2019

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Deliberation and Decision-Making Process in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Do Individual Opinions Matter?\(^1\)*

Ranieri Lima Resende\(^2\),

The work is focused on the adjudicatory nature of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and investigates its model of deliberation, considering three basic schemes: per curiam, seriatim and hybrid. In order to identify an institutional pattern, the importance of individual opinions is analyzed through the quantitative performance of each category of judge (ad hoc and regular), as well as each type of adjudicative activity (judgments and advisory opinions). The quantitative data is also useful to better understand the explicit assimilation of separate opinions to the core reasoning of future cases. As a result, it has been possible to identify relevant aspects applicable to the main problem of whether individual opinions really matter to the Inter-American Court’s decision-making process.

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\(^1\) I thank Professors John Ferejohn and Lewis Kornhauser (NYU) for their valuable comments and Professor Hélène Tigroudja (Aix-Marseille), JSD Candidates and Researchers for their important suggestions during the JSD/NYU Forum (Spring 2018), as well as Professor Alexandra Huneeus (UW-Madison) for her gentle indications. In this opportunity, I also thank Professors José Ribas Vieira, Carlos Bolonha and Cecilia Caballero Lois (UFRJ) for their supervision, encouragement and academic support. The responsibility for any mistakes remains with the author.

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INTRODUCTION

The problem addressed in this article was born from some general issues connected to the institutional behavior of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court), such as the deliberative pattern adopted by the Court, the decision-making process developed throughout the Court’s practice, and the repercussion of the judges’ individual opinions regarding the reasoning of the Inter-American judgments.¹

In summary, concurrent and divergent opinions have one essential characteristic centered in the reasoning that represents the individual views of their authors (judges or arbitrators) as distinct from those of the Court as a whole.⁴

Due to their profuse number, separate opinions have been used by actors of the Inter-American System and the Court itself, as demonstrated by the following situations:

i) the request for interpretation of an individual opinion related to the Quispialaya Vilcapoma case by the Peruvian State, which was refused by the Court based on the argument that separate opinions shall not be the object of this remedy.⁵ Prima facie, the logical conclusion would be the exclusion of the individual opinions from the Court’s reasoning, in spite of the condemned State’s contrary understanding;

ii) the use of individual opinions as the Court’s reasoning in several briefs by demanding States, e.g. the preliminary exception of

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¹ For this paper, I have adopted the term “Separate Opinion” as synonym of “Individual Opinion” and, to differentiate the respective conclusion according to the collegiate body’s position, I assumed the terms “Concurrent Opinion” and “Dissenting Opinion” (or “Divergent Opinion”).


competence presented by Guatemalan State in the Members of the Village of Chichupac case (separate opinion of Judge García Sayán in the case of the Massacres of El Mozote), and the final arguments presented by the Venezuelan State in the Ríos et al. case (separate opinion of Judge García Ramírez in the case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison);

iii) the explicit quotation of separate opinions in the quality of judicial reasoning by the Court itself, as shown by the judgment in the cases of Baena Ricardo et al. (individual opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade in the Advisory Opinion OC-18/03), and Castañeda Gutman (individual opinion of Judge Piza Escalante in the Advisory Opinion OC-7/85).

In principle, identifying such a large amount of individual opinions and their argumentative use could intuitively support the perception that the Inter-American Court’s decision-making process is outlined by aggregating the content of separate opinions regarding past judgments. In order to confirm or refute this perception, a quantitative analysis may produce interesting results for gauging the impact of separate opinions of some judges in comparison to others.

In the first part of this paper, I analyze the adjudicative nature of the Inter-American Court’s institutional activity in order to identify the theoretical models of deliberation and one in which the Court’s deliberative pattern may fit in.

Next, I attempt to better understand the role of ad hoc judges in the Inter-American Court as a possible deviation from impartiality and independence in judgments, because of their direct national connection with the respondent States.

Based on these assumptions, I search for patterns of production of individual opinions in judgments (June 1987 – Aug. 2017) and advisory opinions (Sept. 1982 – Nov. 2017) as available at the Court’s website, in order to identify whether or not the separate opinions were well-distributed among a large number of judges, as an institutional characteristic, or concentrated within a small group, which may reveal personal tendencies.

At last, I focus on the analysis of separate opinions quoted by the Inter-American Court at the core reasoning of its subsequent judgments and advisory opinions, which have generated some unexpected results.

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I. INTER-AMERICAN COURT: AN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIVE INSTITUTION

According to Jeremy Waldron, within a constitutional system based on the separation of powers, the distribution of State functions among different political structures (or institutions) seems to be the keystone of the constitutional theory itself. As a result, the dignity of legislation, the independence of courts and the authority of the executive, exercised by fundamentally distinct entities and persons, tend to generate, in principle, a political environment that is refractory to tyranny and abuse of power. In my previous work, which analyzed the structure of the World Trade Organization (WTO), I adopted the Armin von Bogdandy’s model of division of functions within that international institution. This model postulates:

i) an executive function, centered on the attributions of application, management and operation of multilateral and plurilateral agreements;

ii) a legislative function, focused on the members’ negotiation forum; and

iii) an adjudicative function, centered on the dispute resolution system.

One point deserves special attention regarding the executive function: the absence of a central organ within the Inter-American System, which is similar to the structure of the WTO. Unlike the model adopted by some international organizations (e.g.: International Monetary Fund, World Bank), the WTO does not have an executive collegiate body formed by a strict group of Members to expedite deliberative and decision-making processes. The level of decentralization of the System seems even higher when analyzed the role of the Organization of American States (OAS) and its organs, especially the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the diffuse participation of the Member States.

