THE CRYPTO QUANDARY: IS BANKRUPTCY READY?

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ABSTRACT—As the United States grapples with how best to manage a global pandemic, bankruptcy courts are bracing for the inevitable fallout from COVID-19. As we saw in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, hard-hit businesses will need to reorganize to adjust to new conditions, while out-of-work consumers will need debt relief options. But there will be a new twist for this impending wave of bankruptcies: how should bankruptcy courts deal with crypto assets like Bitcoin? This Essay argues that the rise of cryptocurrency investments over the last decade poses serious complications for the next round of consumer and business bankruptcies. Although legislative solutions may be necessary to adequately address these complications, at the very least, greater awareness of these issues will help ensure that courts and stakeholders are better prepared to address this looming crisis.

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INTRODUCTION

Though cryptocurrency is a relatively recent phenomenon, the academic literature is already replete with attempts to quantify the radical ways in which this new form of asset will uproot society.¹ Bankruptcy is one area that is beginning to bear out these predictions, as courts respond to new and complex questions relating to assets, liabilities, and contractual obligations involving cryptocurrencies.² Outside of the bankruptcy context,


regulators have endeavored to design frameworks to address this new form of asset. However, so far, bankruptcy courts have yet to forge a clear framework for dealing with crypto assets.

This Essay argues that a cogent and comprehensive approach to managing crypto assets in bankruptcy proceedings will be critical in the coming years as these assets will likely play an increasingly significant role in the bankruptcies of the future. The unique features of crypto assets also pose unique challenges for liquidations and reorganizations, including a heightened risk that debtors will use crypto holdings to shield assets from creditors; valuation problems that arise during liquidation or reorganization; the possibility that stakeholders may use bankruptcy opportunistically to exploit the value fluctuations in crypto-collateral; and questions about courts’ authority to issue and enforce binding decisions involving digital assets that defy traditional jurisdictional frameworks.


To avoid the suggestion that Bitcoin or other digital “currencies” resemble fiat currency, this Essay uses the terms “crypto assets,” “crypto holdings,” or “digital assets” instead of “cryptocurrency.”

See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Reliable Perfection of Security Interests in Crypto-Currency, 21 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 159, 159 (2018) (“[A]ll signs suggest that, in the years to come, investments in one or another form of crypto-currency will become more routine and more substantial.”).


For the purposes of this Essay, I am setting aside a fourth, overarching problem: the issue of in rem jurisdiction for crypto assets. Some have argued that in rem jurisdiction should be tied to the location of the server on which transactional data is stored. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 19 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1676 (2012) (arguing in the context of probate law that states lack jurisdiction over the disposition of online social media accounts unless the servers are located in-state). Others have suggested that new jurisdictional frameworks may be necessary for digital assets. See, e.g., Howard Seife, Cross-Border Professionals Respond to Chapter 15 Proposals, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2019, at 8 (“Given

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This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I explains why the undefined nature of crypto assets creates confusion and uncertainty for stakeholders in the bankruptcy process. Part II sketches out the unique features of crypto assets that pose the greatest challenges for bankruptcy and insolvency systems, highlighting cases where these features have already played a disruptive role. Part III concludes with a call to action, arguing that a laissez-faire attitude would be detrimental to the orderly development of the market for crypto assets, and possibly to the U.S. bankruptcy system as a whole.

I. WHAT IS A CRYPTO ASSET AND WHY DOES IT MATTER FOR BANKRUPTCY?

Debates surrounding the proper legal characterization of crypto assets like Bitcoin have been a boon for the legal academy, the source of a seemingly endless stream of articles, notes, and comments over the past decade. Rather than summarizing the useful histories of regulatory efforts at the local, federal, and international levels provided by other scholars, this Essay will merely note that existing regulatory efforts—while substantial—nonetheless fall short of answering a critical question: What is a crypto asset?

Meanwhile, bankruptcy courts have not even attempted to answer the question of what a crypto asset is. This Part argues that developing a clear answer to the question will be essential to the stakeholders in a bankruptcy that involves crypto assets. Not only does an answer give parties more clarity for the purposes of ex ante bargaining, but a definite framework would have the added benefit of making insolvency proceedings more efficient because recent technological advances and the ‘virtual’ nature of certain businesses, a company incorporated in an offshore jurisdiction may not have a physical place of operations or otherwise engage in traditional business activities in its place of incorporation, thereby creating certain challenges for recognition of offshore foreign proceedings.”).

9 See, e.g., Evan Hewitt, Bringing Continuity to Cryptocurrency: Commercial Law as a Guide to the Asset Categorization of Bitcoin, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 619 (2016) (surveying various federal and state approaches to regulation and proposing a new asset type: “electronic pseudo-currency”); Lemchuk, supra note 3, at 341–50 (surveying various approaches to domestic regulation and concluding that regulation as a commodity is most appropriate); Mandjee, supra note 3, at 182 (surveying domestic and international efforts to regulate Bitcoin); Mann, supra note 6, at 160–63 (discussing IRS, SEC, and Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) developments).

10 See, e.g., Mandjee, supra note 3, at 164–66 (describing the disagreements among regulators and courts about how to classify crypto assets such as Bitcoin); Mann, supra note 6, at 160–63 (explaining that crypto assets do not fit squarely into any existing framework and should therefore be considered “general intangibles” for the purposes of the UCC).
stakeholders would have more certainty about the outcome.\footnote{See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Osterman & Debra A. Dandeneau, Bankruptcy and Modern Technology Transactions: An Old Bottle for New Wine, 25 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 181, 197 (2016) ("[M]ismatches between bankruptcy law and current practices . . . divert time and attention during negotiation of deals, and all-to-often leave clients still uncertain as to the extent to which they will be protected in the future.").} Section I.A begins by giving a brief overview of the U.S. bankruptcy system in order to introduce some of the key stakeholders and procedural mechanisms discussed in this Essay. Section I.B then examines a bankruptcy case that identified but did not resolve several critical issues surrounding the nature of crypto assets. The Section concludes by arguing that the ongoing lack of clarity surrounding these issues suggests that legislative intervention may be necessary.

A. A Brief Overview of the U.S. Bankruptcy System

This Section briefly introduces some of the key concepts and stakeholders in the United States bankruptcy system, in order to provide nonspecialist readers with some context for the common issues likely to arise with crypto assets. There are four types of bankruptcy discussed in this Essay: Chapter 7 liquidations for consumers and businesses,\footnote{11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012) (eligibility for Chapter 7); id. §§ 701–27 (procedures specific to Chapter 7). Chapter 7 also prescribes more detailed procedures for a variety of specific types of liquidations, including stockbroker liquidation provisions, id. §§ 741–53, and commodity broker liquidation provisions, id. §§ 761–67. These subcategories of Chapter 7 might be implicated in a liquidation of a crypto exchange. However, as explained in Section I.B, the indeterminate nature of crypto assets creates challenges for predicting which, if any, of these procedures might apply in the event that a domestic crypto exchange files for bankruptcy.} Chapter 13 payment plans for consumers,\footnote{11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (eligibility for Chapter 13); id. §§ 1301–30 (procedures specific to Chapter 13).} Chapter 11 for business reorganizations,\footnote{11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (eligibility for Chapter 11); id. §§ 1101–46 (procedures specific to Chapter 11).} and Chapter 15 for cross-border cases.\footnote{11 U.S.C. § 1501 (purpose of Chapter 15); id. §§ 1502–32 (procedures specific to Chapter 15).} The person or entity filing for bankruptcy is the “debtor,”\footnote{Id. § 101(13) (defining “debtor”).} and the debtor initiates the bankruptcy process
by filing a petition, which is followed by detailed schedules that include lists of the debtor’s assets and liabilities.

A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a relatively quick and streamlined process. For a business, a Chapter 7 filing means that the business is dissolving and using the bankruptcy to make an orderly distribution of its assets to the business’s creditors. For an individual consumer, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy allows the debtor to liquidate nonexempt assets for distribution to creditors. Although debtors can use exemptions to shield some assets from liquidation (such as a home or a car, at least up to a certain dollar value), crypto assets are not covered by most exemptions and would therefore usually be liquidated in order to pay creditors. Following this liquidation, the debtor receives a discharge which covers most types of unsecured consumer debts.

