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Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause

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Government neutrality toward religion is based on familiar considerations: the importance of avoiding religious conflict, alienation of religious minorities, and the danger that religious considerations will introduce a dangerous irrational dogmatism into politics and make democratic compromise more difficult. This paper explores one consideration, prominent at the time of the framing, that is often overlooked: the idea that religion can be corrupted by state involvement with it. This idea is friendly to religion but, precisely for that reason, is determined to keep the state away from religion.

If the religion-protective argument for disestablishment is to be useful today, it cannot be adopted in the form in which it was understood in the 17th and 18th centuries, because in that form it is loaded with assumptions rooted in a particular variety of Protestant Christianity. Nonetheless, suitably revised, it provides a powerful reason for government, as a general matter, to keep its hands off religious doctrine. It offers the best explanation for many otherwise mysterious rules of Establishment Clause law.

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Laws, especially those with ambiguous language, are interpreted in light of their purposes.\(^1\) The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” is an example. One of its core purposes was to prevent the corruption and degradation of religion that the framers associated with religious establishments. The Clause, the Court has said, “stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”\(^2\) This rationale has been neglected in modern Establishment Clause theory, but it can explain and justify the shape of our law better than the prevention of division along religious lines or of alienation, which are the themes that dominate contemporary thought about disestablishment.

The corruption rationale has a problem, however. It cannot be imported without modification into modern jurisprudence. Any notion of “corruption,” “degradation,” or “perversion” implies a norm or ideal state from which the degradation or perversion is a falling off. That

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\(^1\) This is a commonplace of statutory interpretation. See 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45:9 (7th ed. 2007).

\(^2\) Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962), quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. As will be detailed below, this historical claim is accurate.
paradoxically raises establishment clause problems of its own.

A claim that "we ought not to do A, because that is bad for B," implies that (1) B is a good thing, and that (2) we can tell what is good and what is bad for B. Thus, any invocation of the corruption rationale presupposes that religion is a good thing and that we can tell what is good and what is bad for religion. For example, the framers' understanding of the corruption rationale relied on Protestant or Deist understandings of what uncorrupted religion consisted in. No court today could embrace those understandings without engaging in precisely the kind of intervention in live theological controversy that the Clause was intended to forestall. This difficulty has received almost no attention, but it poses a fundamental challenge to the coherence of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

This Article will elucidate the difficulty and show how it can be answered. The framers' specific idea of the "religion" that must be protected from corruption has been supplanted by a different idea of religion, one which

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3 The only extended treatment of the problem of which I am aware is John Courtney Murray, *Law or Prepossessions?*, 14 L. & Contemp. Probs. 23 (1949), discussed infra text accompanying notes 242-247. It is noted in Kent Greenawalt, 2 Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness 493 (2008), and may explain the caution with which he deploys the corruption argument.
resists definition yet is quite clear in application. There is, in contemporary American culture, a proliferation of different understandings of the good of religion. Yet despite this proliferation, we generally know religion when we see it. Many people who are divided by these understandings converge on the idea that the object of their contestation will be damaged and degraded by state interference with it. Thus clarified, the corruption rationale can explain many otherwise mysterious aspects of modern Establishment Clause law – notably, the peculiar rule, which has recently been formally stated for the first time, that older acknowledgements of ceremonial deism are probably constitutional, while newer ones will be invalidated. It also offers a new justification for that law – one that is not really new, since it has been around for 350 years, but which has been obscured by the neo-Rawlsian approach which is now so prominent in contemporary writing on religious liberty.

Part I of this essay explores the gap in contemporary constitutional theory, and how the corruption argument can remedy it. Part II examines the way in which the corruption argument depends on a claim that religion is, in some way, a good thing. It also shows why this claim is hard to cognize from within the framework of neo-Rawlsian
political theory. Part III describes the classic formulations of the claim, primarily by the founding generation. Part IV enumerates the central claims of the corruption thesis, showing how those claims are closely tied to its religious roots, and thus apparently presenting an insuperable Establishment Clause obstacle to a court's making those claims. It also shows the failure of Justice Antonin Scalia's attempt to resolve this difficulty. Part V proposes a revision of the idea that separates it from its Protestant roots. Part VI responds to objections (including Rawlsian ones) to that proposal. Part VII shows how the reformulation offered here makes sense of the law.

I. The Gap in Establishment Clause Theory

Consider some familiar and well-settled rules of Establishment Clause law. The state may not engage in speech that endorses a particular religion, or religion generally.\textsuperscript{4} It may not use a religious test for office.\textsuperscript{5} A law is invalid if it lacks a secular legislative purpose,\textsuperscript{6} or if it purposefully discriminates against certain

\textsuperscript{4} See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
\textsuperscript{6} See Andrew Koppelman, \textit{Secular Purpose}, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002), and cases discussed therein.
religious practices.\textsuperscript{7} Laws may not discriminate among religions.\textsuperscript{8}

A theme that runs through this area of the law is the state’s incompetence to decide matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice or belief. The state may not attempt to determine the “truth or falsity” of religious claims,\textsuperscript{9} courts may not try to resolve “controversies over religious doctrine and practice,”\textsuperscript{10} may not undertake “interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion,”\textsuperscript{11} may make “no inquiry into religious doctrine,”\textsuperscript{12} and may give “no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.”\textsuperscript{13}

Yet at the same time, there is a broad range of official religious practices that are tolerated. “In God We Trust” appears on the currency, legislative sessions begin with prayers, judicial proceedings begin with “God save the United States and this Honorable Court,” Thanksgiving and Christmas are official holidays, and, of

\textsuperscript{8} Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
\textsuperscript{9} United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
\textsuperscript{10} Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
\textsuperscript{11} Id. at 450.
\textsuperscript{13} Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring).
course, the words “under God” appear in the Pledge of Allegiance. The boundaries of this permitted “ceremonial deism” are unclear. Prayers in school are unconstitutional, but not a moment of silence. The Court’s most recent set of decisions is particularly confusing, holding that an official Ten Commandments display is unconstitutional if it was erected recently, but not if it has been around for decades.\textsuperscript{14}

Any account of the Establishment Clause needs to explain these apparent inconsistencies. One can write them off as unprincipled compromises, and many have.\textsuperscript{15} But it is possible to do better than that.

The Establishment Clause has multiple purposes,\textsuperscript{16} so any argument about the basis of the Clause is going to be

\textsuperscript{14} See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (invalidating recently erected display); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding 40-year-old display). Justice Breyer, the only judge in the majority in both cases, relied on the divisiveness rationale in explaining his position. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700-04 (Breyer, J., concurring). I will argue here that there are better grounds for his position than the ones he states.


about what to emphasize. Two accounts of the purposes of the Establishment Clause dominate contemporary theory. One of these, whose leading proponent was Chief Justice Warren Burger, focuses on political division. The other, principally articulated by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, focuses on alienation. Doubtless these concerns are among those that underlie the Establishment Clause. But a theory that makes them central cannot explain or justify the specific rules of law described above.

A. The political division theory

Burger argued that a state program could be unconstitutional because of its “divisive political potential.” 17 This mattered because “political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.” 18 Such division constituted a “threat to the normal political process” and could “divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government.” 19 The argument has often been invoked in

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18 Id.
19 Id. at 622, 623.
Supreme Court opinions, though it is unclear that it has done any analytical work in deciding cases.\textsuperscript{20}

The most fundamental defect with this argument, as a basis for any constitutional rule, is that political division is an unavoidable part of life in a democracy. This division will frequently take the form of religious division.\textsuperscript{21} It is not clear why division along religious lines is worse than religion along lines of race, gender, age, ethnicity, or economic class.\textsuperscript{22} As a standard for constitutionality, the division criterion is not administrable: it is impossible for a court to predict which measures will cause political division.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause decisions themselves have been causes of political division; its decisions to invalidate prayer and Bible reading in the


\textsuperscript{21} Religious division has in fact been a basis for political division throughout American history. See A. James Reichley, Religion in American Public Life (1985). These divisions have remained manageable, not because of judicial intervention, but because the proliferation of religious factions has prevented any of them from gaining ascendancy. See Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 37 Case W. L. Rev. 674 (1987).

\textsuperscript{22} See generally Garnett, supra note 20.

\textsuperscript{23} Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1278-84 (2d ed. 1988).
public schools have been very unpopular. If the aim is to avoid division, then the law has been counterproductive.

B. The alienation theory

A second theory, championed by Justice O'Connor, is concerned with preventing a certain kind of political alienation. "The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community."24 Government may not take action that endorses a particular religious view, because this "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community."25 This criterion, O'Connor argues, is better able than any rival conception to "adequately protect the religious liberty [and] respect the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic political community."26

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25 Id. at 688.
26 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This argument also has a large scholarly following. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber &
It is not clear, however, how endorsement either threatens religious liberty or fails to respect diversity. Endorsement as such is purely symbolic. It does not restrict religious liberty in any tangible way.\textsuperscript{27} As for respect for diversity, several commentators have noted that it is not clear how endorsement is inconsistent with it.

[I]t is not clear why symbolic exclusion should matter so long as "nonadherents" are in fact actually included in the political community. Under those circumstances, nonadherents who believe that they are excluded from the political community are merely expressing the disappointment felt by everyone who has lost a fair fight in the arena of politics.\textsuperscript{28}


To ask that no one be alienated from the results of political decisionmaking is to ask too much. In a pluralistic culture, alienation is inevitable. “[S]ome beliefs must, but not all beliefs can, achieve recognition and ratification in the nation’s laws and public policies; and those whose positions are not so favored will sometimes feel like outsiders.” 29 Once more, judicial intervention may simply make things worse. Finally, the focus on alienation distorts the Establishment Clause, transforming it from a prescription about institutional arrangements into a kind of individual right, a right not to feel like an “outsider.” 30

In short, both the division theory and the alienation suffer from the same defect. The pathology each seeks to prevent is in fact not preventable. Division and alienation will happen no matter what courts do. It is not clear why these effects, however regrettable they may be, are worse when they are connected with religion.

