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## Book Reviews

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### DEVELOPING A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO STUDY DEVIANCE\*

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During the past decade, there has been considerable interest in utilizing the comparative approach to the study of crime and deviance. While such efforts are not new to the social sciences, the objectives, and therefore the implications, of such research are. Predicated on the belief that no theory, model or research result has reliability unless it has been validated cross-culturally, efforts to look at non-conforming behavior internationally test broad general theories developed predominantly within the United States. The rationale for this method, as stated by Clinard and Abbott in *Crime in Developing Countries*, "[i]s to develop concepts and generalizations at a level that distinguishes between universals applicable to all societies and unique characteristics representative of one or a small set of societies." *Id.* at 2.

To this end, Graeme Newman has produced a comprehensive and systematic study. Newman's concern is less with etiology than with reaction to crime and deviance, and his findings have implications for etiological studies. Surveying public perceptions of deviant behavior cross-culturally, the same questions were asked in India, Indonesia, Italy (Sardinia), the United States and Yugoslavia. His results permit scholars to focus on the basic assumptions in criminology, conflict theory in sociology, cultural relativism in anthropology and ethical relativism in moral philosophy.

In the short history of comparative studies, a major question has been whether the definition of crime and deviance is a product of a common residue, that is, a consensus of value, belief, propriety and justice, or whether acts are defined and labeled as the power of vested interest groups and competing ideological and political entities. This study shows that both propositions contain elements of truth. Although the study shows extensive diversity in both law and the perception of such

deviant acts as homosexuality, abortion and drug use, it also demonstrates a high degree of consensus for traditional criminal acts such as robbery, appropriation and factory pollution.

Newman concludes from this that consensus theory is supported "since consensus theorists have never argued that *all* criminal acts are universally disapproved, but only the traditional ones" (p. 117). But, this conclusion over-simplifies and misjudges the nature of conflict theory. Newman too simplistically defines conflict as existing "where roughly equal proportions of all respondents assess an act either very serious or as not serious" (p. 122). Such a definition equates perception with power. Conflict theorists have never argued that there cannot be agreement regarding the seriousness of acts nor that there could not be general consensus about penalties or even definitions. The point is not whether there is simple agreement or disagreement, just as it is certainly not necessary to have organized groups for conflict to exist despite Newman's assertion (p. 288).

Conflict theory suggests that there is differential political power to define certain acts as criminal, not that there cannot be agreement. In fact, the power to define acts may ultimately, *post facto*, legitimate that definition. Therefore, the lack of variability in response to *mala prohibita* offenses which he found in the more totalitarian systems (p. 193), may be the ultimate affirmation of the end product of the conflict and not a refutation of its principles, *i.e.*, dominance of the definitional apparatus.

Newman incorrectly and misleadingly identifies consensus theory with absolutism of morals and conflict theory with relativism. The proportion of the population which agrees on the definition of a norm is in itself irrelevant to consensus or conflict.

Newman can also be faulted for drawing conclusions which go far beyond the data. For example, the statement that the "popular view of anti-psychiatrists toward the medical profession as tyrannical social controllers of deviance may be superficial" (p. 138) is based on the "small tendency for

\* A review article of *COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE: PERCEPTION AND LAW IN SIX CULTURES*. By Graeme Newman. New York, N.Y.: Elsevier, 1976. Pp. vii, 332. \$12.95.

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people in developed countries to see the medical professions as controllers" (p. 138). Likewise, the data for this study in no way serves as a basis for judging the "evolution" of morals; the latter is an illustration of a tendency to draw conclusions by affirmation and to rely on *ex post facto* explanations of unexpected or conflicting findings.

The value of *Comparative Deviance* lies not in its test of conflict theory, but in the theoretical implications of identifying and measuring the components of perception: intensity or perceived seriousness, opinion regarding the act's prohibition, knowledge of the law relevant to the act, appropriate reaction to the act, evaluation of official response, and applicable control processes.

Newman's manipulation of the data is creative and sophisticated and identifies important elements of perception; it is act specific and the public across cultures distinguishes between crimes in the traditional sense and deviance. Such a distinction rests in the respondents' choice of control agent (formal or informal), seriousness and preferred sanction. Crimes seen in all cultures as more serious required police intervention and punishment. Opinions regarding legality, knowledge of the law and perception of governmental activity are peripheral in the perception of crime and deviance.

The definition of deviance, however, appears to be more culture bound and related to the wider structural characteristics of a society. From the elaborate factor analysis and path models, it is clear that the definition of an act and its perceived seriousness, as well as some indication as to how to react to it (punishment, treatment or no action), is a function of the level of development, the relationship cultural groups have to the formal and informal mechanisms of social control and the knowledge of or relationship one has with the actor.

