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COMPARATIVE COSTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN CITIES

BENEDICT S. ALPER*

1. *Introduction*

The purpose of this study is to carry out in some measure the plan of the editors of the Chapter on the "Cost of Administration of Criminal Justice in American Cities"¹ in Volume 12, "Report on the Cost of Crime"² of the Wickersham Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.

The editors had hoped, if time and funds availed, to make a detailed statistical investigation into possible interrelations between their basic findings regarding the cost to three hundred American cities over twenty-five thousand population, of the five departments of police, prosecution, criminal courts, peno-correctional institutions, probation, and certain relevant community data.³ The community data to be considered below include 1) geographical location, 2) population, 3) racial composition and citizenship of the foreign born, 4) age distribution, 5) marital status, 6) illiteracy, 7) volume of crime, 8) form of municipal government. Only those comparisons have been studied for which complete statistics were available from Federal sources.

Before proceeding to an analysis of the figures, all the reports as submitted to the editors of Part VI were studied in their original form in an effort to verify the raw material. Each report was scrutinized for mistakes in allocation, evaluation, or analysis, after which they were divided into the "A" reports, those of superior validity, and the "B" reports, those of inferior validity.⁴ The criteria for the division were 1) completeness, 2) quotation of original sources, 3) evaluation of data and results, 4) freedom from accounting error, 5) accuracy of figures. Without such a preliminary estimate of the worth of the raw data, it was felt that any results derived from them would be insecure. A worthwhile conclusion rewarded such a

*Massachusetts Child Council, Boston.

¹Hereinafter referred to as "Part VI".

²U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1931.

³Part VI, pp. 339-348.

⁴The "A" group made up 32%, the "B" group 68%, of the reports studied.

preliminary evaluation: the more valid studies show, when considered in their entirety, a higher means per capita cost than do those less carefully compiled. (This finding for the more accurately reported group is not always forthcoming when the two groups of studies are examined in various separate classifications according to the data under consideration; this is the result of the re-grouping of the per capita figures rather than a sign that the finding itself is fallacious or that the preliminary appraisal of the basic data is superfluous.)

2. Location

The cost of the administration of criminal justice in 272 American cities⁵ ranges from \$1.21 in Lincoln, Nebraska, to \$11.30 in Jersey City, New Jersey. The first difference we note between Lincoln and Jersey City is one of location—the former is in the West Central group, while the latter lies in the Middle Atlantic States; we note further that Lincoln is a class “A” study, while Jersey City is of class “B.” These two differences are the twin edges of the wedge with which we shall enter the following table, which shows the mean per capita cost of both “A” and “B” cities according to the nine geographic sub-divisions set up by the Federal Census Bureau.

TABLE 1.
MEAN PER CAPITA COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE BY
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION.

<i>Region</i>	<i>“A” Cities</i>	<i>“B” Cities⁴</i>	<i>Total</i>
New England	\$4.09	\$4.70	\$4.38
Middle Atlantic	4.50	4.49	4.49
East North Central.....	3.17	2.85	2.95
West North Central.....	3.37	2.67	2.98
South Atlantic	6.92	3.53	3.86
East South Central.....	3.63	3.49	3.55
West South Central.....	2.18	2.77	2.72
Mountain	3.06	2.92	2.97
Pacific	4.06	3.46	3.85
Mean ¹	\$3.90	\$3.51	\$3.65 ³
Average Deviation ²	2.04	1.00	0.88

¹ The mean was used here rather than the median because its standard deviation showed it to be a better measure of central tendency. The figures for the mean were obtained by statistical rather than by arithmetical methods. That is, the raw per capita figures were taken as they were given in Part VI, table 13, pp. 323-333, regardless of the population of the city. Arithmetically computed, the population of each geographic group would have been added up and this total divided into the total cost for the group. By this method it would have been impossible to secure the average deviation.

² The average deviation is used here rather than the standard deviation because it shows more clearly the variation from the mean.

