Workers, Dignity, and Equitable Tolling

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When workers allege that mental illness prevented the timely filing of a federal employment discrimination lawsuit, courts subject them to extreme standards at the equitable tolling stage, which ends workers’ lawsuits against their employers. Such an approach to workers suffering from mental illness is indicative both of judicial misunderstanding of equitable remedies and judicial ignorance of equity’s historical engagement with those afflicted with mental illness. More importantly, subjection of workers to high threshold requirements at equity is an affront to workers’ dignity. Dignity, like equity, has a powerful moral basis that focuses on the individual. Dignity requires that workers alleging that mental illness foreclosed a timely filing of a federal employment discrimination lawsuit be heard and that they not be humiliated.

My contribution to the scholarly literature is three-fold. First, I introduce dignity to the scholarly literature on equity and reject arguments by prominent readers of American equity as unresponsive to the kinds of dignitary treatment that vulnerable plaintiffs should expect from courts sitting at equity. Second, I extend judicial discussion of dignity and equity to encompass federal remedies law and federal employment discrimination law. Third, I contribute to the literature on disabilities by looking at the treatment of afflicted workers at a particular point in the federal adjudicatory process. My policy prescriptions explore possible legal and equitable responses to the humiliating experience awaiting workers who allege that mental illness prevented the timely filing of a federal employment discrimination lawsuit.

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Consider, for a moment, the following three examples of workers suffering from mental illness who requested equitable tolling of the statutory limitations period on the basis of mental incapacity. Equitable tolling allows a court to resuscitate untimely claims and proceed on the merits against a defendant despite a countervailing statute of limitations. In only one of the

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2. See generally CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 (2014) (articulating a “central distinction” between statutes of limitation and repose: statutes of limitation are subject to equitable tolling while statutes of repose, which reflect a legislative cutoff after which the defendant cannot be sued, generally are not).

3. With some reservations, I use “mental incapacity” when referring to legal arguments. Because mental illness is a complex phenomenon, any term is likely reductive and/or mere shorthand. Andrew Scull’s profound study of mental illness over time, for example, groups all mental illness under “madness.” Andrew Scull, Madness in Civilization: A Cultural History of Insanity from the Bible to Freud, from the Madhouse to Modern Medicine 11 (2015); see also generally American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-5 xli (5th ed. 2013) (observing that “mental disorders do not always fit completely within the boundaries of a single disorder. Some symptom domains, such as depression and anxiety, involve multiple diagnostic categories and may reflect common underlying vulnerabilities for a larger group of disorders”).

4. Equitable tolling is generally distinguished from a number of related doctrines that also deal with the timing of a lawsuit: (1) adverse domination, (2) continuing violation, (3) contra non valentem, (4) discovery rule, (5) equitable estoppel, (6) fraudulent concealment, (7) legal tolling, and (8) waiver. By way of background, I describe each briefly.

   (1) Unlike equitable tolling, adverse domination is a common law doctrine that suspends the running of the statute of limitation applicable to a corporation’s lawsuit against its directors until they are no longer in charge. See Michael E. Baughman, Note, Defining the Boundaries of the Adverse Domination Doctrine: Is There Any Purpose for Corporate Directors?, 143 U. PA. L. Rev. 1065, 1066, 1077 (1995). (2) The continuing violation doctrine is a common law accrual doctrine that, unlike the defense of equitable tolling, considers a chain of events—some of whose links may lie outside the limitations period—and extends the accrual date back in time to encompass the events lying outside the limitations period. See Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001). (3) Contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio (“prescription does not run against a person unable to act”) is a Roman, French, and possibly Spanish equitable creation that tolls the running of a statute of limitation under Louisiana law. Benjamin West Janke & François-Xavier Licari, Contra Non Valentem in France and Louisiana: Revealing the Parenthood, Breaking a Myth, 71 Louisiana L. Rev. 504, 506–07, 537 (2011); see also generally Prevo v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Div. of Prob. & Parole, 187 So. 3d 395, 398 (La. 2015) (contra non valentem is “based on the equitable notion that no one is required to exercise a right when it is impossible for him or her to do so”). But see Black’s Law Dictionary 586 (10th ed. 2009) (indicating that contra non valentem arose in 1938 and is common law in origin). (4) While equitable tolling focuses on the timing of a lawsuit, the discovery rule is concerned with when the injury underlying the lawsuit became apparent. See MRL Dev. I, LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp., 823 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2016). Thus, equitable tolling can be granted because a worker discovered the discriminatory action at a later point. E.g., Sterrett v. Mabus, No. 11-CV-1899, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21261, at *12–13 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2013) (equitable tolling sufficiently pleaded where worker “did not realize the [adverse] employment decision was the result of gender discrimination until her [later] discovery of [a] similarly situated male [treated differently]”). (5) Equitable tolling is generally distinguished from equitable estoppel in that equitable estoppel focuses on another individual or entity’s actions that prevented the worker from filing on time. See Barbara T. Lindemann et al., II Employment Discrimination Law 27–52 (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2015). (6) Fraudulent concealment is related to equitable tolling insofar as it is often a precondition for grants of equitable tolling. E.g., Berry v. Allstate Ins. Co., 252 F. Supp. 2d 336, 345 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (equitable tolling denied where workers failed to prove fraudulent concealment of relevant facts

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I am asking you to please consider allowing me to file suit in Federal court and forgive my untimeliness in filing, as I have been ‘inc[apac]itated’ due to mental illness and medication.
following federal employment discrimination cases did the court grant equitable tolling. In which cases did courts deny equitable tolling? Why does that matter?

The army veteran in the first case had been exposed to bomb blasts in Iraq and suffered brain injuries, “chronic pain, cognitive difficulties, impaired vision, and post traumatic (sic) stress disorder.” He worked for an Army contractor as a Recruiting Operations Officer, where many of his requested accommodations were denied, and coworkers referred to him as a “retard,” “junior varsity,” and “the weakest link.” Unable to thrive in such an environment, he resigned. He sued for failure to accommodate his injuries under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and for a hostile work environment. He had 300 days from the last discriminatory act he suffered to contact the relevant agency and initiate proceedings against his employer; he filed 18 days late. The veteran requested equitable tolling because, after he resigned, he “fell and suffered a serious head injury” that occurred 242 days after he resigned from his job and “fully incapacitated” him for 47 days.

In case two, a radiologist sued the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). There, a coworker had “touched her and other female workers, [had] made sexually suggestive comments on a regular basis, [had] inappropriately texted female workers outside of work hours, and . . . [had] exposed his penis to [her] and touched her breast when she attempted to get up and

by employer since they provided no proof to support that concealment had occurred). (7) Unlike equitable tolling, “legal tolling is derived from the normal process of statutory construction, and, in the context of class actions, occurs any time an action is commenced and class certification is pending.” Christine E. Turner, Note, First Rejection, Then Dismissal: Reconsidering American Pipe Tolling for Securities Class Actions, 64 DUKE L. J. 99, 108 (2014) (citation marks omitted). (8) Finally, “waiver” refers to a decision not to raise the statute of limitations as a defense to an otherwise tardy prosecution of a lawsuit, either by agreement or some other affirmative action. See, e.g., United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 734 (3d Cir. 2013) (conviction vacated where, inter alia, trial court did not accept plea agreement waiving statute of limitations). Nevertheless, despite these distinctions, “[c]ourts sometimes use terms such as fraudulent concealment, the discovery rule, equitable tolling, and equitable estoppel interchangeably . . . .” SEC v. Microtune, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 867, 875 (N.D. Tex. 2011).

6 See PRAIRIE QUEST CONSULTING, http://www.pqconsulting.com/about/ (last visited May 6, 2016) (“We provide innovative cost-effective solutions that make a significant impact for clients such as the Army, the Navy, IBM, Raytheon and the State of Indiana.”).
7 Southall, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52634 at *1. As the case was decided at the Motion to Dismiss stage, where “the court must accept all material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” id. at *3, I cite only to the worker’s facts.
8 Although Mr. Southall provided the relevant documentation to support his accommodation requests, Compl. at 3, id., the contractor only accommodated his request for a telephone with the larger keys and screen. Id. Mr. Southall’s complaint indicates that he made the following accommodation requests:

The accommodations he requested included: being able to conduct work in a quiet area, away from distractions; being able to take breaks during tasks; being able to have additional time to complete tasks; a telephone with larger than normal keys and screen; adjusted lighting on his computer screen and office lighting to reduce glare; an uncluttered work area; assignment to instructor duty rather than recruiter duty.

Id. at 3–4.

9 Id. at 4, 5 (supervisor told veteran that he “viewed [the veteran] as if he were an alcoholic”).
10 Id. at 5.
12 Id. at *4.
13 Compl. at 6, id.
15 Compl. at 6, id.
walk out of the room.” The coworker accepted a plea for indecent exposure. For her discrimination suit to proceed against the VA, as a federal employee the radiologist had to contact an Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor (EEO Counselor) within 45 days of the last discriminatory act that she had suffered. She had also to “file a Formal Complaint within 15 days of receiving her Notice of Right to File” in federal district court. The radiologist surpassed the 45 day period by 29 days and did not file the Formal Complaint within 15 days of receiving Notice of Right to File. She requested equitable tolling on the basis of severe depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and anxiety caused by the traumatic events at work. She also argued that she did not file a Formal Complaint because representations from the EEO Counselor had led her to believe that she had satisfied the 15-day filing requirement.

In the third case, a Nuclear Medicine Supervisor suffered from a deteriorating condition that caused blood to collect in his legs. The hospital at which he worked transferred him to another hospital, allegedly with less pay. After he resigned, he was hospitalized for an infection that led to cardiac problems requiring heart surgery. The worker “lapsed into a coma for several weeks and suffered temporary multi-organ system failure . . . .” He recovered and sued the hospital under the ADA, alleging that the hospital’s transfer and failure to accommodate his deteriorating medical condition were discriminatory. To initiate proceedings against the hospital, the Nuclear Medicine Supervisor had 300 days from the last discriminatory act to contact the relevant agency; he filed his complaint some 295 days late. He requested equitable tolling on the basis of his “mental incompetence, depression, and extended comatose state [which] prevented him from timely filing his charge.”

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17 Id. at *6.
18 The radiologist sued for discrimination (i) on the basis of sex; (ii) hostile work environment; (iii) negligence; (iv) retaliation. Id. at *6–7.
19 Id. at *8.
20 Id.
21 See id. at *27.
22 Id. at *20–21.
23 Id. at *7.
24 Id. at *8.
26 Id. at 850.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 850–51.
29 Mr. Eber sued under both titles I and II of the ADA. Title I deals with employment discrimination, and Title II with discrimination in the provision of public services. Id. at 854. Neither statutory provision includes explicit limitations periods. Id. at 863. Courts apply the limitations period in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, to Title I claims (300 days), Eber, F. Supp. 2d at 854, and the forum state’s limitations period to Title II claims (two years). Id. at 869, 870. As my article focuses on employment discrimination claims, I focus solely on Mr. Eber’s Title I claim.
30 Id. at 850.
31 Id. at 851.
32 Id. at 863.
33 Id. at 851.
34 Id. at 866.
None of the workers was permitted to sue the employer on the merits. In the veteran’s case, the court denied equitable tolling on the basis of mental incapacity.\textsuperscript{35} The court denied the veteran an opportunity to amend his complaint, which it dismissed.\textsuperscript{36} The radiologist in the second case fared no better as the court denied her request for equitable tolling\textsuperscript{37} on the basis of “psychological trauma.”\textsuperscript{38} The court converted the employer’s motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment and dismissed the radiologist’s complaint.\textsuperscript{39} The Nuclear Medicine Supervisor in the final case fared marginally better as the court refused to suspend the limitations period for anything but his comatose period.\textsuperscript{40} Before granting summary judgment to his employer,\textsuperscript{41} the court said that “a long line of federal cases explicitly holds that mental disability, even rising to the level of insanity, simply does not toll a federal statute of limitations.”\textsuperscript{42}

These decisions are an affront to the dignity of the American worker suffering from mental illness.\textsuperscript{43} Through their refusal to grant equitable tolling to vulnerable workers, the decisions humiliate such workers. Equitable tolling is a savior in American law. The doctrine can be traced to eighteenth-century English law.\textsuperscript{44} As part of the equitable canon since at least colonial times, equitable tolling has allowed the court to rely on its discretion and proceed to evaluate a resurrected case on the merits. Generally, the Supreme Court of the United States has “followed a tradition in which courts of equity have sought to relieve hardships, which, from time to time, arise from a

\textsuperscript{35} While some cases mention the specific nature of the plaintiff’s affliction, others do not. Compare Smith v. Shinseki, 716 F. Supp. 2d 556, 560 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“bipolar illness” and “depression”), with Hood v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 168 F.3d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1999) (“mental illness,” “mental incompetence,” and “mental incapacity”).


\textsuperscript{37} Kurikose, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66208, at *12.

\textsuperscript{38} Id. at *1.

\textsuperscript{39} Id. at *12.

\textsuperscript{40} Eber, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 866–67.

\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 872.

\textsuperscript{42} Id. at 869 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{43} By “American” I mean any worker employed in the United States that is protected by federal employment discrimination laws. I am aware that, in some quarters, my definition will be read to impute, at the very least, citizenship status, which will be found objectionable. Nevertheless, my definition is consistent with federal law, which often conflates citizens and non-citizens for workers’ rights purposes. E.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2015) (defining “employee” as “any employee,” and not including undocumented workers in its exemptions); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2015) (“employee” means any individual employed by an employer); Title VII § 2000e(f) (defining “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer,” and not excluding undocumented workers); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2-III(A)(4) (2000), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html (“Individuals who are employed in the United States are protected by the EEO statutes regardless of their citizenship or immigration status.”); see also Pattern Makers’ League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 133 (U.S. 1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to “the American worker” in its discussion of the National Labor Relations Act); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893–94 (1984) (defining “American workers” in immigration terms, but holding that undocumented workers are “employees” under the National Labor Relations Act); Solis v. Cindy’s Total Care, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 7242(PAE), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125501, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2011) (“By its terms, the FLSA applies to ‘any individual’ employed by an employer, as the term ‘employer’ is defined by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The Act contains no exception or exclusion for persons who are not U.S. citizens or who are in this country illegally.”); For bringing some of the materials that I have cited above to my attention, I am grateful to TEX. P’SHIP FOR LEGAL ACCESS, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS (2013), http://texashlawhelp.org/files/685E99A9-A3EB-6584-CA74-137E0474AE2C/attachments/72479B16-CB87-4F1A-8B62-917F8FB74295/undocumented-workers-final-draft2-eff-pa.pdf.

\textsuperscript{44} McQuiggiv v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1941 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 52 (2001)).
hard and fast adherence to more absolute legal rules, which, if strictly applied, threaten the evils of archaic rigidity.”

Equitable tolling suspends the running of the limitations period against the party who filed late through no fault of her own.

Equitable tolling receives scant attention in treatises and casebooks. Treatises on equity (and even remedies casebooks) often omit equitable tolling, as do leading civil and criminal procedure casebooks and treatises. Almost all employment discrimination casebooks similarly overlook equitable tolling, and scholarly treatment of the subject has largely focused on the complexities of equitable tolling outside the employment discrimination context.

