

1956

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Recommended Citation

Bernard C. Brannon, Report on One-Man Police Patrol Cars in Kansas City, Missouri, A, 47 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 238 (1956-1957)

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A REPORT ON ONE-MAN POLICE PATROL CARS IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

BERNARD C. BRANNON

Bernard C. Brannon, Chief of Police, Kansas City, Missouri, presented the findings of this report at the 62nd Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, which was held last October in Philadelphia. Chief Brannon, who has been an advocate of progressive police methods since assuming his present office, has supervised the long period of investigation and experimentation that his department has carried on in their conversion from the two-man to one-man police patrol car. His report, which is published in full, sets forth the various modifications that they have found necessary to successfully handle this new program.—EDITOR.

Prior to the use of automobiles in patrol work the police beats or patrol areas were covered by foot patrolmen. Usually, they walked their beats alone, but sometimes in pairs when the amount and nature of police incidents required it.

Since the advent of the motorized patrol, the traditional procedure has been to assign two officers to each automobile. There were good reasons for this, for not only were the patrol areas greatly enlarged, scattering the officers over a greater geographic area and making them less susceptible to assistance from fellow officers, but the ability to surveil and detect misbehavior correspondingly increased, bringing on a work load considered too heavy for one man.

Then too, the complexity of our civilization increased, much faster, no doubt, than the ability of the police to cope with the rising crime rates on even ground. While the automobile opened new avenues for police progress, it also gave birth to an avalanching category of new police problems. Separated from his fellow officer not by blocks as before but by miles, the motorized policeman reasonably considered it foolhardy and dangerous to tackle his patrolling assignment alone, and police administrators were in agreement. To the argument that the foot patrolman walked alone so why could not the motorized patrolman singularly accomplish his job, these answers and many more were supplied.

Then came the development of the radio. With the possible exception of the automobile, radio communications bestowed on the policeman his greatest weapon for effectively fighting crime and preserving the peace. Pairing radio with the automobile created a boon to law enforcement undreamed of a few short years ago. But the real progress had only started. Next came improvement in radio communications which permitted the patrolling officer to reply to his dispatcher, to relay information, to request assistance, and to receive it often in a matter of seconds. This was our two-way radio. Yet there was more progress ahead.

When car to car radio communication was announced the police administrator knew he had cracked the distance barrier. That is, he realized that three-way radio brought the patrol cars closer together in point of effectiveness than were the foot patrolmen who could often whistle or yell at one another within the close proximity of their beats. He came to reason that there was no substantial difference between

the motorized patrolman who could rapidly converse with his fellow patrolman in a neighboring beat, and the predecessor foot patrolman who would call to his associate by whistle or night stick beating on the pavement. Indeed, if there were a difference it was only that the radio-motorized policeman held all the advantages, all of the safety factors that come with swifter and surer communication.

Those who advocated abolition of the traditional two-man patrol cars in favor of one-man cars even before the remarkable advances of radio could now speak in louder voice. Where before they argued that the officer riding alone was more alert, more careful, more observant, and thereby not only more efficient but personally safer, they now could maintain with authority that the risks of walking alone and riding alone were equalized. For with two and three-way radio communications the solitary patrolman had swift, certain, and effective companionship. Arguments against one-man patrol cars noticeably dwindled.

In Kansas City, Missouri, we came to the conclusion that it was time to reappraise past decisions as to the use of one-man cars. Commencing in June, 1953, after intensive study and consideration, a gradual transition came about. On December 1, 1953, the Kansas City Missouri Police Department effected a complete 24-hour changeover from the traditional two officers to a patrol car to the one-man system, becoming the largest city in the United States to do so.

Numerous inquiries relative to the change were received. These inquiries multiplied as the months went by, interest being manifested even in cities of other lands. If we were to fulfill our obligation of exchanging police information for the betterment of the law enforcement service, it became evident that a report of some kind must be made. But, in keeping with the Department's dedication to the dispensation of only the most authentic and informative data, it was deemed necessary to withhold a report until sufficient time had elapsed to permit the presentation of comparative statistics.

