perception of fairness in the justice system and actual fairness in the exercise of peremptory challenges at trial. Accordingly, the federal system and remaining states that maintain an unequal number of peremptory challenges should continue to do so—at least for now. There is potential for the progressive prosecution movement to supplant the role that the unequal allocation of peremptory challenge plays in maintaining fairness. However, the progressive prosecution movement is young and it is likely too early to tell whether the movement will persist and

248 See id. at 11.
249 Id. at 11.
250 Id.
what its consequences will be.\footnote{See, e.g., Note, supra note 213, at 767 (“The movement toward progressive prosecutors is so young that few of the recently elected nontraditional prosecutors have faced reelection, and so the durability of these shifts remains to be seen.”); Carissa Byrne Hessick \& Michael Morse, \textit{Picking Prosecutors}, 105 \textit{Iowa L. Rev.} 1537, 1541–42 (2020); Alan Greenblatt, \textit{Progressives Find Political Success, and Pushback, as Prosecutors}, \textsc{ Governing: The Future of States and Localities} (May 2019), \url{https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-prosecutors-elections-district-attorney-races.html} [https://perma.cc/R6EA-DN65].} Thus, while the movement holds promise for the peremptory challenge, whether it can justify equalizing the number of peremptory challenges cannot yet be determined, and the legal community must consider further empirical evidence on its successes before making that decision. In the meantime, stasis is the best solution.