More particularly, the Establishment Clause rules discussed above cannot prevent division and alienation. On the contrary, they have sometimes exacerbated these problems. Because division and alienation are so ubiquitous in politics, they do not provide a reason to

29 Smith, supra note 28, at 313.
30 Id. at 300.
single out religion for special treatment: why is this kind of division and alienation especially bad? If these are the purposes that Establishment Clause law is supposed to serve, then the whole body of law is radically misconceived and should be abandoned.

C. The comparative strength of the corruption argument

The corruption argument can clear up these puzzles. It is not possible to prevent division and alienation. But it is possible to keep government away from religion. All the rules we considered at the beginning are well tailored to do that. They all prevent government from deciding religious questions. Even the sanctioning of ceremonial deism prevents government from deciding religious questions: old ceremonies, which were broadly ecumenical at the time that they were enacted, are allowed to remain, but they are frozen in place. No new theological decisions are allowed to be made.

The idea that religion can be damaged and degraded by state involvement with it has nearly disappeared from contemporary Establishment Clause theory. The neglect is apparent, for example, in Frederick Gedicks’s (in many ways
excellent and insightful) analysis of the Supreme Court’s treatment of religion. Gedicks thinks that the Court is nominally committed to principles of secular individualism, which are suspicious of and hostile toward religion, while much of the country is devoted to a very different ethic, “religious communitarianism,” which permits the community to define itself and its goals in expressly religious terms, and which exerts a gravitational pressure of its own on constitutional interpretation. Contemporary doctrine, Gedicks thinks, is an incoherent congeries of these incompatible elements.31 His work articulates widely shared assumptions about the character of contemporary controversies.32 However, he omits an important middle view, one that is friendly to religion but, precisely for that reason, is determined to keep the state away from religion. It is associated with the most prominent early proponents of toleration and disestablishment, including Milton, Roger Williams, Locke, Pufendorf, Elisha Williams, Backus, Jefferson, Paine, Leland, and Madison.

31 See Gedicks, supra note 15.
The omission of this view makes the controversy over the meaning of the establishment clause more polarizing than it needs to be. If any interpretive question simply turns on a choice between secular individualism and religious communitarianism, then in any establishment clause controversy, the state is taking sides between the forces of progressivism and religious traditionalism – in other words, it is adjudicating the bitterest issues of theological controversy that divide American religion.33 There is no middle ground between the two views, and compromise is impossible.

The corruption argument is important, because it offers a way to reframe the rhetoric of the establishment clause in a way that could moderate these tensions and make it possible to find common ground.

If the religion-protective argument for disestablishment is to be useful today, however, it cannot be adopted in the form in which it was understood in the 17th and 18th centuries, because in that form it is loaded with assumptions rooted in a particular variety of Protestant Christianity. Nonetheless, suitably revised, it

provides a powerful reason for government, as a general matter, to keep its hands off religious doctrine.

II. “Corruption” and the free exercise/establishment dilemma

Charles Taylor observes that there are three different strategies by which modern political philosophy has tried to cope with religious diversity. One, the “common ground strategy,” seeks to establish political ethics on the basis of premises shared across different confessional allegiances: what all Christians, or even all theists, believe. The difficulty with this approach is that as pluralism grows, the common ground shrinks. The universal sentiments of Christendom aren’t as universal as they once seemed. A second understanding, the “independent political ethic” strategy, seeks to abstract away from all our disagreements to something that is independent of them. The aim is to infer, from certain fundamental preconditions of modern political life, conclusions about how political life should be organized. Pluralism has also created a

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35 Taylor observes that Grotius was an early explorer of this avenue: “We look for certain features of the human condition which allow us to deduce certain exceptionless norms, including those of peace and
problem for this approach: we may want to ignore God only for political purposes, but if there are real live atheists in the society, then the state, by endorsing an ethic that is independent of religion, may appear to be taking their side on fundamental issues. The difficulties of both of these approaches, Taylor thinks, create the case for “overlapping consensus,” which does not seek any agreement about foundations, but only acceptance of certain political principles.

Taylor borrows the term “overlapping consensus” from John Rawls, but by it he means something considerably shallower, and therefore less necessarily committed to neutrality toward contested ideas of the good. Taylor thinks that “Rawls still tries to hold on to too much of the older independent ethic.” Rawls expects citizens not only to endorse a set of political principles, but also to accept a doctrine of political constructivism and just terms of cooperation. This, Taylor thinks, is too much to ask. As a schedule of rights, political liberalism for Taylor may suggest an independent political ethic, but this ethic will inevitably be interpreted in light of any

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36 Id. at 51.
interpreter’s comprehensive view, and so will partake of the common ground strategy.

The regime of religious neutrality we actually have in the United States today resembles overlapping consensus as Taylor (but not Rawls) understands it. The state is supposed to be neutral toward religion. But at the same time, religion is treated as something so important that even political values are sometimes sacrificed for its sake. This treatment of religion as a good is not a result that could be reached from within Rawlsian constructivism. Neutrality in American law is based on a very abstract understanding of the common ground. Because a Rawlsian approach excludes a common ground strategy, contemporary neo-Rawlsians have understandably had difficulty acknowledging the common ground elements of the present regime.

Federal law and the law of every state sometimes grant exemptions from laws, laws that presumably serve some valid purpose, when the laws place a burden on the free exercise

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37 See infra text accompanying notes 360-371.
38 Prominent among these are Martha Nussbaum, Christopher Eisgruber, and Lawrence Sager. See Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (2008); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 26. Both are critiqued in Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. of Ill. L. Rev. 571; Rawls and Nussbaum are further engaged infra text accompanying notes 360-371.
of religion.\textsuperscript{39} This cannot be justified by a purely political ethic, which either would accommodate religion only when the power or stubbornness of the pertinent religious group makes that prudent, would purge politics of religion altogether because religion is irrational and dangerous, or would make religious ideas a tool of politics whenever that seemed convenient.\textsuperscript{40}

The accommodation of religion gives rise to a puzzle in First Amendment theory: how to reconcile free exercise with establishment principles. The Court has declared that “[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”\textsuperscript{41} The Establishment Clause “mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”\textsuperscript{42} But the Court has also acknowledged that “the Free Exercise Clause, . . . by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.”\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{39} For a survey of statutes and court decisions adopting the rule, see Laycock, supra note 15, at 211-12 & nn.368-73. For a survey of situations in which the rule is applied, see 1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness (2006).

\textsuperscript{40} These were the positions taken by the purely political views that were held the time of the founding. See John Witte, Jr., Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment 29-35 (2d ed. 2005).

\textsuperscript{41} Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).

\textsuperscript{42} Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).

\textsuperscript{43} Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n one important respect, the Constitution is not neutral on the subject of
not logically possible for the government both to be neutral between religion and nonreligion and to give religion special protection. Some justices and many commentators have therefore regarded the First Amendment as in tension with itself. Call this the free exercise/establishment dilemma.

The solution to the dilemma, I have argued in earlier writings, is that the government is permitted to treat religion as a valuable thing, but only if “religion” is understood at such a high level of abstraction that the state is forbidden from endorsing any theological proposition, even the existence of God. Accommodation is

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44 As the Court put it recently, “the two Clauses ... often exert conflicting pressures.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
permissible so long as government does not discriminate, in its accommodations, between theistic and nontheistic religions. I will discuss this argument in more detail in the conclusion. This paper will argue that the explanatory power of the corruption argument is further evidence that my account is correct.

The corruption argument, I have already noted, rests on a core assumption that religion is valuable and that neutrality exists in order to protect it. This is apparent in the Court’s most extensive statement of the corruption argument. In a decision invalidating a state’s imposition of a nonsectarian, state-composed prayer to be read in public schools, the Court explained:

[The] first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion. The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same history showed that many people had lost their respect for any
religion that had relied upon the support for government to spread its faith. The Establishment Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.46

The Court makes two arguments here. The first is a contingent sociological claim, that establishment tends to produce negative attitudes toward the “particular form” of religion that is established. The second runs much deeper. In the final sentence, the Court claims that there is something fundamentally impious about establishment. It breaches the “sacred” and the “holy.” It is remarkable to find such prophetic language in the U.S. Reports, but it has appeared there repeatedly,47 especially in opinions

47 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“The favored religion may be compromised as political figures reshape the religion’s beliefs for their own purposes; it may be reformed as government largesse brings government regulation.”); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 645 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The government-sponsored display of the menorah alongside a Christmas tree also works a distortion of the Jewish religious calendar. . . . the city's erection alongside the Christmas tree of the symbol of a relatively minor Jewish religious holiday . . . has the effect of promoting a Christianized version of Judaism.”); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 640 n.10 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment protects not only the State from being captured by the Church, but also protects the Church from being corrupted by the State and adopted for its purposes.”); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1985) (Brennan,
written by Justice Hugo Black, the principal architect of modern Establishment Clause theory. 48

The most prominent contemporary proponent of this view is Justice David Souter. In four dissenting opinions, two of which were signed by one vote short of a majority of the Justices, and one concurrence, he has invoked the corruption argument as a reason for maintaining a strict rule that the state may not provide aid to religion in any form, even in a neutral program that does not aid religion as such. 49 I will examine Souter’s arguments in Part V.