A key stakeholder in either type of Chapter 7 bankruptcy is the trustee, a private attorney who is appointed by the court to represent the collective

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17 See id. § 301(a) (setting forth the method of commencing a voluntary bankruptcy case).
18 See id. § 521 (describing the schedules that a debtor must file after commencing a case).
19 See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 815 (1994) (contrasting a consumer Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which “is typically completed in less than six months,” with the longer and more cumbersome Chapter 13 process).
20 See David S. Kupetz, Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors: Effective Tool for Acquiring and Winding Up Distressed Businesses, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2015, at 1–2 (explaining that for distressed businesses that are winding down operations, Chapter 7 “provides a procedure for the orderly liquidation of the assets of the debtor and the ultimate payment of creditors in the order of priority set forth in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code”).
21 See Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1943 (2011) (“In theory, the ‘deal’ provided by Chapter 7 is that the debtor will surrender all nonexempt assets and, in exchange, will receive a ‘fresh start,’ free of most unsecured debt.”).
22 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (process for claiming exemptions under either federal or state law).
23 See id. § 522(d)(1) (setting forth a federal exemption of up to $15,000 for equity in real property); id. § 522(d)(2) (setting forth a federal exemption of up to $2,400 of value in a motor vehicle). These federal dollar limits are adjusted every three years. See id. § 104(a).
24 The federal exemptions include a “wild card exemption” that can be applied to any asset, up to a certain dollar value. See id. § 522(d)(5) (allowing a debtor who is using the federal exemptions to designate as exempt up to $800 in any property, plus up to $7,500 of any unused portion of the real property exemption in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)). If eligible for a wildcard exemption, a debtor could have a way to shield at least some crypto assets from liquidation.
25 See id. § 727 (describing the discharge process). Several types of debt are nondischargeable. See id. § 523. Common examples of nondischargeable debt include domestic support obligations, most taxes, and student loans. The latter category is only dischargeable upon a showing of “undue hardship.” See id. § 523(a)(8).
interests of the creditors. The trustee’s primary goal is to identify nonexempt assets that are available for liquidation, for the benefit of creditors, and then sell them. Because crypto assets are not generally exempt, a trustee can be expected to liquidate any crypto assets that a debtor has disclosed in her schedules.

Chapter 7 trustees also have various mechanisms at their disposal to help them recover assets that a business or consumer debtor may have transferred in the months, and sometimes years, leading up to bankruptcy. These mechanisms are generally referred to as the trustee’s avoiding powers. Finally, the Chapter 7 trustee is also tasked with determining whether a debtor has properly disclosed all assets, including crypto assets, and conducting further investigation if there are doubts about whether a debtor has made a complete and accurate disclosure. A debtor who fails to completely and accurately fill out the required schedules can be denied a discharge. The denial of a discharge then renders nondischargeable all of the debt that could have been discharged in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Thus, a debtor’s failure to accurately disclose crypto assets in the bankruptcy schedules could make the debtor worse off than if the debtor had never filed for bankruptcy at all.

Chapter 13 bankruptcy is also an option for consumers, but it operates differently from Chapter 7 liquidations. In Chapter 13, a debtor develops a long-term payment plan and commits a portion of his or her future wages

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26 Id. § 701 (provisions for appointment of trustee in Chapter 7); id. § 704 (duties of Chapter 7 trustee).
27 See id. § 704(a)(1).
28 See supra text accompanying notes 21–24.
30 See generally Richard B. Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee’s Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173 (1979) (providing an overview of the tools available to the trustee under the Bankruptcy Code).
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(4); see also id. §§ 341(d), 343 (requiring the trustee to examine the debtor under oath and permitting other stakeholders to conduct an examination as well). An additional stakeholder, known colloquially as the U.S. Trustee’s Office, also plays a broader oversight role in the bankruptcy process and provides an added layer of fraud detection. 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2012).
33 Id. § 523(a)(10).
34 Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 19, at 814–17 (explaining the “different legal bargain” made by Chapter 13 debtors).
35 The Chapter 13 payment plan will either be three years or five years depending on debtor characteristics that are not significant here. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4).
toward the plan. After the plan is confirmed and fully executed, the debtor receives a discharge of most of the remaining unsecured consumer debts. Unlike a Chapter 7 debtor, who must give up nonexempt assets, the Chapter 13 debtor can typically opt to keep his or her assets. Thus, a Chapter 13 debtor could ordinarily file for bankruptcy without putting crypto assets at risk. However, Chapter 13 becomes significant for debtors that have used their crypto assets as security for loans, because a Chapter 13 debtor can ask the court to reduce or eliminate the liens that a secured creditor has on the debtor’s assets. The possibility that debtors will use these lien-stripping provisions opportunistically will be discussed in Section II.C.

The two remaining types of bankruptcies are discussed only briefly in this Essay and will be given similarly brief treatment here. Chapter 11 reorganization is used primarily (but not exclusively) by businesses and involves both a plan and a discharge from remaining debt. Unlike a Chapter 13 debtor, who is expected to complete plan payments before receiving a discharge, the Chapter 11 debtor obtains a discharge of remaining debt as soon as the plan is confirmed. Chapter 11 gives debtors a variety of tools to implement an effective reorganization, including modifying liens. In addition, most Chapter 11 cases allow the debtor to exercise the same rights to recover assets as the trustee exercises in a Chapter 7 case. Finally, Chapter 15 involves cross-border insolvencies for entities

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36 Id. § 1322(a)(1).
37 Id. § 1328(a). Debtors who have not completed their plan payments “due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable” may be eligible for a hardship discharge. Id. § 1328(b)(1). Chapter 13 discharges are also subject to most, but not all, of the nondischargeability provisions discussed in note 25. Compare id. § 1328(a)(1)–(4), with id. § 523.
38 Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 19, at 814 (explaining that Chapter 13 “debtors keep all their property in return for an agreement to pay their trustees” a portion of their future income).
40 See supra note 14.
42 Id. § 1141(d).
43 Id. § 1328(a).
44 Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
45 See id. § 1123(a)(5).
46 Id. § 1123(a)(5)(E). Lien modification is generally subject to creditor approval, see id. § 1126, but may be authorized even over the objections of the affected lienholder under certain circumstances, known as cram-down. See generally Charles J. Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 113 (explaining how the cram-down process affects secured lenders).
47 See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (defining “debtor in possession”); id. § 1107(a) (giving the debtor in possession most of the same rights as a trustee).
that need to resolve issues surrounding assets and liabilities in various jurisdictions with different insolvency systems. Typically, a debtor will file its main proceeding in the locale where its main business operates, and then open ancillary proceedings in other locales, with the expectation that those ancillary fora will defer to the decisions made in the main proceeding.

B. In re HashFast Technologies LLC: A Missed Opportunity?

This Section examines an early opportunity for the bankruptcy system to at least start developing an analytical framework. This opportunity arose six years ago during a corporate liquidation filed in the Northern District of California: In re HashFast Technologies LLC. HashFast, a Bitcoin mining technology company, had pioneered a technology that purported to allow Bitcoin miners to outpace their competitors. HashFast enlisted the help of Dr. Marc Lowe, an early proponent of Bitcoin who had a large online following, to help market the technology. In exchange for his assistance, HashFast promised to pay Dr. Lowe 10% of the proceeds of the first set of sales, which amounted to $308,000. But instead of paying this commission in U.S. currency, HashFast paid Dr. Lowe using 3,000 bitcoins. When HashFast later found itself in bankruptcy court, the Chapter 11 trustee

48 See id. § 1502(4) (defining a “foreign main proceeding”).
49 See id. § 1502(5) (defining a “foreign nonmain proceeding”).
50 See id. §§ 1515–21 (describing the process for obtaining recognition of the outcome of a foreign main proceeding).
51 In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 11 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2014).
53 See id.
55 Id. at 3–4.
56 HashFast was initially the subject of a petition for involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter 7. See Involuntary Petition filed by creditors Koi Systems, UBE Enterprises, Timothy Lam, Edward Hammond, Grant Pederson, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 7 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 9, 2014). The debtor successfully converted the case to a voluntary Chapter 11 reorganization. See Motion to Convert to Chapter 11, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 7 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 3, 2014); Order Granting Motion to Convert to Chapter 11, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 7 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 4, 2014). Eventually, the bankruptcy court approved HashFast’s Chapter 11 liquidation plan and appointed Michael Kasolas as the liquidation trustee. See Order Approving on a Final Basis and Confirming the Consolidated Plan of Liquidation, In re HashFast Techs. LLC, Ch. 11 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 25, 2015).
charged with liquidating HashFast sought to avoid, or undo, the payment as a fraudulent transfer. By that time, Dr. Lowe’s 3,000 bitcoins had more than tripled in value to over $1 million. Accordingly, the trustee sought to use the tools available in the bankruptcy code to recover either the Bitcoin itself, or the current value of the Bitcoin. In opposing the trustee’s avoidance action, Dr. Lowe asked the bankruptcy court to treat the Bitcoin as currency, thereby limiting the trustee’s recovery to a maximum of approximately $300,000.

During the summary judgment briefing, both parties harnessed available case law and regulatory frameworks to support their competing positions. Specifically, the trustee argued that Bitcoin should be treated as “a commodity, like gold, silver or pork bellies, that fluctuates in price based upon market conditions.” As supporting authority, the trustee cited a September 17, 2015, order from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) requiring that virtual currencies be regulated under the Commodities Exchange Act. The trustee argued that his position was further supported by 2014 IRS guidance, which stated that Bitcoin would be treated as property for the purpose of capital gains tax.