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45 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010) (holding that § 2244(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposing a 1-year limitations period was subject to equitable tolling and that the Eleventh Circuit’s standard (requiring a showing of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, and mental impairment to grant tolling to a pro se death-row inmate whose counsel failed to file habeas petition within 1-year limitations period imposed by AEDPA, despite repeated entreaties and letters from inmate urging counsel to do so and correcting counsel’s misunderstanding of the law, causing pro se litigant to file his own habeas petition in federal district court roughly five weeks after limitations period had elapsed) was “too rigid”).


five student notes have narrowly dealt with equitable tolling in the employment discrimination context and none deals with issues of mental illness and/or human dignity.\(^{51}\)

Equitable tolling raises complex questions about the identity, conduct, and timing of the parties\(^{52}\) and the court.\(^{53}\) Societal interests in equitable tolling include adjudication of meritorious claims and the promotion of transactional security and judicial integrity.\(^{54}\) While a statute of limitations works in the defendant’s favor to thwart stale claims,\(^{55}\) equitable tolling asks the court to prevent a miscarriage of justice on a case-by-case basis where circumstances beyond plaintiffs’ control prevent them from filing on time.\(^{56}\) Equitable tolling is so important that when courts abolish equitable tolling plaintiffs can be exposed to “purposeful manipulation of a limitation period by the more powerful party.”\(^{57}\) Equitable tolling is about “fundamental fairness.”\(^{58}\)

Because the plaintiffs are often poor and are compelled to represent themselves in federal court, workers’ rights are a compelling area in which to study equitable tolling. Many workers

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\(^{52}\) See generally Blakey, supra note 50.

\(^{53}\) See Weidner, supra note 50, at 1575.

\(^{54}\) McGovern, supra note 50, at 802–03.

\(^{55}\) See Malveaux, supra note 50, at 79.

\(^{56}\) Blakey, supra note 50, at 1730–31.

\(^{57}\) Council, supra note 50, at 1410 (decrying the Michigan Supreme Court’s 2005 abolition of equitable tolling in private contracts).

\(^{58}\) Taaffe, supra note 50, at 1065 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
proceed against corporations or against the federal government. Some are recent immigrants, some illiterate, and some have difficulty with English. Often, they do not know the law, and they always depend on the court’s equitable discretion to revive their claims. Their facts underscore the necessity of individualized attention to pleadings at equity.

My argument benefits from the work of several readers of American equity over the past roughly 25 years. Laycock’s seminal 1990 article, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, which gave way to a book by the same title the following year, has both informed my work on equity and is most inconsistent with the notion of equity that I espouse. Even if I were to accept Laycock’s rejection of the distinction between law and equity (which I do not), his argument

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61 E.g., Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 457–58 (5th Cir. 2002) (recent immigrant with limited fluency in English who had failed to find counsel and had worked for 39 days for the United States Postal Services denied equitable tolling).
63 See, e.g., Pena v. Anatole, No. 3-03-CV-1814-AH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2004) (pro se worker who submitted complaint in Spanish had to re-plead); see also Teemac, 298 F.3d at 458 (“lack of English fluency” does not toll limitations period).
64 While my focus is primarily on the work of scholars who have engaged with equity as an institution, the implication is not that the work of scholars who do not directly engage with the institution—but who have nonetheless made major contributions to our understanding of equitable remedies in general—is less important. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, The Just Barely Sustainable California Prisoners’ Rights Ecosystem, 664 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 62 (2016) (injunctive relief in prisoners’ rights litigation in California before and since the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996); Margo Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation: Why and How We Should End the Practical Obscurity of Injunctions and Consent Decrees, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 515, 515 (2010) (proposing litigation clearinghouses as a response to the fact that “notwithstanding the individual and collective importance of all these injunctions, they languish in practical obscurity, unavailable to all but the extraordinarily persevering researcher who joins inside information with abundant funds”); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 551 (2006) (rejecting the view that use of the civil rights injunction declined in the 1980s and 1990s to argue that, while the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA) had a constraining effect on such litigation, “ten years after passage of the PLRA, the civil rights injunction is more alive in the prison and jail setting than the conventional wisdom recognizes”); see also CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clerihouse.net (last visited Aug. 29, 2016).
66 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 4–5, 19 (1991) (attacking the distinction between legal and equitable remedies by arguing that courts have abandoned the reputed rigor of the irreparable injury rule, which only permits entry into equity for the purposes of obtaining an injunction if monetary damages are inadequate as courts almost invariably permit entry into equity for injunctive purposes by finding damages almost always inadequate (except when fungible goods need to be replaced “or routine services in an orderly market”), in such cases “damages and specific relief are substantially equivalent”).
67 See Laycock, supra note 65, at 693 (“Law, equity, and similar conceptual categories are historical rather than functional . . . I seek to complete the assimilation of equity, and to eliminate the last remnant of the conception that equity is subordinate, extraordinary, or unusual.”); Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53 (1993) (“I sense a certain segregationist spirit in the planning of this symposium. Not only should equity be preserved, but it should be preserved separate and self-conscious. In Delaware they do it right, with a separate court and high-ranking official called the Chancellor of Delaware. Chancellor Quillen described the office as preserving ‘a
about equity (which I consider in greater detail below) tells us very little about the kinds of dignitary treatment that vulnerable plaintiffs should expect either at law or at equity.68 Henry Smith’s functional approach to equity as targeting opportunistic conduct similarly does not account for the kinds of dignitary treatment that sympathetic plaintiffs, like those alleging that mental incapacity prevented a timely filing, might expect from courts,69 nor does Samuel L. Bray’s equitable system.70 My essay fills this gap in the scholarly literature.

Dignity requires that courts not humiliate workers suffering from mental illness. Non-humiliation means that equitable courts should take American workers’ mental suffering seriously enough to credit the documentation of their suffering, that courts should hear such workers’ stories, and that such workers should not be treated as malingerers. Non-humiliation means changing the ways in which courts envision an equitable defense. It is a mistake to automatically privilege the operation of a statutory limitations period against an equitable defense, especially when the worker raising that defense (equitable tolling) may suffer from a debilitating mental condition as a result of which he or she may have been mistreated in the workplace.

My goal is thus to highlight and correct judicial engagement with part of equity. While others have offered totalizing theories of equity, my focus is on a threshold equitable concern affecting the lives of American workers as they face courts hostile to their allegations of mental illness.71 While others have explored courts’ hostility to those suffering from mental illness, I extend that observation to federal remedies law and criticize courts at equity.72 A critical approach to courts’ engagement with equity is consistent with that of other scholars. Laycock, for example, indicates that lawyers and judges do not understand references to equity and law.73 Smith has similarly criticized the Supreme Court in this regard,74 and has noted that “the Court has no theory of what doing equity means.”75 Bray similarly says that, when it comes to equity, the Supreme Court “has touch of royalty to the judiciary.” Perhaps it was only sound republican sensibilities that precluded calling this unique judge the Lord High Chancellor of Delaware.”).

68 See infra Part II(B)(1).
69 See infra Part II(B)2.
70 See infra Part II(B)3.
71 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585 (2003) (proposing the eradication of distinctions between workers with physical and mental disabilities under the ADA because such distinctions further disfigure those workers suffering from mental illness); Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527 (2014) (observing that City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), denying heightened scrutiny to those suffering from mental disabilities, continues to be noxious to the efforts of those suffering from mental disabilities to achieve equal rights at the state and federal levels).
73 Laycock, supra note 67, at 81.

Some doctrines of remedies trace back—at least in theory—to equity jurisdiction. Most prominent is the law of injunctions, which the Supreme Court has done much to confuse recently. It should be said at the outset that it is generally regarded as uncontroversial that the same standards for injunctions apply across substantive areas and that those principles draw on the traditions of equity. The problem is that in our post-fusion world, those traditions are subject to misinterpretation, by no less than the US Supreme Court.
sometimes made clear errors.” My critical treatment thus reflects scholarly concerns about the state of judicial engagement with equitable remedies.

Although I criticize courts’ misunderstanding of equity, the objective is not to erase remaining distinctions between law and equity but to illuminate why equity still matters even when courts err. My addition to the literature is three-fold. First, I make explicit the dignitary arguments of workers suffering from mental illness and introduce dignity’s centrality to the scholarly literature on equity. Second, as courts have mentioned that contempt proceedings (an equitable remedy) evoke dignitary concerns, I extend judicial discussion of dignity beyond contempt to encompass federal remedies law and employment discrimination law. Third, I add to the literature on disabilities by looking at the treatment of afflicted workers at a particular point in the federal adjudicatory process.

The argument proceeds in four parts. In Part I, for the non-specialist I provide an overview of how workers bring employment discrimination lawsuits in the United States and at which points they may encounter delays. The process is far from intuitive. Its complexities present multiple opportunities for workers to encounter a number of legally significant errors that their employer may use to defeat their request to be heard on the merits. Part II defines dignity as non-humiliation of human beings, and it argues that scholars do not account for dignity’s injunction against humiliation of the vulnerable. Part III shows how humiliation unfolds in federal employment discrimination cases and how scholarly defiance might be an antidote to humiliation. Part IV proposes legal and equitable responses to the humiliating experience awaiting workers who allege that mental illness prevented the timely filing of a federal employment discrimination lawsuit. My conclusion follows.

I. EQUITABLE TOLLING

For the non-specialist, I provide an overview of how a worker who believes that her workplace mistreatment is legally significant must proceed before she has her proverbial day in court. She faces several legal hurdles. The legal system imputes to her knowledge that she:

- Understands and communicates in English, and
- Has a colorable legal claim against her employer, and
- Will initiate her lawsuit by contacting the relevant federal or state agency, and
- Will do so within the appropriate statutory limitations period.

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77 Because some of these factors can occur simultaneously (initiating a lawsuit by contacting the relevant agency while attempting to secure legal representation) while others are chronological (contacting the relevant agency before requesting permission to proceed as a pauper in civil court), the points that follow are not listed in strict chronological order; they generally summarize what must be done before the worker has her day in court.
78 See Pena, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *3 n.1 (pro se worker who had requested permission to proceed as a pauper was ordered to amend her complaint, originally drafted in Spanish, and to resubmit it in English, which she did by submitting a letter).
80 LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 50, at 26-20 n.109, 26-23, 26-24.
81 Id. at 27-7, 27-8.
William \(\text{or} \) will wait to hear from the relevant agency;\(^82\text{ and} \)

- When permitted by the relevant federal or state agency, will sue her employer.\(^83\)
  - In the appropriate federal court;\(^84\)
  - In the appropriate limitations period stipulated in the agency’s letter to her;\(^85\text{ and} \)
- If she cannot afford or find an attorney to represent her, she will represent herself.\(^86\)

She will represent herself either by:

- Contacting the court and learning about the pro se process, which she must follow;\(^87\text{ or} \)
- Asking the court to exercise its discretion in her favor and appoint an attorney to represent her;\(^88\text{ and} \)
- If she cannot afford filing and other fees associated with her lawsuit, she can apply to proceed as a pauper:\(^89\)

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\(^82\text{ See id. at 26-45.}\)

\(^83\text{ Once the EEOC has completed its investigation of her employment discrimination charge, the worker may “either request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or ask the agency to issue a decision as to whether discrimination occurred. If [she] asks the agency to issue a decision and no discrimination is found, or if [she] disagree[s] with some part of the decision, [she] can appeal the decision to EEOC or challenge it in federal district court.” U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/hearing.cfm (last visited April 29, 2016).}\)


\(^85\text{ See }\text{LINDEMANN ET AL., supra }\text{ note }4, \text{ at }26-46.\)

\(^86\text{ See }\text{id. at }26-48.\)


\(^88\text{ See }\text{LINDEMANN ET AL., supra }\text{ note }4, \text{ at }26-49.\)

\(^89\text{ See }\text{FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (“Proceeding in forma pauperis”).}\)
She will need to obtain the relevant application forms from the court and supply the necessary proof to the court’s satisfaction;\(^90\)

- She may also need to wait for the court’s decision about whether she can proceed as a pauper before her lawsuit can proceed.\(^91\)

A worker might contact the relevant federal or state agency after the statutory limitations period has lapsed. The relevant agency might itself delay its decision regarding her case or misinform her about her rights.\(^92\) The worker might sue in the wrong court, and so on. But for equity, her late suit would be dismissed. Given these preconditions to filing a federal employment discrimination lawsuit, it is unsurprising that a pro se litigant would argue that she filed late because “she was overcome by “the sheer weight of these proceedings.”\(^93\) As a commentator has observed, “the run-up to a Title VII suit is a procedural minefield, which is especially unfortunate given that the structure is designed to be initiated by individuals without the assistance of private attorneys.”\(^94\)

As employment discrimination law is federal, the Supreme Court generally requires a worker requesting equitable tolling to show that she diligently pursued her rights and that some extraordinary circumstance prevented her from filing on time.\(^95\) Federal circuit courts apply these requirements, as they understand them, to workers in their respective jurisdictions.

Federal courts often toll the statutory limitations period on a number of bases. Tolling often applies where either: (1) the worker filed suit in the wrong forum;\(^96\) or (2) the worker requested appointment of counsel (tolled during adjudication of eligibility);\(^97\) or (3) the worker asked to proceed as a pauper (tolled during adjudication of eligibility);\(^98\) or (4) the employer ceased

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\(^91\) See, e.g., Walwyn v. Precision Tube Tech., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28196 (S.D. Tex. May 1, 2006) (equitable tolling appropriate where worker’s request to proceed as a pauper was adjudicated 12 days after filing period had elapsed).

\(^92\) See Charles A. Sullivan, RAISING THE DEAD?: THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT, 84 TUL. L. REV. 499, 504 (2010) (“Although the statute seems to anticipate that the [EEOC] will typically process a[n employment discrimination] charge to conclusion within 180 days of filing, that rarely happens. Delays have been endemic in the EEOC since its founding.”).


\(^94\) Sullivan, supra note 92, at 507.


relevant facts from the worker;\textsuperscript{99} or (5) the EEOC\textsuperscript{100} misled the worker.\textsuperscript{101} Some federal circuits also toll where (6) the relevant state agency made an error that prevented the worker from filing on time.\textsuperscript{102} Others toll where (6) attorney error caused the filing delay;\textsuperscript{103} and they may toll where (7) an unsophisticated plaintiff fails to understand filing requirements.\textsuperscript{104} Still others toll where (6) the worker filed prematurely in an attempt to preserve her rights;\textsuperscript{105} and where (7) the worker, proceeding pro se, was misled by defense counsel about filing requirements.\textsuperscript{106}

As generous as these provisions seem, they do not focus on the worker. These provisions focus on procedural mechanisms external to the worker and on events external to the worker.\textsuperscript{107} As such, the provisions fail to unearth those factors in a particular worker’s life that prevented her from filing on time since they privilege the worker’s relationship with the legal process or the worker’s relationship with someone else as key to resuscitation of a dead case. Did the worker file in the wrong court? Did the pendency of procedural requirements prevent a timely filing? Was the worker wronged by a court, agency, or attorney? Was she wronged by an employer in obtaining relevant facts? These are the questions that matter.

It is unsurprising, then, that courts regard cases alleging that mental incapacity prevented a timely filing with some skepticism. As “a leading treatise”\textsuperscript{108} on which federal courts rely\textsuperscript{109} indicates, “[c]ourts continue to reject most efforts to argue that a plaintiff’s mental incapacity tolls the 90-day filing period.”\textsuperscript{110} The cases in which courts do grant equitable tolling on the basis of mental incapacity present some of the most egregious facts as they may involve a coma,\textsuperscript{111}


\textsuperscript{100} Created by an act of Congress in 1964 “as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964”, the EEOC enforces Title VII, the ADA, ADEA, EPA, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, and the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act of 2008. LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 26-3 to 26-6.


\textsuperscript{102} E.g., Brown v. Crowe, 963 F.2d 895, 900 (6th Cir. 1992).

\textsuperscript{103} E.g., Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2011).

\textsuperscript{104} See Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1992)) (denying equitable tolling).

\textsuperscript{105} E.g., Forester v. Chertoff, 500 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2007).