To accomplish this it was decided to wait until the entire calendar year of 1954 had expired, for this would culminate a full year's operation under the one-man car police patrol. Because the conversion to one-man cars was commenced on a partial and gradual basis in 1953, chronologically the closest year of operation under the two-man car system was 1952. Therefore, the comparative statistics set forth herein will encompass the full 12 month period of 1952, when the total patrol work was performed by two-man cars, and 1954, when the same work was carried out solely under the one-man system.

It is hoped that those who received no reply to their inquiries will accept the reason for the delay in making this report. Also, the Department realizes that since it has adopted the one-man car operational procedure as a matter of its administrative choice, its views in the form of conclusions as to success or failure could be weighed for biasness or partiality and interpreted in light of a possible vindication of its decision. For this reason a deliberate effort to avoid personal judgment or state conclusions has been made. The facts should speak for themselves. Our sole objective is to provide frank and honest data which may be of value to the police administrator in his study of the applicability of the one-man patrol cars to his particular city and department.

EFFECTING CHANGE TO ONE-MAN CARS

Preliminary Matters

Consideration was given to the possibility of changing from two-man patrol cars to one-man cars solely as an effort to obtain greater police service for Kansas City, Missouri, without (1) increasing the hazards of police employment or otherwise adversely affecting the personal safety of the officer, (2) increasing workload of the individual officer beyond fair and reasonable standards, nor (3) increasing costs of operations beyond fair budgetary limitations.

The safety factor of the individual officer was the objective of intensive study. Not only was the Department deeply concerned with the personal safety and welfare of its employees, but it was only logical to anticipate that the one-man patrol system would crumble within and without the Department if the personal risk to the patrolman was increased. Proponents of the one-man patrol operation have long argued that not only is there no greater risk to the officer riding alone but that he is actually safer than when paired with a fellow officer. It was concluded that if the patrolman was physically and mentally prepared, adequately trained and thoroughly schooled in strict compliance with one-man car procedures, and re-assigned to a patrol area and workload determined according to new calculations, the question of personal safety would be favorably resolved.

Personal factors were not overlooked. Such questions were asked as: How many patrolmen were available for one-man car operations? What was the average age? Were they young enough to grasp the new idea and support it? Would they be too set in their ways to embrace such a drastic change? What was the intellectual level and was it indicative of the general ability to assume added responsibilities and to comprehend fully the detailed procedures that would have to be followed?

The attitude of the patrolmen toward one-man cars was noted and explanatory methods of overcoming resistance to the idea were worked out. So too, the supervisory officers were canvassed as to their initial opinions. With proper explanation would they accept the new system willingly and with open mind, or would they reject it, either openly or latently?

Statistics setting forth the number and nature of other cities operating under one-man patrol cars or a combination of one and two-man cars were collected. Arguments for and against the idea were impartially and carefully analyzed. Personal opinions of other police administrators with experience in one-man car operations were sought. (See Table I.)

The cost factor loomed as a formidable problem. Assuming an increase in police service, would that increase carry with it a purchase price too great for justification? There would be substantial expenditures attached to the conversion, for, even if the numerical strength of the patrol force remained constant, there would be an increase in patrol areas or beats brought on through a reduction in the size of present ones, and this would mean more cars, more automobile maintenance, more car accessories, a greater taxing of communications and consequent radio expenses. It was also reasonable to assume there would be some increase in employees supporting line operations.