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11 See generally M. de Montesquieu, Of the Constitution of England, in The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 198 (1777) (discussing the dangers of legislative and executive powers vested in one person or one group of people); The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison) (elucidating the tyrannical dangers of accumulated power in one person or one group of people).
13 Id. at 88-89.
16 Organization of American States, Charter (A-41), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp (“Article 106. There shall be an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, whose principal function shall be to promote the observance
On the other hand, the legislative function is exercised by the *fora* of the States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights and the Member States of the OAS, who negotiate treaties and produce international normative acts applicable to the whole Inter-American System.

Inspired by this paradigm and considering the institutional design of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, it is possible to see that the Inter-American Court has developed an adjudicative function *per excellence*. Through its jurisdiction over litigant matters, the Court produces international rulings to resolve disputes based on obligations mandated by the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica, 1969) in cases of violation of human rights. In this sense, the Court only judges the behavior of States Parties which have expressly accepted its jurisdiction.

As well criticized by José E. Alvarez, the classic, old-fashioned prototype of adjudication in international law involved strict elements: independent judges, relatively precise and pre-existing legal norms, adversary proceedings, and a dichotomous decision in which one of the parties should prevail. According to this formal perspective, the production of advisory opinions would not be part of the adjudicatory activity.

Nevertheless, inspired by Henry J. Steiner’s work, Alvarez understands that it is possible to include the human rights regional court’s consultative function within the sphere of adjudication, based on the legal effects of advisory opinions beyond the boundaries of a single dispute, in order to promote dialogues on human rights norms between international and national and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these matters.”).


18 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.htm (“Article 63. 1. If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 2. In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission”).


21 See Alvarez, supra note 19, at 540, 545, 558; see also José E. Alvarez, *What are International Judges for? The Main Function of International Adjudication, in Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication* 159, 168-70 (Cesare P. R. Romano et al. eds., 2014).
branches and, simultaneously, to decide in advance a number of future probable cases.22

A good example of this phenomenon may be identified in the advisory opinion of Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (1985),23 whose reasoning was adopted by some national constitutional and supreme courts in Latin America.24 This advisory opinion forbade internationally illicit prerequisites applicable to journalists and safeguarded the freedom of expression. As a consequence of the adoption of this opinion by some national courts, several cases were not submitted before the Inter-American System.

In this sense, the adjudicatory activity of the Inter-American Court seems to encompass the resolution of cases as well as the production of advisory opinions.

Although the Pact of San José is the fundamental treaty of the Inter-American System, its substantive and procedural norms have undergone an evident process of expansion. From a formal perspective, the American Convention and the OAS Charter are the strong core of the protective mechanism, but, from a material point of view, the system’s normative base shows highly dynamic characteristics.

As registered in specialized legal literature,25 examples of such expansion can be found in the express references by the Inter-American Court to the Protocol of San Salvador (1988)26 and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994)27, and likewise other regional treaties in which the Court assumes its implicit interpretive capacity, such as the Inter-


American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985)\textsuperscript{28} and the Convention of Belém do Pará (1994)\textsuperscript{29}. There are also international legal standards which cannot be classified as treaties but they are part of the named \textit{Inter-American Corpus Juris}, such as the Inter-American Democratic Charter approved by the OAS General Assembly (2001)\textsuperscript{30} and the OAS Resolution on Access to Public Information (2006).\textsuperscript{31}

Considering this, we should pay special attention to Article 64 of the American Convention,\textsuperscript{32} according to which the Inter-American Court may exercise its consultative jurisdiction for the institutional interpretation of any global or regional human rights treaty applicable to the American Continent, if the treaty has been ratified by at least one OAS Member.\textsuperscript{33}

Another important aspect is the Court’s competence for monitoring the compliance with its own judgments and, in the hypothesis of persistent non-implementation by the recalcitrant State, the Tribunal may report the situation before the OAS General Assembly\textsuperscript{34} for collective deliberation and application of institutional measures. In spite of this abstract design, the Court’s institutional practice in compliance procedure has revealed a more diffuse,
symbolic role which reinforces the conclusion that the political balance applicable to non-compliance issues has not produced effective results overall.

In this sense, the structural characteristic of diffusion permeates the Inter-American System through the complex interactions between institutional, procedural and normative aspects, far from the simplistic perspective of solely two participating organs (namely, Inter-American Commission and Court).

Based on the specific adjudicatory function exercised by the Inter-American Court in the production of international rulings, it is important to identify the deliberative model adopted and, in connection, investigate the weight of the judges’ individual opinions within the Court’s practice.

II. DELIBERATION AND DECISION

After rich academic debate on this article’s initial draft, the best option has been to concentrate the analysis on the formation of the Inter-American Court’s judgments, especially through the verification of its deliberative practice, which includes the identification of the ratio deciden
di in the Court’s reasoning. A quantitative analysis option aims to map relevant decisional patterns in the judicial practice, particularly regarding the explicit importance of individual opinions for future cases.

These aspects, which appear simple at first sight, expose relevant typologies of the judicial deliberative process that are clearly distinct from the final decision-making moment and result.

Despite the fact that the two categories reflect a wider spectrum of the decision-making process (lato sensu), it is fundamental to distinguish “deliberation” from “decision” (stricto sensu). Seen from a temporal perspective, deliberation is a prerequisite to the conclusive moment, and it can be understood as a necessary interstice within the democratic decision-making process, in which an exchange of arguments, communicating discourse and rational persuasion take place.