³ This figure differs widely from \$5.47 given as the “Total” at the end of table 13 in Part VI, page 333 of the original report. The reason for this divergence is that the editors of Part VI have used a weighted average, whereas this figure of \$3.65 represents a mean unweighted by population.

⁴ Does not include the 28 incomplete studies.

⁵ Does not include 28 reports omitted because incomplete.

In six of the nine groups the "A" studies show a higher average per capita cost than do the "B" studies, while they are lower in two cases, and practically equal in one. The New England group with a sample of 22 "A" studies shows an average decrease of \$0.61, the Middle Atlantic group with a sample of 19 "A" cases shows an increase of but \$0.01, the East North Central States with a sample of 22 mark an increase of \$0.32, while the Pacific States with only 13 "A" studies to 7⁶ "B" studies show an increase of \$0.60.

Viewing the country as a whole, the highest charge for crime is paid by the Middle Atlantic group. The next highest toll is taken of New England. From here the cost jumps southward to the South Atlantic, and thence by a decrease of but \$0.01, to the Pacific coast. A drop of \$0.30 to the East South Central States, a longer drop of fifty-seven cents to the West North Central, and then with less striking differences in cost, follow the Mountain, East North Central, and West South Central States. Roughly, this decrease seems to follow the course from densely populated, industrial, large foreign-element cities to more agricultural and less urbanized centers of the country's population.

3. Population

The above analysis has revealed that location of a city may have something to do with its annual per capita bill for protection against lawless elements. The following table will make another effort in this direction, and seek to show the relationship between the crime bill and the size of the city.

TABLE 2.
MEAN PER CAPITA COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE BY POPULATION.

<i>Population Group</i>	<i>"A" Cities</i>	<i>"B" Cities²</i>	<i>Total</i>
Over 500,000 ¹	\$6.61	\$6.91	\$6.70
250,000-500,000	4.46	4.64	4.58
100,000-250,000	4.04	3.93	3.97
50,000-100,000	3.65	3.42	3.51
25,000-50,000	3.15	2.96	3.02

¹ The two groups over 1,000,000 and 500,000 to 1,000,000 have here been combined into one group in order to increase the number of samples.

² Does not include the 28 incomplete reports.

The first two groups in this table show that the "A" cities have a lower mean per capita cost for the administration of criminal jus-

⁶One incomplete study omitted.

tice than the "B" cities, while the last three groups show a higher cost, which same general result is borne out by the previous table.

Turning to a consideration of the "Total" figures, the results are as might be expected, namely, that with the increase in the population group, the per capita cost of municipal administration of criminal justice also rises. This is true in both "A" and "B" cities. The difference in this cost between the cities of from 25,000 to 50,000 (of which there are 107) and the cities of from 50,000 to 100,000 (of which there are 81) is an increase of forty-nine cents. A difference of forty-six cents separates the latter group from those cities of 100,000 to 250,000 population (of which there are 47). A longer jump of sixty-one cents intervenes between this last group and the cities between a quarter and a half million (of which there are but 24) while the 13 cities over half a million in population show a mean per capita cost of \$6.70, which marks the largest increase over any smaller group, of \$2.12. The cities below 100,000 in population fall below the mean for the group of \$3.65, while all the cities over 100,000 show a higher figure than this average. The average deviation of 0.88 for the whole group shows how closely around this mean the raw figures disperse themselves.⁷ In fact, a graphic rather than a tabular representation of this material shows the mode at \$3.00 (where 36 cities cluster) and the mean at \$3.60 (where 18 cities are plotted) while no more than six cities are found at any one point beyond \$4.50, from which figure the tail stretches out, long and low, to the extreme point of \$11.30.

4. *Comparison of Means*

The comparison made in the following table between the mean per capita cost as computed by the editors of Part VI⁸ and the figures obtained by this study, shows the latter's average per capita cost to be higher for each population group except in the cities from 100,000 to 250,000, where it is lower by six cents. The figures for cities over 500,000 are not comparable as Part VI separates these cities into two groups, whereas for purposes of this table the same group of cities has been lumped together. As the explanation of these differences has already been made,⁹ this table merely calls attention to them.