Table I

Population Group	Number of Cities Reporting Motor Patrol	Two Man Cars Only		One and Two Man		One Man Car Only	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
MANNING OF POLICE PATROL CARS IN CITIES OVER 10,000 (1953) ¹							
Cities over 500,000.....	16	6	37.5	10	62.5	0	0
250,000 to 500,000.....	21	8	38.1	13	61.9	0	0
100,000 to 250,000.....	61	28	45.9	28	45.9	5	8.2
50,000 to 100,000.....	119	48	40.4	57	47.8	14	11.8
25,000 to 50,000.....	260	91	35.0	120	46.2	49	18.8
10,000 to 25,000.....	679	174	25.6	356	52.6	149	21.8
All Cities over 10,000.....	1156	355	30.7	584	50.5	217	18.8
MANNING OF POLICE PATROL CARS IN CITIES—OVER 10,000 (1954) ²							
Cities over 500,000.....	17	8	47.1	9	52.9	0	0.0
250,000 to 500,000.....	21	5	23.8	15	71.4	1	4.8
100,000 to 250,000.....	58	23	39.7	30	51.7	5	8.6
50,000 to 100,000.....	106	38	35.9	58	54.7	10	9.4
25,000 to 50,000.....	249	69	27.7	130	52.2	50	20.1
10,000 to 25,000.....	594	122	20.5	364	61.3	108	18.2
All Cities Over 10,000.....	1045	265	25.4	606	58.0	174	16.6

¹ *The Municipal Year Book 1953*: International City-Manager's Association; Table V, p. 419.² *The Municipal Year Book 1954*: International City-Manager's Association; Table V, p. 433.

Need for the establishment of a special training program was apparent. Both the patrolmen and their supervisors would have to receive extensive education and training in one-man car procedures. The Department would be totally remiss in its duty if it failed to provide substantial preconversion training as well as continuing training after the plan went into effect. While it was contemplated that the trial and error method would be a great teacher, the Department was determined to do all within its power to foresee and anticipate the mistakes that could be made and to correct them before they happened.

The public was not forgotten in the educational approach. Samples of public opinion of one-man patrol cars were gathered. Results were sufficiently clear to indicate that the public as well as departmental personnel would require some selling of the new procedure. But it was reasonable to assume that the finest public salesmanship would be the enhanced police service the citizens of Kansas City would receive. There was no error in this prediction.

Thus, it was that the theory of one-man patrol cars invaded the Kansas City Police Department. That it gathered momentum as the studies and research continued is obvious from the final administrative choice. The decision was to adopt the system, and the administration thereby stuck its neck out. But the neck sticking was not a sudden thrust—it was a well-prepared, gradual thrusting that permitted careful looking and more study as the conversion proceeded.

The Patrol Areas

The three police districts of Kansas City were made up of 24 patrol areas or beats. Each patrol area was policed by one car with two patrolmen, and the 24-hour period was divided into three eight-hour shifts. During the peak workload period from 8:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. additional patrolling officers were provided. The patrol areas lacked much needed readjustment as to geographical size, population, and workload factors, although constant surveys and studies were commenced during the new administration in 1952.

The Department did not accept the reasoning that the old patrol areas could be left undisturbed and that one man policing the same area could operate as effectively as two men to a car. Conversely, it was reasoned that one man assigned to the same patrol area previously policed by two officers in the car could result in decreased police service while at the same time increasing the hazards affecting the individual safety of the officer.

Consequently, it was decided to re-district the patrol areas and rearrange them into smaller ones justified by size, population, and police incidents. As nearly as possible the change in patrol areas followed the census tracts, for it was thought that some socio-economic data compiled by government sources would be of value in orienting the patrolman as to his area of operation.

The 24 areas were reduced in size and realigned so that the city was then divided into 41 patrol areas. (See Figure 1.) Extensive workload data was compiled as to each area before the changes in the patrol areas were made. Plans were then made to assign a one-man car to each new patrol area. But this was not to take place at once.

The Gradual Conversion

Once the decision was made to attempt the conversion it was further decided that the change must be gradual. The following reasons for avoiding a hasty introduction of one-man patrols were advanced:

1. Patrolmen and their supervisors would be given a better opportunity to adjust their thinking and actions to one-man operations, and acceptance of the new idea would be more likely.
2. A gradual transition would permit a more thorough study, enhancing the chances of true evaluation, with accompanying modifications and improvements.
3. Radio dispatchers would become acclimated to their increased responsibility and would more readily adapt to new procedures necessary.
4. The public would be given a preview of the new system and could gradually formulate a more valid opinion of the service being received.