Meanwhile, to oppose the trustee’s motion, Dr. Lowe cited the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which had issued the first federal guidance regarding cryptocurrency in early 2013. FinCEN had advised that because cryptocurrency mainly behaves like regular currency, it should be regulated as such. Dr. Lowe also pointed out

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57 HashFast originally filed the motion to avoid the payment in its capacity as debtor in possession. See Adversary Complaint, HashFast v. Lowe (In re HashFast Techs. LLC), Ch. 11 No. 14-30725 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2015). After HashFast’s liquidation plan was confirmed, the liquidation trustee took over this adversary proceeding. See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, HashFast v. Lowe (In re HashFast Techs. LLC), Ch. 11 Case No. 14-30725, Adv. No. 15-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016).

58 Under the trustee’s avoiding powers, discussed in supra note 17 and surrounding text, the trustee typically has the option of recovering either the value of property or the property itself, depending on which option is more beneficial to creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012).

59 Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 54, at 14.


61 Id. at 4–5.

62 Id. at 5.

63 Brief in Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 54, at 5.

64 See Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Virtual Currency Mining Operations (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-
that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau had described Bitcoin as “a kind of electronic money” in guidance issued in August 2014.\textsuperscript{65} Finally, Dr. Lowe argued that court briefs filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in a separate case, along with various court opinions in money laundering cases involving crypto assets, lent further authority to the view that Bitcoin should be treated the same way as currency.\textsuperscript{66}

With such a well-briefed motion, the HashFast case presented a prime opportunity for the bankruptcy court to take a critical first step toward developing a working approach to crypto assets in bankruptcy. Instead, the court only addressed Dr. Lowe’s argument that crypto assets should be treated as the equivalent of U.S. dollars.\textsuperscript{67} In a terse, two-page order rejecting this aspect of Dr. Lowe’s argument, the court stated that there was no need to go beyond this narrow ruling because the trustee had not yet established his claim for avoidance.\textsuperscript{68} After determining that Bitcoin was not the equivalent of U.S. currency, the court deferred further consideration of what exactly Bitcoin was, and what the trustee’s rights to the Bitcoin might be. The court explained that it was unnecessary to address these further issues until the trustee had first established that HashFast’s transfer was fraudulent.\textsuperscript{69}
That day never came because the parties opted to settle rather than continue to litigate over an uncertain benefit or loss.\textsuperscript{70} Indeed, even four years later, these issues remain largely uncharted territory for bankruptcy courts. This lack of clarity over the nature of crypto assets and a trustee’s recovery rights risks leaving the bankruptcy system in limbo because trustees are unable to meaningfully evaluate whether to pursue avoidance actions in situations when a crypto asset has dramatically increased in value after leaving a debtor’s hands. Although the payoff from a successful avoidance action would be significant, both for the trustee and for creditors, trustees must balance the possibility of a large recovery (which would likely be appealed) against the risk of walking away with nothing to show for their litigation efforts. At this point, congressional intervention may be the likeliest way to obtain clarity regarding these issues.

II. CRYPTO ASSETS ARE NOT LIKE ANY OTHER ASSETS

As Part I illustrates, no clear framework has yet emerged for how to characterize crypto assets in bankruptcy. This Part argues that efforts to force crypto assets into an existing category or framework is not an ideal solution because existing frameworks are inadequate to address the unique challenges that these digital assets pose to bankruptcy and insolvency systems. There are four features that make these assets particularly challenging. First, crypto assets are typically bought and sold through pseudonymous\textsuperscript{71} transactions, which pose challenges for determining ownership as well as obtaining key details regarding transfers. Second, crypto assets that are traded on exchanges\textsuperscript{72} present a false facade of liquidity, which adds a potentially unexpected layer of complexity to court-ordered asset sales. Third, crypto assets are highly volatile, which creates a heightened risk of opportunistic behavior. Fourth, to the extent that crypto assets are digital constructions that exist “on the cloud” rather than in physical form, these assets defy traditional jurisdictional characterizations. Each of these features is described in more detail below.


\textsuperscript{71} “Pseudonymous” may be a better term than “anonymous,” because although the blockchain does not reveal the name of a buyer or seller, the blockchain does retain other identifying information. See Nathaniel Popper, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MISFITS AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY 84 (2015).

\textsuperscript{72} See infra text accompanying notes 131–135.
A. Opportunities for Anonymous Transactions

Crypto assets allow for a greater level of anonymity than ordinary assets, at least in theory.73 Although the names of the purchasers and sellers of crypto assets are generally not associated with specific transactions, the blockchain stores other identifying information about each transaction.74 To understand this aspect of crypto assets, it is helpful to consider the context for the creation of one of the most prominent crypto assets: Bitcoin. Bitcoin was born out of an economic libertarianism that skirted the boundaries of anarchy,75 motivated in large part by the desire to create a means of storing and transferring wealth that would be less easily tracked and controlled by centralized authorities.76 Indeed, it is no coincidence that Bitcoin’s early prominence paralleled the development of Silk Road, a website that enabled all manner of illicit transactions, from drug deals to human trafficking.77 The developer of Silk Road, Ross Ulbricht, recognized early on that Bitcoin solved a critical problem for those seeking to use the internet for illegal transactions.78 While other types of electronic payment systems required buyers and sellers to use their names, the pseudonymous nature of blockchain technology enabled buyers and sellers to transact business with nothing more than a post office box.79

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73 See Popper, supra note 71, at 84 (“Bitcoin was actually less anonymous than most people believed, owing to the record of all transactions on the blockchain.”). Other crypto assets promise greater levels of anonymity than Bitcoin. See Mandjee, supra note 3, at 163–64 (describing Darkcoin, a Bitcoin alternative that offers “increased anonymity”).

74 See generally Popper, supra note 71 (providing an in-depth story of Bitcoin and how digital currencies work).

75 See id. at 110–12 (describing Bitcoin’s well-timed introduction against the backdrop of Occupy Wall Street).

76 See Nathaniel Rich, Ponzi Schemes, Private Yachts, and a Missing $250 Million in Crypto: The Strange Tale of Quadriga, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/11/the-strange-tale-of-quadriga-gerald-cotten [https://perma.cc/C743-36WR] (explaining that Canada’s leading crypto exchange, Quadriga, “trade[d] tens of millions of dollars worth of Bitcoin with accounts connected to known Ponzi schemes and illegal marketplaces”); see also Mandjee, supra note 3, at 183 (“[G]iven the potential abuse of virtual currencies and the increasing recognition that they were used to facilitate illicit transactions and to launder criminal proceeds . . . FinCEN provided guidelines on ‘virtual currencies,’ subjecting them to the regulations applicable to money transmitters.”).

77 See Popper, supra note 71, at 167 (“[As of 2012,] the most successful entrepreneur in the Bitcoin world was . . . Ross Ulbricht, the operator of the world’s largest drug bazaar.”); id. at 119 (noting that the Silk Road “provid[ed] a good showcase for how anonymous markets and decentralized currencies could work in practice”); see also Margaret Ryznar, The Future of Bitcoin Futures, 56 Hous. L. Rev. 539, 554 (2019) (“[B]itcoin’s background [is] an anonymous cryptocurrency for criminals.”).

78 See Popper, supra note 71, at 71.

79 Id.
Similarly, it is probably no coincidence that Bitcoin’s value dropped more than 20% in the two hours following the FBI’s bust of Silk Road.\footnote{Bitcoin Value Drops After FBI Shuts Silk Road Drugs Site, BBC (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-24381847 [https://perma.cc/Y6C9-2993] (“The going rate for the virtual currency dropped from more than $140 . . . to around $110 . . . .”).} In the panicked words of one Bitcoin forum poster: “I just hope that mainstream adoption has surpassed the adoption of criminals and drug dealers. LOL! Otherwise its [sic] time to SELL! SELL! SELL!”\footnote{See Popper, supra note 71, at 250 (noting that the market price of Bitcoin dropped from $140 to $110 within two hours of the FBI’s seizure of the Silk Road website).} Although mainstream adoption did ultimately keep Bitcoin values high (thanks to opportunistic investors who had been looking for the right moment to buy),\footnote{See id. at 250–51 (explaining that a “surge of buying” from investors including the Winklevoss twins helped Bitcoin to rebound within a few days).} the Silk Road saga highlights the ways in which the relative anonymity of crypto assets can facilitate illegal activity.\footnote{Despite Ulbricht’s efforts to remain anonymous, he was eventually apprehended at a local branch of the San Francisco Public Library while using their free Wi-Fi to log into his Silk Road account. See Popper, supra note 71, at 246–48. During his subsequent criminal trial, Ulbricht argued that he could not be convicted of money laundering because Bitcoin was not a “monetary instrument[]” for the purposes of federal law. See United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The district court rejected this argument as “nonsensical,” reasoning that “the only value for Bitcoin lies in its ability to pay for things.” Id. at 570. Dr. Lowe subsequently cited this decision in his effort to convince the bankruptcy court that his Bitcoin was the equivalent of U.S. currency. See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text.}