\textsuperscript{106} E.g., McCoy v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228 (E.D. Cal. 2011).

\textsuperscript{107} Thus, filing in the wrong court, being misled, and lacking sophistication regarding filing requirements are likely procedural. An employer might argue that it withheld relevant information that would form the basis for an employment discrimination suit against it on the basis of its own internal procedures.

\textsuperscript{108} St. Andre v. Henderson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16359, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2000) (referring to a previous edition of LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 4 as “[a] leading treatise argues that mental incapacity is ‘theoretically, but rarely practically, available as a basis for tolling the charge-filing period.’”) BARBARA LINDEMANN AND PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1369 (3d. ed. 1996). Many courts, it appears, have declined to allow equitable tolling in the case of alleged mental incapacity.”).


\textsuperscript{110} LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 27-85.

dementia, homelessness and paranoid schizophrenia, or rape in the workplace. While I agree with the application of equitable to such extreme cases, I argue for an extension of equitable tolling to “less extreme” cases like those involving the veteran, the radiologist, and the comatose worker in which individuals suffer, often as a result of what happened in the workplace, and ask courts to hear their cases on the merits. My argument is thus not that equity never tolls on the basis of mental incapacity; it does. My argument is that equity sets impossibly high barriers to entry for tolling to attach, which is injurious to workers who may have suffered in the workplace. Because dignity concerns require it, equitable tolling should apply to workers alleging less extreme facts than those accepted by the most egregious cases.

II. EQUITY AS DIGNITY

In this definitional section, I explore first the links between equity and dignity, articulate what non-humiliation requires, and, finally, explain how approaches proposed by other readers of contemporary American equity make salient the need for a dignitary approach to vulnerable plaintiffs at equity.

A. Defining Dignity

Both dignity and equity draw from a common historical pool, focus on the individual, and both are morally inflected. Dignity powerfully articulates what we should not do when faced with vulnerable human beings in our legal system. Dignity requires that we not humiliate workers who allege that they suffer from a mental illness. I explore these points in turn.

Equity and dignity have roots in Antiquity, and their evolution through the Middle Ages

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113 E.g., Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1993) (describing worker “as ‘nearly a street person,’ the psychiatrist diagnosed her as probable paranoid schizophrenic”). But see DaCosta v. Union Local 306, IATSE, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91468, at *33–35 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2009) (recommending denial of equitable tolling to pro se homeless former worker who had received treatment for paranoid schizophrenia).
114 E.g., Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999).
115 By stating that the standard is high I am neither arguing that the worker whose facts gave rise to the standard should be blamed, nor am I arguing that the case was wrongly decided. I am instead arguing that the standard should be relaxed on a dignitary basis to accommodate less egregious facts.
116 For discussion of “dignity skeptics” (unsure of dignity’s utility) and “antidignitarians” (certain of its uselessness), see Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 169, 178 (2011) (offering an empirical study of Supreme Court opinions to argue that dignity implies five related concepts).
117 That is, both have Greco-Roman origins. For equity, see MARÍA JOSÉ FALCÓN Y TELLA, EQUITY AND LAW 11–33 (2008) (discussing equity (“epieikeia”) in Ancient Greek philosophy and equity (“aequitas”) in Roman law); see also Smith, Opportunity, supra note 75, at 22 (referred to Aristotle’s definition of equity). For dignity, see David Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 263, 264 (Massimo Renzo, Rowan Cruft, & Matthew Liao, eds., 2015) [hereinafter Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism] (“For Cicero, who appears to have introduced the term, our dignity comes from our reason, the quality that sets us apart from beasts.”); David Luban, Human Dignity, Humiliation and Torture, 19 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 211, 213 (2009) [hereinafter Luban, Humiliation and Torture]; ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING, 11 (2012) (discussing Cicero’s “immensely influential” work).
118 Both equity and dignity bear the imprint of medieval thought. For equity, see THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 675–84 (5th ed. 1959); see generally CONWAY ROBINSON, HISTORY OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY: AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS OF ENGLAND FROM THE TIME OF CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR UNTIL THE ACCESSION OF WILLIAM AND MARY (in 1688-9) (1882). For dignity, see Ruedi Imbach, Human Dignity in the Middle Ages (Twelfth to Fourteenth Century), in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN DIGNITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 64–73 (Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword & Dietmar Mieth eds.,
was inflected, at least in part, by Catholic thought.\textsuperscript{119} Samuel Moyn finds that Catholic natural law theories helped enshrine dignity in the Irish constitution in 1937 where “[i]ndividual human dignity entered global constitutional history in an unexpected place and at a surprising time.”\textsuperscript{120} Depending on one’s view, equity either succumbed\textsuperscript{121} or triumphed in 1937.\textsuperscript{122} Either way, equity and dignity track each other across time. Both focus on the individual\textsuperscript{123} and both are deeply rooted in morality.\textsuperscript{124} Unsurprisingly, courts indicate that equitable remedies incorporate dignitary

\textsuperscript{119} Catholic thought, reflected in medieval scholasticism, shaped both equity and dignity in powerful ways. For dignity, see \textit{Rosen}, \textit{supra} note 117 at 16–17 (“That most seminal of Catholic thinkers, St. Thomas Aquinas, gives us an explicit definition of dignity . . .”); see also \textit{Luban}, \textit{Humiliation and Torture}, \textit{supra} note 117, at 213. \textit{But see Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It)}, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 816 (2005) [hereinafter \textit{Luban, Lawyers as Upholders}] (“The concept of human dignity sprouts from theological roots in the Abrahamic traditions.”). For equity, see \textit{Dennis R. KLINK, CONSCIENCE, EQUITY, AND THE COURT OF CHANCERY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND} 26 (2010) (noting that the likely “predominant position [is] that Chancery principles were based on, or influenced by, canon law”). For dignity in other religious traditions, see Mikiłos Maroth, \textit{Human Dignity in the Islamic World}, in \textit{THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN DIGNITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES} 74–84.

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Samuel Moyn, CHRISTIAN HUMAN RIGHTS} 26–27, 31–32 (2015) (correcting the false “popular view [that dignity’s] prominence is essentially due to World War II’s aftermath, when in the shadow of genocide the light of human dignity shone forth”).

\textsuperscript{121} See \textit{DOBBS, supra} note 46, at 51 (rejecting the identification of independent “equitable” remedies as “anomalous” post-merger); \textit{Laycock, supra} notes 66–67 and accompanying text; Stephen N. Subrin, \textit{How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective}, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 923, 925, 974 (1987) (arguing that a deliberate and expansive “equity mentality” permeates the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were adopted in 1937, and that equity has “swallowed the law,” which has led to “unwieldy cases, uncontrolled discovery, unrestrained attorney latitude, and judicial discretion”).

\textsuperscript{122} See \textit{Subrin, supra} note 121.

\textsuperscript{123} For dignity, see \textit{Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism}, \textit{supra} note 118, at 271 (noting that “human rightsindividualizes”); see also generally \textit{Moyn, supra} note 120. For equity, see \textit{Smith, Opportunism, supra} note 75, at 37 (discussing the maxim that “equity acts in personam, not in rem” and arguing that “[t]he focus on the individual allows for evaluation of personal conduct from the moral point of view”).

\textsuperscript{124} On equity’s morality, see \textit{DOBBS, supra} note 121, at 55 (“One group of ideas associated with the term equity suggests fairness and moral quality. The law of fiduciary and confidential relationships developed by equity courts and carried on today in many forms, derived from equity’s early emphasis on moral rectitude.”); Irr Samet, \textit{What Conscience Can Do for Equity}, 3 \textit{JURISPRUDENCE} 13, 13 (2012) (proposing a Kantian reading of equity’s conscience such that “the doctrines of Equity are there to introduce moral norms to dealings among strangers”); Henry E. Smith, \textit{The Equitable Dimension of Contract}, 45 \textit{SUFFOLK U. L. REV.} 897, 903 (2012) (presenting a “reconstruction of the traditional approach to equity” to argue that equity targets opportunism, which “is a moral notion like theft and fraud”); Gergen et al., \textit{supra} note 74, at 238 (arguing, in part, that traditional injunctive relief targets opportunism); Henry E. Smith, \textit{An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity} 25–26 (March 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Yale Law School) (arguing that equity is “a decision making mode that is directed against hard-to-prove opportunism”); Samuel L. Bray, \textit{The System of Equitable Remedies}, 63 \textit{UCLA L. REV.} 530, 536 (2015) (noting that an alternative approach to “equity might be characterized as a model of decisionmaking (sic) that emphasizes case-specific judgment, moral reasoning, discretion, or antiopportunism (sic)"); Kevin M. Teeven, \textit{A Legal History of Binding Gratuitous Promises at Common Law: Justifiable Reliance and Moral Obligation}, 43 \textit{DUQ. L. REV.} 11, 69 (2004) (noting, in the context of a discussion of nineteenth-century state courts’ engagement with moral obligation,
concerns. Dignity has at least three semantic threads, all of which have a moral foundation. Dignity’s most radical form asserts that an individual is “intrinsically valuable” and her dignity “permanent and unchanging, not transitory or changeable.” Gerald L. Neuman identifies another iteration as “differential dignity.” For those who subscribe to this version, an individual’s social rank or status defines her dignity. Others read this iteration to mean that an individual has dignity when she acts in a “dignified” manner, can plan her future, act on her own behalf, and so on.

that “notions of morals and ethics imbedded in equity would have contributed since many American jurisdictions had operated under fused or partially-fused courts of law and equity from statehood”; Manning, supra note 45, at 120 (“the point is simply that if statutes in our constitutional system are untempered by the external moral judgments of equity, they (unlike their English counterparts) are nonetheless tempered by the external constraints codified in a written Constitution”); Bradley M. Elbein, The Hole in the Code: Good Faith and Morality in Chapter 13, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439, 484–85 (1997) (“equity can be characterized as informal, idiosyncratic, and moral. It is certainly not surprising that an area of law descended from equity might contain traces of these elements. Nor is it particularly surprising that an equity court’s analysis should take on a moral dimension.”). On dignity’s moral underpinnings, see generally Düwell, supra note 118, at 32 (noting resistance to evocations of morality in the law, and responding that the legal understanding of dignity would be frustrated by a failure to understand its moral underpinnings); Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism, supra note 117, at 6 (arguing that “without a connection with moral human rights, ILHHRs [international legal human rights will fail as legal rights”); MOYN, supra note 120 (discussing the powerful influence exerted by Catholic morality over legal earlier articulations of dignity).

125 See, e.g., Laguna v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 753 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (“while it is true that equitable relief sometimes is not capable of quantitative valuation (for example, where equitable relief is directed to dignity interests such as privacy rights”); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1989) (Hall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (“Because it is intended to protect the integrity of the judicial process, [judicial estoppel] is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.”); Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252 (2004) (same); Deon v. H & J, Inc., 157 Idaho 665, 668 n.2 (2014) (same); Winebrenner v. Winebrenner, No. 96-L-033, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5511, at *9 (same) (emphasis added) (“In the exercise of that discretion in a civil contempt proceeding, the court has the ability to either exercise its equitable powers in fashioning a coercive remedy designed to achieve compliance with the court’s orders, or, it can determine that the claimed contempt did not, in fact, violate the authority and dignity of the court.”).; Citimortgage, Inc. v. Kurt, 2014 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 21528, *8 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014) (emphasis added) (“The Court finds that Plaintiff has established that it has an equitable lien superior in dignity to all defendants herein . . . .”); Parolisi v. Beach Terrace Improvement Ass’n Inc., C. A. File No. 78-2751, 1980 R.I. Super. LEXIS 79, at *8 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 9, 1980) (emphasis added) (“Ordinarily, matters of contempt are addressed to the sound discretion of the court of equity, to be exercised in accordance with particular facts and findings as to extent and willfulness (sic) of defendants’ contempt for authority and dignity of the Court.”).


127 Gewirth, supra note 127, at 12. I say “radical” because this view of dignity is in sharp contrast to the historical understanding of status-based dignity that operated “in a universe of aristocratic and hierarchical values”. MOYN, supra note 121, at 33.

128 Gewirth, supra note 126, at 12.

129 Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law, in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS: LIBER AMICORUM SPIROS SIMITIS 250–51 (Dieter Sion & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000) (“The idea of intrinsic human dignity should be distinguished from a related idea, that of differential dignity. In some societies, differing levels of dignity (or none at all) have been attributed to different individuals in accordance with their rank, class, office, or achievements.”).

130 Neuman, supra note 130, at 250–51; see also Henry, supra note 117, at 192; Luban, Lawyers as Upholders, supra note 118, at 839.

131 See ROSEN, supra note 118, at 6; Gewirth, supra note 127, at 12.

132 See Gewirth, supra note 127, at 12.
Under this reading, “human dignity is consequent upon the having of rights and hence is not the ground for rights.”

A third thread, and extension of these iterations, subordinates our understanding of dignity as a practical matter to context. Thus, David Luban argues that dignity is its use by courts, lawyers, and those involved in human rights. We might understand evocations of institutional dignity in this light. In this article, dignity fundamentally attaches to each human being and is intrinsic. To the extent that others pursue other formulations, I relate them to the other views of dignity that I have enumerated.

Commentators have shown that dignity requires non-humiliation of human beings. Of at least three definitions of humiliation, Luban’s approach is the most persuasive as it focuses on the individual subject: “I am humiliated when I am wrongly taken down a peg—when others treat me as a lesser sort than I really am. Humiliation is an affront to my dignity.” That is, the subjective “I,” the individual’s experience of conduct, omissions or speech that abases her, matters.

But how might individuals be wrongly abased? They might be denigrated when their

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133 See Gewirth, supra note 127, at 12.
134 See ROSEN, supra note 117, at 6; Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism, supra note 118, at 274–78.
135 Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism, supra note 118, at 275.
138 While Bruce Ackerman, David Luban, and Kenji Yoshino explore dignity’s non-humiliation requirement in the legal context, Avishai Margalit explores non-humiliation more generally, and William Ian Miller explores humiliation primarily in the context of Norse sagas. Ackerman’s definition of non-humiliation begins with the personal where it requires that there be “a face-to-face insult.” ACKERMAN, supra note 138, at 138 (emphasis in original) (“We have reached the moment of humiliation, which I define as a face-to-face insult in which the victim acquiesces in the effort to impugn his standing as a minimally competent actor within a particular sphere of life.”). Ackerman finds that institutionalized humiliation is more powerful than personal humiliation. Id.; see also Yoshino, supra note 138, at 3079 (applying Ackerman’s definition). Margalit’s definition, on the other hand, requires that the individual have “a sound reason . . . to consider his or her self-respect injured.” MARGALIT, supra note 138, at 9. For Margalit, human actions and omissions and life conditions are “sound reasons” to feel humiliated but these “reasons,” outside identified examples of rights violations, appear somewhat difficult to isolate. Id. at 9 et seq. I reject both Ackerman’s and Margalit’s definitions humiliation as too narrow. Regarding Ackerman’s definition, since there are disturbing situations in which the humiliated individual is not aware of her humiliation, Ackerman wrongly predicates his grant of personal humiliation on awareness. Luban, for example, offers the example of a female student who passes out after drinking too much, is undressed and her exposed body “exhibit[ed]” “to everyone” before she is clothed again and is never told about what happened as proof of humiliation as “not merely subjective.” Luban, Humiliation and Torture, supra note 118, at 219. As for Margalit’s definition, his focus on a “sound reason,” in which he includes violations of human rights, can be read to attribute to people other than the humiliated individual the decision about whether feeling humiliated is justified. See MARGALIT, supra note 138, at 9, 39–40.
139 Luban, Lawyers as Upholders, supra note 118, at 839.
“ontological heft”\textsuperscript{140} is denied solely on the basis of the individual’s alleged inferiority.\textsuperscript{141} Under this understanding, dignity’s non-humiliation injunction mandates that institutions\textsuperscript{142} provide counsel, for example, that facilitates the hearing of that particular litigant’s story no matter who she is so that her subjectivity is honored.\textsuperscript{143}

Once we accept that human dignity requires litigants to be heard, the justification of the advocate becomes clear. People may be poor public speakers. They may be inarticulate, unlettered, mentally disorganized, or just plain stupid. They may know nothing of the law, and so be unable to argue its interpretation. Knowing no law, they may omit the very facts that make their case, or focus on pieces of the story that are irrelevant or prejudicial. They may be unable to utilize basic procedural rights such as objecting to their adversary’s leading questions. Their voices may be nails on a chalkboard or too mumbled to understand. They may speak a dialect, or for that matter know no English. None of this should matter. Human dignity does not depend on whether one is stupid or smooth. Hence the need for the advocate. Just as a non-English speaker must be provided an interpreter, the legally mute should have—in the very finest sense of the term—a mouthpiece.\textsuperscript{144}

The individual’s story is a reflection of that individual’s “ontological heft.” When that individual’s ability to tell her story is denied, the denial “fundamentally denigrates [that individual’s] status in the world.”\textsuperscript{145} Kenji Yoshino implicitly extends this insight when he argues that in the civil rights context the opportunity to be heard allows individuals to testify regarding the institutional humiliation that they have encountered and allows them to have experts contextualize their testimony—all subject to adversarial testing.\textsuperscript{146} Non-humiliation thus requires attention to the subjective voice and experience of the marginalized, subject to adversarial testing.