⁷Cf. table 1, note 2, *supra*.

⁸Part VI, table 14, p. 334.

⁹Cf. table 1, notes 1 and 3, *supra*.

TABLE 3.

MEAN PER CAPITA COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMPARISON BETWEEN PUBLISHED RESULTS AND THOSE OBTAINED IN THIS STUDY.

<i>Population Group</i>	<i>Published Mean</i>	<i>Obtained Mean</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Over 1,000,000	\$7.46	} \$6.70	
500,000-1,000,000	6.35		
250,000-500,000	4.79	4.58	+0.21
100,000-250,000	3.91	3.97	-0.06
50,000-100,000	3.53	3.51	+0.02
25,000-50,000	3.08	3.02	+0.06
Mean	\$5.47	\$3.65	+\$1.82

5. Foreign Parentage

City populations vary according to their proportions of native born of foreign or mixed parentage. And it is usually held that the criminal elements are more largely drawn from this group than from any other, due to the conflict in mores and standards of living between these native born sons and their foreign born parents. The following table will attempt to seek out some relationship between the percentage of native born of foreign or mixed parentage¹⁰ and the per capita cost of administration of criminal justice.

TABLE 4.

MEAN PER CAPITA COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACCORDING TO PERCENTAGE OF WHITE POPULATION OF FOREIGN OR MIXED PARENTAGE.

<i>Percentage</i>	<i>"A" Cities</i>	<i>"B" Cities</i>	<i>Total</i>
0.9-9.9	\$3.29	\$3.10	\$3.12
10.0-19.9	3.09	3.05	3.07
20.0-29.9	3.41	3.26	3.33
30.0-39.9	4.95	3.57	3.95
40.0-53.7	4.15	4.67	4.46

In all but the last grouping, the "A" studies show a higher mean per capita cost than do the "B" studies, and there are sufficient samples in the "A" classes to maintain this finding. Turning to the total results we note an obvious and definite trend towards higher crime costs, (but with one exception) as the percentage of native children of foreign parents or parent increases. This result is somewhat weakened by the fact that Negro, Mexican, Indian, and Sino-Japanese elements have been omitted in the compilation of these

¹⁰1930 Census, Volume II, chap. 2, pp. 23-90.

basic figures; the percentages definitely refer to the *white* population of which the native born of foreign or mixed parentage are an element. This would tend to alter the figures, particularly in the Southern, Southwestern, and Pacific States. Despite this probable source of error, the comparison is sufficiently marked to warrant the finding evident on the face of the figures in the above table.

6. *Citizenship*

This is the result when the percentage of native whites of foreign parentage is compared with the cost of criminal justice. The following table will study the citizenship of the foreign born males¹¹ and seek to determine whether the fact of their naturalization affects in any way the municipal cost of crime. The assumption is that affiliation with the country of their adoption would tend to increase their respect for, and obedience to, the laws of the country they have sworn allegiance to.

TABLE 5.
MEAN PER CAPITA COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACCORDING
TO PERCENTAGE OF NATURALIZED FOREIGN BORN MALES, WHITE,
21 YEARS OLD AND OVER.

<i>Percentage</i>	<i>"A" Cities'</i>	<i>"B" Cities</i>	<i>Total</i>
3.75-47.4	\$5.01	\$2.72	\$4.44
47.5-57.4	3.82	4.56	4.20
57.5-67.4	4.39	5.22	4.93
67.5-77.4	3.37	3.15	3.22
77.5-87.4	2.46	2.72	2.66

There are no sufficiently definite conclusions to be drawn from the "A" and "B" reports, due to the fact that in two cases the "A" means exceed the "B" means, while in three cases they are less. But the conclusion to be drawn from the "total" column shows a decided trend toward decreased cost of municipal criminal justice as larger numbers of the foreign born male white elements are drawn into the ranks of citizenship through naturalization. The samples in each case are large enough to warrant this conclusion, despite the fact that in the group 57.5-67.4 there is an upward instead of a downward turn. The results shown in this table are especially striking when compared with the figure 60.4¹² which is the total percentage of naturalized white foreign born, 21 years old and over, for the

¹¹Ibid, chap. 8, pp. 399-492.