After initial training courses in one-man car procedures, tactics, and background information, the system was placed in partial operation in June, 1953. The first tests were conducted only during daylight hours at No. 3 Station, referred to in Kansas City as the Sheffield Station. On July 1, 1953, all patrol areas in this district were converted to one-man patrol cars on a 24-hour basis. Soon to follow was the




Figure 1

The map above left shows the police districts and car beats under the old system of two-man car operation. The city was divided into 24 car beats.

The map at the right shows the increased patrol efficiency under one-man car operation—a total of 41 car beats each watch, with 12 additional cars operating from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m.

The areas outlined in dotted lines represent annexations to the city which will become effective as follows: Areas marked B become part of Kansas City in 1957; those marked C will be annexed in 1958, and those marked A in 1959. The annexation of these areas will give Kansas City a total of 129.83. The present area is 81.72, and Kansas City will be 48.11 square miles larger in area in 1959. This will mean new problems in policing.

conversion of the then No. 4 Station and District on a 24-hour basis.¹ Effective December 1, 1953, the entire city area was included in the one-man patrol system on a 24-hour basis.

During the peak workload period from 8:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. 12 additional patrol cars were placed in operation throughout the city, these, too, being one-man cars.

Communications. The Department regarded radio communications as the heart-beat of one-man patrol. A three-tone system was developed and placed in operation as an added alert to all officers. One tone indicated a general pickup order was about to be transmitted. The two tone signal was notice that two or more cars were about to be alerted for dispatching on a call. Three-tone signals signified a call of extreme or major importance was about to be dispatched.

Tape recordings were used at all times for the maintenance of a permanent record of all transmissions of the dispatcher and mobile units. To insure the most efficient operation of the recordings (for it was thought necessary that extra care be taken to record all oral communications in the event of death or injury to a patrolman in a one-man car), two of the latest model Dictaphone Recording Machines were installed in the dispatching room. Car to car radio transmissions are also recorded here.

Size of Patrol Areas. After the complete conversion to one-man cars took place the wisdom of the prior decision to decrease the size of the patrol areas as a requisite step in the change to one-man cars was confirmed. When the Department operated on the two-man car basis the average size of the patrol areas was 3.4 square miles; after the conversion to one-man patrolling and the increase in the number of patrol areas from 24 to 41, the average size of the areas was reduced to 1.9 square miles.

Almost immediately the public became aware of greater police speed in answering calls. A study revealed there was an average reduction in time of answering calls from three and one-half minutes to two minutes.

In effect, the patrol areas had been reduced to about half of their original size. This enabled the patrolman to more closely surveil his beat, giving it attention that previously was impossible. It also permitted him to carry on his work with the realization that *he was not riding his old patrol area alone—his fellow officer was still there, but in an additional car.*

The Patrol Cars. To provide the coverage required by the creation of new patrol areas, 16 new automobiles were purchased. Table II sets forth the cost involved. The Department uses standard Ford automobiles, either tudor or fordor, with fordomatic transmissions. At \$2,130 each the new cars required an expenditure of \$34,080.

A motor pool was established utilizing all department vehicles not in use on a 24-hour basis. This resulted in sufficient additional cars to provide the 12 cars assigned to the peak workload period.

Patrol cars were made more conspicuous by painting them white with the police identification in large black letters on the sides. Almost immediately the public started complimenting the Department for "having a patrol car around their house so much". Actually, the black car used previously was probably not noticed with the

¹ This became No. 2 station after elimination of the prior No. 2 station in July, 1953.

Table II

COST FACTORS
Additional cars needed

The change over to a single motorized patrol force required the purchasing and equipping of sixteen additional automobiles.

Shown below is the itemized cost involved for supplementary equipment necessary to inaugurate the one-man patrol car system.