Tax authorities have begun to recognize the challenges posed by crypto assets that lack easy traceability, particularly the risk that these assets will be used to shield wealth from taxation.\footnote{See Mandjee, supra note 3, at 187–88.} Although international consensus about how to properly tax cryptocurrencies appears to be a distant prospect,\footnote{See id. at 189–92 (comparing the IRS’s treatment of Bitcoin as property in the United States with the treatment of Bitcoin in the tax systems of Canada, Singapore, Germany, and the U.K.).} domestically, the tax issues are much clearer. In 2014, the IRS opted to treat Bitcoin as property for the purposes of calculating capital gains and gross income.\footnote{See id. at 189.} Perhaps in an attempt to induce voluntary compliance with its newly announced stance, the IRS also created a safe harbor that would allow Bitcoin investors to pay back taxes without penalty.\footnote{See id. at 189–90 (indicating that IRS rules provide penalty relief for persons who can prove reasonable cause for non-filing).} Investors who had reasonable cause for not previously paying taxes on Bitcoin had the opportunity to pay back their taxes to the IRS, but those who failed to take
advantage of this safe harbor were warned that they were “open[ing] themselves to penalties, interest and possible fraud prosecution.”88 Then, in late 2019, the IRS added a question to Schedule 1 of its tax forms, asking filers whether “[a]t any time during 2019, did you receive, sell, send, exchange, or otherwise acquire any financial interest in any virtual currency?”89 Likewise, some state regulators have also taken steps to facilitate the collection of tax revenues from crypto assets.90 Although the ultimate success of these efforts remains to be seen, these efforts show that tax regulators are attempting to be proactive about addressing the issue of crypto assets.

The relative anonymity of crypto investments poses similar challenges for bankruptcy or insolvency systems for three closely related reasons. First, the speculative nature of crypto assets can create a gambling mentality, with some ordinary consumers going deeply into debt in the hopes of a big win. For example, one early Bitcoin evangelizer went deeply into credit card debt in order to increase his holdings.91 But given the boom-and-bust nature of Bitcoin and other crypto assets, investors who get the timing wrong stand to lose significant sums of money.92 Indeed, almost everyone who invested over the nine-month period during late 2017 or early 2018 saw their holdings lose value.93 If those investments were made with borrowed funds, then these losses could ultimately lead to a surge in bankruptcy filings. Second, to the extent that crypto assets create opportunities for pseudonymous investment, debtors may be able to use these vehicles in order to shield assets from creditors. And third, the pseudonymous nature of crypto assets complicates

88 Id. at 189 (quoted source omitted).
91 See Popper, supra note 71, at 108 (introducing early Bitcoin evangelizer Erik Voorhees, who opted to go deeply into credit card debt in order to devote himself full-time to developing the crypto market).
93 Id. ("Almost all of the new customers on Coinbase and Square would be in the red if they bought cryptocurrencies at almost any point over the last nine months and held on to them.").
trustees’ methods for avoiding preferences by making it challenging for them to prove when a crypto transaction occurred or to whom the assets were transferred.

Concerns that debtors can use crypto holdings to conceal assets from creditors during a bankruptcy proceeding are not merely hypothetical. For example, in the case of In re Schultz, the debtor failed to disclose $30,000 worth of crypto assets.\footnote{Schultz v. Keyword Rockstar, Inc. (In re Schultz), Ch. 7 Case No. 17-01568-LA7, Adv. No. 17-90126-LA, 2019 WL 2385186, at *2 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 4, 2019).} Creditors have also begun to alert bankruptcy courts to the possibility that debtors may be exploiting the bankruptcy system to obtain a discharge of debts while shielding crypto assets from creditors.\footnote{See, e.g., Scott Neuman, Rapper 50 Cent, Who Bragged About Owning Bitcoin, Now Denies It, NPR (Feb. 27, 2018, 5:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/27/589052493/rapper-50-cent-who-bragged-about-owning-bitcoin-now-denies-it [https://perma.cc/49QS-HNT3].}

One ultimately unsuccessful example of this creditor warning occurred in the case of In re Peeples.\footnote{579 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Utah 2017).} The debtors in this case had been running a coin dealership\footnote{Id. at 264–65.} in order to provide for their family of seven.\footnote{Id. at 261.} After the debtors filed for bankruptcy, the family’s landlords attempted to have their unpaid rental debts of close to $50,000 declared nondischargeable.\footnote{Id. at 259.} In the alternative, the landlords asked the court to deny the debtors a discharge altogether.\footnote{Id.} Among other things, the landlords argued that the debtors had failed to account for close to $30,000 in proceeds from their coin dealership.\footnote{Id. at 280.} The bankruptcy court found that the debtors’ testimony about their business’s lack of profit from the coin dealership was not credible and that the debtors had failed to provide satisfactory business records to explain their transfers.\footnote{Id. at 265.} Nonetheless, the court described the creditors’ suggestion of debtor malfeasance as “nothing more than a tempest in a teapot.”\footnote{Id. at 259.} Accordingly, the court concluded that the landlords had not carried their burden of establishing that the debtors should be denied a discharge.\footnote{Id.}
On appeal, the landlord creditors pointed out that the missing funds may have been invested in Bitcoin and could now be worth millions of dollars. However, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) rejected this argument as unsupported speculation. In a terse opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the bankruptcy court had erred in concluding that the debtors had satisfied their obligation to provide sufficient records to account for the missing funds, but nonetheless affirmed the debtors’ discharge, concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the debtors “were not the ‘worst actors’ who deserved the ‘extreme step’ of being denied a discharge.”

The debtor-friendly decision in *Peeples* is unsurprising as the case presented only a hypothetical risk that the debtors had funneled assets into crypto holdings. However, the case highlights the challenges that face a creditor who suspects that a debtor has undisclosed crypto assets. Precisely because it is so difficult to prove that debtors have crypto holdings, we might expect courts to respond more harshly when a debtor is actually caught red-handed in failing to disclose these assets. But this expectation does not yet match reality. Thus far, bankruptcy courts appear willing to indulge a debtor’s nondisclosure of crypto assets as an oversight that can be corrected rather than treating it as a serious abuse of the bankruptcy process.

A prime example of bankruptcy courts’ debtor-friendly approach is the Ninth Circuit BAP decision in *In re Schultz*. The debtor was a personal coach who had created a number of educational videos and webinars. After a series of disruptive life events—a fallout with his business partners, an extended family court battle, and a house fire—the debtor filed for bankruptcy, both individually and for his business. However, the debtor was caught making two significant mistakes in his schedules. First, the debtor failed to disclose assets, including most significantly a $30,000

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106 *Id.*
107 *In re Peeples*, 779 F. App’x 561, 566 (10th Cir. 2019).
108 *Id.* at 567–68.
110 *Id.* at *1.
111 *Id.* at *1–2. Schultz filed a Chapter 7 petition on his own behalf and filed a Chapter 7 petition on behalf of his business, JWS Publishing, Inc., a week later. *Id.*
Second, the debtor had valued his email contact list at $700, despite having bragged in a webinar that his customer list was worth $1 million. The debtor’s former business partners—now creditors—asked the court to deny his discharge, arguing that these inaccurate disclosures represented a false oath in violation of the bankruptcy code. In opposing this motion, the debtor argued that he had been in a zombie-like state when he filed his petitions and that he had relied on his accountant as well as advice from a friend.

After hearing testimony from the debtor, as well as the debtor’s accountant and therapist, the bankruptcy court rejected most of the creditors’ arguments in favor of denial of discharge regarding the Bitcoin account. Specifically, the court found that most of the debtor’s false oaths were not intentional, but rather a result of “forgetfulness, lack of focus, [and] inability to connect the dots.” However, the bankruptcy court reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the low valuation that the debtor had assigned to his email list. The court explained that the fact that the debtor had intentionally chosen a low valuation was unreasonable and an act of “commission rather than [of] omission.” Accordingly, the bankruptcy court concluded that this false oath was a proper basis for denying the debtor a discharge.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit BAP reversed the denial of discharge. In addition to discrediting testimony regarding the potentially high value of the email list, the panel focused on the discrepancy between the court’s two findings regarding intent. The panel explained that there was no basis in the record to reconcile the finding that the debtor did not knowingly fail to disclose the Bitcoin account with the finding that the debtor had knowingly

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112 Id.
113 Id. at *3.
114 See id. at *6. The creditors also moved for denial of discharge under § 727(a)(5) for inadequate record keeping but the bankruptcy court rejected this argument. Id. at *5. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit BAP affirmed this aspect of the bankruptcy court’s decision. Id. at *10–11.
115 Id. at *4.
116 Id. at *4–6.
117 Id. at *6.
118 Id.
119 Id. at *11.
120 Id. at *8–9.
and fraudulently undervalued the email list.\textsuperscript{121} Accordingly, the panel concluded that the latter finding “was implausible and clearly erroneous.”\textsuperscript{122}

The pro-debtor decisions in \textit{Peeples} and \textit{Schultz} reflect bankruptcy courts’ nonchalant attitudes toward the risk that a debtor has used crypto holdings to shield assets from creditors. These nonchalant attitudes stand in stark contrast to the proactive steps taken by domestic tax regulators to ensure that crypto investors will pay capital gains taxes on realized profits.\textsuperscript{123} One step that bankruptcy courts can adopt is to specifically ask debtors about crypto assets, just as the IRS recently added a specific question about cryptocurrency to federal income tax forms.\textsuperscript{124} For example, debtors should be asked if they have ever purchased or owned cryptocurrency. Requiring a clear “yes” or “no” answer to this question will make it less likely for a debtor to inadvertently fail to disclose crypto assets, and this will, in turn, make it easier for a creditor or trustee to demonstrate bad faith on the part of a debtor who fails to disclose significant crypto assets.