The distinctive schemes of deliberation and decision have their roots in the example extracted from the Homeric tradition and quoted by Aristotle. According to his Nicomachean Ethics, the kings announced their choices to


Alexandra Huneeus, Compliance with Judgments and Decisions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 438, 449-51 (Cesare P. R. Romano et al. eds., 2014).


It is important to register that this specific research does not aim to analyze the external repercussions of separate opinions, for instance, before constitutional or supreme courts of the States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights, neither focus on their implicit influence on subsequent judgments of the Inter-American Court itself.


the people after prior deliberation. This reveals the judgment to be a direct result of the deliberative interstice and centered in the definition not of ends, but of means.

The capacity to engage in rational action might originate in the foundations of the deliberative process, in order to allow effective communication among persons involved in the decision-making process.

In a democratic environment, the primordial commitment is to adopt decisions in the public sphere after effective public deliberations, during which access to the deliberative forum should be free for all. This would mean every citizen must have the capacity to convince and be convinced by good reasons. On the other hand, all citizens have an obligation to accept the deliberative choice about a public action adopted by the majority.

Obviously, the typical deliberative process before judicial organs does not allow the same open participation to all citizens or their Parliamentary representatives, as part of deciding each case under judgment. However, given that the courts are collegiate institutions, where reasons are generated through an internal process of deliberation and guided by applicable norms and based on democratic premises, the underlying reasons must become public.

Some difficulties seem to arise from the applicability of the democratic concept to non-state institutions, such as international organizations and courts, due to the strong limitations to a broad implementation of the majoritarian premise in international arena. Nevertheless, the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship derived from the Kantian perspective may provide an interesting theoretical support, especially when visualized the main role of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights in protecting individuals and minorities against violations performed by public authorities.

Through an interesting criticism against the Robert A. Dahl’s conception of bureaucratic bargaining system applicable to international organizations, which are characterized as non-democratic institutions, James Tobin points out that the unrestricted majority rule could be disastrous for minorities, for equality of citizens (or members) before the law, and for the democratic continuity itself.

Even if the democratic nature of international organizations cannot be unequivocally assumed, as may demonstrate the role and practice of the UN

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46 James Tobin, A Comment on Dahl’s Skepticism, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 37, 38 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999).
Security Council, for instance, there are undeniable, structural elements of democratic deliberation within international courts’ decision-making and procedure, such as formal, objective justifications for the adjudicatory activity, and the compliance with due process standards based on the rules of the court.

Given the fundamental distinction between deliberation and decision also applicable to international courts, it is important to identify which deliberative model seems more adequate to describe the dynamics of the Inter-American Court.

III. GENERAL DELIBERATIVE MODELS: ELEMENTARY DISTINCTIONS

Meanwhile, there is an interesting variable relevant to legal research on the types of deliberative performances within the decision-making process, i.e. the dynamic distance between per curiam and seriatim models.

According to the long-established English and American judicial tradition, there are three basic schemes of collegiate court deliberation:

i) per curiam model: characterized by externalization of the unified opinion of the court without publicity of the judges’ individual opinions;

ii) seriatim model: when each judge’s judgment is publicly presented one at a time, as an individual opinion, to be used in composing a possible myriad of reasonings that might contain the opinion of the court;

iii) hybrid model: centered on externalization of the court’s majority opinion, which has synthesized the institutional position, but at the same time, the judges may express their concurrent or divergent individual opinions.

The initial phase of judicial reasoning in a per curiam deliberative environment would be quite imperceptible to the general public, as the final, explicit product of the deliberation appears as the unified court’s opinion. Based on this model, the problem of the topographic location of a precedent, for instance, is easily solved by the concentrated factual and legal reasoning adopted unanimously or by the majority.

A historic demonstration of the per curiam scheme can be identified in the arbitral deliberative model promoted by the Hague system of dispute resolution, based on the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. According to the

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50 José Ribas Vieira & Margarida Lacombe Camargo, A Dificuldade de se Criar Precedentes, JOTA (Sept. 21, 2015), https://jota.info/artigos/a-dificuldade-de-se-criar-precedentes-21092015.
first conference, arbitrators had the right to register their dissent in the award, but without any reasoning, while the last one completely suppressed the dissenting rule, under the belief that public divergent positions would reveal national biases of the arbitrators, which could generate difficulties for the implementation of decisions by national States.\textsuperscript{51}

In an interesting comparative study, Rufino do Vale asserts that secret deliberation is highly consolidated in the Spanish legal order, especially regarding constitutional jurisdiction, in order to emphasize the Court’s collegiality in generating a unique decision for the general public, even when individual opinions are available (hybrid model).\textsuperscript{52}

To provide another example of the hybrid scheme, Robert S. Summers analyzes the New York State Court of Appeals, where a typical decision is preceded by a concentrated majoritarian opinion, followed by diffuse concurrent opinions and, if any, divergent opinions. In the hypothesis of unanimity, the unified opinion of the Collegiate is published as one sole document (if there were no concurrent opinions). In both cases, only the majoritarian or the unanimous reasoning has sufficient power to generate a binding precedent.\textsuperscript{53} Based on this judicial practice, other documents of the decision cannot attract the ratio decidendi.