But why focus non-humiliation as proof of dignity? Why offer a negative definition of a positive state? As his argument is about a “decent society . . . one whose institutions do not humiliate people,” Avishai Margalit’s response is useful. Margalit identifies moral, logical, and cognitive reasons for privileging discussions of non-humiliation. Morally, Margalit argues, removal of negative attributes like humiliation is preferable in itself to creating “enjoyable benefits.”\textsuperscript{147} Logically, humiliating acts are more easily identifiable and eradicable (such as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{140} An individual’s “ontological heft” is denied when her subjectivity is overlooked:
  
  Intuitively, it seems plain that, elusive or not, our own subjectivity lies at the very core of our concern for human dignity. To deny my subjectivity is to deny my human dignity. Obviously, only a psychotic or a solipsist really thinks ‘the world revolves around me.’ But, tautologically, my world revolves around me; that is, I am the one necessary being in my world. This is what some have called the ‘egocentric predicament.’ Human dignity is in some sense a generalization from the egocentric predicament. Human beings have ontological heft because each of us is an ‘I’, and I have ontological heft. For others to treat me as though I have no ontological heft fundamentally denigrates my status in the world. It amounts to a form of humiliation that violates my human dignity.

Luban, \textit{Lawyers as Upholders}, supra note 119, at 821.

\item \textsuperscript{141} \textit{Id.} at 821, 822.

\item \textsuperscript{142} \textit{Id.} at 819; Luban, \textit{Fuller’s Canons}, supra note 137, at 40–41; Luban, \textit{Humiliation and Torture}, supra note 118, at 214.

\item \textsuperscript{143} Luban, \textit{Lawyers as Upholders}, supra note 119, at 826 (“[W]hat I care about is central to who I am, and to honor my human dignity is to take my cares and commitments seriously.”).

\item \textsuperscript{144} \textit{Id.} at 819.

\item \textsuperscript{145} \textit{Id.} at 821.

\item \textsuperscript{146} Yoshino, supra note 137, at 3093; see also generally Kenji Yoshino, \textit{The City and the Poet}, 114 YALE L. J. 1836 (2005) (exploring the enduring power of storytelling in the law).

\item \textsuperscript{147} MARGALIT, supra note 137, at 4.

\end{itemize}
“spitting in someone’s face”) than identifying enjoyable benefits, which often arise as “by-products of other actions.”

Cognitively, “it is easier to identify humiliating than respectful behavior, just as it is easier to identify illness over health.” Thus, moral, logical, and cognitive reasons compel focus on non-humiliation of human beings in an argument about human dignity.

Non-humiliation is a powerful antidote to the treatment encountered by the millions of Americans who suffer from mental illness. Recent estimates indicate that almost 44 million

American adults suffer from mental illness; almost 10 million from a serious mental illness, which is a complex phenomenon that varies by sufferer. In some cases of mental illness, an individual’s ability to reason may encounter severe difficulties. Solely on the basis of their mental illness, sufferers may be ignored and/or encouraged to commit suicide. Those with mental illness “still remain the most stigmatized population of people with disabilities.”

An admission of mental illness, even in private, often marks an individual as afflicted in such a way as to make that person appear less reliable, diligent, and less disciplined. Public admissions of mental illness, like those in complaints and open court, often supported by medical evidence, similarly mark an individual as afflicted in disconcerting ways. Thus, a veteran, radiologist, or worker who has lapsed into a coma and who alleges that mental illness prevented a timely filing exposes herself to potential adverse treatment

148 MARGALIT, supra note 137, at 4–5.
149 Id. at 5 (“Health and honor are both concepts involving defense. We defend out honor and protect our health. Disease and humiliation are concepts involving attack. It is easier to identify attack situations than defense situations, since the former are based on a clear contrast between the attacker and the attacked, while the latter can exist even without an identifiable attacker.”).
151 See ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD 13 (2007) (observing in a memoir about schizophrenia that “[c]onsciousness gradually loses its coherence. One’s center gives way. The center cannot hold. The ‘me’ becomes a haze, and the solid center from which one experiences reality breaks up like a bad radio signal. There is no longer a sturdy vantage point from which to look out, take things in, assess what’s happening. No core holds things together, providing the lens through which to see the world, to make judgments and comprehend risk. Random moments of time follow one another. Sights, sounds, thoughts, and feelings don’t go together. No organizing principle takes successive moments in time and puts them together in a coherent way from which sense can be made. And it’s all taking place in slow motion.”); MARYA HORBACHER, MADNESS: A BIPOLAR LIFE 118 (2008) (“When you are mad, mad like this, you don’t know it. Reality is what you see. When what you see shifts, departing from anyone else’s reality, it’s still reality to you.”).
152 See Eyal Press, Madness, The New Yorker, May 2, 2016, at 38, 73 (documenting violence and verbal abuse perpetrated with impunity by prison guards against those with mental illness at a Florida prison and observing that New York City inmates presenting mental health issues are often treated just as egregiously).
153 Waterstone, supra note 72, at 536.
154 Korn, supra note 72, at 587.
155 See generally Nicolas Rüsch et al., Do People with Mental Illness Deserve What They Get? Links Between Meritocratic Worldviews and Implicit Versus Explicit Stigma, 260 EUR. ARCHIVES OF PSYCHIATRY AND CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 617 (2010) (study of 85 participants in Chicago, IL finding that meritocratic worldviews (Protestant work ethic which values personal responsibility and hard work; and “belief in a fundamentally just and fair world”) were associated with more discriminatory attitudes, including toward those with mental illness, particularly among those who subscribed to the Protestant work ethic).
156 See Janet R. Cummings et al., Addressing Public Stigma and Disparities Among Persons with Mental Illness: The Role of Federal Policy, 103 AM. J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH 781, 784 (2013) (noting that “individuals with mental illness might not seek protection from discrimination out of fear of becoming more publicly identified as having mental illness and the stigma that may ensue”).
by alleging that an exceptional condition over which she exercises no control affected her engagement with the judicial process. By upholding that worker’s dignity, equity should aid and not prevent such a worker from proceeding on the merits against her employer.

B. Why Dignity Matters

That dignity matters for equity is underscored by a review of the work of prominent readers of American equity. Equity scholars have responded to Douglas Laycock’s salvos directed at the remaining distinctions between law and equity. I explain why Laycock’s functional argument is unhelpful when considering the dignitary plight of workers suffering from mental illness and also explore why Henry Smith’s and Samuel Bray’s functional arguments similarly fail to yield an account of how vulnerable workers should be treated at equity.

1. Laycock’s Dead Equity

Applying Laycock to the case of veteran, the radiologist, and the comatose worker would be unhelpful for a number of reasons. First, Laycock’s statement of the governing law, issued in 1991, may no longer be correct. Second, Laycock’s paradigm does not tell us about the dignitary treatment that workers alleging that mental illness prevented them from filing on time should expect at equity.

Laycock attacks equity by targeting the injunction’s irreparable injury rule, “modern equity’s premier remedy.”\(^{157}\) The irreparable injury rule is a threshold inquiry in requests for injunctions\(^{158}\) that requires the plaintiff to show that monetary damages (available at law) are not enough (which gets the plaintiff into equity).\(^{159}\) Courts find ways of surmounting or sidestepping the inadequacy of damages requirement in requests for injunctive relief, which means that a litigant gets equitable relief if she wants it.\(^{160}\) The language of irreparable injury is an historical label that tells us nothing about what judges actually do.\(^{161}\) The distinction between law and equity is “obsolete,”\(^{162}\) and Laycock “seek[s] to complete the assimilation of equity, and to eliminate the last remnant of the conception that equity is subordinate, extraordinary, or unusual.”\(^{163}\)

Applying Laycock, “equitable tolling” might be the label that courts use to dispense with a class of cases containing, for example, highly subjective allegations that are costly and difficult to verify.\(^{164}\) Deciding (1) whether the worker has been diagnosed with a mental illness; (2) by whom; (3) when; (4) whether that diagnosis credibly suggests that the worker was incapacitated; and (5) whether the incapacitation overlapped with the requisite statutory limitations period, can tax judicial and other resources.\(^{165}\) Given that courts labor under burdensome caseloads, and that

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\(^{157}\) Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1642, 1644 (1992) (reviewing Laycock, supra note 66). But see F.W. Maitland, Equity, Also the Forms of Action at Common Law 23 (1909) (“Of all the exploits of Equity the largest and the most important is the invention and development of the Trust.”).

\(^{158}\) Laycock, supra note 66, at 10 (“Adequacy seems to imply an absolute standard: Does the legal remedy reach the threshold of adequacy?”).

\(^{159}\) Id. at 4.

\(^{160}\) Id.

\(^{161}\) Id. at 7 (“Irreparable injury rhetoric has survived only as a label, to be affixed to opinions after the court has chosen the remedy.”).

\(^{162}\) Id. at ix.

\(^{163}\) Id. at vii.

\(^{164}\) On the costliness of equitable remedies, see Subrin, supra note 121, at 921, 925, 937, 983 & 986–87.

\(^{165}\) See Cantrell v. Knoxville Community Dev. Corp., 60 F.3d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1995) (observing that “[t]he mental
budget cuts threaten the American model of a thriving judiciary, it may be that whether we call it “equitable tolling,” “tolling,” or (to use a neologism) “A Petition to Proceed on the Merits” is functionally meaningless. 166 What really matters, as Laycock finds, is what courts are doing beneath the label (despite the label’s reputed equitable history and content) and why. That is, courts may be dispensing with cases, like those of the veteran, the radiologist, and the comatose worker whose mental claims they find are costly and/or dubious and/or difficult to verify.

Mental illness at law may also support Laycock’s contention that distinctions between law and equity are untenable. An equitable maxim states that equity follows the law. Where there is a clear legal rule that targets opportunistic conduct, “then there is no call for equity to backstop the law.” 167 The Fifth Circuit’s coma case indicates that while equity refuses to do so, the law may toll on the basis of mental illness. 168 As Laycock might observe, why maintain atavistic distinctions between law and equity when those distinctions may not redound to the veteran’s, the radiologist’s, and the comatose worker’s benefit?

Despite the appeal of Laycock’s argument, the Supreme Court’s recent equitable jurisprudence undermines his argument, and the utility of Laycock’s argument to workers alleging that mental illness foreclosed a timely filing is undermined by equity’s moral and individualized attention to particular facts, which compels a dignitary approach to cases of mental illness.

Fifteen years after Laycock’s 1991 argument, the Supreme Court upheld equitable principles in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 169 In that case the court held that the Patent Act requires a plaintiff requesting a permanent injunction to show:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 170

eBay has been read into a number of other areas of the law. 171 As Bray has found in his analysis of the Supreme Court’s equitable jurisprudence, “in remedies, the Court has insisted with vigor on the historic division between law and equity.” 172 Despite Laycock’s antagonism to equitable remedies, therefore, it is fitting to discuss equitable tolling in the context of an argument

instability of an individual is not capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, as reasonable professionals can disagree as to an individual's mental state.”); see also generally Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 571, 572–77 (2016) (discussing high costs at equity); Gianni Pirelli, William H. Gottdiener & Patricia A. Zapf, A Meta-Analytic Review of Competency to Stand Trial Research, 17 PSYCH. PUB. POL. AND L. 1, 2 (2011) (observing that competency to stand trial in criminal cases involve significant monetary outlays, including “costs associated with competency evaluations should they be conducted poorly.”).


167 Smith, supra note 75, at 36.

168 Eber, 130 F.Supp.2d at 864.


170 eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391.

171 See Gergen et al., supra note 74, at 205.

172 Bray, supra note 77, at 1000.
underscoring the continuing appeal of equitable remedies.

Laycock’s argument similarly fails since it does not tell us how vulnerable individuals should be treated at equity. Unlike the irreparable injury cases in which Laycock found that the plaintiff often got the remedy of her choice, in equitable tolling cases in which workers allege that mental incapacity prevented a timely filing, judges install a high barrier between workers alleging that mental illness foreclosed a timely filing and their ability to proceed on the merits against their employers. While Laycock’s argument tells us what judges might be doing under the guise of “equity” and why distinctions between law and equity might be problematic, Laycock’s argument does not tell us how vulnerable workers should be treated at equity. Laycock’s argument fails in these regards.

2. Smith’s Anti-Opportunism

Henry Smith’s functional approach to equity similarly fails to account for such workers. Smith argues that opportunists find loopholes in the system, which they exploit. Opportunists are creative thinkers against whom equity’s ex post analysis is particularly adept at “keep[ing] the ex ante environment safe from opportunists’ misuse and manipulation.”

Opportunists often engage in “behavior that is technically legal but is done with a view of securing unintended benefits from the system, and these benefits are usually smaller than the costs they impose on others.”

Equity “is reserved for as-yet-undreamed-of opportunism.”

Judicial concern about opportunism may compel courts to use the limitations period as a sword against workers whose inability to substantiate claims of mental illness is likely proof of the invalidity of such workers’ claims that mental illness prevented a timely filing. In such cases, the worker cannot provide the requisite proof because she likely was not mentally ill in the first place. It may thus be that courts inured to opportunistically players denied equitable tolling to the veteran, the radiologist, and the worker who lapsed into a coma not because courts are hostile to workers suffering from mental illness but because they are hostile to opportunists attempting to use employment discrimination cases to game the system.

Since workers may opportunistically sit on their claims to harass their employers, by rejecting equitable tolling on the basis of mental incapacity to the comatose worker, the radiologist, and the veteran, courts may have implicitly invoked the maxim that equity aids the diligent and vigilant. The worker who lapsed into a coma filed his complaint roughly 295 days late; the radiologist failed to meet a first deadline by 29 days and, by never filing, missed the second deadline entirely; and the veteran filed 318 days late. The equitable tolling standard set by the Supreme

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173 Smith, supra note 76, at 6.
174 Id. at 15.
175 Id. at 10.
176 See, e.g., Kerver v. Exxon Production Research Co., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25480, at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 1986) (“This comports with Plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which he indicated that he was at all times capable of handling his own affairs and never considered himself mentally or emotionally ill. Most importantly, Plaintiff does not claim that he was at any time legally incompetent.”); see also Hartnett v. Chase Bank of Tex. Nat’l Ass’n, 59 F. Supp. 2d 605, 614 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (explaining that a medical assessment did not support the worker’s claim).
177 Eber, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 851, 866.
179 Id. at *20–21.
Court requires a showing of diligence for tardy plaintiffs to toll the limitations period at equity. As Smith notes, the problem with some late filings is that they may be filed deliberately late to the prejudice of the defendant. Equity may thus implicitly deploy its doctrine of laches, which targets delays, against such claimants.