As a society develops economically, there is a tendency to rely more heavily on formal controls to combat the most serious behaviors (crime) and to become more tolerant of deviant acts. In such developed societies, the family and other institutions of socialization, such as religion, become less effective as a means of control for serious violations. Therefore, part of the key to understanding societal reaction is the cultural context in which it takes place and the perceived role of agents of social control and the confidence one has in those agents.

Despite Newman's assertion of absolutism, cultural variants are important in determining the reaction to an act once it has been defined. Thus, while robbery is considered serious and deserving of punishment in Sardinia, the act is less likely to

be reported to the police than in other cultures (p. 131).

Looking at perceptions of deviance cross-culturally, the relationship between wider origins and perception is not unidimensional and Newman is forced to explain exceptions in nearly all instances. Not only does the assessment of each dynamic of perception show variance within cultures, but it also shows variance between them. It becomes inescapable, then, that while common dimensions are evident, culture independently plays a role in defining acts just as studies of the etiology of crime on a macro level vary by culture. It is unfortunate that the cultures studied by Newman did not include the major exceptions to the urbanization-crime correlation: Japan, Switzerland and the Socialist Democracies. Since one of the common factors in these areas is strong informal control networks, it would have been interesting to see an assessment of the degree of tolerance and the role played by control agencies in defining crime within them.

The parallel with the explanation of the etiology of the criminal or deviant act proposed by control theory and Newman's findings is strong. Control theory argues that criminal and deviant acts are made possible by a breakdown in the institutional socialization process—notably the family, school, community, etc. Individuals fail to develop commitments to conformity, especially in urban industrial areas. What Newman is basically saying, to put it into a control theory context, is that a reliance on the formal legal apparatus to define the nature of the act is related to the same variables of urbanization which are related to a breakdown in informal controls. In other words, both the etiology of the act and the definition of it may be opposite sides of the same coin; both are consequences of the effect structural variables have on the basic integrating and informal control mechanisms within society.

*Comparative Deviance* takes us one step closer to an integrated and comprehensive model for the study of crime. The book recognizes *basic* patterns in perception formation which suggest that, for example, there is a close affinity among the definition of the act, perceived seriousness, proposed sanction and opinion, especially in India, Iran, Italy and the United States. It also recognizes that perception is affected at different levels: structurally, urbanization and political economy are related; on an institutional level, the role of the agent of social control is dominant; and on the individual level, the knowledge one has of the actor is important.

The implication of Newman's findings is that culture in the sense of tradition and interaction patterns, values and life styles, shows consensus within diversity and that variance in perception is explained less by individual socioeconomic and demographic characteristics than by wider, macro level factors affecting institutional role relationships.

While some universal patterns are evident, neither the etiology of the act nor reaction to it can be explained outside of the political, historical and cultural context—but the *process* may be the same for all cultures. *Comparative Deviance* helps us identify this process; the objective and challenge to comparative research in the future is to better explain it.

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CRIME AND AUTHORITY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND. By David Philips. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977. Pp. 321. \$17.50.

Publications that explain the historical development of, and significance of, the new social control strategies accompanying the emergence of the modern corporate capitalist state are appearing with increasing frequency in the literature of criminology. Many of these studies are being written by authors who do not identify themselves professionally with criminology, but with history. This book is one such publication. The author is not a criminologist but a lecturer in history at the University of Melbourne, Australia, and his book is a product of research done while he was completing a Doctor of Philosophy thesis at Oxford University.

The focus of this study is on the Black Country area of England during the period of 1835–1860. Black Country was a predominantly working class area and 1835–1860 was a period of the Black Country's greatest industrial and population expansion. It was also the period in which the first paid "New Police" forces were established in the area and in which the system of prosecution changed. Moreover, this was a time of alternating depression and prosperity and included a severe depression in 1840–1843 accompanied by rioting. Investigators and reformers of the time stressed the deplorable social and moral condition of the working class in the Black Country area.

The area was a prime candidate for moralistic concern about the rising tide of crime accompanying industrialization and urbanization which would "undermine the established social order." This kind of alarmism promoted the development

of new social control agencies emphasizing the need for order, discipline and moral and class imperialism. This was the era of the emergence of a network of new "carceral" institutions in society designed to train and mold the working class to the demands of the new industrial state.

The Philips book enhances our understanding of these developments and helps to "flesh out" the impressionistic and sweeping generalizations offered in Michel Foucault's recent work, *Discipline and Punish*. It can also be read as a good companion piece to recent examples of historical scholarship such as A.P. Donajgradzki's, *Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain* and Michael Ignatieff's, *A Just Measure of Pain*.

After introducing some ritual doctoral dissertation-like discussions of the viability of various kinds of official statistics and a discussion of definitions of crime, Philips describes the impact on the Black Country area of the introduction of the "New Police" and a new prosecutorial system. He then describes the impact of these new forms of social control on the characteristics of offenders and offenses in the area.

