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A DETERMINISTIC VIEW OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

WILLARD WALLER¹

Science is detached, and not evaluative. It seeks to isolate and describe causative mechanisms, not to praise or blame them. Its purpose is to attain control, practical or intellectual, of a set of phenomena, and not to establish any particular doctrines concerning those phenomena.

Because the assumption that causative mechanisms are operative in a field of phenomena is the *sine qua non* of research in that field, the extension of the scientific method has often been opposed by adherents of the current demonology wishing to preserve for their favorite spirits their full prerogative. Now that the existence of man's interior demon, last and dearest of his tribe, his free will, is questioned by those who wish to apply the scientific method to the study of human behavior, controversy not unexpectedly becomes rife.

On the question of free will two points of view emerge clearly, the deterministic and the libertarian. The determinists believe that the actions of human beings are caused, and that scientific study of man's behavior will show the laws to which it conforms. Deterministic study reveals the regularities of human actions. The libertarians believe that all or a part of the actions of human beings are outside the sphere of operation of causation. This view emphasizes the uniqueness of human experience, its never-recurring quality, the separateness of our subjective lives. Since there are few thorough-going believers in free will in this generation, the camp of the libertarians is occupied mainly by those who have worked out some sort of compromise between the principles of liberty and causation.

The determinists are recruited in the main from the social scientists, sociologists, criminologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, economists, political scientists, scientific philosophers, and others whose professional habit or natural bent inclines them to apply the scientific method in their thought about mankind. The determinists proceed about their work of collecting, classifying, and interpreting facts about human beings, while the world continues to be administered, for the

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most part, by the libertarians. But soon or late social practice must come to grips with social theory.

Argument between people living in radically different universes of discourse is often futile simply because the persons engaged in the dispute do not understand each other's points of view sufficiently to limit the conflict to the fundamental issues. The basic presuppositions and the main lines of the argument on each side may then profitably be restated again and again.

The present paper has particular reference to Mr. C. O. Weber's essay, *Pseudo-Science and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility*,² which was published in a recent number of the Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. Mr. Weber's essay is a closely reasoned and at times brilliant attack upon the doctrine of determinism as it is applied in the more recent criminological literature, but it is by no means unanswerable, and the present writer feels that it will be worth while to reexamine the concept of determinism in the light of Mr. Weber's contentions. Mr. Weber's arguments are selected not because they are bad, but because they are good, and because it is hoped that if they can be satisfactorily met, or comprehendingly taken into account in a theory which is nevertheless deterministic, the case of libertarianism will fall more flatly to the ground.

In the article under discussion Mr. Weber proposes "to defend the traditional attitude toward offenders, and thus accord to the new view that which new views always require, namely, criticism." He proposes to drive the new criminology "from its so-called factual strongholds and to exhibit it in its true colors as a blind philosophical faith in the threadbare cause of fatalism." He calls into question the alleged historical failure of punitive justice; and casts some doubt upon the psychological and psychiatric explanations of crime, supporting with statistical evidence his claim that mental deficiency is not a cause of crime. As evidences of the fact of free will, he adduces "the private experiences of *choice* and *effort*," of which we become aware by introspection. Mr. Weber's stand for a qualified libertarianism may perhaps be made clear by the following quotation:

"Then, however great the measurable factors of delinquency may be, no matter how mentally deficient, and poorly nurtured, and 'complex ridden' an offender may be, there is always a remaining factor in conduct, however small, for which we do not make excuses. For every evil deed, we

²C. O. Weber, "*Pseudo-Science and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility*," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Pt. 1, pp. 181-195 (Aug., 1928).

should allow for all extenuating circumstances, but their sum total can never quite be the sum total of human nature. For, by definition, a thing which is 100 per cent mechanical is a pure mechanism—it is not living at all. The problem in every criminal trial is to decide the enigma; were the precipitating factors too strong, or was the will to blame? To find the will 'weak' because the offense was committed is to miss the whole problem of justice. If scientific justice involved no more than the tabulation of the factors that *were* present during the crime, then we might well assent to the statement of a certain drunkard, who pleaded that since the liquor was beyond his throat, it was foolish to blame him for being 'drunk.'"

In skeleton form Mr. Weber's argument seems to be about as follows:

1. The deterministic system of thought, based as it is upon the underlying hypothesis of determinism, starts with a bare assumption.
2. By appeal to the facts we discover:
 - a. That certain facts which are advanced by the determinists as proof of their beliefs are not such, and
 - b. That certain manifestations of the human personality, i. e., *choice* and *effort*, seem to be outside the sphere of causal laws.
3. From the above we may derive a defence of the present system of criminal justice.