Despite the appeal of Smith’s argument, however, it has limitations to which I now turn. Smith’s anti-opportunism tells us little about the kinds of treatment that particular litigants, like those alleging mental illness, should expect from their judicial system (apart from the detection of opportunistic misconduct, which Smith aligns with immoral conduct, bad faith conduct, manipulation, exploitation and scheming, among others). In the three employment discrimination cases, we encounter a woman who has been subjected to sexual misconduct in the workplace and suffers from resulting mental illnesses, a veteran with severe traumatic injuries and mental illness, and a worker whose near-death experience gave rise to mental illness. These workers represent three vulnerable constituencies: women, veterans, and those ill and unable to work. Anti-opportunism does not tell us how they should be treated at equity.

Because vulnerable constituencies have seen their place in our society change when courts upheld their narratives, these three categories of workers matter in a discussion of equity and dignity. Equity’s own history shows that widows were favored, women relied on equity for assertion of their property interests, and racial minorities sued and won at equity in a Supreme Court case that has been called the most important case decided at equity in the United States. As Gary L. McDowell has noted (albeit with disapproval), “equity, which was originally understood as a judicial means of offering relief to individuals from ‘hard bargains’ in cases of fraud, accident, mistake, or trust, and as a means of confining the operation of ‘unjust and partial laws,’ has lately been stretched to offer relief to whole social classes.” Thus, while anti-

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181 See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
182 Smith, supra note 76, at 49.
183 See id. at 26.
184 See Duane Rudolph, How Equity and Custom Transformed American Waste Law, 2 PROF. L. J. 1, 22–23 (2015) [hereinafter Rudolph, Equity and Custom] (citing to Justice Story for the proposition that “it was ‘extremely difficult’ to object to a widow’s dower at equity.”).
185 See John H. Langbein, Renee Lettow Lerner & Bruce P. Smith, History of the Common Law: The Development of Anglo-American Legal Institutions 357 (2009) (“Chancery’s manipulation of the trust device to create and expand protections for the property of married women was among the court’s most notable doctrinal achievements across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”); see also generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (Kennedy, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) (“As women gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society began to understand that women have their own equal dignity, the law of coverture was abandoned.”).
187 Gary L. McDowell, Equity and the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Equitable Relief, and Public
opportunism implies that the ex post suppression of morally dubious conduct will purge some of that conduct in the ex ante arena, it does not tell us what those who are not acting opportunistically can and should expect in proceedings at equity.

Smith’s anti-opportunism thesis, like Laycock’s argument, thus does not account for the dignitary treatment that workers alleging that mental illness affected their ability to bring a timely claim should expect at equity.

3. Bray’s Equitable System

Bray’s functional equity similarly overlooks the power of dignitary arguments. Bray’s insight is that equity is a rational system that compels action and inaction. As a system, it includes remedies, managerial devices, and flexible equitable constraints to mitigate against high costs and potential abuse at equity. The equitable system is both useful and rationally distinct from the legal system, and its structural integrity should be maintained.

While absent from Bray’s equitable taxonomy, equitable tolling is implicit in Bray’s treatment of equitable defenses. Echoing Smith’s concern with opportunism, Bray argues that equitable defenses reflect “equity’s refusal to allow the power of these remedies to be used on behalf of a plaintiff who acts unjustly.” As such, the courts’ conclusions in the cases of the veteran, the radiologist, and the comatose worker may be the result of judicial concern with unjust plaintiffs who might manipulate the legal process. Like Smith’s opportunism, Bray’s application of equitable defenses against unjust plaintiffs helps us see that the workers in the three cases may have been acting “unjustly,” which is why equitable tolling was denied on the basis of mental incapacity.

Bray’s approach to equity as a system also allows us to see that both the worker and employer can avail themselves of equity, evoking notions of fairness. The veteran suffering from traumatic brain injuries and PTSD whose employer denied accommodation of his disabilities requested equitable remedies in the form of declaratory and injunctive relief. His employer, the army contractor, raised the limitations period against the veteran, and argued against the worker’s invocation of equitable tolling, with which the court agreed. The equitable system is thus one of weights and counterweights in which both workers’ and employers’ interests are balanced against each other, meaning that the system is not inherently opposed to any position since it empowers either party to raise the strongest claims on her own behalf.

Despite these attributes, the limitations of Bray’s equitable system impair its utility to workers alleging that mental illness prevented timely filing of their federal employment discrimination lawsuits. While Bray’s equitable taxonomy allows us to tell the veteran, the radiologist, and the comatose worker why their claims appear to have been denied (a statutory defense was


188 Id. at 533, 534, 536, 553, 562, 563 & 593.
189 See Bray, supra note 125, at 532.
190 Id. at 593.
191 See id. at 581–82.
192 Id. at 581.
193 See id. at 532; see also Smith, supra note 76, at 46.
194 On declaratory relief, see generally Bray, supra note 125, at 542 (“One other remedy, the declaratory judgment, though not easy to classify, should typically be seen as a non-equitable remedy.”).
195 Compl. at 7, Southall, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52634.
successfully raised against them and equity balanced their claims against those of their employers), Bray’s approach lacks the subjective dimension provided by a dignitary approach. Bray’s taxonomy cannot tell a worker that, even though she suffered sexual improprieties in the workplace and will now not be heard on the merits regarding that workplace mistreatment, the court did not humiliate her when it denied her equitable defense in the face of her mental illness. It cannot tell a veteran that the court’s refusal to hear his argument that major depression or PTSD or traumatic brain injuries prevented a timely feeling does not institutionalize the prejudice that those suffering from mental illness have faced and continue to face in the legal system. It cannot tell workers that courts’ privileging of the most extreme facts at equity implies that their suffering is not severe enough. Bray’s system thus cannot tell a worker why it is significant that the court did not get to hear her story and why that matters given that worker’s mental illness and the workplace environment in which she worked.

Thus, just like Laycock’s and Smith’s accounts of equity, while Bray’s equitable system argument is appealing, it fails to account for the kinds of treatment that dignity requires of courts, notably non-humiliation of vulnerable workers.

### III. HUMILIATION AND DEFIANCE

#### A. Humiliation

Recalling Luban’s insight that a human being is humiliated when she is wrongly treated as inferior, we might now examine how humiliation operates at the equitable tolling stage in federal employment discrimination cases.  

Humiliation implies abasement, which makes itself explicit in equitable tolling cases when courts raise the bar so high that all but what courts identify as the most extreme cases of mental suffering are rendered unsuccessful. The standard announced in the extreme coma case (granting

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197 See Luban, Lawyers as Upholders, supra note 118, at 839 and accompanying text.

198 Courts are aware that employees can be humiliated. See, e.g., Craig v. D.C., 74 F. Supp. 3d 349, 371 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted) (“Even after [worker] stepped back, she alleges that [co-worker] continued advancing towards her while pointing his finger in her face and calling her a ‘fucking bitch . . . .’ Both of these incidents, when described in full and considered alongside [co-worker’s] other allegations, suggest the kind of serious and objectively ‘physically threatening or humiliating’ conduct that supports a hostile work environment claim.”); Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 810 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Calling a female colleague a ‘bitch’ is firmly rooted in gender. It is humiliating and degrading based on sex. Cf. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (holding that, to prove a hostile work environment, courts may consider whether conduct is humiliating.”); Ault v. Oberlin Coll., 620 Fed. Appx. 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that where supervisor “stood directly against [worker] so that she could feel his penis, trapping her in position and remaining there despite [worker’s] telling him to remove himself” was “egregious enough to create a hostile work environment”); Mayes v. Office Depot, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 878, 895 (W.D. La. 2003) (“Neither a discriminatory failure to promote nor mere humiliation can support a case of constructive discharge.”); Williams v. GMC, 187 F.3d 553, 563 (6th Cir. 1999):

First, Williams’s own supervisor, Ryan, made her the target of unwanted and humiliating sexual innuendo. On one occasion he looked at her breasts and said, ‘You can rub up against me anytime,’ adding, ‘You would kill me, Marilyn. I don’t know if I can handle it, but I’d die with a smile on my face.’ On another occasion, he put his arm around her neck and placed his face against hers, and noticing that she had written ‘Hancock Furniture Company’ on a piece of paper, said, ‘You left the dick out of the hand.’ Finally, one day while bending over, he came behind her and said, ‘Back up; just back up.’ These incidents, which must be taken as fact for purposes of summary judgment, were not merely crude, offensive, and humiliating, but also contained an element of physical invasion.

Second, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, we do not view a co-worker’s saying ‘Hey, slut’ as merely ‘foul language in the workplace.’ In addition, hearing ‘I’m sick and tired of these fucking women’ while the target of a box thrown by a co-worker is not merely ‘mean and annoying treatment by co-workers.’ These actions could be
equitable tolling for a coma but not for the resulting major depression) is good law 15 years after it was decided. Other courts impose a “profound mental incapacity” standard on which basis they hold that workers proceeding pro se who suffer from PTSD and depression do not merit equitable tolling. Other courts require an “inability to engage in rational thought,” and others recognize dementia (causing “total” disability) as warranting equitable tolling. In the veteran’s case, the court interpreted the governing standard to require the veteran to analogize his experience to that of a worker raped in the workplace who had suffered subsequent mental illness. The court also implied that the employer against whom equitable tolling is sought must be the cause of the conditions underlying the mental illness on which basis equitable tolling is sought.

Recalling the facts of the rape case to which analogy was required helps underscore the nature of the institutional humiliation facing workers at the equitable tolling stage. While the court in the veteran’s case referred to one case, there were in fact two cases in which the worker had been repeatedly raped and otherwise abused in the workplace, which resulted in a number of

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199 See Eber, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 866, announcing but not systematically applying the following factors:

When determining whether a given mental disorder justifies the tolling of limitations, courts have focused on such factors as: (a) the plaintiff’s representation by counsel; (b) the plaintiff’s capacity to work; (c) the plaintiff’s ability to execute legal documents; (d) the degree to which the plaintiff was able to interact with others; (e) medical evidence ‘regarding any mental, emotional or psychological problem’ that the plaintiff endured; and (f) an adjudication of incompetency or a hospitalization for mental incapacity.

200 Deweese v. Colvin, No. 3:15-16210, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82268, at *10–11 n.6 (S.D. W. Va. June 24, 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (“the Fourth Circuit has previously held that equitable tolling based on mental health issues is only appropriate in cases of profound mental incapacity, including institutionalization or adjudged mental incompetence. For example, in [one case] the Court held that the plaintiff’s mental conditions, schizoaffective disorders and generalized anxiety disorder, were not a sufficient basis for equitable tolling”).

201 Nunes v. Butler, No. 14-378L, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117819, at *15–16 (D.R.I. July 17, 2015) (“This standard[—][the inability to engage in rational thought and deliberate decision such that an applicant is unable understand or act on his rights[—][has been applied [for over two decades] as the test for equitable tolling in this Circuit.”).

202 E.g., Hardy, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (granting equitable tolling to worker diagnosed with dementia, living with family).

203 See Southall, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52634, at *9 (“He alleges no facts detailing an inability to function similar to that of the plaintiff in Stoll.”). The veteran relied on the rape case for the general proposition that “Equitable tolling should apply in the case at hand, because Plaintiff alleges facts in his complaint which constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond his control and which made it impossible for him to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days.” Pl.’s Resp. at 6, Southall, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52634 (No. 3:15-CV-02222). In holding against the veteran, the court accepted the employer’s reading of the case to require that there be “severe sexual harassment and assault at the hands of supervisors and co-workers leading to various psychological disorders, that is, her incapacity was directly caused by defendants’ alleged conduct.” Def’s Reply Mem. at 6, Southall, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52634 (No. 3:15-CV-02222).

204 Id. at *8 (“Plaintiff argues that this form of equitable tolling should apply to him because he too alleges facts which constitute extraordinary circumstances. Pl’s. Resp. at 6. I disagree. First, the Stoll court focused on the defendants’ creation of extraordinary circumstances.”).


206 In Stoll, coworkers and supervisors: commented on [the worker’s] body, shot rubber bands at her backside, asked her to wear lacy black underwear for them, bumped and rubbed up against her from behind, pressed their erect penises into her back while she was sorting mail and unable to get away, followed her into the women’s bathroom, asked her to go on vacations . . . . [A supervisor] refused [her] request to leave her workstation to go to the ladies’ room because she was menstruating heavily. Instead, he forced her to remain at her letter-sorting console and bleed all over herself.
psychiatric illnesses, suicide thoughts or attempts and the workers proceeded pro se. In one case, the victim was a Spanish speaker who proceeded pro se and could not read. In the other, the abuse was so extreme that it resulted in an inability to “concentrate well enough to read,” an inability to relate to her sons, and an inability to communicate with her lawyer as she was “totally psychiatrically disabled.” In that case, the court held that “if ever equity demanded tolling a statute of limitations, it does so here.” Subordination to extreme standards that require workers to have been subjected to extraordinary forms of suffering humiliates vulnerable workers.

Compelling workers to appeal to extreme narratives demeans workers since some workers’ mental illness is held as a prohibitive exemplar to others. Courts implicitly create a hierarchy of psychological suffering, rejecting those that they deem not incapacitated enough no matter the depth of their suffering. As one court indicated, there are a variety of “lesser forms of mental and physical impairment” that simply do not warrant equitable tolling:


Courts thus recognize “greater forms” of suffering as a result of which they grant equitable tolling. Establishment of greater suffering humiliates workers afflicted with mental illness who are implicitly told that they are not suffering enough to warrant equitable tolling.

Judicial hostility to cases alleging that mental illness prevented a timely filing is also visible in judicial rejection of workers’ documentation of their suffering. The court in the coma case rejected the worker’s psychiatrist’s statement that the worker “became significantly depressed and

Stoll, 165 F.3d 1239. In Willamette Tree Wholesale, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25464, at *22, the abuser told the worker not to report the sexual assaults or her family would be harmed.

207 In Stoll, the worker suffered from “severe major depression and severe generalized anxiety disorder, as well as somatic form pain disorder.” Stoll, 165 F.3d at 1240. In Willamette Tree Wholesale, Inc., the worker suffered from “severe depression, post-traumatic stress, suicidal ideation, social isolation and panic attacks.” 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25464, at *22.


209 Stoll, 165 F.3d at 1240.

210 Id. at 1241; Willamette Tree Wholesale, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25464, at *23.


212 Stoll, 165 F.3d at 1240.

213 Id.

214 Id.

215 Id. at 1242.

could not physically work or function in daily activities.” Why? Because other courts had rejected psychiatric evaluations, because the worker only saw his psychiatrist once, because the worker could form a narrative about his suffering and could be hopeful, because two medical doctors (themselves not psychiatrists) had found him fit to work before he had gone to the psychiatrist. Similarly, the radiologist’s court rejected her psychiatrist’s evaluation as “just the type of conclusory and vague claim[s] . . . [of] paranoia, panic attacks, an depression[that are] insufficient to invoke equitable tolling, without a particularized description of how her condition adversely affected her capacity to function generally or in relationship to the pursuit of her rights.” Rejection of supporting medical documentation eviscerates the authenticity of the plaintiff’s story and demeans her by not taking her story seriously.