Philips has a dual purpose in presenting this information. On the one hand, he wants to provide evidence for the assertion of the symbolic interactionist/labeling school that social control agencies manufacture crime by virtue of their methods of reacting to deviance. On the other hand, he wants to show that the assertions of the ideologues of the left and right of the time, that crime and criminality are indicators of dangerous instabilities in the social system, is not supported by the facts.

Philips finds that the "New Police" (modeled on the design instituted by Robert Peel for the transformation of the London police) were supported by the capitalist class and the petty bourgeois class to suppress mass demonstrations and rioting by the working class protesting inhumane working and living conditions. The working class continued to support the parish constabulary and a form of "popular justice" in which the victim initiated court action. Gradually these were usurped by a form of control in which the "New Police" investigated and attempted to prevent common crime and initiated indictments against those accused of crime. When this happened, forms of traditional working class culture were outlawed and criminalized. Unauthorized prizefights, bullbaiting, cockfights, dogfights, brawls and public drunkenness were outlawed and prosecuted. Pilfering from employers, a practice which had been generally tolerated and accepted as part of working class cul-

ture, received increased investigative attention and prosecution with the advent of the "New Police" and the growth of industry.

Philips gives a detailed description of offender and offense characteristics during this period, obtaining his information from an examination of court records. Reliance on court records has been criticized by many criminologists as a method of studying the extent and nature of crime in either historical or contemporary settings. But Philips deals with these methodological problems by characterizing his study as one element in an emerging historical picture of working-class life in the period he studied. He adds the caveat, "[i]t is certainly not a complete and rounded picture of working-class life which emerges from the details of prosecuted illegal acts, but it is a vivid picture nonetheless" (p. 288). However, Philips *does* generalize from this data about the nature and extent of crime in this area (and by extrapolation to Victorian England in general) during this period. He finds that this data does not support the contention that violent and serious crime were increasing. On the contrary, most of the increase was in the categories of petty larceny and petty theft.

In spite of Philips's willingness to generalize from a study of court records to assertions about the nature and extent of crime in the Black Country during this period, he does not address completely the motivation of social commentators in the 1830's and 1840's for dramatizing and sensationalizing a crime wave said to be threatening the social fabric. Phillips states that

commentators in the 1850's do not show that same urgency of tone about "increasing crime" which had marked those of the 1830's and 1840's. "Crime" was no longer seen as linked to political subversion, rebellion, social breakdown, but as a social problem which, like disease, bad housing or the poor would be "always with us." (p. 289).

This leaves unasked and unanswered the question of how the earlier dramatization and scare tactics about the dangers of crime might be related to the need to establish the power of the "New Police" over working class life and how this in turn might be related to reinforcing the hegemony of the capitalist class. Also not addressed is the question of what this change from politicizing the crime problem to routinizing it tells about changing social relations in this society.

In spite of these deficiencies in the analysis, the book is worthwhile reading for criminologists interested in historical and comparative study. This

study represents an important addition to the growing body of such studies available in the literature of criminology.

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FORECASTING CRIME DATA. By *James Alan Fox*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books (D.C. Heath), 1978. Pp. vii, 140. \$14.95.

Criminal justice researchers have often profited from the application of techniques and methodologies originally conceived and developed by those working primarily in other fields. As the history of science has amply demonstrated, this is indeed a healthy trait, for major (and often revolutionary) scientific breakthroughs in many disciplines have occurred precisely through insightful, fortuitous or serendipitous interdisciplinary collaboration.

Perhaps no social science discipline has been as vigorously eclectic in its introduction of interdisciplinary techniques and methods as criminology. Criminologists have borrowed from (and often expanded upon) the tools of anthropology, psychology, philosophy, psychophysics, education, sociology and others. Recently, they have begun an introduction to methods developed largely in the field of economics, and several works have suggested the application of econometric modeling techniques to problems in the criminal justice arena. *Forecasting Crime Data* is one such work.

For interdisciplinary collaboration to be fruitful, both (or all) parties to the interchange must be able to communicate effectively with one another. This is a formidable task in its own right, yet one which is especially crucial at the stage of introduction. Typically, this task is accomplished through the mutual translation of, and training in, relevant concerns of each contributing discipline. Unfortunately, Fox makes no apparent attempt to accomplish such effective communication. The end result is a volume which appears largely irrelevant for the vast majority of research workers in the criminal justice/criminology arena and largely trivial for those already involved in econometric modeling.