Moreover, increased scrutiny from bankruptcy courts may be necessary to deter future debtors from taking advantage of the relative anonymity of crypto transactions. At the very least, those debtors who are caught failing to disclose significant crypto holdings—like the debtor in \textit{Schultz}—should face serious consequences for failing to make a complete and accurate disclosure. For example, courts could conclude that the nondisclosure of any nontrivial amount of crypto assets, or any crypto assets directly purchased by the debtor, should be grounds for denying a discharge. In the absence of clear and unequivocal consequences for nondisclosure, courts may be incentivizing debtors to use crypto holdings to at least attempt to shield assets from liquidation. Long term, such conduct could cast doubts on the system as a whole, which might eventually undermine the use of Chapter 7 by honest debtors.\textsuperscript{125}

As noted above, the third challenge posed by the relative anonymity of crypto transactions relates to the trustee’s avoidance powers. In Part I, we

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Id.} at *10.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Id.} The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision is currently being appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Keyword Rockstar, Inc. v. Schultz (\textit{In re Schultz}) No. 19-60032 (9th Cir. filed July 9, 2019).
\textsuperscript{123} See \textit{supra} notes 84–90 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{124} See \textit{supra} note 89 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{125} Cf. James J. White, \textit{Abuse Prevention} 2005, 71 Mo. L. REV. 863, 865 (2006) (describing the fears of opportunistic behavior by debtors that prompted Congress to amend the consumer bankruptcy code in 2005).
saw one example of how crypto assets can create a wrinkle for the trustee’s authority to avoid (or undo) transactions that occur in the months, and sometimes even years, leading up to a bankruptcy filing. But anonymous transactions portend many more challenges, particularly to a trustee’s ability to avoid preferences under Section 547 of the bankruptcy code. This provision gives the trustee the power to avoid any transfer that occurs within ninety days of a bankruptcy filing. The recovery period extends to one year if the counterparty is a statutorily defined “insider” — typically a close relative or business partner. The relative anonymity of crypto transactions complicates both options for trustee recovery. A debtor who admits to having owned crypto assets in the past may nonetheless claim to have disposed of these assets before the preference period (and at a lower valuation), putting trustees in the challenging position of having to prove a negative with limited information. Moreover, even assuming that a trustee can develop evidence to determine the timing of a particular debtor transaction, the question of whether the transaction was conducted with an insider may be even harder to answer due to anonymity issues concerning the transferee. Thus, we are likely to see increased complications for trustees in future liquidation cases that involve crypto assets.

In sum, the uncertain nature of crypto assets—as highlighted by the HashFast case—coupled with the relative anonymity of these investments have created many complications for stakeholders in the bankruptcy process. These complications undermine the prospects for creditor recovery when debtors choose not to be forthcoming about their crypto assets. To deal with these issues, bankruptcy courts should consider following the IRS’s lead by requiring specific disclosures of crypto assets. In addition, courts should consider denying a discharge to debtors who fail to make an adequate disclosure.

126 See supra Section I.B.
128 Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
129 Id. § 101(31).
130 See, e.g., Eric S. Rein & John Guzzardo, The Trustee and the Bitcoin, 37 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2018, at 4 (“[M]ost virtual currencies are transferred between parties in an anonymous fashion that, in all likelihood, make it impossible for the creditor to identify the recipient or take possession of the transfers.”). But see Popper, supra note 71, at 84 (noting that “sophisticated network analysis” can be used to glean personally identifying information from the blockchain).
B. The False Facade of Liquidity

The second unique feature of crypto assets is that they often present an illusionary facade of liquidity. From the outside, the market for crypto assets resembles that of other market-traded assets, such as securities and commodities. Indeed, many of these assets trade on “exchanges,” and the current prices of these assets are usually available from a variety of internet sources. To the extent that this superficial resemblance to a market-traded asset suggests that a Bitcoin seller could actually obtain that current amount in fiat currency, the picture does not always accurately reflect reality.\footnote{See generally Smith, supra note 4 (explaining that Bitcoin exchanges function as money transmitters and depository institutions but are not regulated as closely).}

Instead, early crypto investors learned the hard way that enterprises that call themselves “exchanges” do not operate in the way that investors in other market-based assets might expect.\footnote{See Alexandra Harney & Steve Stecklow, Twice Burned: How Mt. Gox’s Bitcoin Customers Could Lose Again, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/bitcoin-gox/ [https://perma.cc/S324-BS98] (noting that as of late 2017, Bitcoin exchanges have lost close to one million bitcoin valued at over $6 billion).}


Both the Quadriga and Mt. Gox bankruptcies involved entities that purported to act as exchanges for Bitcoin. Although these entities did provide customers with some of the functions of an exchange, such as being able to transfer fiat currency for crypto assets and vice versa, neither entity was regulated as an exchange, nor did either entity operate strictly as a trading market for these assets. Rather, both also served as wallets\footnote{Levitin, supra note 4, at 315 (“A digital wallet is a computer software application that stores and transmits payment authorization data for [a] credit or deposit account[].”); see also Ryznar, supra note 77, at 542–43 (explaining that many crypto investors keep their crypto assets remotely in wallets that are maintained on the cloud).} for many of the assets and currencies being exchanged in the crypto market. This wallet service is the main reason why each insolvency hit its customers much harder than did the insolvency of any exchange for

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\footnote{See generally Smith, supra note 4 (explaining that Bitcoin exchanges function as money transmitters and depository institutions but are not regulated as closely).}


\footnote{Levitin, supra note 4, at 315 (“A digital wallet is a computer software application that stores and transmits payment authorization data for [a] credit or deposit account[].”); see also Ryznar, supra note 77, at 542–43 (explaining that many crypto investors keep their crypto assets remotely in wallets that are maintained on the cloud).}
traditional market-based assets. Similarly, many other types of insolvencies would allow consumers to recover up to $250,000 from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).\(^{135}\) When a consumer stores crypto assets in an online wallet, however, there is no safety net in the event of an insolvency by the wallet provider.

The circumstances surrounding both insolvencies are shrouded in intrigue and mystery. Quadriga’s insolvency was prompted by the death of its founder, Gerald Cotten, in 2018.\(^{136}\) Since late 2013, Cotten had run Quadriga, one of Canada’s most prominent Bitcoin exchanges, from his personal MacBook Pro.\(^ {137}\) Purportedly, Cotten kept all of the passwords to his customers’ accounts in encrypted files on this laptop and did not share the encryption codes with anyone else at the company.\(^ {138}\) After Cotten died, customers were unable to access the wallets where their assets were stored.\(^ {139}\) Quadriga entered insolvency proceedings in Nova Scotia with Ernst & Young (EY) appointed as monitor.\(^ {140}\) EY’s investigation determined that close to $200 million in customer funds was missing—likely funneled into Cotten’s pockets.\(^ {141}\) EY has been able to collect some assets, including from

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\(^{136}\) See Rich, supra note 76. According to official reports, Cotten died of complications relating to Crohn’s disease while honeymooning in India. Id. Not surprisingly, this series of events is the subject of rampant internet speculation. Id.

\(^{137}\) See id.

\(^{138}\) See Randy Shore, Troubled Bitcoin Trader QuadrigaCX Takes Another Bizarre Turn, VANCOUVER SUN (Feb. 1, 2019), https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/troubled-bitcoin-trader-quadrigacx-takes-another-bizarre-turn/ [https://perma.cc/42WL-LNR8] (quoting an affidavit from Cotten’s colleague which states that “[t]he laptop computer from which Gerry carried out the company’s business is encrypted and I do not know the password or recovery key”); see also Rich, supra note 76 (describing an episode in which Cotten became hysterical upon realizing that he had left his laptop on a yacht that was departing from the dock).