48 See infra text accompanying notes 216-247.
49 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (Establishment Clause aims “to save religion from its own corruption,” and “the specific threat is to the primacy of the schools' mission to educate the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of their faith”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871-72 (2000) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (“government aid corrupts religion”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243 (1997) (Souter, J., joined in this part of his opinion by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (“religions supported by governments are compromised just as surely as the religious freedom of dissenters is burdened when the government supports religion.”); Rosenberger v. Univ.
III. The classic formulations of the claim

As noted earlier, any notion of “corruption” or “perversion” implies a norm or ideal state from which the corruption or perversion is a falling off. A claim that “we ought not to do A, because that is bad for B,” implies that (1) B is a good thing, and that (2) we can tell what is good and what is bad for B. Thus, the Court’s claim presents, in a different form than accommodation, the same problem: it presupposes that religion is a good thing and that we can tell what is good and what is bad for religion.

of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 891 (1995) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“the Establishment Clause . . . was meant not only to protect individuals and their republics from the destructive consequences of mixing government and religion, but to protect religion from a corrupting dependence on support from the Government”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 615 (1992) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring)(quoting with approval Madison’s statement that “religion & Govt. will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed together.” Letter from J. Madison to E. Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 The Founders' Constitution, at 105, 106); id. at 627 (quoting the same passage again, and citing the importance of “protecting religion from the demeaning effects of any governmental embrace.”). Perhaps one should also count his dissent in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007), which quotes with approval Justice Black’s statement that the framers thought “individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions.” Id. at 2588 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting), quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).

50 Vincent Blasi has noted that ideas of corruption or distortion of religion “are meaningless in the absence of a baseline.” School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 783, 798 (2002).
These claims made perfect sense at the time of the founding. They played a large role in the movement toward disestablishment. But they depend on contestable theological claims.

The claim’s basis is at least as ancient as Jesus Christ’s insistence on distinguishing the things that are Caesar’s from the things that are God’s. It was pervasive during the period of the founding. Here I will focus on its leading expositors, but variations on the claim appear in much popular rhetoric of the time.

A. Precursors

The generation that enacted the Establishment Clause did not invent the corruption argument. It had been around for over a century. Here we consider the most prominent early statements of the argument.

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52 For examples, see Hamburger, supra note 51, at 5 n.7, 55, 74-75, 121-22, 124, 170-71; Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment 64-67, 124 (1986; 2d ed. 1994); Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment 130, 144, 156, 168 (1986).
i. John Milton

The corruption argument against establishment emerged roughly simultaneously in England and America. We will begin with Milton, because he was writing against establishment in its classic form. The central elements of the English religious establishment were government control over the doctrines, structure, and liturgy of the state church; mandatory attendance at the religious worship services of the state church; public financial support of the state church; prohibition of religious worship in other denominations; the use of the state church for civil functions; and the limitation of political participation to members of the state church. There was also a restriction of the dissemination of heretical doctrines by means, inter alia, of licensing of the press: it was illegal to publish anything without prior permission of the Crown.

Milton was opposed to all of these, but attacked different strands of the Establishment in different writings. In Areopagitica, Milton argued for the abandonment of licensing. This, he admitted, would allow

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the proliferation of heretical religious doctrines, and so undermine the established church’s monopoly over religious opinion.

Milton insisted that even correct religious doctrine would not bring about salvation if it was the consequence of blind conformity rather than active engagement with religious questions. “A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because his pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his heresy.”

Religious salvation was to be achieved only by struggle against temptation. “Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather: that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary.” It follows that “all opinions, yea errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service and assistance toward the speedy attainment of what is truest.”

55 Id. at 728.
56 Id. at 727. The importance of a free choice between good and evil is likewise emphasized in *Paradise Lost*, Book III, lines 102ff, in Collected Poems and Major Prose at 260. The speaker here is God the Father, explaining why it was right to allow the rebel angels and, later, Adam to transgress:

Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
Not free, what proof could they have giv’n sincere
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love,
Where only what they needs must do, appear’d,
The truth did not need state assistance to prevail: “And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter.”  

The state, moreover, is likely to err in deciding what ideas to restrict: “if it come to prohibiting, there is not aught more likely to be prohibited than truth itself; whose first appearance to our eyes bleared and dimmed with prejudice and custom, is more unsightly and unpleasable than many errors.” Even if errors can be prevented by coercion, “God sure esteems the growth and completing of one virtuous person more than the restraint of ten vicious.”

What matters is not outward conformity, but adherence to the inner light. All that coercion can produce is “the forced and outward union of cold and neutral and inwardly divided minds.” On the other hand, the pluralism that

Not what they would? what praise could they receive?
What pleasure I from such obedience paid,
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice)
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil’d,
Made passive both, had serv’d necessity,
Not mee.

57 *Areopagitica* at 746.
58 Id. at 748.
59 Id. at 753.
60 Id. at 742.
toleration would produce is not a bad thing; “those neighboring differences, or rather indifferences . . . whether in some point of doctrine or of discipline . . . though they be many, need not interrupt ‘the unity of spirit,’ if we could but find among us the ‘bond of peace.’”61

Christopher Hill observes that Milton’s theology rests on a radical Arminianism, in which salvation is available to all men who believe, and is in no way dependent on the formal ceremonies of Catholicism or of the Anglican Church.62 In sacraments as Milton understands them, “it is the attitude of the recipient that matters, not the ceremony.”63 This radical individualism was connected with a range of heretical religious views, many of them

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61 Id. at 747-48. See also Paradise Lost, Book III, lines 183ff., in Collected Poems and Major Prose at 262-63, where the “sincere intent” of prayer is a lot more important than its content:
Some I have chosen of peculiar grace,
Elect above the rest; so is my will:
The rest shall hear me call, and oft be warn'd
Thir sinful state, and to appease betimes
Th' incensed Deity while offer'd grace
Invites; for I will clear thir senses dark,
What may suffice, and soft'n stony hearts
To pray, repent, and bring obedience due.
To Prayer, repentance, and obedience due,
Though but endeavor'd with sincere intent,
Mine ear shall not be slow, mine eye not shut.
And I will place within them as a guide,
My Umpire Conscience, whom if they will hear,
Light after light well us'd they shall attain,
And to the end persisting, safe arrive.

63 Id. at 306.
Prominent among these was the priesthood of all believers: anyone with a gift for making the Word of God known should be free to disseminate it. Milton’s defense of free speech depended crucially on his religious views. Given Milton’s individualism, there was little of value left for a state-sponsored church to do.

Thus Milton opposed any state funding for the support of ministers. The desire for state support, Milton argued, reflected “covetousness and unjust claim to other men’s goods; a contention foul and odious in any man, but most of all in ministers of the gospel.” State-mandated tithes for the established clergy “give men just cause to suspect that they came neither called nor sent from above to preach the word, but from below, by the instinct of their own hunger, to feed upon the church.” The clergy’s claim to a share of each person’s earnings, Milton observed, had led to “their seizing of pots and pans from the poor, who have as good right to tithes as they; from some, the very beds,”

64 See generally id. at 233-337. His religious views rested on a reading of Biblical authority which was equally idiosyncratic. See Regina M. Schwartz, Milton on the Bible, in A Companion to Milton (Thomas N. Corns ed., 2001).
68 Id. at 870.
from which “it may be feared that many will as much abhor
the gospel, if such violence as this be suffered in her
ministers, and in that which they also pretend to be the
offering of the Lord.”69 Such support was fundamentally
unchristian, because

the Christian church is universal; not tied to nation,
diocese, or parish, but consisting of many particular
churches complete in themselves, gathered not by
compulsion or the accident of dwelling nigh together,
but by free consent, choosing both their particular
church and their church officers. Whereas if tithes
be set up, all these Christian privileges will be
disturbed and soon lost, and with them Christian
liberty.70

State support likewise elevates the civil power over
God, subjecting the church to the “political drifts or
conceived opinions”71 of the civil ruler, and thus “upon her
whose only head is in heaven, yea, upon him who is her only
head, sets another in effect, and, which is most monstrous,

69 Id. at 866.
70 Id. at 865.
71 Id. at 872. Cf. id. at 878: “For magistrates . . . will pay none
but such whom by their committees of examination they find conformable
to their interests and opinions: and hirelings will soon frame
themselves to that interest and those opinions which they see best
pleasing to their paymasters; and to seem right themselves, will force
others as to the truth.”
a human on a heavenly, a carnal on a spiritual, a political head on an ecclesiastical body.”72

Some authorities have suggested that state support of religious should not be deemed to violate the establishment clause unless someone is coerced to support a religion with which they disagree.73 Certain versions of the corruption argument, we shall see, condemn only coercive establishments, while others reach any state support for religion. Milton falls into the latter category. He never seems to have considered the possibility of a noncoercive establishment, but the argument just quoted reaches such an establishment as well. Any state influence over religion of any kind is a usurpation.

ii. Roger Williams

In the Americas, the germinal formulation of the corruption argument is that of Milton’s friend Roger Williams, who invented the modern, religiously tolerant state when he founded Rhode Island in 1635. Williams also

72 Id. at 872.
was one of the first to use the metaphor of the wall of separation between church and state, and his overriding concern was that, absent such a wall, the church would be corrupted by the world. Williams’s religious views are deeply alien to modern sensibilities. He was no secular individualist. Timothy Hall observes that Williams was “a religious fanatic” who “did not champion a proto-ecumenism and was not the sort of person likely to attend an interfaith community worship service.”74 Williams’s weirdness shows how broad the range of views is that can join in an overlapping consensus.75 Common ground can be found even between modern liberals and the likes of Williams.