What is perhaps more unfortunate, however, is that this is not the only, or even necessarily the major, shortcoming of this volume. The process of modeling implies and demands *comparison* between models and between techniques of their construction. Yet, no such comparisons are found in Fox's work, and, where they would be appropriate, they

are summarily dismissed as unnecessary: "The appropriateness of the two-segment straight-line model, rather than a curvilinear model, is clear [from an inspection of figures 3-1 through 3-3]" (p. 10). While Fox notes in a footnote that tests for the lack of fit of the two-stage models are not possible, this fact does not preclude the necessity for a comparison of the two-stage model with potential competitors. In fact, it is not at all clear from inspection of his figures that a two-stage, rather than a curvilinear, model is the more appropriate. Nonetheless, two- (and sometimes three-) stage models are all that are presented in his sections on description.

Discoursing on the need for parsimony in scientific explanation, Albert Einstein is reported to have said that "it is necessary to be as simple as possible—but no more so." Likewise, one could suggest that it is wise to be as sophisticated as necessary—but no more so. Fox apparently disagrees with this suggestion and feels it necessary to exclude, in his reviews of past research, "analyses involving methodological sophistication no greater than multiple regression" (p. 128; p. 28 n.2). Through such exclusion, Fox arrives at erroneous conclusions: "The absence of an impact of the unemployment rate on the rate of crime appears at this time to be unequivocal" (p. 29). In fact, this statement is quite equivocal, and Dr. Fox's position truly represents a major departure from both recent econometric research and the major theoretical traditions relating to criminology that are found in the social and psychological sciences. Specifically, Fox does not include unemployment in his equations despite the fact that in previous multiple regression econometric research, unemployment has been found to be a stable and important predictor of crime trends as estimated by arrests. Indeed, a major and consistent empirical finding in over thirty time-series studies is that unemployment is temporally associated with crime indices within statistically significant ranges.

In addition, in a 1976 multiple regression time-series study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, one of the reviewers found that inflation, as well as unemployment, influences rates of homicide and imprisonment. Subsequent studies by the same author, based on rates of crimes known to the police and arrests, indicate that inflation is not an appropriate variable in the equation; rather, variables indicating rapid economic growth and urbanization (which are moderately correlated with inflation), in addition to unemployment and the proportion of young

males in the population, are basic predictors of crime trend statistics.

Lest it seem that we are reacting only to the serious omission of work which we value, we will simply note that large fields of effort are similarly treated; Fox dismisses out of hand findings based on cross-sectional analyses despite the fact that they are generally consistent with the basic time-series findings. He refers to the cross-sectional research as being "ecological," thus leaving the reader to infer that there are inherent methodological problems of an ecological nature that are peculiar to cross-sectional analyses. In fact, however, there is perhaps no greater source of ecological error than can typically occur in aggregate time-series analysis, and the credibility of findings of time-series studies is commonly tested by the extent to which they confirm the results obtained by cross-sectional methods.

Finally, the volume is far too short. While this is due in part to the omissions and dismissals noted above, it is also due in large part to the lack of verbal explanation and explication of Fox's own empirical work.

In his preface, Fox notes that "because macro modeling is quite novel to criminological research, there is a long way to go before the task is finished. This research constitutes an early attempt in a much needed area of research" (p. xv). We agree with both statements. In a foreword to the volume, Marvin Wolfgang states that Fox "combines a mathematical-statistical sophistication with a genuine interest in historical and theoretical analysis. Not all of this combination appears in this volume; it has more of the former, less of the latter" (p. xiii). Again, we agree. Unfortunately, because Fox has omitted discussion of the "latter," we feel that *Forecasting Crime Data* will prove disappointing to most readers.

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CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN. By C. Ray Jeffery. Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1977. Pp. 352. \$17.95.

Criminology, particularly sociological criminology, is bankrupt, and its days are numbered. Such is the ominous conclusion of C. Ray Jeffery in *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*.

Jeffery begins his panoramic vision of the rise and decline of a disciplinary paradigm with the critical proposition that traditional criminology has "viewed behavior as involving a nonphysical organism in a nonphysical environment" (p. 10). The first three parts of the book examine the impact of this perspective on theoretical and research criminology (Part I), on the criminal justice system as the arbiter of punishment (Part II), and on the criminal justice system as the arbiter of treatment (Part III). Upon completion of these discussions, Jeffery proceeds to conclude his work on the same critical note as he began it. As a consequence of the theoretical perspective which it has adopted, traditional criminology has failed in its theory, in its research and, because of these two failures, also in its practical application. According to Jeffery, "[t]he basic argument in this work has been that punishment has not worked; treatment has not worked; and everything we now do is a failure" (p. 342; also see p. 9).