Cost of additional equipment for change from two to one-man cars

Item	Cost Each	Number Purchased	Total Cost
Automobile.....	\$2130.00	16	\$34,080.00
Seat Covers (Patrol Cars).....	9.50	10	95.00
Seat Covers.....	20.00	6	102.00
Generators.....	152.66	16	2,442.56
Redlight (Dome).....	26.55	10	265.50
Redlight (Side).....	4.98	10	49.80
Gun Rack.....	20.20	60	1,212.00
Siren.....	71.25	16	1,114.00
Tags.....	2.00	16	32.00
Decals.....	3.50	10	35.00
Three way radio.....	598.75	16	9,580.00
Speaker (Outside).....	11.90	60	714.00
Blanket.....	4.40	10	44.00
Tarp.....	8.50	10	85.00
Rope (200 Ft.).....	7.72	10	77.20
First Aid Kit.....	5.67	16	90.72
Total Cost.....			\$50,018.78

frequency indicated after the change in color, although there were, of course, more patrol cars on the streets.

Motor Car Equipment. Uniform patrol vehicles were all equipped with three-way FM radio. Three-way radio accomplished its purpose. (1) It proved a significant safety factor in enabling the officer to summon immediate assistance of patrol cars in neighboring areas; (2) gave a feeling of security to the officer riding alone; and (3) tended to alleviate the work load of the radio dispatchers, making additional air time available. An additional outside radio speaker was installed behind the grill work of each patrol car. The speakers are controlled by a toggle switch mounted on the dashboard of the car, permitting the patrolman to hear his radio calls while outside of his car performing a foot patrol function. Repeat calls have diminished as a result of this installation.

Each patrol car is equipped with a 12 gauge Remington riot gun. With the adoption of the one-man patrol system the former overhead shot gun brackets were replaced with a new type Fletcher gun holder making it more accessible to the officer. The riot gun is now placed in a vertical position beside the driver, and the Fletcher Gun holder protects against theft by a paracentric key lock, one that prevents removal of the gun without the proper key. Facilitating immediate use, the automatic release permits instant access to the gun.

A red flashing dome light is mounted on each uniform patrol car as a supplement to the red light located on the left side of the car. Its value is being proven as an alert to motorists during emergency runs and also when used in stopping pursued vehicles.

The Costs

The cost of the new cars together with the additional equipment amounted to \$50,018.78. With more police cars in operation on a 24-hour basis, the cost of repairing, servicing, and refueling the motor fleet of the Department increased. Table III sets out these items in a comparison of the years 1952 and 1954. Examination of this table will reveal that purely maintenance costs, excluding depreciation, are \$163,461.25 for 1952, during two-man car operations, and \$222,291.79 for 1954. This is an increase of 27 percent. It will also be observed that the number of motor cars subject to maintenance increased from 128 to 148, to the present time, or a percentage increase of 14 per cent.

As a natural corollary to the acquisition of more vehicles the item of depreciation increased from \$46,947.53 to \$72,514.87. This operational cost when added to the maintenance cost shows a total increase over 1952 of \$87,939.76.

In explanation of the increased maintenance costs, other than the normal expectancy arising from 20 more vehicles being placed in use and the normal increase in all costs over a two-year period, is the fact that the patrol force traveled 1,277,762 miles during 1952 and 2,777,460 miles in 1954, a numerical increase of 1,499,698

Table III
COMPARATIVE OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE COSTS

	1952	1954	Increase or Decrease
Payroll (Automobile Mechanics only)	\$65,551.60	\$86,315.77	+\$20,764.14
Parts Installed	21,411.66	31,726.28	+10,314.62
Other Maintenance and Fleet Items	9,009.62	14,341.68	+5,332.06
Tires and Tubes	8,118.34	7,464.43	* -649.91
Motor Oil Used	1,168.18	1,399.26	+231.08
Gasoline	58,201.85	81,044.37	+22,842.52
Depreciation	46,947.53	72,514.87	+25,567.34
Sub Total	210,408.78	294,806.66	+84,397.88
Other Operational Costs (Lights, Heat, Water, Motorcycles, etc.)	44,443.37	47,985.25	+3,541.88
Total	\$254,852.15	\$343,791.91	+\$87,939.76
Number of Motor Cars	128	148	+20
Cost of Additional Motor Cars	—	\$34,080.00	+\$34,080.00
Mileage (All Vehicles)	3,379,235	4,390,171	+1,010,936
Mileage (Patrol Bureau Only)	1,277,262	2,777,460	+1,499,698

* This decrease due to policy adopted of recapping all sound tire carcasses, particularly for snow tires.