Williams’s political views grew out of his religious ideas.76 Williams was a part of the Separatist movement, which held that only those who had personally received God’s grace could partake in the sacrament of communion. The Puritans who believed this eventually concluded that

74 Timothy L. Hall, Separating Church and State: Roger Williams and Religious Liberty 18, 6 (1998).
75 Hall notes this and uses the term on pp. 8-10, 147, and 165. The parallel between Williams and Rawls is developed at much greater length in Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 34-71. See also the exposition of Williams’s political philosophy in Edmund S. Morgan, Roger Williams: The Church and the State 115-26 (1967).
76 Nussbaum claims that Williams “nowhere alludes to these beliefs in arguing for liberty of conscience – nor should he, since it is his considered position that political principles should not be based on sectarian religious views of any sort.” Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 43. This is true of some of Williams’s arguments. It is not, however, true of his argument that establishment corrupts religion.
they had to leave the Church of England, which ministered to saints and sinners alike, and form new, separate churches.77 Williams accepted this argument, and eventually radicalized it by holding that the Separatist churches of New England were unregenerate as long as they did not publicly repent for ever having had anything to do with the Anglican church. Even regenerate persons, such as Martin Luther or the martyrs burned by Queen Mary, were unqualified for church membership until they repented their past associations with corrupted churches, whether Catholic or Anglican.78 Similar logic led him to hold that a man should not pray with his wife unless both were regenerate.

The Puritans departed from English establishment by separating religious from political authority. No clergyman held any public office in early Massachusetts.79 However, the state was responsible for the spiritual welfare of its citizens, and heresy was a punishable offense; Williams himself was exiled for his heretical views.80 Ministers were supported by taxes, and voting and public office were restricted to church members.81

77 Morgan, supra note 75, at 11-17.
78 Id. at 37.
79 Id. at 70.
80 Id. at 71.
81 Id. at 74-76.
Williams condemned all this. Religious activity, Williams thought, was worthless unless it was sincere:

“What ever Worship, Ministry, Ministration, the best and purest are practiced without faith and true perswasion that they are the true institutions of God, they are sin . . .”

Authentication of belief was, on the contrary, the central requirement for salvation. If one held that some points of doctrine were so fundamental that salvation is impossible without believing them,

I should everlastingly condemn thousands, and ten thousands, yea the whole generation of the righteous, who since the falling away (from the first primitive Christian state or worship) have and doe erre fundamentally concerning the true matter, constitution, gathering and governing of the Church: and yet farre be it from a pious breast to imagine that they are not saved, and that their soules are not bound up in the bundle of eternall life.

State coercion to participate in religious services was sinful for everyone present: it corrupted the service.

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83 Id. at 64. On the other hand, Williams evidently presupposes in this passage that he is only talking about Christians. He does not suggest that people exposed to the Christian message who rejected it in favor of a competing nonChristian view could be saved. Thanks to Kent Greenawalt for pressing me on this point.
by introducing the presence of sinners, and it lulled the
sinners into a false sense of security, hiding from them
their awful condition.  Moreover, no human being had the
power to start churches – that right was reserved to God –
and so the people could not delegate to the state an
authority to control religion that they did not themselves
possess.  To subject religion to temporal power was thus
“to pull God and Christ, and Spirit out of Heaven, and
subject them unto naturall, sinfull, inconstant men, and so
consequently to Sathan himselfe, by whom all peoples
naturally are guided.”

Williams’s defense of freedom of conscience was
crucially dependent on his ideas about the incompetence of
government in religious matters.  He did not value freedom
for its own sake.  For Williams, Perry Miller observes,
“freedom was something negative, which protects men from
worldly compulsions in a world where any compulsion, most
of all one to virtue, increases the quantity of sin.
Liberty was a way of not adding to the stock of human
depravity; were men not sinful, there would be no need of
freedom.”  In nonreligious matters of morality that (he

84 Morgan, supra note 75, at 32, 139.
85 Id. at 89.
86 Williams, The Bloudy Tenent, supra note 82, at 250.
87 Perry Miller, Roger Williams:  His Contribution to the American
Tradition 29 (1962).
thought) affected the public safety, in which he included quarreling, disobedience, prostitution, uncleanliness, and lasciviousness, the state could legitimately coerce even those who were motivated by religion.\textsuperscript{88} Williams did not favor religious exemptions as such, though he did worry that government’s claim to be pursuing legitimate public interests might sometimes be a mask for religious persecution.\textsuperscript{89} Conscience should be respected, not because it was less likely to err in religious matters, but rather because the conscientious search for religious truth was the only possible path to salvation. Although only a few people could be saved, conscience alone could bring even this small number to God.

A consequence of disestablishment that troubled most of Williams’s contemporaries was that voluntary contributions might not be enough to support churches. This did not bother Williams, because he thought that only false churches existed in the world, and that therefore the world would be no worse if they all disappeared.\textsuperscript{90} It followed from Williams’s radical individualism that any religious institution at all was a corruption of

\textsuperscript{88} Morgan, supra note 75, at 126-135; but see Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 49-51.
\textsuperscript{89} Hall, supra note 74, at 103-11, 120-1.
Christianity. The worthlessness of any state-sponsored church was a corollary.

If you don’t accept the theological premises of Separatism, then Williams’s arguments about corruption won’t move you at all. But it was by way of his Separatism that he arrived at a view of the proper role of government that bracketed religious controversy from public life.

Because Williams’s theological views are so pessimistic and intolerant, he is a wonderful counterexample to Rousseau’s dictum that "it is impossible to live at peace with those whom one believes to be damned."91 It’s hard to find another American thinker who was as convinced as Williams that his neighbors were headed for the inferno.92

92 Mark DeWolfe Howe’s The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History (1965) appropriates Williams in a strange way. Howe, throughout the book, draws a contrast much like that of Gedicks, contrasting the Jeffersonian, secularist view of separation, which he disfavors, with that of Williams, who feared “the worldly corruptions which might consume the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not maintained.” Id. at 6. He takes as evidence that the Williams view better represents our traditions what he calls the “de facto establishment,” which embraces “a host of favoring tributes to faith” such as Sunday closing laws, the use of God on the currency, legislative prayers, Thanksgiving proclamations, and so forth. Id. at 11. He uses the term because “this social reality, in its technical independence from law, bears legally some analogy to that ugly actuality known as de facto segregation.” Id.

This gives rise to several puzzles. What Howe describes isn’t de facto at all, but de jure. De facto segregation is segregation in which the state does not officially give recognition to race at all, or even silently but intentionally take race into account. What Howe calls de facto establishment is a set of practices in which the state behaves in overtly religious ways, and proclaims religious truth.
The idea that state authority over religion can corrupt religion is likewise emphasized in John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration. The central target of the Letter is the forcible repression of those who dissented from the doctrines of the Anglican church. The punishment
of dissent in Restoration England was severe, with about ten percent of the country’s population subject to confiscation of goods, imprisonment, and deportation. Locke dissented from all this. The position he advocated was shortly to be enacted in the Toleration Act of 1689, which granted freedom of worship to Protestant Trinitarian dissenters who took an oath of allegiance.93 (That Act also ended the repressive Massachusetts regime that Williams had opposed.)

Locke argued that “the Care of Souls is not committed to the Civil Magistrate, any more than to other Men.”94 Part of the reason was the limited responsibilities of the state, which existed, according to his well-known social contract theory, solely in order to protect life, liberty, and property. But another was that “no Man can, if he would, conform his Faith to the Dictates of another.”95 Coerced worship, Locke argues, would be “Hipocrisie, and Contempt of his Divine Majesty.”96 Coercion of worship is absurd, because what it produces has no religious value. “Although the Magistrates Opinion in Religion be sound, and the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet if I be

95 Id.
96 Id. at 27.
not thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk in, against the Dictates of my Conscience, will ever bring me to the Mansions of the Blessed.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 38.} Moreover, the religious divisions that existed “for the most part” concerned “frivolous things . . . that (without any prejudice to Religion or the Salvation of Souls, if not accompanied with Superstition or Hypocrisie) might either be observed or omitted,” and that such matters ought not to divide “Christian Brethren, who are all agreed in the Substantial and truly Fundamental part of Religion.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 36.}

These arguments reach only coercion, and so do not speak directly to gentler forms of state authority over religion. Locke aspired to a social unity that crossed denominational lines, but one that only included Christians.\footnote{\textit{Wills, supra note 92, at 177-83.}} But Locke also thought that the state was generally incompetent to adjudicate religious questions: “The one only narrow way which leads to Heaven is not better known to the Magistrate than to private Persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him for my Guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the
way as my self, and who certainly is less concerned for my Salvation than I my self am."\textsuperscript{100}

Locke’s argument is, of course, loaded with religious premises: that conscience is valuable because it is a way of discovering God’s will; that it is sinful to act against conscience; that the rights of conscience are inalienable, and that no one can legitimately grant to another the right to make one’s religious decisions.\textsuperscript{101}

\textbf{iv. Samuel Pufendorf}

The same premises animate the German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf’s \textit{Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society}, written in 1687, two years before Locke’s Letter, in reaction to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by King Louis XIV. The revocation outlawed Protestantism in France. Pufendorf is not a direct source for American constitutional thought, but he was widely read and influential. When the first English translation of this work was published in 1698, Pufendorf “was already renowned in England and elsewhere in Europe” for his

\textsuperscript{100} Locke, supra note 94, at 37.
\textsuperscript{101} This is emphasized in Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality (2002), especially at 208-211; Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom 64-67 (1995), and Stanley Fish, \textit{Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State}, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2255, 2258-69 (1997).
writings on natural law, which “were to play a major role in the shaping of German, Scottish, and French moral philosophy up to the American and French revolutions.”