As a positive response to this total failure, Jeffery proposes his "new criminology," a criminology grounded in "crime prevention, environmental design, and learning theory" (p. 177). This "new criminology," alternatively called "bioenvironmental criminology," begins with the premise, earlier proposed by Pierre van den Burghe, that behavioral science, of which criminology is but a specialized branch (p. 97), must begin "bringing [the] beast back in" as one of its core explanatory variables (p. 253). It is in line with this premise that Jeffery claims that his approach to crime prevention through environmental design "goes beyond target hardening" (pp. 45, 229), beyond designing only the physical architectural environment within which crime occurs. Because by "beast" is meant "biology," when Jeffery states that he has gone beyond "target hardening," he means that he has gone on to include the organic biological environment as a focus of design. In other words, crime prevention through environmental design represents the attempt to prevent crime through the hardening not only of the physical architectural environment but also of the organic biological one.

Jeffery intends to reintroduce biology into criminological theory, but in contrast to early Italian biological positivism, he intends to do so as part of an interdisciplinary perspective which views crime as the behavioral outcome of the interaction of multiple factors. Although we applaud Jeffery's recommendation of an interdisciplinary strategy for criminology, we only do so in its most general

statement. In essence, Jeffery's particular interdisciplinary formulation is unacceptable. It must be rejected as interdisciplinary because it is so only in rhetoric, but not in substance. Upon close examination, it reduces, both in its theory and in its application, to an inconsistent and confusing forced marriage between behavioristic psychology and biogenetics.

We begin our criticism by pointing out Jeffery's inconsistent characterization of his interdisciplinary approach. First he tells us that it is "psychobiological in nature" (p. 33), then that it is a "biosocial learning theory" (p. 177), and finally that it is a combination of the first two characterizations, that it represents the "interaction of social, biological, and psychological variables" (pp. 311, 323-27). These different versions of his approach might be excused were it convincingly argued that the author was simply trying to pace his presentation, not wishing to confuse the reader by presenting too much material too soon. However, were this line of reasoning to be used, that the inconsistency is but a matter of textual organization, then another problem would present itself. How can Jeffery propose that his interdisciplinary approach represents the integration of sociology, biology, and psychology when he rejects sociology with the assertion that "there is no such thing as a social variable" (p. 327)? By taking this position, Jeffery does not just reject sociologism, that untenable perspective which proposes that behavior is determined *exclusively* by social factors. Rather, he takes a more extreme position: he rejects all social variables and, by implication, the position that any social factor influences behavior. What Jeffery has done, therefore, is to reject one untenable position, only to accept another.

In light of such inconsistencies and rejections, Jeffery's recommendation that criminology reconstruct itself upon a biosocial foundation can only be construed as mere polemic. What can possibly be the "social" component of a "biosocial" criminology which has rejected *both* sociologism and the "social variable"? As a result of these rejections, a body of theory and research of whose bankruptcy we remain unconvinced would not be utilized in the effort to solve the crime problem. Consistent with his rejection of the "social variable," when Jeffery finally makes his recommendations concerning crime prevention, he restricts himself to recommending biological engineering (pp. 315-16) and stimulus management (p. 316). Although the "social response system" is also mentioned in this regard, in light of Jeffery's position regarding the

"social variable," this can only be interpreted as empty gesturing.

Although we are disturbed by the inconsistencies in Jeffery's argument, we are disturbed more by his failure to try to identify—let alone to address—the practical, political, and ethical implications of his position. The magnitude of the environmental management program which Jeffery advocates must of theoretical necessity be enormous. For example, the behavioristic component of his theory would require the introduction of punishment and reward schedules. This means that a host of reinforcement variables would have to be available for manipulation. Regarding the introduction of just a punishment reinforcement schedule, Jeffery observes:

In order to be effective, punishment must satisfy several basic conditions. It must be related to an alternative response pattern which can be used to reach a reward, that is, a substitute for the punished response must be provided. Punishment must be immediate, certain, and severe. Escape and avoidance responses must not be possible. The level of motivation for the act (the positive reinforcement) must be reduced. The punished act must not be reinforced at the same time, otherwise, the reinforcement may be strong enough to maintain the behavior (p. 276).

The implication is clear; to implement an effective crime prevention program which is rooted in biological behaviorism, powers which are now viewed as being extraordinarily broad would have to be delegated to crime control agencies to manipulate the physical and the biological environments.