¹²Ibid, p. 402.

whole country. This latter figure includes both males and females for this age group, and even though it is not possible to draw off the percentage for the male group alone, the table above shows how rapidly the cost of crime figure drops to \$3.22, and thence to \$2.66 as soon as this mean for the whole country is exceeded.

7. Age

The age group to which most of the criminal and potential criminal elements belong is a problem of great interest in the field of criminal statistics. The volume of crime figures give no clue to this special phase, and we have to turn to the ages of those already arrested, convicted, and imprisoned in order to find an answer. For 1926, 1927 and 1928 the age group from 15 to 24 made up 44.2%, 44.7%, and 44.6%, respectively, of all those in the state and Federal prisons of this country.¹³ While no figures are available to show how long this age group was in prison at the time the count was made, nevertheless, we may assume that cities having a larger proportion of this young and volatile age group¹⁴ would have a larger amount of crime to be detected and prevented, and therefore would spend more money on the five phases of criminal procedure.

TABLE 6.
MEAN PER CAPITA COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ACCORDING TO PERCENTAGE POPULATION FROM 15-24 YEARS OLD.

<i>Percentage</i>	<i>"A" Cities</i>	<i>"B" Cities</i>	<i>Total</i>
14.0-15.9	\$3.70	\$2.62	\$3.11
16.0-17.9	3.81	3.52	3.64
18.0-19.9	4.20	3.74	3.88
20.0-21.9	3.57	3.46	3.48
22.0-23.9	3.79	3.79

A complete comparison between the "A" and "B" groups is prevented by the absence of any figure for the former in the last group. This invalidates somewhat the conclusion that might otherwise be drawn that greater care in the compilation of the reports results in a higher figure for the "A" cities over the "B" cities.

The figures in general are subject to this further error—the statistics for the cities from 25,000 to 50,000 made it impossible to get a single figure for the total population and therefore for these cities

¹³"Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories," U. S. Census Bureau, 1926, p. 34; 1927, p. 32; 1928, p. 24.

¹⁴1930 Census, Volume II, chap. 10, pp. 563-833.

the percentage of males only between the ages of 15 and 24 was taken, instead of for both males and females. As the percentage of females exceeds that of males in the age group studied by 0.8%,¹⁵ and as the number of cities of 25,000-50,000 in this study is 41%, the whole table above may be said to be in error by 3.3%, which is not sufficient to throw out any results that the table as a whole may reveal.

This table shows that there is little, if any, direct effect of an increase in the percentage of members of the "dangerous age" on the mean per capita cost of the administration of criminal justice. The average percentage of the whole population contained within these two ages is 18.3%¹⁶ and it is interesting to note that at this point the mean per capita cost for the studies under consideration is at its highest. Nor is this due to a paucity of samples in this group, which includes 82 cities. If the two extremes in the above table are considered, there is a definite increase in the cost of crime with an increase in the percentage included within ages 15-24, but the ascent is too irregular to draw a definite conclusion.

In the belief that if the larger cities showed a higher percentage within the ages of 15-24 than those for the country as a whole the conclusion might then be drawn that they attract the younger and more unstable groups, the average for just the cities over 500,000—of which there are 13—was computed. But this revealed an average of 17.7% which is 0.6% below the mean figure for the whole country.¹⁷ As we have seen previously that the cost of municipal criminal justice increases with the increase in the size of the city,¹⁸ and the percentage of those within the ages 15-24 does not so increase, this may account—in part—for the lack of definite results in this table.

8. *Marital Status*

Much has been said in the genesis of crime of the effect of "broken homes," in which either the father or mother is dead, divorced, deserted, or in prison or hospital. The result on the young is to leave them without parental control at a time when they are most in need of training, love, and guidance. To determine such a factor from a general body of national statistics is, of course, impossible, but some attempt may be made, as in the following table, which shows a comparison between the cost of criminal administra-

¹⁵Ibid, p. 5, 6, 7, table 3.