Pufendorf began with the premise that “every body is obliged to worship God in his own Person, religious duty being not to be performed by a Deputy, but by himself, in Person, who expects to reap the Benefit of religious Worship, promised by God Almighty.” The state could have nothing to do with this: truth could only be imparted by convincing arguments, and revelation “must be acquired by the assistance of Divine Grace, which is contrary to all Violence.” God left people free to choose whether to be saved or not: “It was not God Almighty’s pleasure to pull People head-long into Heaven, or to make use of the new French way of Converting them by Dragoons; But, he has laid open to us the way of our Salvation, in such a matter, as not to have quite debarr’d us from our own choise; so, that if we will be refractory, we may prove the cause of our own

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102 Simone Zurbuchen, Introduction, in Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society x-xi (1687; Simone Zurbuchen ed. 2002). However, “[e]xcept for the treatises on natural law, little is known about the translation and reception of Pufendorf’s works in Great Britain.” Id. at xvii. The American colonists during the revolutionary period were quite familiar with his work. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 23, 27, 29, 43, 150 (1967).

103 Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society, at 13.

104 Id. at 15.
Destruction.”\textsuperscript{105} If orthodoxy is forcibly imposed, “by such
Methods, perhaps the Commonwealth may be stock’d with
Hypocrites, and dissembling Hereticks, but few will be
brought over to the Orthodox Christian Faith.”\textsuperscript{106} The
existence of open dissent may even “contribute to the
encrease of the Zeal and Learning of the established
Clergy,” as evidenced by the fact that “in those places and
times, where and when no Religious Differences were in
agitation, the Clergy soon degenerated into Idleness and
Barbarity.”\textsuperscript{107} Pufendorf’s book is replete with Biblical
quotations and citations.

Note how the character and scope of the threatened
corruption depends on the nature of the religion that needs
to be protected from corruption. Unlike Roger Williams,
Pufendorf does not deny that churches are legitimate
institutions. Unlike Milton or Locke, he does not deny the
competence of the state to determine religious matters.
For Pufendorf, corruption consists in the forcing of
individual consciences and the suppression of views
regarded by the sovereign as heretical.

v. Elisha Williams

\textsuperscript{105} Id. at 33.
\textsuperscript{106} Id. at 78.
\textsuperscript{107} Id. at 109.
The religious character of the corruption argument is perhaps clearest in Congregationalist minister Elisha Williams’s *The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants.* Williams’s pamphlet denounced a 1742 Connecticut law prohibiting ministers from preaching outside their own parishes.

That the sacred scriptures are the alone rule of faith and practice to a Christian, all Protestants are agreed in; and must therefore inviolably maintain, that every Christian has a *right of judging for himself* what he is to believe and practice in religion according to that rule . . . . Every one is under an indispensable obligation to search the scripture for himself (which contains the whole of it) and to make the best use of it he can for his own information in the will of GOD, the nature and duties of Christianity. And as every Christian is so bound; so he has an unalienable right to judge of the sense and meaning of it, and to follow his judgment wherever it leads him; even an equal right with any rulers be they civil or ecclesiastical. . . . That faith and practice which depends on the judgment and choice of any other person, and not on the person’s own understanding judgment and choice, may pass for religion
in the synagogue of Satan, whose tenet is that ignorance is the mother of devotion; but with no understanding Protestant will it pass for any religion at all. 108

The idea that beliefs founded on the authority of other people are worthless, so prominent in Milton, appears again in Williams.

Now inasmuch as the scriptures are the only rule of faith and practice to a Christian; hence every one has an unalienable right to read, enquire into, and impartially judge of the sense and meaning of it for himself. For if he is to be governed and determined therein by the opinions and determinations of any others, the scriptures cease to be a rule for him, and those opinions and determinations of others are substituted in the room thereof. 109

The principle of establishment, Williams argued, “has proved the grand engine of oppressing truth, Christianity, and murdering the best men the world has had in it; promoting and securing heresy, superstition and idolatry; and ought to be abhorred by all Christians.” 110

108 Elisha Williams, The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants (1744), in 1 Political Sermons of the Founding Era 1730-1805, at 55, 61, 62 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed. 1998). Williams also relies on a Lockean social contract theory about the limited jurisdiction of the state, id. at 56-61, 82-83, but he obviously does not stop there.
109 Id. at 63.
110 Id. at 77.
Williams did not, however, object to noncoercive endorsement of religion: “if by the word establish be meant only an approbation of certain articles of faith and modes of worship, of government, or recommendation of them to their subjects; I am not arguing against it.”\textsuperscript{111} Thomas Curry observes a deep tension within Williams’s views on this point. Like other Congregational writers, he “assumed that there existed a fundamental Christianity that every reasonable Christian could advocate and, consequently, that the State could promote without violating anyone’s conscience.” This “usually took the formed believed in by themselves.”\textsuperscript{112} But they would become uncomfortable as soon as the state began to promote positions with which they disagreed.

Williams’s entire argument is premised on a set of obligations that “all Protestants are agreed in.” From those obligations derive limitations on state power. If you don’t accept his Protestant premises, however, the argument can have no weight at all.

B. The founding generation

\textsuperscript{111} Id. at 73.
\textsuperscript{112} Curry, supra note 52, at 118.
Proponents of the corruption argument at the time of the founding came out of two very different religious factions. By far the more numerous were the Baptists, led by Backus and Leland. But the principal spokespersons for the argument were Enlightenment Deists such as Jefferson, Paine, and Madison.

i. Isaac Backus

The minister Isaac Backus wrote “the most complete and well-rounded exposition of the Baptist principles of church and state in the eighteenth century.”\textsuperscript{113} He and his much younger colleague Leland, discussed below, were the leaders of the Baptist movement for separation. Like his admired predecessors Roger Williams and Locke, Backus was centrally concerned about corruption: “bringing in an earthly power between Christ and his people has been the grand source of anti-Christian abominations.”\textsuperscript{114} Backus’s specific target was the levying of religious taxes upon those who did not subscribe to the established religion and the jailing of

\textsuperscript{114} Isaac Backus, \textit{An Appeal to the Public For Religious Liberty} (1773), in id. at 334.
unlicensed preachers.¹¹⁵ Both were persistent grievances of the Baptists.

Like all the other writers we have examined, Backus relied on the voluntarist premise: “As God is the only worthy object of all religious worship, and nothing can be true religion but a voluntary obedience unto his revealed will, of which each rational soul has an equal right to judge for itself, every person has an unalienable right to act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion of his own mind, where others are not injured thereby.”¹¹⁶ After some agonizing on the issue, he rejected infant baptism.¹¹⁷ He thought preachers should be those who feel God’s call. External qualifications, such as a college education or ordination, hindered God’s work.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ McLoughlin, Introduction, supra note 113, at 31. “Though never imprisoned himself, he was several times in imminent danger of it.” Id. at 31 n.11.
¹¹⁶ Isaac Backus, Isaac Backus’ Draft for a Bill of Rights for the Massachusetts Constitution, 1779, in id. at 487. Put another way, “in religion each one has an equal right to judge for himself, for we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ.” An Appeal at 332. William McLoughlin notes that the individualism here is very different from that of a Deist such as George Mason, who wrote in the Virginia Declaration of Rights that religion “can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.” “The pietist wanted religious freedom so that men may follow the Truth of Revelation; the deist wanted it so men might seek the truth wherever reason may lead.” Introduction, supra note 113, at 47-48. See also William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separation of Church and State in America, 73 Am. Hist. Rev. 1392, 1403-04 (1968) (drawing a similar contrast with Jefferson).
¹¹⁸ Id. at 29.
Christian establishment did not lead to pure religion. Rather, “tyranny, simony, and robbery came to be introduced and to be practiced so long, under the Christian name.”\textsuperscript{119} Ministers who sought state support were unchristian: “can any man in the light of truth maintain his character as a minister of Christ if he is not contented with all that Christ’s name and influence will procure for him but will have recourse to the kings of the earth to force money from the people to support him under the name of an ambassador of the God of Heaven.”\textsuperscript{120} Religious duties could not be delegated: “In all civil governments some are appointed to judge for others and have power to compel others to submit to their judgment, but our Lord has most plainly forbidden us either to assume or submit to any such thing in religion.”\textsuperscript{121} The state was also an unreliable source of religious guidance. “[A]s all earthly states are changeable, the same sword that Constantine drew against heretics, Julian turned against the orthodox.”\textsuperscript{122}

Backus was, however, a less strong separationist than his ally Jefferson. He did not oppose official proclamation of fast days and days of prayer. He supported

\textsuperscript{119} Backus, Policy as Well as Honesty (1779), in id. at 373.  
\textsuperscript{120} An Appeal to the Public at 314.  
\textsuperscript{121} Id.  
\textsuperscript{122} Id. at 315.
a law confining public officeholding to Christians.\textsuperscript{123} He endorsed a petition requesting Congress to create a bureau to license the publication of Bibles, lest there be erroneous or heretical translations.\textsuperscript{124} He did not object to laws requiring attendance at church.\textsuperscript{125} In one tract he opposed paying Episcopalian chaplains for Congress, but, McLoughlin observes, “that was because they were Episcopalians.”\textsuperscript{126} His views on church and state, McLoughlin concludes, were “far less logical and consistent”\textsuperscript{127} than those of his better-known contemporaries Madison, Jefferson, or even Leland. Rather, his view resembled that of the proponents of noncoercive establishment, such as John Adams, who regarded the rights of conscience as “indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, [and] divine,” yet who nonetheless favored state-supported establishments.\textsuperscript{128}

ii. Thomas Jefferson

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} McLoughlin, supra note 113, at 50.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Id.; Curry, supra note 52, at 217.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Curry, supra note 52, at 170.
\item \textsuperscript{126} 2 William G. McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 1630-1883: The Baptists and the Separation of Church and State 931 (1971).
\item \textsuperscript{127} McLoughlin, supra note 113, at 50.
\item \textsuperscript{128} John Witte, Jr., “A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of Religion”: John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. Church & State 213 (1999). This inconsistency weakened the Baptists’ position politically. “Congregationalists found it difficult to believe that Baptist preoccupation with ministerial maintenance was anything more than a rationalization of self-interest on the part of people who wanted to avoid spending money.” Curry, supra note 52, at 176.
\end{itemize}
Thomas Jefferson, the quintessential rational Enlightenment proponent of separation, also relied on religious arguments about the corrupting effects of establishment. In his 1777 *Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom*, he proposed to do away with all religious coercion and all taxation to support churches: “no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief.”¹²⁹

Jefferson, too, relied on theological premises. He noted that “Almighty God hath created the mind free,” and from this he inferred that “all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the holy author of our religion, who being lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do.”¹³⁰ He also noted the

¹³⁰ Id. at 346.
state’s incompetence: “the impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others, hath established and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world and through all time.”  