On the other hand, one clear example of the seriatim model can be found in the Brazilian Supreme Court’s decision-making process. Its deliberative option was reinforced by the creation of Justice TV (TV Justiça) in 2002 and Justice Radio (Rádio Justiça) in 2004, which simultaneously broadcast plenary judgments.\textsuperscript{54} This means that the general public can watch entire live judgments, displaying an overly public type of deliberation. The formalistic sequence of the judges’ individual opinions, presented one by one according to the Rules of the Court, immediately publicizes the judges’ legal reasoning and, after the publication of the decision, their written considerations become fully available for all.\textsuperscript{55}

A relevant uncertainty risk permeates precedent formation in courts that adopt the seriatim model. This is based on judges’ individual autonomy in presenting their separate opinions and publicly sustaining their persuasive arguments, as the judgment itself carries nothing more than a sum of monocratic, isolated decisions. Because of the accumulation of diffuse opinions, sometimes in a completely inharmonic way, the synthesized opinion of the court

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{See} Jhabvala, \textit{supra} note 4, at 35-38.

\textsuperscript{52} \textsc{André Rufino do Vale}, \textit{La deliberación en los tribunales constitucionales: un estudio empírico de las prácticas deliberativas del Tribunal Constitucional de España y del Supremo Tribunal Federal de Brasil} 35, 79-80, 95-96 (Laura Criado Sánchez transl., 2017).


\textsuperscript{54} \textit{See} Thiago Luis Sombra, \textit{Why Should Public Hearings in the Brazilian Supreme Court Be Understood as an Innovative Democratic Tool in Constitutional Adjudication?}, 17 \textit{German L.J.} 657, 668-69 (2016).

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{See} Vale, \textit{supra} note 52, at 134, 174-75; \textit{see also} Diego Werneck Arguelhes, \textit{The Open Court and its Enemies: Publicity in Judicial Deliberations Reconsidered} 24 (Feb. 2018) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
might not appear as clear and precise. In this case, the prospective precedent would generate similar obscurities and imprecisions.\textsuperscript{56}

Based on the inherently structural nature of the precedent for public authorities,\textsuperscript{57} this kind of risk will be detrimental to both external assimilation of the judicial reasoning and its internal legal repercussion on future cases.

IV. DELIBERATIVE OPTION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT AND THE WEIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS

A. Ad Hoc Judges: A Deviation?

Before the analysis the deliberative scheme adopted by the Inter-American Court, it is necessary to distinguish the categories of ordinary judges from ad hoc judges according to the rules applicable to international courts.

It is interesting to notice that the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ, 1922-1946) had a specific provision on ad hoc judges,\textsuperscript{58} which had caused intense debate in the Advisory Committee of Jurists responsible for drafting the Statute. After the great powers had refused the proposal which forbade individuals to judge cases connected to their original national States,\textsuperscript{59} the solution found by the Committee in its famous meetings of 1920\textsuperscript{60} was the extension of the prerogative for all litigant States, through the faculty of ad hoc judge nomination for cases under the Court’s appreciation.

During these meetings, the members of the Advisory Committee tackled important issues regarding ad hoc judges, such as the problem of the variable number of judges in proportion to the number of parties (Loder),\textsuperscript{61} the ad hoc judges’ tendency to express individual opinions dissenting from the majority (Lapradelle),\textsuperscript{62} the prohibition of recording dissent opinions applied to the ad hoc judges as a measure of independence with regard to national pressure (Lapradelle & Fernandes),\textsuperscript{63} and the low likelihood of ordinary judges from


\textsuperscript{58} Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 379, 450 (“Article 31. Judges of the nationality of each of the contesting parties shall retain their right to sit in the case before the Court. If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, the other party may choose a person to sit as judge”).


\textsuperscript{61} Id. at 534.

\textsuperscript{62} Id. at 535.

\textsuperscript{63} Id. at 591-92.
Asiatic, South-American or “smaller” States which would be compensated by the ad hoc judges’ nominations (Phillimore)\(^{64}\).

Notwithstanding the prevailing position in the Committee synthetized in the final text of Article 31 of the PCIJ Statute,\(^{65}\) the consensus on these issues has not always been achieved by Jurists, and defensible divergences remain.

These topics can be summed in three essential perspectives: the reason d’être of the ad hoc judge, its functional independence, and its distinction related to an ordinary (or regular) judge in international adjudicatory institutions.

First, it is urgent to recognize the immanent deviation from the principle of judicial independence (\textit{nemo iudex in sua causa})\(^{66}\) generated by the participation of national judges in judgments involving their respective national States. This originally happened when they were in the position of regular judges. Therefore, the justifications for the procedural right to nominate ad hoc judges were centered in the equality argument, in order to compensate this unbalanced situation inside the international adjudicatory process.

Considering the continuity of the PCIJ Statute’s text after the new Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 1946–),\(^{67}\) which absorbed the previous, consolidated rules, this issue focused on the judicial impartiality remained as a cogent argument, as pointed out by Fitzmaurice and Guerrero,\(^{68}\) for whom the independence of the ad hoc judges may be affected by their tendency to voice the point of view defended by the government of their respective national States.

Despite these criticisms, part of the specialized legal literature sustains that there is sufficient support to ad hoc judges in the ICJ’s institutional practice, based on which the negative aspects apparently would not affect the credibility and independence of the Court.\(^{69}\) On the other hand, even though the quantitative analysis of the ICJ’s judgments shows a few voting tendencies of national judges (regular and ad hoc), they are always a small minority, not more than two in the entire Court.\(^{70}\) Additionally, the ad hoc judges “shall not be

\(^{64}\) Id. at 537, 576.