Table IV
PART I CLASSIFICATION OFFENSES
2 Year Comparative Figures
Kansas City Missouri Police Department

	1952	1954	Numerical Increase or Decrease	Percentage Increase or Decrease
Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter.....	42	45	+3	+7.14
Manslaughter by Negligence.....	18	21	+3	+16.67
Rape.....	76	60	-16	-21.05
Robbery.....	490	372	-118	-24.08
Aggravated Assault.....	492	340	-152	-30.89
Burglary.....	2050	1194	-856	-41.76
Larceny (\$50 & Over).....	1687	1179	-508	-30.11
Larceny (Under \$50).....	2760	2548	-212	-7.68
Auto Theft.....	664	822	+158	+23.80
Total.....	8279	6581	-1698	-20.51

miles, or an increase of 117.37 per cent. This amazing increase in activity should be studied in relation to the results obtained.

In addition to the cost of new vehicles and the operational and maintenance expense, additional costs may be reasonably anticipated in communications and in the police garage. Both appear to be operating well at the present time, but an enlargement of staffs and some physical facilities may be necessary. These are cost factors that must be carefully studied in appraising the patrol system.

RESULTS

Crime Rate

Table IV is a two-year comparison of Part I Classification Offenses. There was a numerical decrease in the total of these offenses from 8279 to 6581, or 1698; a per-

Table V
PART I CLASSIFICATION OFFENSES
2 Year Comparative Figures

	1952			1954		
	Actual Offenses	Cleared by Arrest	Percent Cleared	Actual Offenses	Cleared by Arrest	Percent Cleared
Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter.....	42	37	88.1%	45	43	95.6%
Manslaughter by Negligence.....	18	17	94.4%	21	21	100.0%
Rape.....	76	47	61.8%	60	46	76.7%
Robbery.....	490	262	53.5%	372	338	90.9%
Aggravated Assault.....	492	412	83.7%	340	318	93.5%
Burglary.....	2050	498	24.3%	1194	671	56.2%
Larceny (\$50 & Over).....	1687	228	13.4%	1179	323	27.4%
Larceny (\$50 & Under).....	2760	425	15.4%	2548	654	25.7%
Auto Theft.....	664	240	36.1%	822	333	40.5%
Total.....	8279	2166	26.2%	6581	2747	41.7%

Table VI
PART II CLASSIFICATION ARRESTS
Kansas City Missouri Police Department

	1952 Arrests	1954 Arrests	Numerical Increase or Decrease	Percentage Increase or Decrease
Other Assaults.....	161	275	+114	+70.8%
Forgery and Counterfeiting.....	63	62	-1	-1.6%
Embezzlement and Fraud.....	172	300	+128	+74.4%
Stolen Property.....	41	95	+54	+131.7%
Concealed Weapons.....	252	335	+83	+32.9%
Prostitution and Commercialized Vice.....	362	345	-17	-4.7%
Sex Offenses.....	323	289	-34	-10.5%
Offenses Against Family & Children.....	352	439	+87	+24.7%
Narcotic Drug Laws.....	79	134	+55	+69.6%
Liquor Laws.....	623	284	-339	-54.4%
Drunkness.....	18073	17069	-1004	-5.56%
Disorderly Conduct.....	4253	4681	+428	+10.1%
Vagrancy.....	983	1494	+511	+52.0%
Gambling.....	2165	1779	-386	-17.8%
Driving While Intoxicated.....	2597	2344	-253	-9.7%
Road and Driving Laws.....	31000	33022	+2022	+6.5%
Parking Violations*.....	138	17	-121	-87.7%
Other Traffic and Vehicle Laws.....	2196	3313	+1117	+50.9%
All Other offenses.....	3955	3041	-914	-23.1%
Suspicion.....	951	1030	+79	+8.3%
Total.....	68739	70348	+1609	+2.3%
Total Less Suspicion.....	67788	69318	+1530	+2.3%
Parking Tickets.....	120404	128798	+8394	+6.97%

* Arrests, not Tickets.

centage decrease of 20.51 per cent. These statistics are carefully kept in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Crime Reports as requested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and concurred in by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

According to the Annual Bulletin of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's "Uniform Crime Reports", the National Average Crime Rate increased 6% in 1953 over 1952 and 5% in 1954 over 1953. For the same periods in Kansas City there was respectively a 7% decrease in 1953 and a 14.5% decrease in 1954.