¹⁶Ibid, p. 5, 6, 7, table 2.

¹⁷Do.

¹⁸Cf. table 2, supra.

tion of justice and the percentage of the female population 15 years old or over whose marital status is widowed, divorced, or unknown.¹⁹ This figure was taken for women instead of for men for two reasons: the figures for the former are 12.5%, while for the latter they are 5.9%²⁰ and therefore widowed women are left with the children in more cases than are the men; and also because in cases of divorce "where dependent children are involved, the court usually assigns them to the mother,"²¹ although here no exact figures are available. Perhaps, to arrive more closely at a figure which would be as good an indication of the percentage of "broken homes" as the statistics will allow, despite the fact that the number of children is unknown, it would have been better to take the percentage of widowed and divorced women in the age group from 35 to 44 years, especially where the median age for married women is 22.4 years²² as this would find them at an age when their children might be expected to be growing up, and therefore to be affected by a disruption of normal family life. But such a procedure, it was felt, would be too narrowing and theoretical, and therefore the conditions of selection above referred to have been preferred.

TABLE 7.

MEAN PER CAPITA COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ACCORDING TO PERCENTAGE OF WIDOWED AND DIVORCED WOMEN, 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER.

<i>Percentage</i>	<i>"A" Cities</i>	<i>"B" Cities</i>	<i>Total</i>
6.0-9.9	\$4.11	\$4.05	\$4.07
10.0-11.9	4.29	3.48	3.78
12.0-13.9	3.58	3.87	3.76
14.0-15.9	3.51	3.07	3.23
16.0-17.9	4.16	3.14	3.08
18.0-21.9	4.30	3.63	3.90

The "A" reports in this table again show an increase over the "B" reports, except in the case of the 12.0-13.9 group, where they are lower by twenty-nine cents. Results for the table as a whole, how-

¹⁹1930 Census, Volume II, chap. 11, pp. 835-1088. It was impossible to separate out the "unknown" from the "widowed and divorced" but as these make up but 0.1% of the female population, they have slight bearing on the results. *Ibid.*, p. 837, table 1.

²⁰Do. Cf. especially p. 839 of this same chapter which reads, in part, "in each class of the white population, and also among the Negroes, the number of widows is more than twice as large as the number of widowers; . . . and in both white and negro there is a considerable excess of divorced women over divorced men."

²¹Census publication, *Marriage and Divorce, 1932*, p. 33.

²²1930 Census, Volume II, chap. 11, p. 838, table 3.

ever, disprove the assumption that an increase in the number of divorced and widowed women would result in a greater expense to their cities for the administration of criminal justice. In fact, the trend of the whole table points to an almost exact reversal of this assumption, for the cost decreases, with but one exception in the very last group, from the smallest percentage of widowed and divorced women to the very largest. The samples in every case are over 20 in number.

9. Illiteracy

The factor of illiteracy²³ is compared in the next table with the per capita cost of municipal criminal justice.

TABLE 8.

MEAN PER CAPITA COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ACCORDING TO PERCENTAGE OF ILLITERACY IN THE POPULATION 10 YEARS OLD AND OVER.

<i>Percentage</i>	<i>"A" Cities</i>	<i>"B" Cities</i>	<i>Total</i>
0.2-1.9	\$3.44	\$2.94	\$3.15
2.0-3.9	4.24	3.60	3.86
4.0-5.9	4.26	4.38	4.16
6.0-7.9	4.09	3.52	3.67
8.0 and Over.....	4.45	3.54	3.67

Those reports which make up the "A" class here again show a higher mean per capita cost of crime than do those reports in the "B" class, with the exception of the group, 4.0-5.9, which shows a decrease of twelve cents. Interestingly enough, this decrease in the "A" class and the high point of \$4.16 for the "Total" reports is found in the same group as that which contains the average figure of illiteracy for the whole country, which is 4.3%.²⁴ Nor is this due to a paucity of samples in this group, which contains forty-nine cities. Looking only at the two extremes of the table, there is apparent a definite increase in the cost of crime as the percentage of illiteracy increases, but there are too many variations between these two extremes to make the finding absolute.