We object to such a program for several reasons. First, we doubt the feasibility of its implementation. The technological know-how required for its implementation does not currently exist, and probably will not exist, except perhaps in the distant future. From a policy standpoint, this approach trivializes any proposal which calls for immediate, or even nearly immediate, initiatives in the direction of a crime prevention program guided by principles rooted purely in biological behaviorism. Second, we question the advisability of recommending such a crime prevention program in the absence of a preliminary investigation of the potential unintended consequences which might be associated with it. We are especially concerned about the possibility that such a solution to the crime problem might create new deviant forms whose associated social costs would be greater than those associated with the prevented criminal behavior. For example, we direct the reader to the "1984"

solution wherein aversion and negative reinforcement therapies are used to extinguish "criminal" behavior. However, as a byproduct, individual initiative and creativity are also extinguished. We also direct the reader to the "Clockwork Orange" solution wherein the impulse to engage in violent criminal behavior is inhibited through a negative reinforcement therapy. However, this end is achieved at too high a price. By being treated in such a fashion, the individual is unable to defend himself forcefully in an environment replete with violence. Every solution, therefore, has unintended consequences associated with it. Failure to identify the possibility of such consequences is to accept *de facto* one's own proposed "solution" as the final one. Because Jeffery fails to pursue his position in this one of its many implications, caution must be exercised.

Third, we fear the political consequences of a crime prevention program grounded purely in biological behaviorism. We believe that it would place in jeopardy the central democratic precept which protects the individual against excessive control by the state. Although Jeffery himself does not suggest it, this would be a logical implication of his position. Because Jeffery embraces biological behaviorism, and because, as he observes, "punishment must satisfy several basic conditions" in order to control behavior effectively (p. 276), Jeffery would be forced to conclude by the logic of his own position that in any sector engendering crime prevention, relevant reinforcement variables would have to be opened to the possibility of reinforcement variable manipulation by empowered crime control agencies.

We do not doubt that the granting of broad powers over reinforcement variable manipulation to crime control agencies would secure a new order from the old disorder. However, we believe that this end would be bought at an exorbitant price. Payment would be exacted in the form of limitations upon "freedom, liberty, self-realization, self-respect, and . . . human dignity," those very principles which Jeffery believes can be affirmed and preserved only through his own crime prevention scheme (p. 10).

Perhaps Jeffery has failed to recognize the unacceptable price demanded by his proposal because of the technological "newspeak" into which he has fallen. Indeed, as he states, he "will argue, in contrast to most liberal or radical criminologists today, that a scientific system of behavior control is more effective and therefore more humane and dignified than the present system" (p. 10).



Technical effectiveness in behavior control, humaneness and dignity are clearly distinct goals, often in conflict with one another. Yet Jeffery equates them. He then proceeds to write only in terms of technical effectiveness in behavior control, as if an increase in it automatically occasions concomitant increases in both humaneness and dignity. However, as we have seen, just the opposite is the likely consequence of the technical effectiveness of a crime prevention program which is based purely on biological behaviorism. There will be less "humaneness" and less "human dignity," also less "freedom," less "self-respect" and less "self-realization." In view of these likely consequences, if Jeffery's "new criminology" is to be included as one of the "new horizons in criminology," then it must be counted as one of the more dangerous.

In sum, Jeffery's "new criminology" is politically dangerous, practically infeasible and ethically pernicious. On these grounds we reject his claim (p. 342) that *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design* is one of the promising new places in which an answer can be found to the crime problem.

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**VIOLENT DELINQUENTS: A REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION FROM THE VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE.** By Paul A. Strasburg. New York, N.Y.: Monarch, 1978. Pp. xvi, 272. \$8.50.

This book reviews what the best known researchers and government sources have to say about the size, recent trends, causes and treatment of delinquency. The book includes a report of a study of a sample of 1974 delinquency petitions in three counties: Manhattan and Westchester in New York, and Mercer (Trenton) in New Jersey. An attempt is made to isolate the peculiar features of violent delinquency and its treatment, but since nothing special about violent, as opposed to other delinquency, has been found, except its seriousness and relative rarity, the book says far more about delinquency in general than about violent delinquency in particular.

This polished, clearly written book, by an admitted newcomer to the field, promises to receive wide and favorable attention. Already, it has the enthusiastic endorsement of a leading senator (Birch Bayh, in the foreword) and of several leading criminologists (Gerald Caplan, James Vorenberg and Marvin Wolfgang on the back cover).

The author, the Vera Institute and the Ford Foundation are well connected. At the same time, the author has obviously worked hard and made an earnest attempt to contribute something new to a troubled field. The difficulty is that good political connections and substantial contributions do not mix.

Since the nineteenth century, criminologists in the United States and in Europe have known that delinquency—especially violent delinquency—is a serious and growing problem; that although identification of delinquents entailed political discrimination, most delinquents are still poor youths; that delinquency and violence are probably the combined result of a number of kinds of biological, physical and social deprivation; that apart from age at onset and length of prior record, delinquency and violence are hard to predict at an individual level; and that more money and arrangements for multifaceted, intensive treatment of delinquents are needed. The only clear advances in treatment in recent years have been in controlling behavior of youths while in institutions, through the use of token economies and positive peer pressure. There have been waves of enchantment and disenchantment with punishment, rehabilitation, diversion, community treatment and comprehensive planning and monitoring strategies. More and better data are needed. Still, the problem always seems to be getting worse, with success being sporadic and short-lived. Even the trend toward taking juveniles out of institutions and closing the institutions, noted with favor by Strasburg, has been reversed in the last few years.