Humiliation is thus the experience of one’s legal system as made by others for others so that one’s subjectivity is denied. For those suffering from mental illness, it amounts to the recognition that the law is made by the “sane” for the “sane,” and the “sane” are only willing to accommodate those “unlike them” whose stories are extreme. This produces arguments that should not have to be made. Take, for example, the coma case. There the worker, possibly aware that his coma would toll the limitations period but his subsequent major depression would not, argued that “[f]or many months [he] could not do tasks such as driving a car, shopping for groceries, paying bills and in fact [he] was in a zombie-like state and unable to function.” To the layperson “zombie-like state and unable to function” may not be far from a coma. But the analogy between zombies and mental illness risks trivializing the genuine nature of the worker’s suffering, especially when the court can rebuff the analogy by saying that the worker was able to diet, sleep well, drive to the state worker’s compensation office, “walking across the parking lot to another building after learning that [his] first stop was erroneous, and applying for unemployment compensation.” Humiliation means that those untouched by mental illness can require those afflicted by it to dishonor the true nature of their suffering and appeal to extreme narratives that do not coincide

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217 Eber, 130 F. Supp.2d at 867.
218 Id. (“Similar affidavits of physicians characterizing a plaintiff as incapacitated during the limitations period have been deemed insufficient to toll the running of the statute, especially when refuted by evidence to the contrary.”).
219 Id.
220 Id. (“Dr. Flowers’s notes from Eber’s sole visit on September 9, 1998, indicate that although Eber reported that he was depressed, was having problems with his memory, and could not concentrate, he was able to give Dr. Flowers a fairly detailed description of his prior medical history as well as his family, employment, and educational history. He also reported that he was ‘sleeping well’ and was ‘dieting,’ reducing his weight from 300 to 234 pounds. Eber further stated that he was at times energetic, that he was using a treadmill, and that his mood varied, sometimes feeling that ‘everything would be alright.’”).
221 Id. at 869.
222 Kuriakose, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66208, at *32–34 (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted) (rejecting psychiatrist’s assessment that the radiologist suffered from “depression and PTSD,” was “withdrawn and anxious” and that “people who suffer sexual assault are often ashamed of reporting abuse and ‘incapable of coming to terms with what happened to them’”).
223 See generally 1-1 Michael L. Berlin, Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal §1-2.2.6 (2d. ed. 2005) (identifying “sanism as an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry that permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses”).
224 Eber, 130 F.Supp 2d at 851.
225 Id. at 867, 868.
with their own.

Extending Smith’s opportunism argument to courts, humiliation means that an American worker alleging mental illness is compelled to disabuse himself of the view that the court is a forum amenable to claims like hers. Predatory conduct—and opportunism can be about predation—becomes not only the province of bad faith litigants, but also of tribunals that close equity’s doors to some of the most marginalized workers. Even if it were the case that courts do not target those with mental illness—and judicial antipathy to those proceeding pro se as paupers may support this view—rejection of mental illness claims underscores widespread judicial antipathy to those suffering from mental illness, resulting in damaging precedent that continues to marginalize this most stigmatized disability group nationwide.

Humiliation thus means that courts establish high barriers at equity that prevent workers suffering from mental illness from proceeding on the merits against their employers. Such high standards require workers to trivialize the nature of their suffering and conform to extreme narratives. Courts thus establish a hierarchy in mental illness cases that privileges only the most extraordinary examples of mental incapacity, which is damaging to workers whose predicament is already vulnerable. Such humiliation requires a response, to which I now turn.

B. Defiance

Defiance counters humiliation by refusing to allow humiliation to stand. Here, I explore the assuredly controversial notion of what scholarly defiance of institutionalized humiliation might mean for equitable tolling cases in which workers alleged that mental illness prevented a timely

226 On opportunism and predation, see Smith, Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism, at *21 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015) at 7–11 (founding and concluding his discussion of opportunism at equity with Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) in which the grandson poisoned his grandfather to prevent him from amending his will in favor of his grandfather’s new spouse so that the grandson might take title to his portion of the estate under the old will).

227 See, e.g., Milam, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3629, at *9 (“Plaintiff’s pro se status and mental condition represent a garden variety example of excusable neglect, but they do not amount to extraordinary circumstances that prevented her from complying with the statute of limitations.”); Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 2005) (severe depression combined with pro se status do not justify equitable tolling); Flores v. Ashcroft, No. C 00-21168 JF, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16572, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2001) (worker’s claim to tolling on the basis of pro se status inconsistent with circuit precedent); Williams v. West, No. C 95-2546 SI, No. C 95-2547 SI, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20648, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1997) (“Furthermore, courts have not tolled the statute of limitations merely because a plaintiff is pro se.”); White v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 900 F. Supp. 51, 53 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (“Simply neglecting to heed a limitations period will not serve to invoke equitable tolling; this is true even when the plaintiff is proceeding pro se.”).


229 See Korn, supra note 72.

230 See Waterstone, supra note 72 (observing that City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) denying heightened scrutiny to those suffering from mental disabilities continues to be noxious to the efforts of those suffering from mental disabilities to achieve equal rights).
filing.\textsuperscript{231}

Ackerman states that “[i]t’s only if you go along that your humiliation is complete. If you defy your [offender] instead, he hasn’t succeeded in humiliating you.”\textsuperscript{232} Humiliation is thus a process that is complete only if left un-defied.\textsuperscript{233} In other words, the offensive act, omission, or comment opens an “intersubjective encounter” in which one party announces his hostility to the other based on his belief in the other’s inferiority on which basis he will humiliate the other party.\textsuperscript{234} As an act of defiance, therefore, we might respond to judicial humiliation of vulnerable workers by unearthing ways in which courts misunderstand equity and its requirements. Courts misunderstand equity when they misconstrue the meaning of an “extraordinary” remedy, which they sometimes conflate with “extreme.” They also misunderstand equity when they overlook equity’s historical treatment of those afflicted with mental illness. Defiance permits the conclusion that the holdings in cases like those of the veteran, the radiologist, and the comatose worker were not inevitable. This section lays the foundation for the next (and final) section of my article in which I propose changes to judicial application of the equitable tolling doctrine when workers suffer from mental illness.

Given courts’ requirement of “extraordinary” and “extreme” cases to which they grant equitable tolling, we should examine the meaning of “extraordinary,” a word on which courts often rely without any sense of what the word means. Courts in jurisdictions where the coma case, the radiologist’s case, and the veteran’s case, respectively, arose provide that “equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy.”\textsuperscript{235} Under Supreme Court precedent, workers requesting an extraordinary equitable remedy like equitable tolling must show “extraordinary circumstances.”\textsuperscript{236} Workers requesting an extraordinary remedy must thus show extraordinary circumstances.

What does “extraordinary” mean? Some courts align it with “exceptional,”\textsuperscript{237} some with “rare

\textsuperscript{231}Courts are attentive to defiance of their institutional dignity. \textit{See}, e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 246 (U.S. 1993) (“It is the District Court that has the authority to defend its own dignity, by sanctioning an act of defiance that occurred solely within its domain.”); United States v. Giovanelli, 897 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Although the contempt power should not be used in a manner that impinges on legitimate advocacy, a judge need not tolerate disrespect or a deliberate show of defiance in open court. To affront the dignity of the court the misbehavior need not insult the judge personally, but may consist of threats, disrespect or other like behavior.”); Scott v. Hughes, 106 A.D.2d 355, 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1984) (citation omitted) (“Conduct which manifests an intent to defy the dignity and authority of the court may properly be adjudged contemptuous.”).

\textsuperscript{232} \textit{ACKERMAN}, supra note 137, at 139.

\textsuperscript{233} \textit{See id.} (“It’s only if you go along that your humiliation is complete. If you defy your [offender] instead, he hasn’t succeeded in humiliating you.”).

\textsuperscript{234} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{235} \textit{E.g., Eber}, 130 F.Supp.2d at 865 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (“equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy appropriate only in a narrow class of fact situations”); Lazerson v. Colvin, No. 4:13-cv-02832-YGR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29979, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014) (“equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy [applicable] in certain rare cases”); Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 273 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Aluminum Workers International Union Local Union No. 215 v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1982)) (“Precisely because equitable relief is an extraordinary remedy to be cautiously granted, it follows that the scope of relief should be strictly tailored to accomplish only that which the situation specifically requires and which cannot be attained through legal remedy.”).

\textsuperscript{236} \textit{See supra note 95 and accompanying text.}

\textsuperscript{237} \textit{E.g., Cadieux v. Donahoe, No. 5:11-cv-185, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98419, at *16–17 (D. Vt. July 13, 2012) (“As with all equitable tolling, tolling due to a mental disorder is limited to exceptional circumstances.”); Lloret v. Lockwood Greene Eng’rs, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 5750 (SS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3999, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1998) (“Whether a mental disorder may be the basis for tolling in a civil rights action is decided upon principles of equity
and exceptional,”238 some with “so extraordinary,”239 and still others with “extreme.”240 They misunderstand. The first and original meaning of “extraordinary” is “extra-ordinary,” which is descriptive rather than normative. An equitable remedy is extra-ordinary in the denotative sense that it is “[o]ut of the usual or regular course or order.”241 The common law is the regular course or order, and equity’s jurisdiction is irregular by comparison.242 Blackstone,243 Justice Story,244 and is limited to exceptional circumstances.”).

238 E.g., Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 598, at 615 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“Equitable tolling is only appropriate in rare and exceptional circumstances in which a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising [his] rights.”); George, No. H-10-3235, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94318, at *32 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“[E]quitable tolling applies only in rare and exceptional circumstances.”); Harris v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 628 F.3d 237, 239 (5th Cir. 2010) (same); see also Bray, supra note 76, at 1002, et seq.

239 E.g., Vlad-Berindan v. LifeWorx, Inc., No. 13 CV 1562 (LB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58741, *22 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2014) (citing Kantor-Hopkins v. Cyberzone Health Club, No. 06 Civ. 643, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66820, 2007 WL 2687665 at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2007)) (“Whether equitable tolling should be applied is not a question of the illness’ severity and it is not a question of hospitalization; rather, the issue is whether a party can show that the illness was so extraordinary that it functioned as a complete bar to the procedural steps required to file suit in a timely fashion throughout the entire period in question.”).

240 E.g., Nunes, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117819, *15 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (“the plaintiff’s assertion of mental incapacity must be accompanied by a proffer sufficient to overcome the reality that equitable tolling is available only in the most extreme cases.”); Stewart v. Rock Tenn CP, LLC, No. 3:13-cv-02147-AC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54196, *25–26 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2015) (alteration in original) (citation and quotations marks omitted) (“A statute of limitations is subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, which courts apply in extreme cases . . . in a case-by-case analysis.”); Fresquez v. County of Stanislaus, No. 1:13-cv 1897-AWI-SAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66466, at *21 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) (“Equitable tolling is applied in extreme cases only . . . .”); Luong v. U.S. Bank N.A., No. 3:12-cv-01220-HU, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116433, at *11–12 (D. Or. June 20, 2013) (“This case is not ‘extreme’ and equitable tolling premised on mental incompetence would not be appropriate.”); Ellison v. Northwest Airlines, 938 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (D. Haw. 1996) (citation and quotations marks omitted) (“The Ninth Circuit has held that the 90 day filing requirement is subject to equitable tolling, although the doctrine is available only in only extreme cases and is to be applied sparingly.”).


242 See generally 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 62 [hereinafter 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES] (University of Chicago Press, 1979) (1769) (“And law, without equity, tho’ hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public good, than equity without law.”); F.W. MATILAND, FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 19 (2d ed. 1936) (“if the legislature had passed a short act saying ‘Equity is hereby abolished’, we might still have got on fairly well; in some respects our law would have been barbarous, unjust, absurd, but still the great elementary rights, the right to immunity from violence, the right to one’s good name, the rights of ownership and of possession would have been decently protected and contract would have been enforced. On the other hand had the legislature said, ‘Common Law is hereby abolished’, this decree if obeyed would have meant anarchy”); Smith, supra note 75, at *36 (relying on Matiland to argue that “that equity follows the law in part because it presupposes the law. It is ‘law about law.’ A safety valve has to be a safety valve on something else”).

243 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 48, 49 (1769) [hereinafter 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES] (distinguishing between “this ordinary, or legal, court” and “the extraordinary court, or court of equity, [which] is now become the court of the greatest judicial consequence”).

244 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 33 (1839) [hereinafter STORY, COMMENTARIES] (referring to “equitable or extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery”).
John Norton Pomeroy, Roscoe Pound, Edward D. Re, and Laycock all refer to the chancellor’s or equity’s extraordinary jurisdiction. Smith’s opportunism argument relies on Maitland to advance this view of equity. “Extraordinary” merely means “separate, apart from, or distinct from common law.”

The problem arises when “extraordinary” takes on particular (predictive) normative valence. Under this reading, equitable tolling and the facts giving rise to it are “extraordinary” not because they are unavailable at common law, but because they are subsumed under another iteration of “extraordinary,” that is, “[o]f a kind not usually met with; exceptional; unusual; singular.” The court might then find itself “expressing astonishment, strong admiration or the contrary.” As we have seen, that equity has moral basis is uncontentious. When equity’s extraordinary nature is conflated with “exceptional,” “unusual,” “rare,” “extreme,” however, it raises concern since equity then requires workers suffering from mental illness to cross an elevated threshold for courts to accept a worker’s plea for judicial intervention on the basis of mental incapacity. This is visible in the veteran’s case in which the court required analogy to workplace rape case and in the radiologist’s case in which the court marveled at the nature of radiologist’s mental illness. In such cases, equity identified some facts as morally endorsable while it rebuffed others, which redounded to the employer’s benefit. A defiant posture rejects such readings of equitable tolling.

