Police Problems in Industrial Protection

Kenneth E. Kline
POLICE PROBLEMS IN INDUSTRIAL PROTECTION

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Even before December 7, 1941 it became evident that an expansion of industrial protection was to be very necessary, throughout the entire country.

Based on requests from Indiana industries and a knowledge of the requirements of the situation, the Public Safety Institute of Purdue University organized an Industrial Protection Division in September 1941 for the purpose of assisting Indiana industry in the development of effective industrial protection units.

Since the organization of this Division a great deal of research and training has been completed. Information materials have been secured from over three hundred sources in the United States, Canada and Great Britain. The greater part of this material came from industrial plants, police departments, fire departments, safety organizations and insurance companies. Based on this information and the experience of the writer in industry and the United States Army, materials relating to the police, fire and safety phases of protection have been prepared. This material covers all phases of training, administration, tactics and supply.

The Public Safety Institute has also established a reference library on the subject of industrial protection, for the use of all Indiana industries.

Schools and regional meetings for the purpose of training instructors and supervisors in the technique of training industrial plant protection units are conducted regularly.

The entire program is designed to present the basic materials necessary for the formation of new protection units and for the effective functioning of those units already established. The material and information presented is supplementary to that of the various governmental agencies concerned with this field.

Based on our experience in this work the following police problems in industrial protection are presented. There are many more which, for obvious reasons, cannot be discussed in an article of this nature.

Employment Checking

The job of industrial protection begins in the personnel department.

It is the first concern of any plant to determine the accurate historical background of every person employed therein. If the complete personnel background of each employee is known the plant is

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in a position to eliminate those persons who have some characteristics in their history which might be dangerous to production.

In order to stop production the saboteur must either introduce himself into the plant as an employee, as an unauthorized person, or carry out his work through a regular employee. Proper personnel checks can eliminate a large portion of this possibility.

To determine the proper history of each employee the plant should obtain written references from responsible persons who have known the employee for a period of five years, who are not relatives and who are not former employers. The complete work record should be checked, this to account for every day the person has worked since he took his first job. His possible police record should be developed, personal investigation of his habits, associates and other information about his home life should be secured along with a retail credit bureau report to determine his financial resources and reliability.

In addition to the above, birth certificates or other information (acceptable to other Government agencies) should be established. Employees should be finger printed and their prints sent through proper channels to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for necessary action.

All other information necessary to develop the complete and accurate history should be secured.

To illustrate the necessity for some of these checks let us assume that in checking the police record of an employee it is determined that he is a drunkard. Because he is a drunkard it may not follow that he should be discharged, but it certainly would follow that he not be placed in a vital spot in the plant where he has access to confidential or secret information because we know he may talk at the wrong time.

To illustrate another case let us assume that the retail credit bureau report indicates that the employee has a poor financial structure. This would tell us that he may become a very definite avenue of approach into the plant for some agent bent on the stoppage of production. Hip-pocket loan artists have been known to function in the vicinity of industrial plants and naturally they single out such industrial employees as are financially embarrassed. When such an employee becomes obligated he makes himself liable and provides a possible means of damage to the plant through some “squeeze act.”

And again a personal investigation may show that an employee gambles rather heavily. This information would bar him from employment in any department where he might be tempted by possible embezzlement, or other acts where he has opportunity to convert industrial funds to his own use.
Finally—by determining this background we are able to place each employee in a position where he is least likely to damage the plant and we are able to compensate for any irregular conditions in his complete structure. After the determination of this background for each employee is completed and we know all of our employees, the other primary job for complete protection is the necessary mechanical process of keeping unauthorized persons and materials out of the plant.

**Identification System**

The first phase of the mechanical process is the establishment of a system to identify each and every person entering and leaving the plant. This is usually accomplished by the use of credentials such as, photo badges and identification cards. We all know that almost any type of such card can be counterfeited, therefore, we must be careful in designing such credentials.

A system of background colors or special passes should be devised for all vital, vulnerable, secret and special defense areas.

In checking personnel at the gates every employee should be identified by the proper credentials. This is applicable to each person regardless of his position.