The uncertainty and relativity of human knowledge seem to be among the most certain and absolute things we know. Our thinking tends to be orientated by and arranged in idea systems. Each such system consists of a complex mass of inter-related beliefs, logical demonstrations, and practices, of which each part is true with reference to the others, and each part in turn buttresses all the others. An idea system is likely to have a particular set of facts upon which it is based, rules by which the appeal to the facts must be carried out, and a method of abstracting from the facts the aspects considered significant. Knowledge may thus be thought of as a free-floating island of mutually conditioning facts and beliefs, of which each part supports and is in turn supported by all the rest, but whose totality is no more true than the totality of matter is heavy.⁸

The idea system of the criminal law could be, and for some people is, such a closed system. It is based upon the notion that the will of man is free. The related concepts of retributive justice, guilt, degrees of guilt, responsibility, and punishment, and the elaborate justifications for all these, acquire, for one whose intellectual life is within this universe of discourse, the solidity and convincingness of verifiable fact. There is no point in arguing with a person who be-

⁸See Spykman, Nicholas, "*The Social Theory of Georg Simmel.*"

believes that the will of man is always free, or with one for whom the idea system of the law is in fact a closed system. The thorough-paced libertarian refuses to grant the fundamental postulates of science, and the scientist denies the validity of the principles from which the libertarian starts. There discussion ceases.

There are, however, in point of fact, but few who hold to the freedom of the will in its logical completeness. Those who now take that side of the argument prefer to say that the will is partly free, or that it is sometimes free, preserving for man some of his original prerogative, but admitting partial determinism. They have sacrificed logical impregnability for the sake of conformity to the facts of modern science, and their peculiarly exposed position renders them liable to attack from either side. Their idea system is not in fact a free-floating island of mutually consistent beliefs, but a hodge-podge, a melange, a collection of ill-assorted notions which are given coherency by wishful thinking. The libertarians could be safe from attack if they could give up their yearning for scientific truth, but once they resort to the scientific method of the appeal to the facts of the objective world, they admit the validity of the presuppositions of science, and they are lost in a labyrinth of inconsistency.

Mr. Weber belongs indeed to the unfortunate group of modified libertarians. Admitting the validity of the scientific method, he nevertheless wishes to preserve the notions of the older metaphysics. This leads him into inconsistency from which he is put to great pains to extricate himself even to his own satisfaction. His statement of the criteria of knowledge, for instance, is as follows:

"All thinking, including the scientific mode, is under two necessities, and one of these is logically prior to the other. (1) Our knowledge ought to be based on a set of mutually consistent principles, and (2) our knowledge must be true to the realities with which they deal. The last named necessity is the logically fundamental one."

It will be seen below that Mr. Weber has violated both these cherished principles.

Quite different is the case with the criminological idea system founded upon the deterministic postulate, for it is in fact a free-floating island of mutually consistent beliefs and practices which buttress each other. The concepts of retributive justice, guilt, and punishment, even that of justice, have here no place. The deterministic criminologist can only base his actions upon predictions of behavior arrived at from a study of the offender in his relations to other persons. The deterministic idea system cannot claim a greater absolute validity than

the older metaphysical one. Its only advantage is its greater utility, which derives from the fact that only science can give intellectual or practical control. Scientific determinism is justified by works; metaphysical libertarianism by faith. No argument between the two is possible; one must simply accept the one or the other. But argument between the scientific determinist and the modified libertarian is possible.

Those approaching the problem of criminal responsibility from the conventional standpoint have often had the better of it in the past, possibly because their training in the subtleties of the law gave them a greater dexterity in the manipulation of their set of concepts than their opponents had been able to attain, and because science, by insisting on facts, figures, and formulae, tends to reduce the verbal facility of its devotees. No doubt the controversial power of the lawyers accounts in part for the stubborn resistance which the law has made to all efforts to change it. But the disadvantage of those who speak in defence of the conventional idea system is that they cannot be consistent, because the law has had to accept piece-meal the results of deterministic investigation, and because no one, in the modern world, can fail occasionally to apply deterministic principles in the interpretation of his own conduct or that of others. The determinist, though he does not stand against the background of hoary institutions, though he is not buttressed by a system of moral, religious, and legal philosophy, and is not equipped with a set of ready rationalizations which have met the test of time and never failed to be useful, can at least be wholly consistent.