In Kansas City Part I Offenses cleared by arrest in 1952 were 26.2%, and in 1954 the clearance percentage had been increased to 41.7. (See Table V.)

Table VI is a comparison of Part II Offenses 1952 and 1954. As is standard procedure in reporting Part II Offenses in approximately 71% of the incidents, the arrest report serves the dual purpose of a complaint report. Necessarily, therefore, in this type of Part II Offenses, reporting is based on arrests.

In some 29% of Part II Offenses, namely Forgery and Counterfeiting, Embezzle-

Table VII
2 YEAR COMPARATIVE TRAFFIC FIGURES

	1952	1954	Numerical Increase or Decrease	Percentage Increase or Decrease
Accidents.....	11,939	12,968	+1,029	+8.62
Persons Killed.....	31	38	+7	+22.58
Persons Injured.....	1,333	1,771	+440	+33.06
Traffic Arrests.....	39,482	42,728	+3,246	+8.22
Convictions.....	33,194	36,059	+2,865	+8.63
Dismissed or Discharged.....	6,288	6,669	+381	+6.06
Traffic Fines.....	\$400,191	\$437,773	+\$37,582	+9.39
Registered Motor Vehicles.....	144,715	164,705	+19,990	+13.81

ment and Fraud, Sex Offenses, Arson, Vandalism, and Lost Property, etc., preliminary complaint reports are normally made. Therefore, when our records show 68,739 Part II Offenses for 1953 and 70,348 for 1954, the 1,609 numerical or 2.3 percentage increase indicates principally more police activity through a greater number of arrests in the Part II classification.

Traffic

Table VII is a two year comparison of traffic data. The variables present in the traffic situation are well known to all police administrators. Especially important is the constant increase in the number of motor vehicles that daily travel the streets. There were 3,246 more arrests in 1954, but the accident rate increased 8.62%. There were 2,865 more traffic convictions with \$37,582.15 increase in fines.

Safety of Officer

The Department is pleased to announce that the inauguration of one-man patrol cars brought but slight increase in injuries to the patrolmen as the result of police

Table VIII
INJURIES, LINE OF DUTY
Patrol Bureau

	1952	1954	Numerical Increase Or Decrease
Assaults Upon Officers.....	11	17	+6
Vehicular Accidents (Police Cars).....	12	11	-1
Other Injuries.....	7	10	+3
Totals.....	30	38	+8
Assault Upon Officers Per Patrol Unit.....	.458	.415	-.043
Vehicular Accidents Per Unit.....	.5	.268	-.232
Other Injuries Per Unit.....	.292	.244	-.048
Totals.....	1.25	.927	-.323

Table IX
INCIDENTS OF RESISTING ARREST

	2-Man Operation 1952	1-Man Operation 1954	Numerical Increase or Decrease	Percentage Increase or Decrease
January.....	0	18	+18	+100.00%
February.....	0	14	+14	+100.00%
March.....	0	10	+10	+100.00%
April.....	0	4	+4	+100.00%
May.....	1	5	+4	+400.00%
June.....	0	12	+12	+100.00%
July.....	0	11	+11	+100.00%
August.....	9	7	-2	-22.00%
September.....	18	7	-11	-61.11%
October.....	27	8	-19	-70.37%
November.....	13	8	-5	-38.46%
December.....	15	7	-8	-53.33%
Year Total.....	83	111	+28	+33.73%
	1953	1955		
January.....	8	14	+6	+75.0%
February.....	5	6	+1	+20.0%
March.....	20	10	-10	-50.0%
April.....	17	8	-9	-52.9%
May.....	16	19	+3	+18.8%
June.....	7	6	-1	-14.3%
6 Month Total....	73	63	-10	-13.7%

activity, and there have been no deaths. In 1952 the total number of men injured in all types of incidents, in line of duty, during patrol was 30, and this increased to 38 for 1954. None of these injuries were severe. Thus far the individual safety factor in one-man patrols presents no problem. See Table VIII for types of injuries and injuries per patrol unit.