A great many devices can be used to facilitate this identification system as the use of single lane runways, turnstiles, and other types of block gates.

No system of passes or identifying credentials is effective unless the employees of the patrol division are taught to use them properly for identification. It has been reported that an agent of a Government bureau gained admittance to a plant even though he had inserted the picture of a monkey in the place of his photograph in his photo badge!

**Employees**

In order to be successful every protection department must have a very close working agreement with all other employees in the plant. Every employee in the plant should be a protection unit member in some capacity. If such is the case every unusual act which might or might not be sabotage, poor conditions of housekeeping, unsafe working conditions, safety hazards, fire hazards or any other condition which might damage production will be observed by some employee and reported to the protection department for proper action.

A reserve protection unit of regular employees should be made to fulfill the requirements of the emergency defense organization, that is, to function as air-raid wardens, fire watchers, etc.

In order to be successful any protection unit must have the good will and confidence of each employee in the plant. In other words, every employee must be made to feel that it is his responsibility to protect life and property within the plant as well as to carry on his
normal function of production. This is a very definite public relations job.

**Visitors**

Every visitor going into a plant should be sent to a reception desk. At this point he should be required to identify himself to the satisfaction of the plant and government officials. Before being permitted to enter the plant he should be required to sign a release protecting the plant management and the United States Government.

During the present emergency and due to the enormous production required, the writer believes it is not good policy to permit any visitors in the plant unless such visits are absolutely necessary. (Government regulations usually cover.)

Each visitor should be escorted by a runner to and from his point of contact. No visitor should ever be allowed in the plant at any time without such escort unless he has authority to be unescorted. Special care should be taken to ascertain that such authority is genuine.

**Automobiles, Trucks, Trains, Boats**

In checking any vehicle entering the plant there are three primary requirements to be met. The first being to identify all passengers; second, to check the authorization of the vehicle entering the plant; and third—to determine that there are no unauthorized materials in the vehicle.

This requires a very careful search. Where possible it is advisable to have a classification yard or some enclosure into which the vehicle can be introduced while being searched.

One problem which presents itself in this particular phase is the necessity for the entrance and exit of ambulances, fire equipment or other emergency vehicles. Regulations for them must be consistent with the requirements of protection and the necessity of the emergency.

All packages, materials equipment and other items belonging to the company or to the employees should be checked at the gates upon entrance or exit of employees to determine if they contain any unauthorized materials.

A similar inspection must be made for all visitors or any other persons entering or leaving the plant.

**Fences**

Another step in our mechanical process is to make the approach to the plant as difficult as possible. One requirement is the establishment of fences or barriers around the entire plant property. Ordinarily these fences or barriers do not keep people out of the plant but they serve to deter or delay unauthorized entry. Therefore it becomes necessary that the entire fence line be under constant observation, either mechanical or visual or a combination of both.
Observation towers may be erected around the outside enclosure at a height or distance from the fence which will provide the best interlocking observation. The location of these towers will depend upon the physical nature of the plant and surrounding territory. High points of building, roofs or other similar locations may be used as observation towers. These towers should be equipped with search-lights to allow any unusual objects or movements to be picked up at night. They should also be equipped with the necessary arms for proper protection and a means of communication to keep the towers in constant contact with headquarters. Care should be taken in designing the flood lighting scheme for the plant to allow maximum observation at all times.

Sound detection devices may also be used along the fence lines to indicate any unusual contacts with the fence.

Patrol roads or paths should be established along this line. These may be used by patrolmen on foot, in motor vehicles, or both. These road or path systems should be designed to permit the patrols to operate in dark areas and special care should be taken that they are never silhouetted against any lights.

Patrols should also be established outside the fence lines to determine any unusual activity in these areas.

**Patrols—Interior**

Patrols are essential in any plant for two reasons: a. The establishment of definite areas of coverage. b. Normal purposes of observation.

In the development of these patrols the technical experts in the plant should be consulted in order that the vital, vulnerable and other special areas can be carefully covered. In the establishment of these rounds the time element must be analyzed in order to allow the patrols ample opportunity for observation. The time for starting these patrols on their routes must be changed periodically in order to prevent the anticipated arrival at any given point.