Determinism, as it takes its place in modern social thought, might be said to be:

(1) A useful supposition which allows scientific truth to be found out, a heuristic principle.

(2) A logical inference from (a) the preponderance of evidence in favor of universal causation, and (b) the rapidly accumulating evidence from psychology, psychiatry, and the social sciences that human behavior is caused.

(3) A principle at the basis of much of our modern social practice, underlying, indeed a large part of the moral structure.

1. As a heuristic principle, determinism lies at the basis of all scientific discovery. One can be scientific only in so far as he is willing to suppose that causation extends. We come here, of course, to a bare assumption, but it is the assumption which makes scientific thought possible. It can only be justified by its results.

2. (a) Determinism in human affairs is a logical inference from the preponderating evidence in favor of universal determinism. Even those who advocate libertarianism in human affairs reject supernaturalism in the interpretation of all the other phenomena of the universe. One by one these phenomena, from the majestic movements of the planets to the motions of the infinitesimal electrons, have been shown to be causally determined. It is strange, indeed, when we have very good reason to believe that the remainder of the universe is determined, to suppose that the behavior of one tiny animal upon an insignificant planet is outside the range of causal laws.

(b) While the causation of human actions can perhaps never be absolutely proved, the rapid accumulation of evidence pointing toward it in psychology, psychiatry, and sociology indicates that it may soon be made to seem one of the most probable things in the world.

3. The notion of determinism underlies much of our ordinary social life. Even where freedom of action is thought to prevail, the assumption that the manner in which that freedom is to be exercised can be predicted is frequently made, and this is of the essence of scientific and deterministic interpretation. The most thorough-going advocate of free will cannot avoid basing his action, many times in the course of the most uneventful day, upon the belief that the behavior of his fellow human beings can be predicted; he would have to become a complete anchorite to avoid dependence upon his own forecasts of what others will do. He believes that his meals will be prepared in a certain way, that his tailor will make his suit of clothes according to the specifications, that a certain person can be depended upon, or cannot be depended upon, to pay his debts. He might insist, of course, upon the spontaneity of all these actions, but a spontaneity that is predictably exercised is no spontaneity, but a caused action. Science attempts to isolate and describe certain regularities in human behavior, and any attempt to predict future behavior on the basis of past is in its inmost nature deterministic. It may readily be seen that no society could exist in which every individual in every so-called choice of the day made up his mind afresh. In that sense at least, causation is the basis of the moral order.

Let us turn now to the criticism in detail of the statements in Mr. Weber's article, not because of any special animus toward it, but because the fallacies and inconsistencies it contains may be typical of the libertarian point of view.

Mr. Weber's statement of the basis upon which certain authors are alleged to rest their determinism is as follow: "They rest their

determinism on two classes of alleged fact: (1) historical evidence of the failure of the jury system and its punitive justice, and (2) proof from the twin sciences of psychology and psychiatry that criminal conduct is indeed subject to prediction and determinate law. Yet (3) while claiming to eschew philosophy, these writers show everywhere their reliance, not on the facts of science alone, but on its theoretical assumptions." Now it requires only an elementary degree of discrimination to see that the failure of the jury system and its punitive justice has strictly nothing to do with the doctrine that the actions of human beings may be described and predicted in accordance with causal laws. It happens that the failure of the system of procedure based upon the concept of criminal responsibility constitutes another count in the indictment of the present sort of criminal procedure, but determinists do not cite it as a proof of determinism. It is connected with determinism only in being an attack upon the present system. Mr. Weber's second basis of determinism includes proof from the sciences of psychology and psychiatry that human conduct is indeed subject to prediction and law. He omits to mention proof from strictly sociological studies, an omission which causes much of his later reasoning to be, for the sociologist, beside the point. The third point, that deterministic theorists rely upon the theoretical assumptions as well as upon the facts of science, may well be admitted.