10. Volume of Crime

Of all the factors which have been compared so far with the per capita cost of the administration of criminal justice, none is so important as the factor next to be considered: the volume of crime.²⁵

²³Ibid, chap. 13, pp. 1217-1343.

²⁴Ibid, p. 1219, table 1.

²⁵Figures taken from Part VI, Appendix G, pp. 644-655.

If the volume of crime statistics had been accurately compiled, which is doubtful, in the light of Professor Warner's discussion in an earlier volume of the Wickersham Report,²⁶ there should be a definite trend traceable between an increase in the number of crimes known to the police and the cost of the municipal administration of criminal justice. Before this comparison is made, let us turn to the following table which considers the number of Part I offenses²⁷ known to the police according to population groups.

TABLE 9.
VOLUME OF CRIME BY POPULATION.

Population Group	Average			Total
	Number of Offenses per 100 Inhabitants	Known	Unknown	
Over 500,000	1.47	8	5	13
250,000-500,000	1.98	17	7	24
100,000-250,000	1.76	36	11	47
50,000-100,000	1.40	59	22	81
25,000-,50,000	1.26	74	33	107
Total	1.32 ¹	194	78	272

¹ Median of offenses per 100 population. The median is used here instead of the mean, because its standard deviation is lower.

Despite the many criticisms that may be directed at the validity of these statistics, the rise in the volume of crime closely parallels an increase in population which shows that they are not entirely valueless. The one exception to this conclusion, found in the group of cities over 500,000 is not so strong, when it is noted that five of the thirteen cities of this class supply no figures, and that they include the first, second, fifth, tenth, and eleventh cities in size for the whole country.²⁸

The cost of criminal justice figures show a similar rise with the rise in population group,²⁹ and therefore the two factors of cost of crime and volume of crime may be deemed of almost equal validity for comparison in the following table.

²⁶Volume 3, particularly pp. 32-52.

²⁷These include "1) Homicide, divided into, a) murder and non-negligent manslaughter, and b) manslaughter by negligence; 2) rape; 3) robbery; 4) aggravated assaults; 5) burglary; 6) larceny (other than auto theft), divided into, a) larceny of property valued at \$50 and over, and b) larceny of property valued at less than \$50; and 7) auto theft." Part VI, p. 344.

²⁸These cities are New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Pittsburgh, respectively.

²⁹Cf. table 2, supra.

TABLE 10.
MEAN PER CAPITA COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ACCORDING
TO VOLUME OF CRIME.

<i>Number of Offenses per 100 Population</i>	<i>"A" Cities</i>		<i>"B" Cities</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Average Cost</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Average Cost</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Average Cost</i>	<i>Number</i>
.10-.49	\$3.68	13	\$3.85	13	\$3.77	26
.50-.99	4.28	13	3.43	31	3.68	44
1.00-1.49	3.53	17	3.49	27	3.50	44
1.50-1.99	5.14	7	3.99	14	4.36	21
2.00-2.49	3.57	13	3.29	22	3.39	35
2.50-4.47	3.95	8	3.25	16	3.49	24
Known	3.94	71	3.50	123	3.65	194
Unknown	3.83	25	3.52	53	3.64	78
Total	\$3.90	96	\$3.51	176	\$3.65	272

Considering first the difference in results between the "A" and "B" cities, it is noted that in all cases but that included in the group from .10-.49, the more accurately compiled reports show a higher average cost of criminal justice than do those less carefully compiled. This is the trend that is shown throughout the preceding tables—that when not considered in their total average the "A" reports do not show a consistently higher mean than the "B" reports for each separate classification.