He specifically invoked corruption: establishment “tends also to corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to encourage, by bribing, with a monopoly of worldly honours and emoluments, those who will externally profess and conform to it.” And all this was unnecessary. Echoing Milton, Jefferson wrote that “truth is great and will prevail if left to herself.”

He repeated these arguments a few years later in his Notes on the State of Virginia. He explained that religious dissent in Virginia had been fostered by establishment: “the great care of the government to support their own church, having begotten an equal degree of indolence in its clergy, two-thirds of the people had become dissenters at the commencement of the present

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131 Id.
132 Id. at 347. That the prevention of corruption is the dominant theme in Jefferson’s bill is argued in Wills, supra note 92, at 191-97.
133 Jefferson, supra note 129, at 347.
revolution.”134 Establishment was a violation of natural right. “[O]ur rulers can have authority over such natural rights only as we have submitted to them. The rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not submit. We are answerable for them to our God.”135 The effect of religious coercion has been “[t]o make one half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites.”136 But Jefferson’s argument, too, goes beyond coercion to imply a more general state neutrality toward religion. “Difference of opinion is advantageous in religion. The several sects perform the office of a Censor morum over each other.”137

Thus, Jefferson famously advocated a “wall of separation between church and State.”138 He eliminated the chairs of Divinity at the College of William and Mary, and prevented such chairs from being established at the University of Virginia, which did not even have a chaplain while he was its rector.139

Jefferson’s idea of corruption was quite distinct from that of the earlier thinkers we have considered, because he was a deist who regarded any religious mystery as a foolish

134 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in id. at 283.
135 Id. at 285.
136 Id. at 286.
137 Id.
138 To Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, Jan. 1, 1802, in id. at 510.
139 Levy, supra note 52 at 70-75; Thomas E. Buckley, Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-1787, at 62-65 (1977).
superstition. He was an admirer of Joseph Priestley’s *History of the Corruptions of Christianity*, which denounced such core Christian doctrines as the resurrection and the Trinity.\(^{140}\) While he was President, he prepared a new, corrected version of the Bible, using scissors and razor to excise from the New Testament any claim of the divinity of Jesus.\(^{141}\) The corruption of Christianity consisted precisely in its capture by institutions that sought state largesse:

> My opinion is that there would never have been an infidel, if there had never been a priest. The artificial structure they have built on the purest of all moral systems, for the purpose of deriving from it pence and power, revolts those who think for themselves, and who read in that system only what is really there.\(^{142}\)

Jefferson’s view had the potential to overlap with that of the religious proponents of disestablishment we have considered earlier. Because his theological views were so

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\(^{140}\) He wrote to Adams that he had read the book “over and over again.” Quoted in David L. Holmes, *The Faiths of the Founding Fathers* 82 (2006). He “recommended it for students at the University of Virginia as the work most likely to wean them from sectarian narrowness.” Sidney E. Mead, *The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America* 48 (1963).

\(^{141}\) See Jaroslav Pelikan, *Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in the History of Culture* 189-93 (1985).

\(^{142}\) Letter to Mrs. M. Harrison Smith, Aug. 6, 1816, quoted in Mead, supra note 140, at 46. This letter is written late in Jefferson’s life, and as Noah Feldman notes, he became more radical about religious matters as he grew older, but even in his early career he sometimes expressed anticlerical views in private. Feldman, supra note 15, at 39.
different, however, they implied a dramatically different understanding of what counted as corruption.

iii. Thomas Paine

Similar to Jefferson, but even starker in his rejection of traditional religious dogmas, was Thomas Paine. Paine was the author of Common Sense, “the most incendiary and popular pamphlet of the entire Revolutionary era.”¹⁴³ His deism places him well outside the mainstream of contemporary American religion, though the ideals he articulates were pervasive among the educated elite.¹⁴⁴ He trumpeted ideas that other framers, such as Washington and Franklin, privately believed but thought it prudent to keep to themselves.¹⁴⁵

Paine believed in God, but rejected all of the specific doctrines of Christianity, which he regarded as a collection of unbelievable superstitions. He thought that “religious duties consist in doing justice, loving mercy, and endeavouring to make our fellow-creatures happy.”¹⁴⁶ This, he thought, was the true teaching of Jesus Christ,

¹⁴⁴ On the place of Deism in 18th century America, see Holmes, supra note 140, at 1-51 (2006).
¹⁴⁵ See Holmes, supra note 140, at 53-71.
but institutionalized Christianity “has set up a religion of pomp and of revenue, in pretended imitation of a person whose life was humility and poverty.”\textsuperscript{147} Establishment corrupted religion precisely insofar as state support tended to perpetuate “wild and whimsical systems of faith and of religion.”\textsuperscript{148}

The adulterous connection of church and state, wherever it has taken place, whether Jewish, Christian or Turkish, has so effectually prohibited by pains and penalties every discussion upon established creeds, and upon first principles of religion, that until the system of government should be changed, those subjects could not be brought fairly and openly before the world; but that whenever this should be done, a revolution in the system of religion would follow. Human inventions and priestcraft would be detected; and man would return to the pure, unmixed and unadulterated belief of one God, and no more.\textsuperscript{149}

Paine confirmed the worst fears of proponents of establishment by holding that without state support, the

\textsuperscript{147} Id. at 417.
\textsuperscript{148} Id. at 442.
\textsuperscript{149} Id. at 401. Benjamin Franklin held a similar view of “the essentials of every religion,” which were unfortunately, in many religions, “more or less mix’d with other articles, which, without any tendency to inspire, promote, or confirm morality, serv’d principally to divide us, and make us unfriendly to one another.” Quoted in Mead, supra note 140, at 64.
central dogmas of Christianity would wither away. Paine, however, regarded this as cause for celebration.

iv. John Leland

   It was not necessary to be a deist in order to support strong separation. One of Jefferson’s most loyal allies was the Baptist minister John Leland.\(^1\) Like Backus, he was primarily concerned with systems of taxation and licensing that burdened nonconforming religions. Far more consistent than Backus, he strongly opposed any involvement of the state in religious matters. He was an important source of the pressure to promise an amendment banning establishment in exchange for the ratification of the Constitution. There are even unconfirmable stories indicating that, had Madison not promised Leland to work for such an amendment, Leland would have derailed the Constitution by blocking ratification in Virginia.\(^2\)

   Leland, like the other writers we have examined, took religious voluntarism as a basic premise. “Every man must

\(^1\) See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 156-57.
give an account of himself to God, and therefore every man
ought to be at liberty to serve God in that way that he can
best reconcile it to his conscience. If government can
answer for individuals at the day of judgment, let men be
controled by it in religious matters; otherwise let men be
free.”¹⁵² The state was an unreliable source of religious
guidance: “It is error, and error alone, that needs human
support; and whenever men fly to the law or sword to
protect their system of religion, and force it upon others,
it is evident that they have something in their system that
will not bear the light, and stand upon the basis of
truth.”¹⁵³ Establishments foster contempt for religion;
they “metamorphose the church into a creature, and religion
into a principle of state; which has a natural tendency to
make men conclude that bible religion is nothing but a
trick of state.”¹⁵⁴ Even if nonconformity is tolerated, but
certain beliefs favored, “the minds of men are biassed to
embrace that religion which is favored and pampered by law
(and thereby hypocrisy is nourished) while those who cannot
stretch their consciences to believe any thing and every
thing in the established creed are treated with contempt

Political Sermons of the Founding Era 1730-1805, at 1085 (Ellis Sandoz
¹⁵³ Quoted in Butterfield, supra note 151, at 199.
and opprobrious names." The state should not have any power to provide for ministers, enact Sabbath laws, pay military chaplains, or have any religious qualifications for office. He opposed a proposal to end delivery of the mail on Sundays.

Leland was as suspicious of dead religious forms as Milton. He opposed Sunday schools, theological seminaries, and missionary societies, because their “natural tendency” was “to reduce the gospel to school divinity, and represent the work of the Holy Unction in the heart, to be no more than what men can perform for themselves and for others; and also to fill the ministerial ranks with pharisaical hypocrites.” Even communion was of doubtful value, because after “more than thirty years experiment, I have had no evidence that the bread and wine ever assisted my faith to discern the Lord’s body. I have never felt guilty for not communing, but often for doing it.”

A common strand in all of these arguments is religious individualism – the view that religious truth was a matter between the individual and God. Thomas Sanders observes that Leland brought the individualism of the Enlightenment.