It has already been shown that the attempted refutation of charges made against the present system of procedure proves nothing concerning the doctrine of determinism. But it is very interesting that in making this refutation Mr. Weber reasons deterministically. (It is not intended to accuse this writer of falling into unconscious inconsistency, but merely to show that he proves a bit too much.) He says, "Whether or not the infliction of punishment will deter from crime is answerable in only two ways—psychologically and statistically. If Wines could show, as a matter of actual record, that the frequency or the severity of crime is unrelated to the frequency or severity of punishment, then little could remain to be said in favor of punishment." Mr. Weber here subscribes to good deterministic reasoning, he says, in effect, that the question of the deterrent effect of punishment can only be answered by deterministic investigation. Granting that his argument applies to the doctrine of determinism, it would seem that Mr. Weber has put himself in the psalmist's dilemma. He makes use of the deterministic method to prove that determinism is unsound. If he proves his point, he makes his own demonstration invalid, and nullifies the effect of his onslaught upon the doctrine. The

devout libertarian should not use the deterministic hypothesis in proving his doctrine of free will. The weakness of the present day opponents of determinism lies in their inconsistencies. They cannot stand consistently without the pale of scientific method, but must, by their use of scientific method and materials, admit their validity and utility. This lack of consistency makes ineffectual their Jesuitical reasonings.

Mr. Weber then makes an onslaught upon the second basis of determinism, evidence from psychology and psychiatry. The elaborate demonstration that one can be guilty of socially abnormal or undesirable conduct without mental defect or disorder would be granted at once by those who are accustomed to approach the problem of the causation of crime from the point of view of sociology. Mr. Weber, in proving that feeble-mindedness is not a cause of crime, is not driving the new criminology from its factual strongholds, but bombarding, with great noise and furore, a position that has not been occupied for at least half a decade. What Mr. Weber succeeds in showing is that the concepts of individual psychology are not adequate for explaining phenomena which are peculiarly the results of group life. Mr. Weber's argument seems to indicate that he is totally unfamiliar with the work of Burgess, Thomas, Thrasher, and other investigators who have applied the sociological technique to the investigation of the crime problem. At no point does he show a willingness to deal with, or any knowledge of, determinism on the social level.

Let us admit at once the truth of Mr. Weber's charge that the deterministic system of thought is based after all upon certain theoretical assumptions. Let us not dwell upon the seeming unfamiliarity with the theory of knowledge, with that body of thought which discusses how we can ever know anything at all, which is displayed by a man who makes such a charge a count in the indictment of the deterministic mode of thinking, but let us proceed at once to a counter-attack. We have already shown that liberatarianism and determinism differ fundamentally in that they are based upon radically different underlying assumptions. It is proposed to show now that the deterministic assumption is more tenable and that the deterministic mode of thought is more useful.

Libertarians of the present day are unwilling to take the logically extreme position which would render them impregnable from attack, but insist upon occupying an unsound middle position. They are partly scientific, and partly vitalistic. The one element vitiates the other and the net effect of both is a nullity. Being partly scientific, they

must reason deterministically in a large part of their lives. They may even, as does Mr. Weber, use deterministic reasoning in their attack upon the deterministic mode of thought. The simple fact is that the habit of scientific explanation is so deeply ingrained in the modern mind that no one can dispense with it. So much the worse for the libertarians, for by their use of deterministic reasoning they admit the validity of its presuppositions and demonstrate anew the utility of its operations.

But how can one harbor both determinism and libertarianism in the same mind? The existence of one iota of spontaneity destroys the utility of deterministic study, for, if it is a true spontaneity that is involved, one can never know when or where or how often or how strongly or in what manner it will assert itself, and will be at sea in a complete unpredictability. No law and no causative principle can have any validity, because one can never tell when this uncaused spontaneity will enter to upset the calculations. Nor does free will resist any better the corrupting influence of determinism. For if one admits partial determinism, he begins to set metes and bounds upon the operation of spontaneity, to predict where it is and where it is not likely to show itself, to reduce it, in a word, to scientific law. But then it ceases to be really free. When one attempts to believe in both determinism and free will, he finds himself, then, unable to believe even a little in either one. Determinism and libertarianism are horses that start from different places and go in different directions, and the philosophers, for all their circus tricks, cannot ride them both at the same time.

What really happens is this: that so far as we are able to understand human behavior, we know it to have a deterministic basis, but that where we do not understand, some of us prefer to say that free will is operative. Free will is thus a doctrine of ignorance, a metaphysics based frankly upon what we do not know, and squints toward obscurantism. It is not based upon proved errors or failures of determinism, but upon its lacunae.