Defiance would similarly require us to appeal to equity’s historical treatment of mental illness to undermine the contention that antagonism to individuals suffering from mental illness has always characterized proceedings at equity. If that contention on its own did not compel change, we might then advert to nineteenth-century precedent, which shows that courts of equity paid particular solicitude to individuals suffering from mental illness. The English Lord Chancellor had jurisdiction over a class of propertied individuals suffering from mental illness who were unable to take care of their person and property. After an inquisition held by the Master in Lunacy, the Lord Chancellor would determine if the afflicted individual and his property would be subject to

245 J O H N N O R T O N P O M E R O Y , A T R E AT I S E O N E Q U IT Y J U R I S P R U D E N C E 1 7 ( 1 9 0 7 ) ; I R O S C E P O U N D , J U R I S P R U D E N C E 4 4 4 n . 1 8 ( T h e L a w b o o k E x c h a n g e , L t d . 2 0 0 8 ) ( 1 9 5 9 ) .
246 P O U N D , s u p r a n o t e 2 4 4 , a t 4 4 4 n . 1 8 ( r e f e r r i n g a l s o t o e q u i t y ’ s g r a n t s o f “ e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e l i e f i n c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t e d c a t e g o r i e s o n t h e g r o u n d o f i n a d e q u a c y a t l a w ” ) .
247 E D W A R D D . R E , C A S E S A N D M A T E R I A L S O N E Q U I T Y A N D E Q U I T A B L E R E M E D I E S 4 3 4 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ( e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) (“ S p e c i f i c r e d r e s s o r r e l i e f , a s t h e c a s e s a n d m a t e r i a l s i n t h i s b o o k i l l u s t r a t e , r e q u i r e d a r e s o u r t t o e q u i t y f o r a n e q u i t a b l e r e m e d y . H e n c e , t h e p h r a s e o l o g y t h a t t h e s p e c i f i c r e l i e f o r r e m e d y i n e q u i t y w a s e x t r a o r d i n a r y . ” ) .
248 L a y c o c k , s u p r a n o t e 6 6 , a t v i i i ( a r g u i n g i n f a v o r o f d e s p e n s i n g w i t h t h e c o n c e p t t h a t e q u i t y i s s u b o r d i n a t e , e x t r a o r d i n a r y , o r u n u s u a l . ” ) .
249 S e e S m i t h , s u p r a n o t e 7 5 , a t * 3 5 ( e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) (“ I m p o r t a n t f o r t h e t h e o r y o f e q u i t y a s a n t i - o p p o r t u n i s m i s t h a t m o s t l y e q u i t y s e r v e s a s a s a f e t y v a l v e . T h i s m e a n s t h a t e q u i t y f o l l o w s t h e l a w i n p a r t b e c a u s e i t p r e s u m p s t h e l a w . I t i s ’ l a w a b o u t l a w . ’ A s a s a f e t y v a l v e h a s t o b e a s a f e t y v a l v e o n s o m e t h i n g e l s e . . . . I n [ M a i t l a n d ’ s ] f a m o u s f o r m u l a t i o n , ’ e q u i t y w i t h o u t c o m m o n l a w w o u l d h a v e b e e n c a s t l e i n t h e a i r , a n i m p o s s i b i l i t y . ” ) .
250 S e e s u p r a n o t e 2 4 0 a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g t e x t .
251 E x t r a - o r d i n a r y , V O X F O R D E N G L I S H D I C T I O N A R Y , s u p r a n o t e 2 4 1 , a t 6 1 4 .
252 I d . ; s e e a l s o , e . g . , S t o l l , 1 6 5 F . 3 d a t 1 2 4 2 ( h o l d i n g t h a t “ i f e v e r e q u i t y d e m a n d e d t o l l i n g a s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , i t d o e s s o h e r e ” ) .
253 S e e s u p r a n o t e 1 2 4 a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g t e x t .
254 S e e s u p r a n o t e s 2 0 3 – 1 4 a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g t e x t .
255 K u r i a k o s e , 2 0 1 5 U . S . D i s t , L E X I S 6 6 2 0 8 , a t * 3 5 .
256 C h a n t a l S t e b b i n g s , R e E a r l o f S e f t o n ( 1 8 9 8 ) , i n L A N D M A R K C A S E S I N E Q U I T Y 4 5 3 – 7 2 ( C h a r l e s M i t c h e l l & P a u l M i t c h e l l , e d s . 2 0 1 2 ) .
Chancery jurisdiction as a Chancery lunatic.257 The goal was to “ensure the protection of [the lunatic’s] person and property.”258 “The guiding principle of the Lord Chancellor in his dealings with the property of lunatics was to ensure that, should they recover, they would find their estates exactly as they were when they became insane.”259 More recently, a California appellate court held that “[i]t is well established that incompetency is a basis for equitable relief and that equity will relieve an incompetent from a judgment taken without an adversary hearing.”260 Given equity’s historical and more recent approaches to mental illness, hostility to mental illness at equity is not inevitable.

Indeed, even if equity’s history were antagonistic to those raising claims on the basis of mental incapacity, the Supreme Court’s recent dignity cases are instructive. The cases support the proposition that dignity breaks the chain of discrimination against a vulnerable constituency, no matter how deeply-rooted the animosity toward that constituency. In a case involving prisoners afflicted with mental illness261 who over at least two decades262 did not receive adequate care in the state’s penal system,263 writing for the majority Justice Kennedy upheld a far-reaching structural injunction264 targeting conditions inimical to the prisoners’ inherent dignity.265 Similarly, in response to arguments grounded in historical hostility to gays’ intimate lives,266 Justice Kennedy held for the majority “that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”267 In a more recent same-sex marriage opinion, Justice Kennedy found that marriage inequality humiliates members of the lesbian and gay community.268 To reach this finding, Justice Kennedy accepted the plaintiffs’ argument that an antagonistic history can be acknowledged but “cannot end there.”269 The Supreme Court’s dignity jurisprudence270 thus suggests that a history of judicial antagonism to Americans suffering from mental illness is reason to oppose and not

257 Stebbings, supra note 256 at 456–59.
258 Id. at 457.
259 Id. at 459.
261 See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 503 (2011); see also generally, Schlanger, supra note 65.
262 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. at 506.
263 Id. at 503–04.
264 Id. at 545.
265 See id. at 510 (citation omitted) (“Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”).
267 Id. at 567.
269 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
270 See generally Noah Feldman, The United States of Justice Kennedy, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2011, 9:52 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2011-05-30/how-it-became-the-united-states-of-justice-kennedy-noah-feldman (discussing Justice Kennedy’s “favorite constitutional concept: dignity” and observing that “[i]t’s Justice Anthony Kennedy’s country[——]the rest of us just live in it. Or so it sometimes feels when the U.S. Supreme Court’s most important and decisions come down from Mount Olympus, aka 1 First Street, NE, where the justices preside in their white marble temple in Washington”).
perpetuate such mistreatment. 271

Opposition to the mistreatment of those suffering from mental illness requires that we hear the stories of workers like the veteran, the radiologist, and the worker who fell in to a coma. Their stories carry particular power at equity. Equity, after all, is about more than the vindication of monetary interests. We see this in equitable tolling, which is a threshold defense raised by the worker so that her case might proceed on the merits; no money requested. True, workers sue for any number of remedies, including back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, and liquidated damages, among others. 272 Outside the employment discrimination context, money is also generally available at equity, for example, in restitution or unjust enrichment cases. But workers also sue for injunctions against their employers. 273 That is, equity, even in the employment discrimination context, is more often than not about non-monetary matters. Workers at the equitable tolling stage want the opportunity to proceed to the telling of their stories, and, at the injunction stage, they want to live their stories in a workplace free from the discrimination that brought them to court in the first place. Equity is about more than money.

Might workers simply be paid not to tell their stories? Luban reminds us that, in their quest for justice the most vulnerable often ask for more than money from the judicial process. 274 Responding to commentators who argue that the poor would rather receive a lump sum than legal representation, Luban unearths the constraints of this monetary argument. 275 There are areas of the law in which cash cannot replace (or would be an inadequate substitute) for the right that would be forfeited: parental rights, immigration status, cessation of domestic violence, having a home. 276

271 See generally PERLIN, supra note 223, §§ 1-2.1.1 (observing how some state courts are granting rights to those with mental illness on a dignitary basis).
272 LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 50, § 41-3.
273 Id. §§ 40-1 to 40-40.
274 See Luban, Lawyers as Upholders, supra note 119, at 840–41.
275 See id.
276 Luban’s dignitary response merits full replication:

Prospective Client #1: The city is trying to terminate my parental rights and take my child away. Can you help me?
[Professors] Silver and Cross: That’s a twenty-hour job. We won’t represent you, but we’ll give you $3,000. They are honoring her autonomy. Which does she prefer, the money or the child? It’s her call. After she leaves, clutching the child to her, the next client comes in:

Prospective Client #2: Immigration is trying to deport me back to my home country. I’ll be arrested if I’m sent back, maybe tortured and killed. Can you represent me at my asylum hearing?
Silver and Cross: Oh sure. But that will take at least forty hours to do right. Tell you what: We’ll give you $6,000 instead. That should get you across the Canadian border in style!

Next comes Client Number Three:

Prospective Client #3: Last week my boyfriend beat me up and broke my arm. Now he’s threatening to kill me. My cousin told me that you could help me get a court order to keep him away.
Silver and Cross: We could. It would take about four hours. But what if we give you $600 instead? Now you can buy a gun and take yourself out to dinner with the change.

And now the last:

Prospective Client #4: My landlord is trying to evict me, and I haven’t got the money for a new apartment. He has no right to evict me[—]I’ve always been a good tenant and paid the rent on time. He just doesn’t like me. My eviction hearing is next week. Can you help me?
Silver and Cross: Here’s the money for a new apartment.
It’s been a good day’s work at the alms factory. Instead of foisting legal services on clients, they have honored the clients’ autonomy by giving them money they can spend on anything they wish. The professors apparently believe that the four prospective clients will be grateful for their response. My own prediction is rather different. Even if
I would add to this list the ability to have one’s story heard, especially when one suffers from mental illness. As Andrew Scull observes in his powerful study of millennia of severe abuse targeting those who have mental illness, “(e)xcept in very occasional circumstances, however, our knowledge of how patients responded to asylumdom is almost always filtered through the eyes and ears of their doctors.”

Similarly, in the judicial sphere courts and employers often frame the judicial history of those suffering from mental illness, especially when their stories are not heard.

Dignity, too, is about more than money. Gewirth observes in his discussion of inherent dignity that:

This is a concept that sets peculiarly stringent moral requirements. In this sense, dignity is contrasted by Kant with price. If a thing has a price, then it can be substituted for or replaced by something else of equivalent value, where value signifies, as in Thomas Hobbes, a worth that is relative to a person’s desires or opinions. Thus Hobbes recognizes only a certain version of the empirical concept of dignity, which he defines as ‘the publique worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the Commonwealth.’ In contrast, inherent dignity cannot be replaced by anything else, and it is not relative to anyone’s desires or opinions. It is such inherent dignity that serves as the ground of human rights.

Money can neither vest nor divest dignity. Dignity requires us to take seriously the stories of those who approach equity and document mental illness that prevented them from filing on time. It requires that we not humiliate them even if they might not be aware of it because of their mental

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Prospective Client Number Four will be happier with the money for a new apartment than with legal assistance, I suspect she will also be angered and humiliated by the offer.

Id. at 841.

277 Those suffering from mental illness have been subjected to the following treatments that reflect both the deep-seated hostility that they have faced and the depth of their suffering over time: “spitting and isolation”; exorcism; “ingestion of toxic heavy metals”; chaining to walls; beating; “[b]lood-letting, cupping, vomits and purges”; “trials, tortures and executions”; hanging, drowning, dismemberment, crushing to death under piles of rocks; being made objects of financial speculation and investment; binding to chairs restricting movement; binding to swinging chairs producing “an instant discharge of the stomach, bowels, and bladder, in quick succession”; rape; dragging; sterilization; public entertainment; electric shocks to mouths and genitals; infection with bacterium causing fevers and illness; infection with malaria (Nobel Prize in 1927); removal of teeth and tonsils; partial or entire removal of cervixes, colons, spleens and stomachs; use of barbiturates to induce prolonged sleep; “injection of horse serum into spinal canals to produce meningitis”; lowering of body temperatures to dangerous levels; injection of cyanide, colloidal calcium, or strychnine; lobotomy (Nobel Prize in 1949); electro-convulsive therapy; “insulin shock therapy”; “injections of camphor in oil”; injections of drugs resulting in “joint dislocations, fractures, heart damage, permanent brain trauma, and even an occasional death.” Scull, supra note 4, at 32; 43, 77, 177–79; 47; 65, 97; 65, 191; 66, 92, 171; 86; 86; 134–140; 156–57; 158; 191; 191; 266; 280; 298; 300; 300–301; 306; 306; 308; 309; 309; 309; 318; 309; 310; 311; 311.

278 Id. at 232.

279 See generally Douglas Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1065, 1076–77 (1979) (reviewing Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction (1978)) (observing in a discussion of Fiss’s “understat[ed] . . . objection” to economic efficiency that “[l]aw in a democracy must reflect the values of the people, and although efficiency is undoubtedly important to Americans, so are other values, such as personal autonomy, fairness, morality, and distributive justice. These values lack the illusion of mathematical precision that surrounds the analysis of efficiency, and their policy implications are not always clear. But they are strongly and widely held, and they underlie the widespread resistance to making efficiency the touchstone of legal analysis”).

280 Gewirth, supra note 127, at 13.
illness.\(^\text{281}\)

Equity remains powerful in this regard because it often acts as a gatekeeper to the judicial system. It represents an American worker’s only hope for judicial reprieve from the creation of conditions giving rise to or exacerbating the effects of mental illness, which may be aggravated by poverty and the requirement that she proceed alone through the legal system if she cannot find a lawyer to represent her. In such cases, equity matters because, as Blackstone reminds us of equity’s particular individuated approach:

Equity thus depending, essentially upon the particular circumstances of each individual cases, there can be no established rules and fixed precepts of equity laid down, without destroying it’s very essence, and reducing it to a positive law. And, on the other hand, the liberty of considering all cases in an equitable light must not be indulged too far, lest thereby we destroy all law, and leave the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge.\(^\text{282}\)

Perhaps, then, equity’s individuated approach requires judges to approach the most vulnerable in a conscientious fashion. Perhaps for a worker alleging failure to meet the limitations period on account of mental illness, a conscientious approach to her allegations of mental suffering would be extraordinary.

IV. AN EXTRAORDINARY EQUITY

But what would amount to an extraordinary approach to mental illness at equity? Would it be extraordinary inasmuch as it deferred to the law? Might it be extraordinary insofar as it adopted a balancing of the hardships approach that allowed workers suffering from mental illness to proceed on the merits against their employers? I first explore potential procedural and statutory responses at law before examining an equitable response. My conclusion follows.

A. A Legal Response

Since equity is an engraftment onto the law, if non-humiliation requires that workers suffering from mental illness be heard, we might begin with a procedural proposal whose effect would not be to endow judges with greater discretion at equity.\(^\text{283}\) To do this, courts might simply refuse to decide timeliness issues in mental illness cases at the motion to dismiss stage and require that they be resolved instead at the summary judgment stage. The fix would be procedural and not equitable, which might be responsive to concerns about equitable “swallowing” of the rule of law.\(^\text{284}\)


\(^{282}\) 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 243 at 61–62.

\(^{283}\) On the resistance to equity’s discretion, see JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 205 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that equity is often associated with “‘discretionary decision making . . . .’ Many modern scholars view discretion with distaste. It has been suggested that where law ends, discretion begins, paraphrasing William Pitt’s famous aphorism ‘where law ends, tyranny begins.’”); Bray, supra note 76 at 1040–41 (“Discretion, too, is deeply rooted in the tradition of equity. Much of the literature on equity over the last five hundred years has focused on this characteristic, and the arguments are predictable. Critics, such as John Selden or more recently Daniel Farber and John Yoo, have objected that equity is a cloak for arbitrary judicial policymaking.”); see also generally LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 185, at 268, 316–17 (2009) (referring to Cardinal Wolsey (c. 1473-1530) who abused his office as chancellor in England and used “his arrest power to pursue personal and political vendettas”); AZIZ RANA, TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 33, 40 (2010) (showing how in American history discretion in general smacks of abuse since it also evokes “discretionary and absolute royal authority” over native, slave, and settler populations, whose “striking brutality” Rana details).

\(^{284}\) E.g., Subrin, supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also generally Lawrence B. Solum, *Equity and the Rule*
As radical as the proposal may sound, some federal courts already require that mental illness concerns be resolved at the summary judgment stage. “The Second Circuit has held it is error for a district court to resolve [the fact-specific equitable tolling issue on a motion to dismiss when mental capacity is at issue.” As a court in the Second Circuit has reasoned:

[T]o secure the benefits of equitable tolling plaintiff must present evidence that supports more than a conclusory and vague claim of mental incapacity. Rather, the evidence must provide a particularized description of how [his] condition adversely affected [his] capacity to function generally or in relationship to the pursuit of [his] rights. Nonetheless, the possibility makes dismissal at this stage inappropriate. Such a fact-specific inquiry should not be resolved on a motion to dismiss; rather, the best practice is to analyze a question of mental incapacity in the context of summary judgment . . . . Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice to renewal as a motion for summary judgment following discovery.