A consideration of the total results shows no conclusive influence of the volume of crime upon the setting of the cost of it. In the cities that report from .10-.49 offenses per hundred population, the per capita costs is \$3.77, whereas those cities at the top of the scale with a reported number of offenses per hundred population as high as 2.5-4.47 have the smaller per capita bill of \$3.49 to pay. There is another conclusion that may perhaps be drawn from this table, namely, that the higher cost of the administration of criminal justice effectively serves either to deter or to prevent the occurrence of criminal offenses. But this table can serve but to point out possible trends, not to prove cause and effect in a situation as complex as this.

11. *Form of Government*

If the police and other crime-preventing agencies in our cities were to base their budgets on the amount of work to be done, and the amount of work they were doing, the above table might then be taken as a rough indicant that the more money spent on the five

branches of criminal administration, the less number of offenses is known to the police. But so long as the manner of compiling these police statistics gives rise to the suspicion that the police are not so wary in their detecting nor so honest in their presentation of results as they might be, their statistics must be used with a great deal of caution.

The 239 cities studied report 13 different forms of city government.³⁰ Yet despite their diversity of names and titles they really subsume but three main types—according to the manner of selection and power of the executive head. Thus the three types of city government are mainly: mayor-council, commission, and manager. A brief note on each of these three: the first is the longest in existence in this country, a direct outgrowth of that period in American municipal history when the Federal form of tri-partite management was imitated in the smaller units of local government. Under this system the mayor is elected by popular vote, and has general supervision of the city, makes recommendations to the council, and has veto power over their acts. The council is elected by wards or on a general ticket, and its duties comprise legislation, ordinance making, the granting of appropriations and the levying of taxes. Under this system, the appropriating and spending of funds are in separate hands, which assuredly does not make for either economy or planned expenditures.³¹ Under the commission form, first started in 1900, the concentration of both legislative and administrative power is invested in the same body, made up of five commissioners—severally the heads of five separate departments, collectively exercising complete legislative and executive authority. This plan substitutes harmony for the deadlock often witnessed between mayor and council.³² Under the city manager plan, all the administrative functions of the city are placed in the hands of a trained “career” municipal expert, appointed by the commission, and responsible to it. The commissioners, in turn, are elected directly by the people. This most recent and most popular experiment in municipal government emphasizes the expert professional element as opposed to the political in administration.³³

³⁰These are: Commission; commission-mayor; mayor-council; mayor-board of supervisors; mayor-aldermen; mayor-council-aldermen; mayor-manager-council; council-commission-manager; council-manager; city manager; burgess-council; president-trustees; commission-manager.

³¹Bates, *Forms of City Government*, Indianapolis, 1916, p. 18.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 10 and 11.

³³*Ibid.*, pp. 13 and 14.

Before turning to a consideration of the possible effects of the form of city government on the cost of the administration of criminal justice, it might be well to look at the following table to note first the size of city population which may favor one or another of these three forms.

TABLE 11.

FORM OF CITY GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO POPULATION.

<i>Population Group</i>	<i>Form of Government</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>Mayor-Council</i>	<i>Commission</i>	<i>Manager</i>	
25,000-50,000	22.6%	11.2%	5.5%	39.3%
50,000-100,000	10.8	14.6	4.6	30.0
100,000-250,000	8.8	5.1	3.4	17.3
250,000-500,000	2.5	4.2	2.1	8.8
Over 500,000	4.6	0.0	0.0	4.6
Total	49.3%	35.1%	15.6%	100.0%

We note that of the 239 cities out of the 272 complete reports which give their local form of government, one-half live under some form of mayor-council control, the remaining half being divided into two-thirds commission form, and one-third manager. Therefore in the table about to be considered these weights will have to be kept in mind. The cities of the smallest group still largely retain the mayor-council form; the commission form leads in the cities of from 50,000 to 100,000, as also in the cities from 250,000 to 500,000, while the mayor-council form is found in most of the cities from 100,000 to 250,000, and still rules the eleven largest reporting cities without interference from either of the other two newer forms of municipal government. In none of the population groups is the most recent experiment—the manager expert—found to lead. The reason for these differences in governmental form may be found perhaps in the recency of the two experiments, as well as in the structure of state constitutions which may prevent the easy shifting from an older to a newer type. But the concern of the following table will be not in the likely reasons for these differences but in their possible effects on the municipal cost of criminal justice.