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155 Id.
156 See Curry, supra note 52, at 176.
157 McLoughlin, supra note 126, at 932; The Writings of Elder John Leland 561-70 (L.F. Greene ed. 1845).
158 Quoted in Butterfield, supra note 151, at 235.
159 Id. at 205-06.
into religion, by abandoning the Puritan conception of a community governed, collectively, by God’s law. “The form, nature, and significance of the church receded behind a preoccupation with the conversion of single souls, and the church represented no more than a voluntary compact of individuals.”160 This assumption was pervasive at the time of the founding. In the late eighteenth century, Mark Noll observes, most Americans “shared both a mistrust of intellectual authorities inherited from previous generations and a belief that true knowledge arose from the use of one’s own senses - whether the external senses for information about nature and society or the moral sense for ethical and aesthetic judgments. Most Americans were thus united in the conviction that people had to think for themselves in order to know science, morality, economics, politics, and especially theology.”161 A state-sponsored orthodoxy was as counterproductive in theology as it would be in any of these other fields. Salvation was a matter for the individual. “My best judgment tells me that my neighbor does wrong,” Leland wrote, “but guilt is not

160 Sanders, supra note 51, at 215.
transferable. Every one must give an account of himself." ¹⁶²

Yet despite his alliance with Jefferson, Leland was no rationalist. He preached “the great doctrines of universal depravity, redemption by the blood of Christ, regeneration, faith, repentance, and self-denial.” ¹⁶³ He once heard the voice of God speaking to him. One night, some devilish ghost approached his bed, groaning so horribly that Leland hid under the bedclothes and prayed to God for help. He said, “I know myself to be a feeble, sinful worm.” ¹⁶⁴ Yet he was indifferent to most theological controversies. ¹⁶⁵ Feeling mattered to him more than doctrine. ¹⁶⁶ He made Jeffersonian political philosophy appealing to his poor, ignorant, and enthusiastic followers, and thus “succeeded in linking the political philosophy of the American enlightenment with the camp-meeting spirit.” ¹⁶⁷

v. James Madison

¹⁶² Quoted in Butterfield, supra note 151, at 239.
¹⁶³ Quoted in McLoughlin, supra note 157, at 931.
¹⁶⁴ Id.
¹⁶⁵ See Butterfield, supra note 151, at 158.
¹⁶⁶ At Baptist revivals, he wrote, “Such a heavenly confusion among the preachers, and such a celestial discord among the people, destroy all articulation, so that the understanding is not edified; but the awful echo, sounding in the ears, and the objects in great distress, and great raptures before the eyes, raise great emotion in the heart.” Quoted in id. at 170.
¹⁶⁷ Id. at 242.
The radical Protestantism of Backus and Leland and the deism of Jefferson and Paine were brilliantly synthesized by Madison in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, the classic description of the pathologies that the founding generation associated with establishment. Madison, of course, is the one who actually led the movement for disestablishment, first leading the fight in Virginia, then as principal author of the First Amendment.

Madison’s argument reaches well beyond coercion, because it was offered against a bill that attempted to provide nonpreferential aid to religion. The bill in question would have allowed all Christian churches to receive tax money, and would have permitted each taxpayer to designate the church to receive his tax. If the taxpayer refused to designate a church, the funds would go to schools.\textsuperscript{168} Even this nonpreferential aid, Madison thought, tended to corrupt religion.

Madison was a rationalist Deist. He deplored the fact that “accidental differences in political, religious, and other opinions” were the cause of factional disputes. “However erroneous or ridiculous these grounds of

dissention and faction may appear to the enlightened Statesman, or the benevolent philosopher, the bulk of mankind who are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers, will continue to view them in a different light."\textsuperscript{169} The coalition he led, however, consisted predominantly of Baptists and Presbyterians. All supported freedom of conscience, thought that religion was essentially voluntary, and regarded man’s allegiance to God as prior to state authority. But the rationalists emphasized natural rights and the use of reason in the pursuit of religious truth, while the religious dissenters wanted to free man to respond to God’s call and the scriptural teachings of Christ. Each side drew on the other’s rhetoric, but they had fundamentally different goals.\textsuperscript{170} Madison’s task was to bring them together into a political coalition that could disestablish Anglicanism in Virginia.

The \textit{Memorial and Remonstrance} begins with a theological claim, offering an understanding of religious duty which at this point will be familiar: “It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is


\textsuperscript{170} See Buckley, supra note 139, at 179-80.
precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.” Madison further argued that the idea “that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth” is “an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages.” The idea that religion should be promoted because it conduces to good citizenship, an idea that we often hear even today, Madison denounced as an attempt to “employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy,” which he thought “an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.”

Moreover, experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution.

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171 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in Marvin Meyers ed., The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison 9 (rev. ed. 1981).) 172 Id. at 9-10. The importance of the corruption theme in the Memorial is further elaborated in Wills, supra note 92, at 207-22.
Madison was reticent about his own religious beliefs, which were probably some variant of Deism, but the Memorial and Remonstrance is nonetheless the most useful source of anti-establishment thinking. It was a public document, not a private statement of Madison’s views. It presented a synthesis of the anti-establishment views that prevailed in his time, combining religious arguments designed to appeal to Evangelical Christians and secular arguments designed to appeal to Enlightenment Lockeans.

It is unlikely that these groups agreed on anything more than the propositions stated by Madison himself. But they did agree about them.

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173 See Holmes, supra note 140, at 91-98 (2006). For some evidence that Madison was, at least early in his life, sincere in holding the religious views stated in the Memorial, see John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom 64-91 (1998). The specific claims about corruption in the Memorial are also made in his private correspondence, both early and late in his life. See Meyers, supra note 171, at 2-5, 341.

174 On the variety of religious positions to which Madison was appealing, see John Witte, Jr., Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment 21-35 (2d ed. 2005); see Buckley, supra note 139, at 1776-1787. Vincent Phillip Munoz observes that “Madison leaves it unclear whether the ‘Memorial’s’ argument is theological, strictly rational, or both.” James Madison’s Principle of Religious Liberty, 97 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 17, 22 n.13 (2003).

175 Douglas Laycock has explained why someone interested in the original meaning of disestablishment might focus on the Virginia debate in which Madison’s was the most important document:

The state debates help show how the concept of establishment was understood in the Framers’ generation. Learning how that generation understood the concept may be more informative than the brief and unfocused debate in the House [on the First Amendment. The Senate debate was not recorded.]. If the Framers generally understood the concept in a certain way, and if nothing indicates that they used the word in an unusual sense in the first amendment, then we can fairly assume that the Framers used the word in accordance with their general understanding of the concept. . . .
What Madison achieved in Virginia is a fine early example of the kind of overlapping consensus contemplated by Taylor. A collection of very different comprehensive views of the purpose of human life converges on a set of political principles. The Memorial states a set of pathologies that are to be avoided, which can be regarded as pathologies from a variety of different points of view. Different members of his coalition had different ideas about why these were pathologies. They had fundamentally different ideas of what a non-corrupted religion would look like. Madison was carefully noncommittal about which of them was right. The coalition did not last long. It shortly fragmented over support for the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{176} But by that time, the Establishment Clause had been adopted, and it remains in the Constitution.

Later, as President, Madison vetoed a Congressional act incorporating an Episcopal congregation in the District of Columbia, and at first refused to issue proclamations of days of thanksgiving and prayer. He later did issue such proclamations, but still later, said that this was a

\begin{quote}
For several reasons, the debates in Virginia were most important. First, the arguments were developed most fully in Virginia. Second, Madison led the winning coalition, and he played a dominant role in the adoption of the establishment clause three years later. Third, the debates in Virginia may have been the best known.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{176} Sanders, supra note 51, at 211-12.
mistake. Finally, in an unpublished memorandum written late in his life and found after his death, he opposed the creation of Congressional and military chaplains.\textsuperscript{177}

C. Other formulations

We have concluded our review of the use of the corruption argument up to the time of the framing of the First Amendment. There are, however, three other writers who have had such a powerful influence on modern thinking about the corrupting effect of establishments that they should be considered here. Two of them, Adam Smith and Alexis de Tocqueville, are major political theorists. The third, Justice Hugo Black, is the principal architect of modern Establishment Clause doctrine.

i. Adam Smith

Smith did not participate in the framing. He never traveled to the United States, spending most of his life in his native Scotland. But he was widely read in America. The \textit{Wealth of Nations} was found in 28 percent of American

libraries in the period from 1777-1790, exceeding the holdings of Locke’s Treatises and any book by Rousseau except Emile. Smith had a substantial impact on the thinking of the framers of the Constitution, and particularly on Madison’s views about religious liberty.\textsuperscript{178}

Smith focused, not on coercion, but on state financial support for an established church. He thought that if clergy were given dependable incomes from the state, “[t]heir exertion, their zeal and industry,”\textsuperscript{179} were likely to be much diminished.

The clergy of an established and well-endowed religion frequently become men of learning and elegance, who possess all the virtues of gentlemen; but they are apt gradually to lose the qualities, both good and bad, which gave them authority and influence with the inferior ranks of people, and which had perhaps been the original causes of the success and establishment of their religion.\textsuperscript{180}

Smith was responding to his friend David Hume’s defense of established churches. In a passage that Smith quoted at length, Hume argued that the “interested

\textsuperscript{178} The case for that impact is made in Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith’s Reception Among the American Founders, 1776-1790, 59 Wm. & Mary Q. 897 (2002).