A trial court in the Ninth Circuit has similarly stated that “issues surrounding [the plaintiff’s] mental competence needed to be addressed in a motion for summary judgment or at trial—where the Court is not limited to consideration of the pleadings.” Thus, a change in the procedural approach implies that the veteran’s case, decided in the Ninth Circuit, could have proceeded to the summary judgment stage at which point the veteran would have benefited from the discovery process’s depositions, interrogatories, and document production, on which basis he might have developed his narrative in a way that was impossible at the motion to dismiss stage.

Despite the appeal of a procedural deferral to the summary judgment stage, the radiologist’s and comatose worker’s cases show the limitations of the summary judgment approach since workers suffering from mental illness would still encounter high barriers at equity to a pursuit on the merits of their employment discrimination lawsuits. In the radiologist’s case, the court converted the employer’s motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment and dismissed the radiologist’s complaint. In the comatose worker’s case, the court said that “a long line of federal cases explicitly holds that mental disability, even rising to the level of insanity, simply does not toll a federal statute of limitations” and granted summary judgment to the employer. Thus, summary judgment may simply delay the application of extreme standards to workers alleging that

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of Law, in The Rule of Law: Nomos XXXVI 120, 136 (Ian Shapiro, ed.) (offering an Aristotelian virtue-centered argument in favor of equity’s particularized justice as “consistent with the rule of law”); contra Stephen Macedo, The Rule of Law, Justice, and the Politics of Moderation, in id. at 148–78 (rejecting Solum’s attempt to reconcile the rule of law and equity as “theoretical” and “unsuccessful” due to its “inattention to politics”); Steven J. Burton, Particularism, Discretion, and the Rule of Law, in id. at 178–205 (denying that Solum has reconciled the rule of law and equity and proposing judicial reasons grounded in “conventional law” as a means of doing so).

285 Kalola v. IBM, No. 13 CV 7339 (QB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27444, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2015) (quoting Mandarino v. Mandarino, 180 F. App’x 258, 261 (2d Cir. 2006) (nevertheless, equitable tolling on the basis of mental incapacity granted at the motion to dismiss stage but “[t]his finding is without prejudice to defendants’ right to challenge plaintiff’s alleged mental incapacity at the summary judgment stage or thereafter.”)).


290 Eber, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 850.

291 Id. at 869.
mental illness prevented the timely filing of a federal employment discrimination lawsuit, which would be an affront to workers’ dignity.

Given that it would ensure that mental incapacity cases face no timeliness bar, congressional abrogation of the statutory limitations period for such cases may be a sounder approach. Abrogation or absence of statutes of limitations at both the federal and state levels might inform such an approach. Congress has eliminated statutes of limitation applicable to the collection of student loan debts. At the state level, there has been a strong movement both in favor of abolition of statute of limitations for rape cases and against. States have no statutes of limitations for mortgage foreclosures, quiet title actions, “a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in a death,” “murder, arson, forgery[,] or treason,” and for fraud perpetrated on the court. Therefore, property and monetary issues (student loans, quiet title, and mortgages) and serious felonies (arson, capital or life felonies, fraud, murder, rape and treason) may provide the basis for congressional action in favor of workers suffering from mental illness.

A congressional response is unlikely for a number of reasons, however. While the House of Representatives recently passed the Helping Families in Mental Crisis Act of 2016 by a vote of 422–2, which “make[s] available needed psychiatric, psychological, and supportive services for individuals with mental illness and families in mental health crisis, and for other purposes,” the Act has no visible impact on federal employment discrimination laws. Indeed, the Act must still pass the Senate and be signed into law by the President before it has any legal effect. Second, senators balk at the possible abolition of the statute of limitations in employment discrimination actions; on the basis of such fears, they were ready to defeat the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. Finally, mental illness—no matter its seriousness—is unlike the property, monetary, and criminal issues that prompt widespread concern and outrage informing the abrogation or absence of a statute of limitations. It is unlikely that Congress will lift the statute of limitations for federal employment discrimination cases that have a mental illness component.

Congressional action in this regard may also be imprudent. Lifting the statute of limitations

295 See George Joseph, US Catholic church (sic) has spent millions fighting clergy sex abuse accountability, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2016, 14:32), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/12/catholic-church-fights-clergy-child-sex-abuse-measures; see also James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitation in Sex Offense Cases, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1205, 1279 (2004) (“the disequilibrium caused by eliminating limitations periods in sex offense cases will cause untold harm by facilitating conviction of the innocent, by allowing the State to cease active criminal investigations too early, and perhaps even by endlessly prolonging the trauma for rape victims”).
296 See Boyd v. Boyd, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1335, at *14 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 19, 2015) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he rule in Connecticut, as far back as the early nineteenth century, is that a statute of limitations does not bar a mortgage foreclosure.”).
300 Ehrenberg, 541 B.R. at 737.
specifically for those suffering from mental illness may recreate the statute of limitations in practice. To prevent opportunistic workers and lawyers fearing malpractice actions from including a mental illness claim (no matter how weak), courts would likely require workers (if the abrogation did not) to show that they were actually mentally ill to benefit from the elimination of the statute of limitations, recreating many of the same issues that workers, employers and courts currently face. The alternative might be to lift all statutes of limitations in employment discrimination actions, whose effect would be to disturb any notion of repose for the worker, the employer, and the judicial system. Congressional action in this regard may be unwise for these reasons.

Given that changes to the rules would either leave the current extreme standards in place or would not receive requisite support to pass, I now turn to a possible equitable response.

B. An Equitable Response

When faced with requests for equitable tolling on the basis of mental illness, courts might engage in a balancing of the hardships analysis that would permit workers alleging that mental illness prevented a timely filing of a federal employment discrimination lawsuit to proceed on the merits against their employers.

Dobbs’s treatise on remedies law supports this line of argument for plaintiffs who filed late:

[T]he balancing of equities and hardships looks at the conduct of both parties and the potential hardships that might result from a judicial decision either way. For example, the plaintiff’s delay might, when viewed as a defense, simply bar the plaintiff’s claim altogether. If the delay is not sufficient to bar the plaintiff, that delay may nevertheless be considered in the total balance of all factors affecting the equities. The equities in favor of, as well as those against the plaintiff would be considered in balancing, and the equities in favor of and against the defendant are likewise considered. So, the plaintiff’s delay, coupled with minimal prejudice to the defendant might lead the court to strike the balance of equities in the plaintiff’s favor and permit the claim to proceed.304

Dobbs notes that balancing can weigh good faith,305 the public interest,306 and can involve an analysis in which “[t]he costs and benefits are not necessarily quantifiable or expressed in money terms.”307 That is, equitable relief might issue where the benefit sought “has no market value.”308 Balancing of the equities would thus apply in cases in which a plaintiff failed to file a lawsuit on time and would take a number of factors into account, like good faith and the public interest.

Some courts already adopt this approach when applying federal employment law. In an overtime wages case arising under both the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and state law, the Eastern District of New York recently held that the balance of the equities favored a grant of equitable tolling to a class of workers from the date of their Motion to Certify the class action and not from the date that equitable tolling was requested.309 The court reasoned that the class had shown “overall steadfast due diligence during the pendency of these motions.”310 That the court

304 DOBBS, supra note 46, at 109.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 111.
307 Id. at 166.
308 Id.
310 Id. at 188.
cited scant precedent for the proposition that “there is no bright line rule for equitable tolling as to length of tolling” may imply the accepted nature of a balancing of the equities approach and why courts refuse to impose arbitrary cutoffs beyond which a case may not be resuscitated.\textsuperscript{311} Other courts show that a balancing of the equities approach can apply as well in cases alleging mental illness where the public interest can be invoked to deny equitable relief to an individual with a violent criminal record.\textsuperscript{312}

Applying a balancing of the equities approach to the case of the veteran would require that the case proceed on the merits so that the veteran might tell his story. In the veteran’s favor, since other federal courts had extended the limitations period where a medical condition had intervened to prevent the worker from enjoying the full statutory period, a good faith analysis might show that the veteran’s equitable tolling request to extend the filing deadline by the 47 days in which he had suffered a serious head injury was supported by other cases.\textsuperscript{313} That the veteran sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, a remedial statute that attempts to prevent discrimination against those with disabilities, might allow courts to read the substantive content of the relevant law into its equitable analysis as indicative of the public interest.\textsuperscript{314} Such public interest might require particular attention to the severity of the veteran’s injuries sustained during service while the nation was at war. It might take into consideration that the United States has over 21 million veterans,\textsuperscript{315} over 4 million of whom have “a service-connected disability.”\textsuperscript{316} Significant numbers

\textsuperscript{311}Chime, 137 F. Supp. 3d at 188 (citing Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118542 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2015)).


\textsuperscript{313}Eber supports this conclusion. There, the worker had 300 days from the discriminatory event to initiate his lawsuit at the EEOC. Eber, 130 F. Supp.2d at 863. Mr. Eber’s job transfer on September 10, 1997 was the alleged discriminatory event that triggered the running of the limitations period. Id. at 866. July 7, 1998 was 300 days from then. Id. Mr. Eber’s first hospitalization was on April 14, 1998—216 days after the alleged discriminatory event. Id. Mr. Eber’s second hospitalization was on June 6, 1998, when he underwent heart surgery and his coma ensued shortly thereafter. Id. He was finally discharged from hospital on July 26, 1998. Id. at 867. Mr. Eber’s coma happened during his second hospitalization, not during his first. Yet the court “most generously” suspended the entire limitations period from his first hospitalization on April 14, 1998 to his final discharge on July 26, 1998 (after his second hospitalization and coma, which it didn’t have to do). Id. The court thus chose to overlook the 103 days beginning with Mr. Eber’s first hospitalization. Id. By skipping those 103 days, which include days on which Mr. Eber was in a “conscious state,” id., the 300 statutory days ended on October 18, 1998—84 days after Mr. Eber was finally discharged from hospital (216 days from his job transfer to his first hospitalization + 84 days from his final hospital discharge = October 18, 1998). Mr. Eber thus initiated his lawsuit 191 days after October 18, 1998, and 295 days after the limitations period had ended (if his hospitalizations are excluded). The veteran could have similarly had 47 days added to the end of his incapacitation, which, in his case, would have allowed the court to toll.

\textsuperscript{314}See Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. Mass. 1993) on looking at the substantive content of the relevant statute in adjudication of equitable tolling:

In holding that mental illness provides an available ground for equitable tolling here, we note that we are dealing with a broad remedial statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Cf. Bassett v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1244, 1246–47 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (mental incompetence is more appropriate basis for equitable tolling under ADEA than under Federal Tort Claims Act). Moreover, we deal with a case in which mental illness or instability is “the very disability that forms . . . the basis for which the claimant seeks [relief].” Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir. 1991)(quoting Elchediak v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 892, 894 (11th Cir. 1985)) (SSDI benefit proceeding). Under these circumstances, we think an absolute rule barring equitable tolling for a plaintiff’s insanity might conflict with the substantive purposes of the Act. Finally, we deal with a very short filing period, thirty days.


of veterans suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder in a given year\textsuperscript{317} and veterans are at higher risk of suicide than the rest of the U.S. population, with male veterans being at even higher risk.\textsuperscript{318} As a matter of public policy we may want to purge the workplace of discrimination against veterans, by allowing their lawsuits to proceed on the merits, especially when they allege that mental illness prevented a timely filing.

Contra we might say that the veteran acted in bad faith by not filing during the 242 days preceding his serious head injury, as a result of which he filed 18 days late.\textsuperscript{319} The public interest may require that all workers (including veterans) prosecute their claims on time, failing which the congressional statute of limitations—reflecting its own balance of the equities—would be rendered meaningless. Were that to occur, employers would be unable to plan their affairs accordingly, and the stability, predictability, and efficiency promoted by rules would be eviscerated.\textsuperscript{320} Nevertheless, given the severity of the veteran’s injuries, the fact that precedent supported his claim for equitable tolling, the public interest in hearing his story, and that his lawsuit was only 18 days late, the balancing of the equities might strongly favor a hearing of his story about how he was denied reasonable accommodations for his injuries in the workplace where coworkers referred to him as a “retard,” “junior varsity,” and “the weakest link,” and a supervisor told the veteran that he “viewed [the veteran] as if he were an alcoholic.”\textsuperscript{321} A similar result might be reached in the radiologist’s and the comatose worker’s cases. Good faith might require a different approach to the radiologist’s case where even the court agreed that the EEOC’s representations to the radiologist about her filing were “ambiguous and potentially confusing.”\textsuperscript{322} Good faith might similarly apply in the comatose worker’s case to defeat application of the statute of limitations where the court’s dictum that even insanity did not toll a statute of limitations had been undermined by precedent that the court overlooked.\textsuperscript{323} As for the veteran, public interest might weigh against dismissing the radiologist’s lawsuit by looking at the substance of her claim: a coworker had “touched [the radiologist] and other female workers, [had] made sexually suggestive comments on a regular basis, [had] inappropriately texted female workers outside of work hours, and . . . [had] exposed his penis to [her] and touched her breast when she attempted to get up and walk out of the room.”\textsuperscript{324} The coworker accepted a plea for indecent exposure.\textsuperscript{325} Courts in both the radiologist’s and the comatose worker’s cases could also have weighed in their balancing the severity of the workers’ mental illness claims and their supporting documentation. In their employers’ favor, the courts might have weighed the time delay and the necessity of imposing strict constructions of the statute of limitations.

Indeed, broader iterations of a balancing of the equities approach might be supported under what Dobbs refers to as “the total balance of all factors affecting the equities.”\textsuperscript{326} As part of an

\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{320} See \textit{generally} Macedo, supra note 284, at 156.


\textsuperscript{322} \textit{Kuriakose}, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66208, at *23.

\textsuperscript{323} \textit{See Nunnally}, 996 F.2d at 5.

\textsuperscript{324} \textit{Kuriakose}, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66208, at *6.

\textsuperscript{325} Id. at *6.

\textsuperscript{326} DOBBS, supra note 46, at 79.
\end{footnotesize}
holistic approach to factors that are currently atomized at equity, when any worker requests equitable tolling, we might take into account pro se status, pauper status, and mental illness, among other factors. In the employer’s favor, we might weigh the amount of time that has elapsed since the alleged discriminatory practice, the availability of relevant records and evidence, and whether remedial steps have been taken to address similar or the same issues in that particular workplace in the intervening time. A balancing of the equities approach would thus de-emphasize antipathy to mental illness claims on the basis of strict application of statutory limitations periods and would interpolate a broader approach to equitable tolling than is currently practice. Such an holistic approach would uphold workers’ dignity by allowing those afflicted with mental illness to tell their stories.

**CONCLUSION**

Because equity raises its drawbridge as they approach, workers suffering from mental illness lose to their employers even before they have had a chance to tell their stories. Such vulnerable workers are often isolated as a result of their mental illness, which often prevents them from participating fully in many socially relevant activities that many Americans enjoy (even outside the workplace) and possibly take for granted. As Todd Rakoff generally reminds us in his work on time:

> The ability of workers to participate jointly in activities other than work is not merely a matter of individual happiness; it has important social consequences as well. Participatory groups build the skills and norms needed for trust, accommodation, and cohesion among members of a society, and also provide the springboard for movements for social change. Groups do exist, of course, in which members each do their activities on their own time. But these tend to be rather passive affairs. The socially more valuable groups thrive on activities that the members do together.327

Workers alleging mental incapacity are thus at triple risk: from the effects and the perception of their mental condition in the workplace, from judicial engagement with that illness, and from their illness’s ability to hinder their full participation in those activities that so many others enjoy and take for granted. This is why equity is so important. Equity can and should intervene in at least one area of that worker’s experience where it can affirm that worker’s dignity.

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