\(^{65}\) PCIJ Statute, \textit{supra} note 58.


taken into account for the calculation of the quorum” based on the Rules of the Court (Article 20.3).71

Under the historical inspiration of the World Court’s model, the Inter-American System on Human Rights has accepted the ad hoc judges in the composition of the Court during judgments.72

Theoretically, the participation of ad hoc judges in the Inter-American Court could possibly explain a high number of separate opinions. According to the Pact of San José,73 the respondent States have the option of appointing one ad hoc judge, when there is not a permanent judge of its own nationality in the collegiate body. In this sense, the natural conclusion would be the moral duty of the ad hoc judges to present individual opinions in the judgments, even if to publicly justify their appointments.

Nevertheless, there is no reasonable justification for the ad hoc judges to participate every case before human rights courts. These cases are based on the individual procedural initiative against the State, differently from the classic international adjudication State vis-à-vis State.74 In this sense, the Inter-American Court has changed its understanding on the subject in the Advisory Opinion OC-20/09 requested by Argentina, when the Tribunal concluded that the appointment of ad hoc judges is restricted to contentious cases originated by inter-state communications, but not by individual petitions.75 Afterwards, the Rules of the Court were adapted to this new position, stating that the national judge of the respondent State shall not participate in the hearing and deliberation of individual cases,76 in order to restore the original solution discussed during the Advisory Committee of Jurists’ meetings of 1920.77

Therefore, changes in the Court’s rules and practice on ad hoc judges have intensely impacted the quantitative analyses, including the complete cessation of occurrences of separate opinions by ad hoc judges after 2011.78

73 American Convention, supra note 18 (“Article 55. […] 3. If among the judges called upon to hear a case none is a national of any of the States Parties to the case, each of the latter may appoint an ad hoc judge”).
74 LEDESMA, supra note 72, at 185.
76 Aida Torres Pérez, La Independencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos desde una Perspectiva Institucional, in DERECHOS HUMANOS: POSIBILIDADES TEÓRICAS Y DESAFÍOS PRÁCTICOS 66, 75 (Jorge Contesse et al. eds., 2013).
77 Cf. Bahten, supra note 59.
78 According to the Court’s Internet site, the last separate opinion was registered by ad hoc Judge Diego Rodríguez Pinzón in the case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Judgment of March 3, 2011, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_222_ing.pdf.
B. Legal Tradition of Separate Opinions and the Inter-American Court’s Early Years

Another aspect that deserves our attention concerns the secrecy inherent in the deliberative process adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. According to its Statute, the Court “shall deliberate in private” and “its deliberations shall remain secret”, with exceptions decided by the Collegiate (Article 24.2). Additionally, the Rules of the Court reinforce this procedural choice when they register that “only the Judges shall take part in the deliberations”, under the assistance of secretariat members (Article 15.2). Nevertheless, the secret deliberative pattern does not mean enclosing the separate opinion’s content, based on the long-standing tradition of national and international judicial deliberation.

Seen from a formal perspective, the legal support for the individual opinion manifestation is based on the American Convention on Human Rights, the Court’s Statute and Rules of Procedure, which recognized this procedural right to all Inter-American judges.

Similarly to the legal basis for ad hoc judges, the tradition for the rules of Court on separate opinions can be found in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1920) and, subsequently, in the International Court of Justice’s Statute itself (1946). However, as mentioned above, it is important to note that a previous debate had taken place in the Advisory Committee of Jurists (1920), when a proposal for forbidding the publicity of national judges’ dissenting opinions was overthrown.

82 American Convention, supra note 18 (“Article 66. […] 2. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to have his dissenting or separate opinion attached to the judgment”).
83 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Statute, supra note 79 (“Article 24. […] 3. The decisions, judgments and opinions of the Court shall be delivered in public session, and the parties shall be given written notification thereof. In addition, the decisions, judgments and opinions shall be published, along with judges' individual votes and opinions and with such other data or background information that the Court may deem appropriate”).
84 Rules of Procedure, supra note 80 (“Article 65. […] 2. Any judge who has taken part in the consideration of a case is entitled to append a separate reasoned opinion to the judgment, concurrent or dissenting. These opinions shall be submitted within a time limit to be fixed by the President so that the other judges may take cognizance thereof before notice of the judgment is served. Said opinions shall only refer to the issues covered in the judgment”).
85 PCIJ Statute, supra note 58 (“Article 57. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, dissenting judges are entitled to deliver a separate opinion”).
86 ICJ Statute, supra note 67 (“Article 57. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion”).
87 See Jhabvala, supra note 4, at 35-38; see also P.C.I.J. Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 60, at 591-92.
Historically, the Inter-American Court’s first three official judgments, dated 1987, seem to take the per curiam model, which is shown by the total absence of individual opinions. However, according to Thomas Buergenthal, the very first judgment of the Court, the In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al. case (1981), was a truly contentious case rather than a request for an advisory opinion, whose inadmissibility by the Court revealed strong procedural failures of the parties. This case was also remarkable because of the first separate opinion originally presented in the history of the Court (Judge Piza Escalante).

Therefore, the definitive option for the hybrid scheme became clear after the fourth judgment related to the Velásquez Rodríguez case (merits). In this model, the Court generates a consolidated document which represents the opinion of the Court (unanimous or majority), while judges are allowed to present separate individual opinions, including joint opinions given by two or more judges.