Appreciation of the situation requires that the researcher initially transcend the bounds of current political concerns and issues to gain a long-term historical or cross-cultural perspective on current data. Only then do ostensibly novel proposals stand a chance of being novel in fact. For instance, the figures for the three-county study show that the probability of being placed in an institution if petitioned, is highest in Westchester County, where the probability of being petitioned is lowest. However, the probability of being institutionalized if petitioned is the same for Mercer and Manhattan Counties, although the antecedent probability of being petitioned among all juveniles, among those whom police contact, and among those arrested, is higher in Mercer than in Manhattan County. Further exploration of this anomaly might yield genuinely new ideas on how to keep juveniles already in court from being sent to institutions, without having to compensate by increasing the quota of

juveniles petitioned into court beforehand.

Such true novelty is unlikely to appeal to governments and large research foundations, who are heavily invested in using new data and analyses to perpetuate established truisms about how social problems can best be addressed. When Strasburg proposes a Continuous Case Management Plan, his perspective remains too narrow to see that implementation of the plan would just add more bureaucratism to a long-established bureaucratic morass, and that it would further confound the mission to which he subscribes of conducting carefully controlled studies of the effects of treatment. Strasburg is a talented analyst. It is unfortunate that he has been trapped in the banality of being at the top of the criminological order.

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PRISON HOMICIDE. *Sawyer F. Sylvester, John H. Reed & David O. Nelson.* New York, N.Y.: Spectrum Publications, Inc., 1977. Pp. xxiii, 126. \$12.

*Prison Homicide* is an important contribution to the literature in both penology and homicide. Though the literature in these two areas is quite extensive, heretofore there had been no major work which attempted to describe and explain homicides in prison. Thus, this book serves as the first attempt to build a bridge between these two major bodies of literature. The study, funded by the LEAA, was carried out by three professors of sociology at Bates College. The sample consisted of all homicides occurring in 1973 in United States prisons housing adult male felons and having populations of 200 or more inmates. Thus, federal and state prisons were included, with the exception of small facilities or those housing exclusively females.

Data on all homicide events and participants were gathered through questionnaires to prison officials and through a field examination of prison files in every homicide identified in the national survey. Data were collected and coded for institutional characteristics as well as for homicide events and participants.

The first of five chapters compares death and homicide rates in prison to those in the free world. Rates for each of the states are computed and ranked for prison deaths in general and for specific causes (accidents, suicide, homicide). The authors conclude that the mortality rates in prison are lower than those outside when the characteristics

(age, sex, race) of the prison population are considered. Deaths from natural causes are six-tenths as likely as would be expected, accidents are about one-twentieth as likely as would be expected, deaths by suicide are twice the expected rate and deaths by homicide are about what would be expected (in the free world given the same age, sex and racial characteristics of those in prison).

However, some of the conclusions stated in the chapter are questionable in light of the authors' failure to explain adequately the methodology and the statistics upon which the comparisons are made. The authors do not explain their methodology in computing a homicide rate for prisons that would control for the greater relative numbers of males, certain age groups and Blacks and Spanish-speaking inmates. A rate that would be truly comparable to the rate for the same type of persons living in the free world would necessitate the collection of data on all inmates in the United States so that age, sex and racial composition of the prisons could be determined and an appropriate free world rate computed given these demographic characteristics. There is no indication that such computations were done in the authors' study, nor were there any references to such figures that may have been produced by others.

The national inmate homicide victimization rate was reported as 7.44 per 10,000 inmates. No comparable figure for the free world victimization rate was given, though the authors asserted that the rate was "identical" when one controls for the age, sex and racial characteristics of the inmate population. Further questions were raised when the authors reported (without documentation) that the age-specific homicide victimization rate for non-white men from 18-25 is roughly 13 per thousand. There is no data to support the equivalent of a national rate of 1,300 per 100,000 for this age, sex and racial group.

One interesting finding reported in this chapter involves the lack of disparity in prison homicide rates for Blacks and Whites. Though the homicide rate for Blacks outside of prisons is several times that for Whites, it appears that the rates inside prison are almost identical. Since the authors claim that the overall prison homicide victimization rate is equal to the outside rate, it follows that Whites are victimized more often within prisons than without, while Blacks are victimized more often outside of prisons than in them. This "racial parity of victimization within prison" is striking and the authors suggest in a later chapter that the result may be due to the amelioration of the subculture

of violence (prevalent among Blacks on the outside) by conditions inside prison walls.