But we have here no mere theoretical discussion, no mere problem of esoteric doctrine, but a very important problem of social practice as well, for the dualism in Mr. Weber's thinking is paralleled by the dualism in our theory and practice of punishment. As this dualism, involving, as it does, a large measure of inconsistency, vitiates the compelling force of his logic, so the attempt to attain opposed and inconsistent ends by punishment robs the law of its effectiveness. Mr. Weber admits a degree of determinism, and would consider desirable

no doubt a certain amount of reformatory and preventive treatment. This is paralleled by the preventive and reformatory efforts of our criminal procedure. But Mr. Weber thinks that there is a certain amount of free will, and he would therefore have the criminals, to some extent, punished. He says, "To the degree that we understand, let us forgive." The inference is plain and we may remedy the ellipsis by saying, "but as far as we do not understand, let us punish." This is paralleled too by our legal practice. And it is the attempt of the law to obtain these irreconcilable objectives which frustrates it.

As the undoing of the libertarians is their inconsistency so the merit of deterministic thought may be its consistency with itself and with the facts. Let us see what would be the elements of a completely deterministic system of dealing with crime.

From the deterministic point of view, the concepts of guilt, degrees of guilt, retributive justice, punishment, and responsibility become meaningless. Those who do not understand often claim that this means that the determinist would do nothing at all about crime. A more obvious *non sequitur* could hardly be imagined. It might well be that many features of the present practice, continued through the ages ostensibly for their deterrent effect, but really because of the power of custom, would be found to be useless if the deterministic point of view were accepted. But, far from rendering the law nugatory in its effect, a scientific attitude toward crime and criminals would render the law consistent and effective.

Granting that punishment as at present understood could not persist if responsibility were removed and retribution were no longer accepted as an end of justice, it does not follow that nothing would be done to the criminal. For the only rational aim of the law, the protection of society, would be left untouched, and we should be able, by more exclusive and intelligent devotion to it, to come much nearer to realizing it than we do at present. The question continually before the court would then be, not, "Was this man responsible for his actions?" but "What, for the protection of society, should we do with him?" It seems to be the conclusion of many recent studies that punishment, through the stigma that it attaches to the person, through the hate that it arouses toward society, through the bad associations that it causes people to form, and through its tendency to develop, in conflict, such groups as gangs, aggravates the problem of crime. In our penal institutions, the attempt to combine punitive with reformatory methods results in the complete failure at least of the attempts to reform; he who runs may read the statistics of recidivism and be con-

vinced. If we view the criminal deterministically we can hope for greater success.

That there are many offenders who are so thoroughly oriented in the criminal way of life that they are beyond the reach of any reformatory methods now at our command we may admit at once, but we will be much more easily able to isolate these and to treat them as such if we study them deterministically than if we think about them in any other way. Further, if dangerousness to society rather than the commission of specific acts which must be expiated be made the criterion by which we shall judge men, we may be able to remove from society many dangerous criminals before they have committed the worst crimes of which they are capable. In what a different situation is the libertarian! If a man says that he has reformed, that he will go and sin no more, he must take his word for it, and hold him only the requisite time for which his acts have made him liable, at the end of which he must be returned to society, even though all believe that he is returning more dangerous than he was before. Our free-will law must pass upon the turpitude of specific acts, which must perforce be considered out of their setting, must decide upon the exact degree of guilt of the offender, must subject him to a set and predetermined punishment proportioned to the magnitude of his offence and the degree of his guilt, and must then return him to society. It is in this last necessity that the rub comes, for inductive study of our penal institutions seems to show that people nearly always come out of them worse than they went in.

There are those who grant the truth of these arguments as applied to the offender but insist that they are overbalanced by the fact that if punishment were discarded its deterrent effect would be lost, and the social structure would at once crumble, since all the persons who had previously been restrained from the commission of divers crimes by the thought of the punishments likely to be attached thereto would rush at once to commit them. Overlooking the fact that most of us are kept in line by the informal rather than the formal machinery of social control, i. e., by the approval and disapproval of our fellows rather than by the fear of the law, and not emphasizing the very doubtful character of deterrence, we may reply to this argument that deterministic treatment of criminals might not in most cases be more pleasant for the criminal than the present treatment, and that it would in many cases be much more unpleasant. Treatment would be less to the liking of the criminal, for instance, in the case of those persons who are known to be dangerous because of their philos-

ophy and mode of life but with whom we can only deal under the present system after they have been convicted of a major crime. There is no reason to think that, if deterrence really occurs, it might not be almost as well attained by a completely deterministic legal system. (Nor is it impossible that the satisfaction of vindictive feelings, regarded by some as a primary function of our present system, would be attained also as a by-product of deterministic justice, even though it were not concerned with them.)