TABLE 12.

MEAN PER CAPITA COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACCORDING TO FORM OF CITY GOVERNMENT.

<i>Form</i>	<i>"A" Cities</i>		<i>"B" Cities</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Average Cost</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Average Cost</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Average Cost</i>	<i>Number</i>
Mayor Council	\$4.21	54	\$3.68	67	\$3.92	121
Commission	3.46	27	3.50	53	3.49	80
Manager	3.59	13	3.26	25	3.38	38
Unknown	3.73	2	3.43	31	3.45	33
Total	\$3.90	96	\$3.51	176	\$3.65	272

A consideration of the "A" and "B" cities points out an interesting fact that touches on the completeness and care with which the reporters followed the directions of the editors of Part VI in supplying the information wanted.³⁴ In only two cases, or 2.1%, of the "A" reports was the requested information omitted, while thirty-one or 17.6%, of the "B" reports failed to heed this instruction. A further comparison of the "A" and "B" reports shows again that the mean of the former exceeds the mean of the latter in their per capita costs, except in the commission group.

The general conclusion to be drawn from the "Total" column is that as the control of government gets into the hands of a smaller and more expert group, freer from political influence than the unwieldy mayor-council form, trained in the scientific technique of handling municipal problems and funds without so great a pressure from their constituencies, the cost of the administration of criminal justice drops perceptibly. Here a warning from the previous table must be inserted, that the eleven largest cities in the country are under the mayor-council form, while the two groups of cities of 50,000 to 100,000 and 250,000 to 500,000 are chiefly guided by commissions. This is compensated somewhat by the further fact that the mayor-council form leads in the smallest cities studied as well as in the largest, and that it is also found more often in the group of cities from 100,000 to 250,000 than either of the two other forms. An additional finding from the previous table that aids in the establishment of the general conclusion noted above is that the manager form, found in only 15.6% of all the cities reporting, has more than a third of its numbers in the group from 25,000 to 50,000.

³⁴Cf. Part VI, Manual of Instruction, p. 522.

12. Summary

The general conclusions that follow will be given in the order in which they have been developed above.

Verification: The studies more accurately compiled and reported show a higher mean per capita cost than those less carefully done. Extremes—\$3.51 and \$3.90.

Geographic Location: The highest cost is found along the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard, and decreases for the area lying between. Extremes—\$2.72 and \$4.49.

Population: There is a definite and consistent rise in cost from the cities of twenty-five thousand population to those over one million. Extremes—\$3.02 and \$6.70.

Foreign Parentage: The cost increases, roughly, with the increase in the percentage of native born children of foreign parentage. This may be a matter of large-city concentration. Extremes—\$3.12 and \$4.46.

Citizenship: There is an unmistakable decrease in cost with an increase in the percentage of naturalized foreign born men who have reached their majority. Extremes—\$2.66 and \$4.44.

Age: Some slight evidence is afforded for the belief that as the percentage of individuals between the ages of 15 and 24 increases, the cost also increases. Extremes—\$3.11 and \$3.79.

Widowed and Divorced: There is no evidence at all that the cost increases with an increase in the percentage of widowed and divorced women over 15. In fact, this a priori assumption is reversed. Extremes—\$3.90 and \$4.07.

Illiteracy: There is some evidence that with the increase in literacy the cost declines. Extremes—\$3.15 and \$3.67.

Volume of Crime: Despite the fact that the much criticized statistics for volume of serious criminal offenses known to the police show a fairly definite increase with a corresponding increase in population as do the cost figures, nevertheless no inter-relation between the two sets of statistics is demonstrated. Extremes—\$3.49 and \$3.97.

Form of Government: The cost is highest in the cities which are under mayor-council rule, lower under a commission form, and lowest under the city-manager type of government. Extremes—\$3.45 and \$3.92.