Points of communication contact must be established throughout the patrol rounds in order to allow the patrol to maintain constant communication with headquarters. The general objective of these patrols is to discover police hazards, fire hazards, safety hazards, and any unusual activity at any time.

**Flying Squadron**

A group of specially trained men may be used as a flying squadron. Those selected for this purpose are to be trained in every aspect of plant protection. They work on an unanticipated schedule over the entire plant. The primary purpose of such a group is to permit the protection supervisor to make special spot checks in certain areas as desired. This group, of course, must
work in the open and the employes must never be allowed to feel that they are a secret or undercover group.

**Emergencies**

Detailed plans for any emergency should be established and tested prior to the possibility of such an emergency. Every protection unit member should be assigned his particular duties for any emergency, be trained and then rehearsed in these duties, so that when the emergency occurs the operation of the protection unit will be automatic.

Plans for an emergency should be coordinated with the following agencies:—plant police department, plant fire department, plant medical service, plant safety department, plant maintenance department, plant wardens division, adjacent police departments, adjacent fire departments, adjacent medical services and all other organizations that may be useful in any type of emergency.

The emergency organization should be designed to care for fires, explosions, riots, major accidents, air-raids, black-outs, parachute or ground attacks, or any others which might disrupt production.

The passive protective measures necessary to conform with the instructions published by the War Department, Navy Department, the Office of Civilian Defense and other recognized government agencies should be established.

**Municipal Police**

A very close working agreement between the plant protection group and the adjacent police departments must be established. This is especially necessary in the event the plant must call on adjacent police departments for assistance in the case of an emergency. It is also true where it is necessary to coordinate the traffic efforts with those of the adjacent police units.

Proper coordination of the efforts of the plant police and the adjacent police will result in much better public relations as far as employees are concerned and should facilitate their movement to and from the plant.

The municipal police should assist the plant police in the training of the latter in those subjects common to both departments. This will require very careful preparation on the part of both departments in order that it may be accomplished.

**Training Program**

Because of many conditions confronting protection units today a constant training program should be effected. This program should be designed to include the normal peace-time functions of
protection work as well as the emergency requirements. A careful and comprehensive program is necessary because the great majority of men and women employed in protection units have had no previous training in this field. Therefore, they must have a basic or recruit training course of instruction before they can be taught the advanced features of protection.

It is believed that the training course should run for a period of at least six months to a year, of from two to four hours a week. It is not believed that a protection member can be trained to perform all of its functions properly in a less period of time.

The minimum training course should include the following subjects: Protection organizations, patrol problems, emergencies, traffic control, fire prevention, fire inspections, fire practices; safety inspections, plant geography, ethics and courtesy, public relations, police tactics, self-defense, first-aid, sabotage, leadership, identification, bombs and explosives, reports and report writing, discipline, state and federal laws, patrol rules and regulations, safety rules and regulations and small arms firing. These subjects may be broken down into many other allied ones.

In selecting training instructors care should be taken to determine that such persons not only have the necessary knowledge relative to protection but also the ability to teach others. This question of training has too often been charged to an individual who does not have the necessary knowledge of the subject or the ability to impart it to others.

It must be understood that the protection unit can be effective only where men are properly trained and this course of training must be abreast of the present day requirements of protection.

The foregoing observations are applicable to any type of plant. They are necessary in every plant regardless of its size. For instance, as soon as we purchase one fire extinguisher we have a fire department, or as soon as we employ one guard or patrolman we have a police department. It would be entirely possible to stop the production of some of our large war machines simply by the destruction of a very small plant which may be supplying some small part or parts for the assembly of the larger unit.

CORRECTION

On page 324 in our last number is a note entitled: "Blood Tests in Affiliation Proceedings." The material is from Section 120 (not 12 as stated in our note), Part XIV of Act 17, 1939, New South Wales. The title of the Act is: "Child Welfare Act." We are indebted to Mr. George Wiener of Brooklyn, N. Y. both for the original note and for this correction. (Ed.)