The phenomena of *choice* and *effort* constitute, for Mr. Weber, the positive proofs of freedom. We become aware of these through direct introspection. This is the old argument that we are free because we seem to be free; that we are self-directing because we think we are so. In both choice and effort we have the sense of freedom and are sometimes painfully aware of the participation of the ego. Choice and effort are directed, often enough, at the realization of goals outside one's self. How, then, are they not free?

Different psychologies give somewhat different interpretations of these phenomena, but all would agree in giving them an essentially rationalistic interpretation. Choice to most psychologists is simply the process of reconciling conflicting impulses, and this would seem to remain true whether we think of it subjectively as the formation of a new configuration or whether we regard it more objectively as a performance whose novelty differentiates it from habit.

The fact that the causes of behavior are often not accessible to consciousness accounts for the feeling of freedom. The fact that we assimilate our experiences in such a manner that they continue to influence us throughout life, that all the persons that we have ever seen and all the things that we have ever experienced speak in our every act,—this accounts for the seeming freedom of the developed personality. The thirty year old seems to be free because he is still reacting to his three year old experiences; the very rigor of his bondage makes him feel that he is free.

But Mr. Weber objects to having the reality of choice and effort analyzed away. Let us grant his request, and treat these phenomena as if they were what they seem to be, solid facts of the objective world.

A certain young man goes to college, passing by other vocational opportunities, postponing matrimony, abjuring the world outside. He rises at four in the morning and handles express for four hours. He goes to classes in the morning, and in the afternoon handles express again. He studies until eleven or twelve at night. Somehow he finds time for extra curricular activities—of the more serious sort. He

has no time for pleasure, or recreation, or exercise; he spends no money foolishly. He keeps at that regimen year after year, and finally completes his course. The case is not uncommon.

That is effort, and choice. Solid-seeming facts, are they not? In truth, too solid in appearance and in fact to issue from nothing at all. Mr. Weber would have us think that these things have no cause. that they are the result of some mysterious and inexplicable inner principle. How? He cannot say. He can only assure us that the maxim, "Like produces like," is not true.

Let us look at our young college student again. He is the son of a poor farmer in the back country. From his earliest days he has known only hard work, poverty, and debt. His parents—kind, industrious parents—harassed by economic insecurity and worn out with their laborious years, have thought to save their son from sharing their lot in life by encouraging him to get the education that they have missed, for they believed, as many such, that it was this magic of learning that made the difference in people's lives. His teachers have told him that his salvation lies in his getting a college training. There is also the religious urge toward enlightenment, and that general idealization of the educated man so common in communities where educational facilities are few. The young man is motivated by an intense desire to lift himself from the mire in which his life began.

How obvious the explanation seems! Can we any longer think of this young man's choice and effort as causeless? Are not the causes so patent and writ so large that even the obscurantist must see them? How can we now avoid the deterministic belief that, given the same concatenation of factors, the same complex inner and outer situation, a like result would ensue?

Granting the reality of choice and effort, even granting that they are not further analyzable, we must point out that they are directed toward something outside one's self, and that that goal of effort is determined by the group. People choose something, they make an effort for something, something right, something beautiful, something proper, something good. And what that something is, is determined by the group in which these people have their being. No one, since Sumner, can doubt that the mores can make anything right, or beautiful, or proper, or good. What? Can one imagine the followers of Aeneas directing their efforts toward achieving Christian ethics, or a girl regulating her conduct by the ideal of chastity among the Trobriand Islanders? Effort is no kingdom unto itself, for its goals are socially determined, and its nature, which must be accepted just as it

is, and its direction, which depends upon the ultimate and unquestioned values of the group, are both beyond the control of the individual. Nor does choice introduce anything new or uncaused, for choices,—choices, for example, of the goals of effort—are implicit in the culture pattern.

Neither determinism nor libertarianism, in the opinion of the present writer, can ever have more than a pragmatic justification. Nor will the last word ever be said on the subject, for probably there will always be those who emphasize the uniqueness of the individual's inner experience, and these tough-minded and extroverted persons who fasten their attention upon the regularities of human conduct. The present paper is therefore simply an attempt to show the relative superiority of determinism for (1) the understanding of the facts of human experience, even those brought forward as proofs of libertarianism, and (2) the control of human behavior.