Nevertheless, the individual opinions not only performed an exclusive adjudicatory behavior applicable to judgments, but also to advisory opinions given by the Court. In this sense, it is urgent to refer to the OC-3/83 (Restrictions to the Death Penalty), which had separate opinions by Judges Carlos Roberto Reina and Piza Escalante, and OC-4/84 (Proposed Amendments of the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica), which had individual opinions by Judges Piza Escalante and Thomas Buergenthal.

C. Quantitative Data: Parameters in Judgments and Advisory Opinions

Through a recent search in the Court’s website, it was possible to identify a total of 338 judgments in litigant cases, consisting of preliminary objections, judgments of merits, joint judgments of preliminary objections and

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94 Advisory Opinions and Decisions and Judgments, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence Finder, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/index.cfm?lang=es (click separately on “Advisory Opinions” and “Decisions and Judgments” options in “Type” dropdown box, summation of queries result in 338). The Spanish version of this material was used during the search, as not all documents were available in English language.
merits, and requests for interpretation, including the advisory opinions as part of the adjudicatory activity.\footnote{See supra Part I.}

In this sense, I have followed these premises:

i) when the same judge has presented more than one documented opinion on the same judgment or advisory opinion, only one opinion was counted;

ii) when there were separate opinions shared by more than one judge, including permanent and \textit{ad hoc} judges, each judge was counted as an independent individual opinion;

iii) when the same judge simultaneously presented concurrent and divergent positions in an individual opinion for the same judgment, only one dissenting opinion was counted;

iv) the first judgment analyzed was the Case of \textit{Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras} (preliminary objections), dated June 26, 1987, and the last one was the Case of \textit{Lagos del Campo v. Peru} (preliminary objections, merits, reparation and costs), dated August 31, 2017;

v) the first advisory opinion analyzed was the OC-1/82 of September 24, 1982, and the last one was the OC-24/17 of November 24, 2017.

After counting all judgments individually, I identified 153 judgments which had no individual opinion attached, in contrast to 185 others which had individual opinions (concurrent or divergent), i.e. about 55\% of the Court’s contentious cases had separate opinions attached to them (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judgments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With / Without Individual Opinions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Individual Opinions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Individual Opinions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During this data search, I identified some extraordinary occurrences, such as 4 cases in which 6 individual opinions were attached to a single judgment.\footnote{See, e.g., Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Television) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 293 (June 22, 2015); Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 222 (Mar. 3, 2011); Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 90 (Dec. 6, 2001); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).} This is very interesting as the Court consists of only 7 permanent judges and, when applicable, 1 \textit{ad hoc} judge.

At this point, it is appropriate to register the Shabtai Rosenne’s warning,\footnote{SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE PERPLEXITIES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72, 135 (2004).} for whom the extensive use of separate opinions in international courts may fracture the final judicial statement and, eventually, weaken its external, legal force.

According to quantitative data, a significant difference was founded between concurrent and divergent separate opinions in both categories of judges...
(permanent and *ad hoc*). For a total of 359 separate opinions (documents), there were only 100 divergent individual opinions, i.e. for each divergent opinion 2.59 concurring separate opinions were identified in judgments (Table 2). Differently from the previous table, here I counted the number of individual opinions as the number of documents.98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Opinions</td>
<td>259 (72.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent Opinions</td>
<td>100 (27.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analyzing the percentage of separate opinions related to the consultative activity of the Inter-American Court, the scenario was slightly different, when I found 24 advisory opinions in the Court’s history until November 2017 and, among them, 50% had individual opinions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Without Individual Opinions</td>
<td>12 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Individual Opinions</td>
<td>12 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, the proportion of concurrent and dissenting individual opinions in connection with the Court’s consultative function was resembling to the proportion in contentious cases.99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Opinions</td>
<td>21 (67.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent Opinions</td>
<td>10 (32.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In spite of the quantitative difference between the numbers of judgments and advisory opinions produced throughout the history of the Court, some of

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98 For instance, a single divergent separate opinion document was counted as one occurrence, even when it had three joint individual opinions (e.g.: the joint partially dissenting opinion of Judges Ventura Robles, Vio Grossi and Eduardo Ferrer in the case of Mémoli v. Argentina, Judgment of Aug. 22, 2013, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_265_ing.pdf).

99 *Id.*
these data reveal interesting similarities, which can be used to analyze adjudicatory patterns. In this sense, the high percentage of concurrent opinions is a coincident aspect in both categories of adjudicatory manifestations (around 70%).

**D. Quantitative Data: Ad Hoc Judges**

Opportunistically, based on the analysis of all concurrent and divergent individual opinions registered in 185 judgments (Table 1), one interesting fact has emerged: the large majority of the separate opinions were made by regular, not *ad hoc* judges.

In evaluating the separate opinions presented by each permanent judge, whether isolated or joined by other judge(s), I found a total of 312 occurrences, in contrast to only 49 individual opinions presented by *ad hoc* judges (Table 5). This means that, throughout the history of the Inter-American Court, about 14% of the individual opinions were given by *ad hoc* judges, and about 86% were produced by permanent ones.\(^{100}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Judgments</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Opinions by Category of Judges</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Judges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ad Hoc</em> Judges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on these data, I considered it necessary to verify whether the enormous amount of separate opinions is connected to a historical institutional characteristic, definitive feature in the Inter-American Court, or whether it is just the result of the personal behavior by a small group of judges, which artificially increased this number.