\(^{139}\) See Henry Mance, Left High and Dry by a Crypto Founder’s Demise, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/6f10707a-2ac1-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8 [https://perma.cc/37S4-UKF2] (“For years, I’ve had one thing in common with most cryptocurrency investors: I know almost nothing about cryptocurrency. I now share something else with users of cryptocurrency trading platform QuadrigaCX: I cannot access any cryptocurrency.”).


Cotten’s widow, but customers are unlikely to recover more than a small fraction of the lost Bitcoin value.\textsuperscript{142}

The Mt. Gox insolvency also centered around the unexplained disappearance of customer assets. Mt. Gox was founded in 2010 by Jed McCaleb,\textsuperscript{143} who soon sold the enterprise to Mark Karpelès.\textsuperscript{144} It quickly became the world’s leading forum for trading Bitcoin.\textsuperscript{145} Based in Japan, Mt. Gox allowed customers to buy and sell Bitcoin, initially using McCaleb’s PayPal account for transactions and storage.\textsuperscript{146} However, the entity was plagued with numerous security breaches, which suggested that the nascent exchange lacked fundamental security measures.\textsuperscript{147} Likewise, its inability to handle high-volume trading left customers waiting extended periods for execution, which in turn affected their returns.\textsuperscript{148} Finally, in early 2014, Mt. Gox suddenly shut down for good,\textsuperscript{149} with Karpelès dodging a flood of questions about whether any of its customers would recover their Bitcoin.\textsuperscript{150} Eventually, Mt. Gox’s operators revealed that 750,000 bitcoins had vanished.


\textsuperscript{143} See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132 (“The Mt. Gox exchange was first launched by Jed McCaleb, an American software engineer, in 2010.”). McCaleb was an early adopter of Bitcoin and also an internationally renowned player of Magic: The Gathering, a card-based role play game, that in turn inspired the acronym Mt. Gox (“Magic: The Gathering Online Exchange”). See Popper, supra note 71, at 51. The website that hosted the exchange was originally a forum where game players could trade cards. See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132. However, after several frustrating months trying to run a Bitcoin trading operation from his beach home in Costa Rica, McCaleb realized that he lacked the professional appetite to manage the enterprise full-time. See Popper, supra note 71, at 63–65. After an early hack, McCaleb also recognized that he lacked the expertise necessary to provide a safe venue for customers. \textit{Id.} at 67.

\textsuperscript{144} See Popper, supra note 71, at 67–68.

\textsuperscript{145} As of 2012, Mt. Gox handled approximately 80% of Bitcoin trades. \textit{See id.} at 203.

\textsuperscript{146} \textit{See id.} at 52.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{See id.} at 82–83 (showing Karpelès’s slow response to an early denial-of-service attack, which suggests that the nascent exchange lacked fundamental security measures); \textit{id.} at 89–91 (describing a 2011 Mt. Gox hack in which the price of Bitcoin dropped from seventeen dollars to one cent over the course of an hour); \textit{id.} at 207 (“[H]ackers showed up and staged fierce denial-of-service attacks, forcing [Karpelès] to shut down the site altogether in the middle of the day.”).

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{See id.} at 200–01 (describing Karpelès’ struggles to manage the challenges presented by Mt. Gox’s massive growth); \textit{see also id.} at 206 (describing one period of extreme volatility where trade delays forced buyers to pay as much as $300 per coin, before cancellations drove the price down to $100 a few hours later); \textit{id.} at 307–08 (noting that by early 2014, the price of Bitcoin on Mt. Gox was almost $100 more than on any other exchange and customers were having difficulty withdrawing their funds).

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{See id.} at 309.

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{See id.} at 310–11.
from Mt. Gox wallets, wiping out virtually all of its customers as well as some of the exchange’s own holdings.\textsuperscript{151} The value of the lost crypto assets amounted to more than $400 million\textsuperscript{152} and represented approximately 6\% of the total outstanding Bitcoin.\textsuperscript{153} Surprisingly, the price of Bitcoin remained relatively robust in the face of this failure.\textsuperscript{154}

Karpelès eventually sought insolvency protection in Japanese bankruptcy court, where creditors—consisting mainly of Mt. Gox’s unhappy customers—filed claims totaling close to $600 million.\textsuperscript{155} The court entered an order of liquidation in April 2014, and appointed Japanese bankruptcy practitioner Nobuaki Kobayashi as trustee.\textsuperscript{156} Pursuant to the cross-border provisions of Chapter 15, a companion proceeding was opened in a bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Texas.\textsuperscript{157}

An added twist for the Mt. Gox proceedings, as compared to the Quadriga proceedings, was that Kobayashi was able to recover around 200,000 bitcoins after Karpelès turned over additional crypto assets that had been stashed away in Mt. Gox’s system.\textsuperscript{158} Following Japanese law, the bankruptcy court ordered Kobayashi to liquidate the newly discovered Bitcoin in order to pay creditor claims in fiat currency, with each Bitcoin’s value set at the then-current price of $483.\textsuperscript{159} However, during the lengthy process for customers to submit their claims and obtain court approval, the

\textsuperscript{151} See id. at 312. Other sources reported the loss at 850,000 bitcoins. See Jon Southurst, \textit{Mt. Gox Files for Bankruptcy, Claims $63.6 Million Debt}, COINDESK (Feb. 28, 2014, 11:33 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/mt-gox-files-bankruptcy-claims-63-6m-debt [https://perma.cc/TPD5-ZQXM].

\textsuperscript{152} See Popper, supra note 71, at 315.


\textsuperscript{154} See Popper, supra note 71, at 315.


\textsuperscript{156} See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132.

\textsuperscript{157} In re Mt. Gox Co., Ch. 15 No. 14-31229-sgj15 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014).


\textsuperscript{159} See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132 (explaining that the Japanese court fixed the approved claims to the value of Bitcoin as of April 2014, which totaled approximately $400 million).
price of Bitcoin rose to eighteen times its 2014 value. Continued liquidation promised a massive payday for Karpelès, who would receive any surplus after customers had been repaid at the depressed price of $483 per Bitcoin. Not surprisingly, Mt. Gox’s customers protested, arguing that they should be paid back in Bitcoin. However, Kobayashi’s hands were tied by the Japanese legal process, and he proceeded to liquidate close to $400 million in Bitcoin. As the liquidation proceeded, coin prices sunk: Bitcoin’s price had peaked in December 2017 at an all-time high of over $20,000 per coin; then, as Kobayashi sought to exchange the Bitcoin for fiat currency, the price of Bitcoin dropped by half. Kobayashi’s single biggest transfer of Bitcoin took place on February 5, 2018, which in turn marked a long-term low point for Bitcoin’s valuation at just over $6,000—less than a third of its price just two months earlier.

Due to this extreme volatility in the price of Bitcoin, the total value lost over the course of liquidation dwarfed the total amount of creditors’ approved claims. The fact that Karpelès received some surplus after the repayments at $483 per Bitcoin was the final straw for creditors, who successfully organized to put pressure on Kobayashi to halt the Bitcoin sales. In June 2018, Mt. Gox’s liquidation was converted to a rehabilitation


162 As one creditor complained, “Those of us who were burned by this are now permanently locked into that depressed price.” See Harney & Stecklow, supra note 132 (quoting software developer Aaron Gutman, who lost 464 bitcoins in the hack).

163 Id.

164 See Williams-Grut, supra note 161.

165 See id.

166 See Jeffries, supra note 160 (describing the formation of Mt. Gox Legal, led by Andy Pag).
proceeding, which meant that creditors could opt to be repaid in Bitcoin. The price of Bitcoin promptly rebounded.

The Mt. Gox liquidation in particular carries an important lesson for insolvency systems dealing with crypto assets: forced liquidation of crypto assets is a risky process. Not only does forced liquidation often drive down creditor recovery (a problem that occurs with many types of assets), but it can also drive down the value for other investors in the crypto asset at issue. Moreover, unlike forced sales of other assets in bankruptcy proceedings, such as real estate, the loss in value to other investors has ripple effects globally. A global problem calls for a global solution, so insolvency systems should be mindful of the need for uniformity. That said, requiring creditors to accept payment in Bitcoin seems to be the fairest system, both from the standpoint of creditors and from the perspective of coinvestors who would otherwise face losses from large-scale liquidation. Creditors who are paid in crypto assets will then be on even footing with other investors, regardless of whether they choose to remain invested in the crypto asset.

C. Avoiding Opportunistic Behaviors Enabled by High Volatility

A third problem that arises with crypto assets is the risk that creditors or debtors will exploit bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings in order to capitalize on the high volatility of crypto assets. Although such risks exist for other assets, the potential for opportunistic behavior is exacerbated by the

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168 The story for Mt. Gox creditors does not yet have a happy ending: rehabilitation proceedings have since ground to a halt, due to a massive $16 billion suit filed by Coinlab. See Nikhil De, Advocate for Mt Gox Creditors Quits, Saying Bitcoin Payouts Could Take Years, COINDKESK (Apr. 9, 2019, 9:16 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/coinlabs-mt-gox-claim-may-hold-up-payouts-for-another-2-years [https://perma.cc/VZ8D-GAVM]. After successfully leading the creditor uprising that would allow repayment in Bitcoin, Pag quit the fight in early 2019 and sold off his claims for quick cash. Id.