Resisting Arrest

Incidents of resisting arrest are difficult to tabulate with accuracy because the officer does not always fully report them. This is usually due to the wide variation in the nature and degree of such resistance. If it is a minor one, it may or may not be reported, depending on how the officer views it. Then too, if a charge of resisting arrest is not filed against the arrestee, it may not reach the official records. However, on the basis of available records for the years 1952 and 1954, there appears to be 28 more incidents of resisting arrest reported in the latter year. Of interest (See Table IX) is the fact that for the last five months of 1954 the number of incidents were lower than the corresponding period of 1952 and for 1955 the six month total is 13.7% under same period in 1953. This in spite of the fact that the crime rate and workload invariably increases toward the end of the year, and it leads to the observa-

Table X
COMPARATIVE PATROL WORK LOAD DATA

	1952	1954	Numerical Increase or Decrease	Percentage Increase or Decrease
Calls Received	86,969	165,794	+78,825	+90.64
Car Checks	26,421	98,197	+71,776	+271.66
Pedestrian Checks	17,218	92,698	+75,480	+438.38
Residence Checks	5,230	25,459	+20,229	+386.79
Building Checks	285,437	856,312	+570,875	+200.00
Open Doors Found	254	811	+557	+214.17
Open Windows Found	280	884	+604	+215.71
Reports Taken	21,146	41,940	+20,794	+98.33
Warrants Served	845	6,129	+5,284	+625.33
Arrests	25,733	39,607	+13,874	+53.92
Tickets Issued	29,080	48,899	+19,819	+68.15
Accidents Investigated	5,021	8,626	+3,605	+69.81
Miles Traveled	1,277,762	2,777,460	+1,499,698	+117.37

tion, if not speculation, that the patrolmen were becoming more proficient in the operation of one-man cars and were cooperating as a team in making their arrests.

Patrol Activity

Table X should prove of great interest. The items of patrol activity jumped so greatly over 1952 that recorded results are admittedly amazing. Within a range of 438.79 percent increase in the total of pedestrians checked to a 53.9 percent increase in arrests, the step-up in patrol activity appears to be more than doubled.

As before stated, the greater efficiency in answering calls (a decrease in the time element of one and one-half minutes) brought public acknowledgment and much praise. The fact that two cars would often appear in answer to a call convinced many persons that they were being given more police protection. Adding to this the fact that the patrol cars were painted the conspicuous white color, the reason for the complete acceptance of the one-man car system by the public of Kansas City, Missouri, is understandable.

To place the same number of patrol units in the field on a two-man car basis would necessitate the employment of 152 additional officers at a cost of \$592,800 annually. A further expenditure for uniforms would add \$46,500.

PRESENT STUDIES

Since little more than a year and a half has passed since the Department adopted and put into operation the complete one-man car system of patrol, studies in all directions are being carried on². Of particular interest is the element of the individual

² As this article was going to press the complete data for 1955 has become available covering all of the statistics appearing in the tables of this report. Readers who are interested in these comparative figures can obtain them by writing the author.

workload. Checks are being made as to the personal effect, physically, emotionally, etc., if any, upon the officers working alone. No facts accumulated to date indicate change in regard to these factors as a result of solo policing. In fact, to the contrary there are indications that the officer working alone is divorced from personality clashes and pressures that often were present when he worked with another officer.

At present a study is being completed as to the workload of each patrol area, and an average percentage workload is being compiled. The extent to which each patrol area varies from the average workload is being analyzed as a possible criterion of the need to further adjust the patrol area boundaries.

Of course, the passage of additional time will lead the Department to safer and sounder conclusions as to its one-man patrol system, and when the time element justifies the advancement of definite conclusions by the administration a further report in greater detail will be issued.