Strictly considering the *ad hoc* category, it is possible to identify an aspect related to the unbalanced performance of some judges in comparison to others. Despite individual opinions given by 26 different authors, just 5 *ad hoc* judges have issued 20 separate opinions, which means that 20% of the judges produced about 40% of the occurrences (Table 6).\(^{101}\)

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\(^{100}\) The counting was based on the “Decisions and Judgments” results presented by the Inter-American Court’s internet search tool, through individualized verification and reading of the dispositive sections of each 185 judgments with separate opinions. Here the individual opinion of each judge was counted as an independent manifestation, even when it was part of joint opinions (e.g. I counted three individual opinions in the joint dissenting opinion of permanent Judges Picado Sotela and Aguiar Aranguen, and *ad hoc* Judge Cançado Trindade, presented in the case of Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_16_ing.pdf).

\(^{101}\) *Ad hoc* Judges Vidal Ramírez (7), Montiel Argüello (5), Novales Aguirre (3), Roberto F. Caldas (3) and Cançado Trindade (2).
On the other hand, it was not possible to identify a numerically extraordinary production of separate opinions by any specific *ad hoc* judge during the Inter-American Court’s history, based on the peculiar nature of this jurisdictional performance designated to decide case by case. According to this characteristic, the most frequent occurrences were 7 individual opinions by *ad hoc* Judge Vidal Ramírez and 5 by Montiel Argüello.

Opportunely, as explained in Section IV.B, changes in the rules and practice of the Court has caused the complete absence of individual opinions produced by *ad hoc* judges in judgments after 2011, which affected their numbers even further.
Continuing the comparison of judges in the same category, it is clear that a few permanent judges have produced a high number of separate opinions, as the following data elucidate.

Based on the Table 7, about 51% of the total number of individual opinions were given by only 3 regular judges. Therefore, considering 312 separate opinions, 159 individual manifestations were produced by Judges Cançado Trindade (69), García Ramírez (61) and Vio Grossi (29). Accordingly, one out of every two opinions presented in judgments during the Court’s history came from one of these three permanent judges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Judges</th>
<th>Individual Opinions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cançado Trindade</td>
<td>69 (22.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>García Ramírez</td>
<td>61 (19.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vio Grossi</td>
<td>29 (9.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mac-Gregor Poisot</td>
<td>23 (7.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ventura Robles</td>
<td>18 (5.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medina Quiroga</td>
<td>13 (4.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>García-Sayán</td>
<td>13 (4.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pérez Pérez</td>
<td>13 (4.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roux Rengifo</td>
<td>12 (3.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Porto</td>
<td>11 (3.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto F. Caldas</td>
<td>8 (2.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abreu Burelli</td>
<td>8 (2.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver Jackman</td>
<td>7 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salgado Pesantes</td>
<td>7 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacheco Gómez</td>
<td>4 (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montiel Argüello</td>
<td>4 (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piza Escalante</td>
<td>3 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May Macaulay</td>
<td>3 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abreu Blondet</td>
<td>2 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picado Sotela</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aguiar Aranguren</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nieto Navia</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonardo Franco</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apparently, the disproportional distribution and concentration of individual opinions produced by a few permanent judges is a common phenomenon which I have also identified in the performance of the Inter-American Court’s consultative jurisdiction.
Considering the universe of 17 judges, only 5 (about 30%) were responsible for about 50% of all individual opinions presented in advisory opinions (Table 8). These data demonstrate that the observed phenomenon in the Court’s advisory opinions involved a high concentration of separate opinions by a small group of judges, even if it was not as high as the concentration observed in contentious cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Judges</th>
<th>Individual Opinions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Piza Escalante</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>García Ramírez</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cançado Trindade</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Buergenthal</td>
<td>2 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vio Grossi</td>
<td>2 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Nikken</td>
<td>2 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver Jackman</td>
<td>2 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafael Navia</td>
<td>2 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Porto</td>
<td>2 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Roberto Reina</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Máximo Cisneros</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacheco Gómez</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gros Espiell</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salgado Pesantes</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abreu Burelli</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Caldas</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pérez Pérez</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another interesting aspect may be gleaned from a coincidence: most individual opinions both in judgments and advisory opinions were given by the same three judges, i.e. Judges Cançado Trindade and García Ramírez, followed by Vio Grossi.

Furthermore, it is important to register that these three judges were re-elected for a second term,\(^{102}\) which means a double mandate of 12 years for each one in the Court. Notwithstanding this fact, there also are eight other regular judges who have exercised two terms in the Tribunal,\(^{103}\) and these judges have not given such a disproportionate number of separate opinions.

Even considering the peculiar nature of the consultative function, the high number of individual opinions connected to the Court’s adjudicatory activity in its entirety seems to demonstrate the prevalence of personal


\(^{103}\) Judges Abreu Burelli, Fix-Zamudio, García Sayán, Oliver Jackman, Nieto Navia, Pacheco Gómez, Salgado Pesantes and Ventura Robles.
performances in detriment of a well-distributed institutional decision-making pattern.