169 See generally Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, Forced Sale Risk: Class, Race, and the 'Double Discount,' 37 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 589, 601–03 (2010) ("In many areas of the law it is well accepted that an asset sold at a forced sale will likely sell for a price significantly below the asset’s fair market value.").

170 See Doherty, supra note 153, at 38–39 ("[D]ue to Bitcoin’s finite and largely unregulated existence, its supply can be easily affected large-scale by outside events, such as the Mt. Gox liquidation... .")
rising use of crypto assets as collateral. In particular, the extreme volatility of crypto assets means that there are more opportunities for lenders who were previously fully secured to suddenly find themselves undersecured. As explained in Section I.A, a consumer debtor might then be able to use the tools of Chapter 13 to strip down the lender’s lien to the current value of the collateral. A business debtor could achieve the same result using the tools of Chapter 11. Such opportunistic behavior could take other forms as well. However, this Section focuses primarily on the risk of opportunistic behavior by the debtor.

To explore the risks that we might see from crypto investors, we can consider behaviors that have already played out in real estate markets. This comparison is helpful from a policy perspective because the modern bankruptcy code, as well as the court decisions applying it, provide tools intended to prevent stakeholders from manipulating the volatility of the real estate market. However, these tools do not work for crypto assets as the volatility risks affect both the individual debtor–creditor relationships and the rest of the market for crypto assets. These impacts illustrate that there is an even stronger case for congressional intervention in crypto than there was for real estate.

In the business reorganization context, the risk of opportunistic behavior by debtors arose primarily from reorganization provisions that authorized debtors who obtained secured loans at a time when the collateral was highly valued to then use the bankruptcy code to reorganize if the value of the collateral fell, even temporarily. Under this scenario, any rise in value following a discharge would represent a windfall to the debtor. This strategy is, in a nutshell, “the Pine Gate problem” that Congress sought to fix in 1978 when it revamped the bankruptcy code.

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172 See Tabb, supra note 46, at 118 (explaining how, in the wake of Pine Gate, secured creditors went “straight to the legislature” and obtained “the kinds of protections they wanted against the sort of low-ball cram-down ignominy that Pine Gate wrought”).

173 See generally Douglas G. Baird, Remembering Pine Gate, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 5, 8 (2004) (referring to a debtor’s once unchecked ability to use bankruptcy to write down secured debt as the “Pine Gate problem”).
Professor Douglas Baird has described the circumstances surrounding the Pine Gate problem in colorful detail, but the basic facts are as follows: the Pine Gate bankruptcy involved a debtor who had borrowed $1.45 million to build an apartment complex. The complex was not nearly as profitable as projected, and the secured lender eventually sought to foreclose by arguing for a low valuation of the asset. But, using the debtor-friendly tools of the prior version of the bankruptcy code, Pine Gate’s developers were able to use reorganization proceedings not only to retain the apartment complex, but also to write down the loan significantly. The developers emerged from bankruptcy lien-free by paying the formerly secured lender $1.032 million—barely two-thirds of the amount the lender had advanced just a few years earlier.

The Pine Gate decision quickly became infamous in bankruptcy circles, due in part to the influence of William Norton, Jr., the bankruptcy judge who put his stamp of approval on the debtor’s plan. Judge Norton’s decision was widely criticized for striking the wrong balance: allowing the debtor to capture all of the benefits of any future appreciation of the apartment complex, while imposing the consequences of any undervaluation on the lender. Indeed, Congress expressly cited the Pine Gate decision when revamping the bankruptcy code.

In his article, Professor Baird identified three statutory tools that Congress enacted to prevent future debtors from similarly exploiting the volatility and valuation problems that arise in the real estate lending market:

174 See id. at 6–8.
175 Id. at 7.
176 Id.
178 See id. at *1.
179 Professor Charles Tabb uses the adjective “notorious” to describe Judge Norton’s decision in Pine Gate. See Tabb, supra note 46, at 117.
Section 1111(b)(1), which allows a lender to turn nonrecourse debt into recourse debt; Section 1111(b)(2), which allows a lender to treat the entire amount of its allowed claim as secured; and Section 1129(b)(2), which ensures that when a plan is confirmed over a lender’s objection, the lender will nonetheless receive the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of its collateral.\(^{183}\)

These statutory responses to the Pine Gate problem give secured creditors more tools to protect themselves from debtors who use volatility opportunistically. In particular, these statutory tools prevent secured creditors from being at a systemic disadvantage relative to other creditors, or to the debtor itself, due to fluctuations in the value of the collateral. Importantly, these tools work most effectively if the secured creditor makes an accurate assessment about the current and future value of the collateral. Of course, creating incentives for accurate valuation does not always ensure that the valuation will be accurate. A creditor’s failure to make an accurate valuation, if accepted by the court, could still result in forced sales that destroy value, thereby inflicting external costs on the broader market.

This last point is not a significant problem in the real estate market, because the fallout from secured creditors’ suboptimal choices is generally localized. For example, the collapse of the savings and loan industry in 1984 prompted a wave of bankruptcy filings involving single asset real estate ventures.\(^{184}\) The surge began in Texas and then extended to nearby regions.\(^{185}\) The Northeast experienced its own surge, as did California and Florida.\(^{186}\) The relatively localized nature of this crisis allowed local courts to develop their own approaches to the flood of cases.\(^{187}\) However, the shortcomings of these statutory fixes may become more apparent in the crypto asset market, where—as the Mt. Gox trustee demonstrated—untimely liquidations based on pessimism about future value can have negative effects that are felt around the globe.\(^{188}\) The risk for opportunistic behavior by creditors is also

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\(^{183}\) See Baird, supra note 173, at 9–10. In the interest of concision, this Essay will not attempt to provide a detailed explanation of these concepts, but interested readers may find Professor Baird’s article quite helpful to explain how these tools work in practice.


\(^{185}\) Id.

\(^{186}\) Id.

\(^{187}\) See id.

\(^{188}\) See supra text accompanying notes 97–110.
possible, particularly if the creditors are in a position to benefit from volatility and can use the statutory tools cynically to create price swings.189

Finally, the risk of opportunistic behaviors is not limited to Chapter 11 debtors: consumer debtors may be able to use Chapter 13 to reduce the value of liens on crypto collateral.190 Once again, a comparison to the real estate market provides helpful context. Prior to 1992, consumer debtors attempted to use the bankruptcy code to strip down liens on home mortgages when real estate values had fallen.191 The Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in *Dewsnup v. Timm* put a halt to this practice.192 Over a sharp dissent from Justice Scalia,193 the majority conceded that rejecting the debtor’s straightforward application of the lien-stripping provisions of the bankruptcy code was “not without its difficulty.”194 However, the majority explained that the “windfall” for a debtor who was allowed to use lien stripping in this manner would upend the home mortgage market.195 Surely Congress could not have intended such a significant outcome.196

The *Dewsnup* decision has been widely criticized by courts and commentators alike.197 These critiques raise doubts about whether *Dewsnup*’s logic, dependent as it is on the reliance interests of home mortgage lenders, would be extended to lenders in the relatively new crypto

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191 See, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1306 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The majority of the bankruptcy and district courts that have considered this issue agree that the language of Sec. 506 allows a Chapter 7 debtor to void liens secured by property that is not administered.”).


193 *Id.* at 420–36.

194 *Id.* at 417.

195 *Id.*

196 *Id.*

collateral lending market. Thus, in the future, we may see debtors using bankruptcy opportunistically to try to strip down liens on crypto collateral, creating another round of valuation and statutory interpretation problems for bankruptcy courts.

D. Planning Around Future Jurisdictional Headaches

A final feature unique to crypto assets is the wrench that these assets throw into traditional analysis of jurisdiction. In particular, crypto assets pose a new complication when a court’s authority to dispose of certain assets depends on in rem jurisdiction: namely, how to determine the location of an asset that arguably exists only in digital form. Already we see regulators and lawmakers around the world approaching these issues differently. Under some proposals, the location of the key that unlocks the digital asset is the hook for in rem jurisdiction. In others, regulators have focused on the location of the server on which the asset is stored. Under this approach, to determine jurisdiction over a wallet-stored crypto asset, we would look to the location of the server for the entity that provides the wallet services. Finally, some commentators have argued that jurisdictional concepts are meaningless because these assets exist both nowhere and everywhere.

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198 See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]he legislative history indicat[es] that favorable treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market.").

199 See, e.g., Dillon Collett, Cryptocurrency Assets Under Insolvency and Personal Property Security Law, AIRD BERLIS (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.airdberlis.com/insights/publications/publication/cryptocurrency-assets-under-insolvency-and-personal-property-security-law [https://perma.cc/3LVP-ABX6] (suggesting that obtaining the debtor’s cooperation to take possession of the private key might avoid an otherwise “lengthy and tedious” process, especially if the debtor has stored the private key offline).