This first chapter also states that the inmate over a twenty-year sentence would be projected to have a 1:67 chance of being a homicide victim before completing his term. Likewise, guards would have a 1:200 chance of being killed over a twenty-year period. The authors do not discuss the difficulties of making such projections based on data for only one year and do not seem to be aware of the literature which discusses the problems inherent in making such predictions even when data is available for several years.

Chapter two deals with the characteristics of homicide events. Results are reported as to location (the risk of homicide to an inmate in the West and South was at least one and a half times as great as it was in the rest of the country), as well as to time. Unlike homicides in the free world, prison homicides were more likely to occur in the afternoon rather than at night and *not* on a weekend. Unfortunately, the authors did not place these findings in the context of the homicide literature of the free world so that the reader would not be aware of the significance of these findings. Other findings contrary to the results found in studies of homicide outside prison were that stabbing was the most common method, one quarter of the homicides occurred in the victim's cell and homosexuality and snitching were the two most common motives. Contrary to popular belief, the study found only 3% of homicides in prison to be inter-racial (though the race of the assailant was unknown in 30% of the cases). Also, gang-related motives seemed to be involved in less than 10% of the cases; however, the type of motive was not broken down by states even though it is well known that such states as California and Illinois have numerous gang-related homicides. Considerable discussion was also devoted to the type of action taken against assailants (conviction rates, etc.).

Chapter three involves a description of the homicide events along with case histories for four categories of relationships: inmate/inmate, inmate/guard, guard/inmate and guard/guard. Significant differences in inmate/inmate homicides were found for single-assailant versus multiple-assailant events. For example, in single-assailant cases the three leading motives were homosexuality, arguments and debts, while in the multiple-assailant events the leading motives were snitching, "gang phenomena" and drug quarrels. Also, 56% of single-assailant cases were "victim-precipitated" while the figures for multiple-assailant and unidentified

assailant(s) were 14% and 18% respectively. However, the authors do not define "victim precipitation" so the reader is left to wonder which definition (Wolfgang's or some other) was utilized.

Chapter four involves a discussion of the "Characteristics of Homicide Institutions." The chapter purports to assess the extent to which prison homicide is related to the size of the institution, the extent of overcrowding, the security status of the prison, the educational and racial composition of the staff, etc. However, any conclusions reached are questionable given the methodology employed. The methodology utilized is not adequately explained and what little description is given leads to doubts about the entire chapter. The authors seem at times to be comparing the characteristics of "homicide institutions" ("adult, male, felon, penal institutions, of size 200 or more which had at least one prison homicide in the calendar year 1973") to some other type of institution, presumably non-homicide institutions. However, the number of the comparison group is never mentioned (there appear to be 130 homicide institutions).

Also, results are often reported which indicate that some type of reduction in error measurement was utilized, although the statistic utilized is never identified. No tables are included among the many at the end of the chapter which would allow the reader to compare characteristics of homicide institutions to those of non-homicide institutions. Curiously, there are a series of tables about the characteristics of homicide institutions (type of security status, size of institution, etc.) which are relatively useless since comparable data are not given for non-homicide institutions. Thus, the reader learns nothing about the extent to which such differences predict homicide status of an institution.

The methodology utilized also does not distinguish among homicide institutions with respect to the number of homicides which each experienced. Thus, the characteristics of an institution which had ten homicides are not weighed more heavily than those for an institution which had only one homicide (*i.e.*, institutions are divided by status—homicide versus non-homicide—rather than by the number of homicides experienced).

Finally, the methodology leads to some remarkably unsophisticated and inappropriate conclusions. For example, the authors state that the size of the institution increases (by about 60%) the ability to predict the homicide status of an institution—that is, the more inmates living in a prison the more likely the institution is to experience a

homicide. The possibility of spurious relationships is not discussed and no explanation is given as to why a methodology was not utilized that would allow simultaneous control for other independent variables. The choice of scale for the dependent variable and for the methodology employed seems entirely inappropriate.

Chapter five presents some conclusions gleaned from the data presented in earlier chapters. The authors state that the most important question "is whether homicidal acts stem from the influences of physical, social and cultural environments in prisons or whether acts of homicide can largely be explained in terms of the characteristics of the individuals involved." They conclude that the "most appropriate answer seems to be that these factors are interactive." However, no description of the interactive process is given to the reader and the conclusion seems indefensible given the data

presented to the reader and given the methodology employed.

The faulty methodology leads to errors in conclusions with respect to policy suggestions as well as to factual errors. Since the study inaccurately concluded that the size of the institution was the most important environmental characteristic in predicting homicide status, the equally unsupported corollary conclusion was drawn that smaller prisons would help to reduce prison homicides.

Overall, it appears that some useful data were gathered on homicide events and participants, but that the methodology employed by the authors to analyze the data were inappropriate and thus many conclusions reached are questionable if not totally invalid.

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