**F. Separate Opinions as Core Reasoning of Subsequent Cases**

In order to check the explicit use of individual opinions by the Inter-American Court in its core reasoning, one last search was conducted in all 338 judgments and 24 advisory opinions available at the Court’s institutional website.\(^{104}\)

As a result, it was possible to identify only three express quotations of separate opinions in the Court’s reasoning (judgments and advisory opinions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Cited Individual Opinion</th>
<th>Quoted Original Thesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama</em>, Judgment of November 28, 2003, n.70.(^ {105})</td>
<td>Concurring Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade In: Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003, ¶ 81.</td>
<td>“81. One ought to secure a follow-up to the endeavours of greater doctrinal and jurisprudencial development of the peremptory norms of international law (<em>jus cogens</em>) and of the corresponding obligations <em>erga omnes</em> of protection of the human being, moved above all by the <em>opinio juris</em> as a manifestation of the universal juridical conscience, to the benefit of all human beings. By means of this conceptual development one will advance in the overcoming of the obstacles of the dogmas of the past and in the creation of a true international <em>ordre public</em> based upon the respect for, and observance of, human rights (…)”.(^ {106})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{104}\) During the data search, we accessed each judgment and individually searched for the occurrences of the words “voto,” “votos,” “opinión” and “opiniones.” These are adopted by the Inter-American Court as the Spanish version of “individual opinion” and “separate opinion.” For each word found, I have read the respective paragraph and footnote looking for explicit citations of separate opinions used as part of the Court’s fundamental reasoning: [http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/index.cfm?lang=es](http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/index.cfm?lang=es).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“27. (…) Some rights, however, due to their nature or to the wording of the Convention, lack this immediate and full enforceability unless domestic norms or other complementary measures grant it, as is the case for example with political rights (…) or those of judicial protection (…). If there are no electoral codes or laws, voter rolls, political parties, means of publicity and transportation, voting centers, electoral boards, dates and time periods for the exercise of the right to vote, this right, by its very nature, simply can not be exercised; nor can the right to judicial protection be exercised unless there are courts to grant it and there are procedural standards that control and make it possible”.¹⁰⁸</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>**Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, Judgment of September 4, 2012, n.218.**¹⁰⁹</th>
<th><strong>Concurring Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade In: Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003, ¶ 75.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“75. In a well-known <em>obiter dictum</em> in its Judgment in the case of the <em>Barcelona Traction</em> (…), the International Court of Justice determined that there are certain international obligations <em>erga omnes</em>, obligations of a State <em>vis-a-vis</em> the international community as a whole, which are of the interest of all the States (…). The prohibitions mentioned in this <em>obiter dictum</em> are not exhaustive: to them new prohibitions are added (…) precisely for not being the <em>jus cogens</em> a closed category (…)”.¹¹⁰</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data admit some preliminary interpretations, such as:

i) in general, the Inter-American Court hardly ever quotes individual opinions in the core reasoning of its judgments and advisory opinions (about 0.83%);

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ii) the Court has strictly quoted separate opinions originated from its consultative jurisdiction, not from judgments;

iii) no dissenting opinions were mentioned, only concurrent ones;

iv) one specific individual opinion was cited in two of the three occurrences, but related to different original parts;

v) the quoted theses were connected to notorious themes of the International Human Rights Law and the International Law, on which highly controversial debates in specialized legal literature had occurred.\textsuperscript{111} the universal perspective of \textit{jus cogens} norms, the effective granting of political rights, and the progressive nature of \textit{erga omnes} obligations.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Based on this short analysis, it is possible to conclude that the hybrid deliberative model adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights displays some structural tendencies related to the \textit{seriatim} scheme. This is shown by the numerically relevant and inconstant production of individual opinions verifiable in the adjudicatory activity as a whole (judgments and advisory opinions).

Nevertheless, the accessible location of the core reasoning of collegiate deliberation, by majority or unanimity, makes it easy to find the \textit{ratio decidendi} as the Court’s institutional position, even when I found a disproportionately large number of individual opinions in judgments. On the other hand, the Court had a more balanced rate of separate opinions related to its consultative function (advisory opinions), but with some similarities with the judgments in regard to the high level of concurrent opinions.

According to the quantitative data searched, one possible explanation for the high number of separate opinions can be found in the personal behavior of a relatively small group of judges, rather than in a well-distributed deliberative institutional practice. Even when I verified the writing manifestations of \textit{ad hoc} judges, a perceptible level of concentration of individual opinions could be noticed.

Setting aside the rare exceptions related to the incorporation of only two separate opinions originated from advisory opinions in three different judgments, the hybrid deliberative scheme in the Inter-American Court tends to isolate the \textit{ratio decidendi} from the influence of past individual opinions. Cogitating the case law’s premise in International Law, the separate opinions might be considered a relevant source of international legal doctrine, but not as an explicit part of the Inter-American precedent. In addition, the use of individual opinions by respondent States in their briefs before the Court may be understood according to this same doctrinal perspective.

As it seems verifiable in the practice of the International Court of Justice,\textsuperscript{112} the Inter-American Court resists to adopt expressly separate opinions (concurring or dissenting) as part of the core reasoning of its judgments. On the other hand, I must admit that those three exceptional quotations of past individual opinions identified during the research were an interesting surprise, especially because of the controversial themes involved (\textit{jus cogens} norms, political rights, and \textit{erga omnes} obligations).

Remembering Rosenne’s concern about the immanent risks of extensive use of individual opinions in international adjudication,\textsuperscript{113} perhaps it is time to evaluate whether or not the atomistic behavior of some judges within the collegiate body could debilitate the institutional position of the Inter-American Court, which can possibly affect its public authority before the States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{112} See \textsc{Mohamed Shahabuddeen}, \textsc{Precedent in the World Court} 191-95 (1996).
\textsuperscript{113} Rosenne, \textit{supra} note 97, at 135.
\textsuperscript{114} See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, \textsc{The Judicial Trilemma}, 111 \textit{Am. J. Int’l L.} 225, 274-75 (2017).