200 See, e.g., Dealing With Cryptocurrency in a Bankrupt Estate, AUSTL. FIN. SECURITY AUTHORITY, https://www.afsa.gov.au/insolvency/i-am-practitioner/dealing-cryptocurrency-bankrupt-estate [https://perma.cc/97KW-QARS] (explaining that the trustee should immediately gain control of the digital key to unlock the crypto asset and should consider using UNCITRAL if the key is stored in an extraterritorial wallet).

201 For an early articulation of this view, see, for example, Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 Int’l L. 1167, 1170 (1998) (arguing that the fact that actions in cyberspace can have global effects “requires the abandonment, or at least compromise, of sovereign claims” to jurisdiction). Japan’s approach seems to fit into this last category. See generally Akihiro Shiba, What Tokyo’s Mt Gox Ruling Means for Bitcoin in Japan, COINDESK (Aug. 14, 2015, 3:25 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/what-tokyos-mt-gox-ruling-means-for-bitcoin-in-japan
Interestingly, the current U.S. approach most closely resembles this third option, in that we define our bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction as being coextensive with the reach of 11 U.S.C. § 541, which defines property of the estate as “property, wherever located and by whomever held.”202 But this approach may eventually create conflicts in cross-border cases, where Chapter 15 requires U.S. courts to defer to proceedings that occur in “the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests”—also known as the COMI principle, which guides European bankruptcy jurisprudence.204 Although current approaches to cross-border insolvencies have generally promoted comity and function over strict adherence to form,205 jurisdictional skirmishes have already limited the extraterritorial application of U.S. judgments in some instances.206 If other, more favorable jurisdictions opt to take a more restrictive approach to in rem jurisdiction over crypto assets, we may see similar skirmishes in future large-scale bankruptcies involving widely held crypto assets.207

[https://perma.cc/EYE4-XE93] (explaining why a Japanese court rejected a Mt. Gox customer’s argument that his Bitcoin was an object of ownership that the court should order returned: Article 85 of the Japanese civil code requires that “an object of ownership must occupy a portion of space” whereas crypto assets merely represent contractual rights and obligations).


203 See id. § 1502(4) (defining “foreign main proceeding”); id. § 1517(a)-(b) (stating the standard for recognition of a foreign proceeding); see also id. § 1508 (“In interpreting this chapter, the court shall consider its international origin, and the need to promote an application of this chapter that is consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.”).


205 See generally UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION 3 (2014) (“The purpose of this Law is to . . . promote the objectives of: [c]ooperation between the courts and other competent authorities of this State and foreign States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency; . . . [p]rotection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets; and [f]acilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.”).

206 See, e.g., Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 (appeal taken from Eng.) (refusing to enforce a U.S. judgment in accordance with Chapter 15 due to the failure to satisfy local personal jurisdiction standards); see also Osterman & Dandeneau, supra note 11, at 189–91 (discussing cross-border skirmishes between U.S. and German bankruptcy courts over patent licensing in the Qimonda bankruptcy).

207 See generally Collett, supra note 199 (describing that cryptocurrencies “are intended to be borderless” and that the location of the main proceeding will have large implications).
III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT WAIT-AND-SEE APPROACH

As this Essay shows, bankruptcy systems have yet to forge a cogent and comprehensive approach for how to manage crypto assets. One explanation for the agnostic approach in cases like *HashFast*, and the current void of concrete guidance, is that bankruptcy courts and litigants alike would prefer to wait until other authorities have had a full opportunity to characterize and regulate this asset. But this wait-and-see approach is a mistake for three reasons.

First, the speculative nature of crypto assets creates a potent risk of a future market collapse, which would likely lead to a surge in bankruptcy filings. To see how this risk might play out for bankruptcy, we can look to the collapse of the real estate market in the early 1980s. Single-asset real estate filings surged, overwhelming bankruptcy courts. This wave of filings in turn prompted a variety of inconsistent and arguably inadequate responses, including judicial work-arounds that had no basis in the text of the bankruptcy code. A crypto market failure could have a similarly detrimental effect on bankruptcy, with overwhelmed and underprepared bankruptcy courts aiming for quick dispositions as opposed to thoughtful decisions that guarantee consistency or that make sense from a long-term policy perspective. Moreover, the global nature of crypto assets practically ensures that the fallout will be far more widespread than it would be with other assets.

Second, there is little upside to a wait-and-see approach, because waiting for other authorities to act is unlikely to yield a coherent framework that would allow bankruptcy courts to handle these assets efficiently. To the contrary, legal developments surrounding crypto assets look more like

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208 See *supra* Part I.
209 See generally Clark, *supra* note 184, at 179 (explaining that bankruptcy serves as “a ready device with which to blunt the worst effects” of a market collapse).
210 See id. (explaining that the number of single-asset Chapter 11 filings surged from dozens to thousands after the speculative real estate bubble burst).
211 Id. at 179–80 (explaining that the variety of approaches and lack of consistency in the single-asset real estate cases “skew[ed] the law” and “may have rendered [Chapter 11] less of a fit” for other types of debtors).
212 See, e.g., Lemchuk, *supra* note 3, at 323 (“[W]hile government actors have been stepping into the virtual currency world and trying to set its borders, the assortment of definitions and regulations seem more to confuse than clarify.”).
regulatory power grabs than an effort to provide a meaningful framework. Moreover, as Part II shows, crypto assets have unique features that create idiosyncratic problems for bankruptcy. Accordingly, waiting on other actors would likely leave the bankruptcy system with a patchwork approach that still forces difficult and uncertain choices about how to handle crypto assets in bankruptcy proceedings. Because crypto assets create unique problems in the bankruptcy context, bankruptcy will likely need its own framework to properly address how these assets should function within bankruptcy.

Third, a wait-and-see approach could inhibit the development of reliable crypto enterprises here in the United States, which in turn could eventually limit U.S. courts’ ability to take meaningful action in bankruptcies and reorganizations that involve crypto assets. Without any real certainty or even guidance about how crypto assets will be treated under Title 11 of the United States Code, sophisticated players may be tempted to look elsewhere for a framework that provides more clarity (or, from a cynical perspective, lax regulation). Moreover, depending on how the jurisdictional issues discussed in Section II.D play out, the COMI principles followed by the European Union could eventually become a barrier to U.S. courts seeking to exercise jurisdiction over digital assets held on foreign servers. Large-scale cases involving crypto assets would more likely be filed in jurisdictions that have a stronger COMI claim, and U.S. courts may be shut out of this arena entirely.

CONCLUSION

The possibility that the United States will be shut out of the crypto bankruptcy arena is an important consideration for the country, one that

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213 See, e.g., id. at 320–23 (describing the patchwork of state and federal regulation and judicial rulings, which has led to a split over whether cryptocurrencies are property or currency); id. at 349–50 (arguing that agencies such as the CFTC and the SEC need to collaborate in regulating crypto assets rather than pursuing overlapping but disparate regulatory actions).

214 See Mandjee, supra note 3, at 9 (explaining that the proper legal characterization of Bitcoin depends in large part on the type of use that is being regulated).


216 See generally Bryan Rochelle, Cross-Border Insolvency in the U.S. and U.K.: Conflicting Approaches to Defining the Locus of a Debtor’s “Center of Main Interests,” 50 INT’L LAW. 391, 391 (2017) (“This lack of clarity [about how to apply COMI principles] has left courts on both sides of the proverbial ‘pond’ with the task of formulating definitions of their own.”).
raises questions about its continued leadership role, not just in insolvency but in the future global economy. Although myths of American exceptionalism may at times overstate the case, the United States has long been recognized as a global leader in corporate reorganization.\footnote{See, e.g., Deborah Ball, \textit{Europe Builds Own Chapter 11}, \textit{WALL ST. J.} (Apr. 5, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323296504578398612178796882 [https://perma.cc/Y8GG-EHB5] (“[T]he Continent’s bankruptcy laws are getting an extreme makeover. And the model for European lawmakers is Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.”).} Though the U.S. system may not always get the right answer, our decades of experience with a time-tested framework for Chapter 11 reorganizations serves as a useful base model that other countries can choose either to mirror or to deviate from. Either way, the choice is both conscious and informed.

However, if the United States’ insolvency systems continue to ignore the mounting issues presented by crypto assets, we may see other jurisdictions stepping into that void and positioning themselves as the base model for handling crypto assets. Perhaps that is for the best, but at the very least, the possibility of a future in which U.S. bankruptcy courts are relegated to second-tier status ought to be a conscious and informed choice. This is exactly why the United States bankruptcy system’s lack of focus on crypto assets is so troubling: without some centralized effort to address the particular challenges associated with crypto assets, we may find ourselves with no choices left at all.