\textsuperscript{180} Id. at 789.
diligence” of the clergy, spurred by the need for voluntary contributions of support, “is what every wise legislator will study to prevent, because, in every religion except the true, it is highly pernicious, and it has even a natural tendency to pervert the true, by infusing into it a strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion.” Such superstitious delusions, together with “the most violent abhorrence of all other sects,” is what is most likely to draw customers. The way to avoid this pernicious behavior by the clergy is “to bribe their indolence, by assigning stated salaries to their profession, and rendering it superfluous for them to be farther active, than merely to prevent their flock from straying in quest of new pastures.”181

Smith agreed that, absent establishment, each pastor would be pressed try to increase the number of his disciples. “But as every other teacher would have felt himself under the same necessity, the success of no one teacher, or sect of teachers, could have been very great.”182 The consequence would be “a great multitude of religious sects.”183 This pressure would in turn produce a better religion than an establishment could:

181 David Hume, History of England, quoted in id. at 791.
182 Id. at 792.
183 Id.
The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every other sect, and the concessions which they would mutually find it both convenient and agreeable to make to one another, might in time reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism . . . .\textsuperscript{184}

Smith also thought that small religious sects were much more likely than large churches to police the conduct of their members and keep them away from the dangers of profligacy and vice that were particularly ubiquitous in large cities.\textsuperscript{185}

Samuel Fleischacker thinks it unlikely that Madison had read \textit{The Wealth of Nations} at the time he wrote the \textit{Memorial and Remonstrance}, but argues that the arguments against establishment just cited did have an influence on Madison’s famous argument in \textit{Federalist 10} that political factions could more easily be controlled in a large republic. Madison there responds to the widespread concern that in democracies, majorities will be prone to oppress minorities. \textit{Federalist 10} claims that this danger will be

\textsuperscript{184} Id. at 793.  
\textsuperscript{185} Id. at 795-76.
averted by the size of the new American republic that the Constitution would create. "Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other." Madison makes the point specifically with respect to religious factions: "a religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source."

Fleischacker observes the similarity between Madison's analysis of factions and Smith's analysis of sects: mutual conflict makes both weaker and less capable of achieving pernicious ends that they regard as their good. Both thought that deep features of human nature produce this result: "people generally want to be addressed in truthful, decent terms, rather than with the accent of passion and prejudice, strong emotions driving fanaticism tend to dominate only for short periods of time and are

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187 Id. at 52.
discouraged in normal social intercourse, and people have economic and other interests connecting them with a great range of others in society."¹⁸⁸ Because social forces tended to temper the problem, there was less need for enlightened statesmen to do the job. “Both Madison and Smith saw the liberty that gave rein to such interests as compatible with a republic that would be concerned, for the most part, with fostering virtue.”¹⁸⁹ For both, uncorrupted religion could be known by its fruits: peaceable, virtuous behavior.

It’s worth noting for a moment here a now-familiar argument that neither of them was making, but that is easily confused with theirs. That is the idea that religion is improved by market-like competition, in which the better religions succeed and the worse ones go out of business. Friedrich Hayek, in some ways a disciple of Smith, makes this claim. Hayek thought that the persistence of customs conducive to social cooperation was closely tied to the support those customs received from religion. Of course, not all religions had this beneficent effect. “Among the founders of religions over the last two thousand years, many opposed property and the family. But the only religions that have survived are those which

¹⁸⁸ Fleischacker, supra note 178, at __.
¹⁸⁹ Id.
support property and the family.” 190 The process by which the pertinent selection occurred may have been invisible to those who benefited from it. “Customs whose beneficial effects were unperceivable by those practicing them were likely to be preserved long enough to increase their selective advantage only when supported by some other strong beliefs; and some powerful supernatural or magic faiths were readily available to perform this role.” 191 What matters is that the customs that survived were the ones that “influence[ed] men to do what was required to maintain the structure enabling them to nourish their enlarging numbers.” 192

It is clear what Hayek’s notion of uncorrupted religion is: any set of beliefs (whether they are true or false does not matter) that enables people to engage, “peacefully though competitively, in pursuing thousands of different ends of their own choosing in collaboration with thousands of persons whom they will never know.” 193 Hayek

191 Id. at 138.
192 Id. The evolutionary argument is further developed in Friedrich A. Hayek, 2 Law, Legislation, and Liberty: The Mirage of Social Justice 17-23 (1976).
193 Hayek, supra note 190, at 135.
himself was an atheist who regarded the notion of God as unintelligible; 194 effects were all he cared about.

The dynamic of competition contemplated by Hayek is quite unlike that of Madison or Smith, primarily because of Hayek's evident reliance on the theories of Max Weber and Charles Darwin. 195 Weber argued that the early growth of capitalism in Europe was facilitated by militant Calvinism, which promoted rationality, calculating frugality, and the highly systematized pursuit of profit. This, he thought, was why the most prosperous parts of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were Protestant ones: Holland, England, Brandenburg-Prussia, and the Huguenot communities of France. 196 Darwin thought that some traits became more common in successive generations of organisms because those traits were more conducive to their carriers' survival in a given environment. 197 Hayek's model combines a Darwinian model of competition with a Weberian model of the effect of some religious ideas on economic behavior. Religions that promote economic cooperation, as early Protestantism did, are most likely to survive and prosper.

194 See id. at 139-40.
Madison and Smith had a very different idea of the effects of competition. They both thought that the factions themselves would intentionally modify their behavior in the face of competition. Darwin did not think that species intentionally evolved. Weber did not think that the Calvinists were deliberately aiming at the creation of a capitalist economy. For Hayek, cooperation-inducing rules need not be adopted for that purpose: “Neither the groups who first practised these rules, nor those who imitated them, need ever have known why their conduct was more successful than that of others, or helped the group persist.”

Hayek did not care about religion as such at all. He liked it because he thought it was instrumentally good. He thus parts company with both Madison and Smith.

ii. Alexis de Tocqueville

A variant of the corruption argument holds that establishment can only generate the kind of religion that people are likely to hold in low regard. This argument was pressed during the election of 1800 by followers of Jefferson, who wanted to discourage Federalist clergy from

198 Hayek, supra note 192, at 21.
opposing Jefferson for his deism. (As we just saw, it was also anticipated by Hume, who however thought that the decline of religious enthusiasm was a good thing and so supported establishment.)

Here the baseline against which corruption is measured is not the Protestant one of personal communion with God, but simply sincere religiosity, whatever its content. The argument thus is less pervasively Protestant. But it continues to presume that religion is a good thing, and that this good thing can be corrupted by state sponsorship. The classic proponent of this argument is Alexis de Tocqueville.

Tocqueville, writing at about the time that the last establishment in America was being abandoned, thought that in the new egalitarian regime of the United States, the old feudal morality had disappeared, and a pressing question was what kinds of morality would take its place. The answer was that people would be motivated by “self-interest properly understood.” They could be made to understand that it was in their self-interest to do good and serve their fellow creatures. The rational pursuit of self-interest would not produce heroes, but it would shape “a

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199 See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 130-32.
lot of orderly, temperate, moderate, careful, and self-controlled citizens.”201

Religion played a crucial role in bringing about this understanding. “The main business of religions is to purify, control, and restrain that excessive and exclusive taste for well-being which men acquire in times of equality . . . .”202 Tocqueville was silent on the theological issues, but he thought religious belief important to the well-being of democracy. “How could society escape destruction if, when political ties are relaxed, moral ties are not tightened? And what can be done with a people master of itself if it is not subject to God?”203

All religions, Tocqueville thought, had salutary social consequences:

Every religion places the object of man’s desires outside and beyond worldly goods and naturally lifts the soul into regions far above the realm of the senses. Every religion also imposes on each man some obligations toward mankind, to be performed in common with the rest of mankind, and so draws him away, from

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201 Id. at 527.
202 Id. at 448.
203 Id. at 294.
time to time, from thinking about himself. That is true even of the most false and dangerous religions.\textsuperscript{204}

The American experience had taught that the best way to promote religion was to keep the state away from it. Man is naturally religious. Because “the incomplete joys of this world will never satisfy his heart,”\textsuperscript{205} he is naturally driven, by “an invincible inclination,”\textsuperscript{206} toward contemplation of another world.

The “intellectual aberration”\textsuperscript{207} of unbelief had arisen in Europe, Tocqueville thought, only because of establishment. Because religion had become identified with a conservative politics, it aroused the opposition of anyone who opposed the conservative party. It thereby forfeited its natural strength.

As long as religion relies only upon the sentiments which are the consolation of every affliction, it can draw the heart of mankind to itself. When it is mingled with the bitter passions of this world, it is sometimes constrained to defend allies who are such from interest rather than from love; and it has to repulse as adversaries men who still love religion, although they are fighting against religion's allies.

\textsuperscript{204} Id. at 444-45.  
\textsuperscript{205} Id. at 296.  
\textsuperscript{206} Id. at 297.  
\textsuperscript{207} Id.
Hence religion cannot share the material strength of the rulers without being burdened with some of the animosity roused against them.\textsuperscript{208}

This, Tocqueville thought, was why religious faith had withered in Europe. "Unbelievers in Europe attack Christians more as political than as religious enemies; they hate the faith as the opinion of a party much more than as a mistaken belief, and they reject the clergy less because they are the representatives of God than because they are the friends of authority."\textsuperscript{209} In America, on the other hand, religion was powerful precisely because it was not associated with any party. All the clergy with whom Tocqueville spoke during his visit to America agreed that "the main reason for the quite sway of religion over their country was the complete separation of church and state."\textsuperscript{210}

Tocqueville agrees with Smith and Hume that sincere and enthusiastic religion is likely to be promoted by disestablishment, and he insists, even more than Smith, that religious enthusiasm is likely to conduce to virtue.

\textsuperscript{208} Id. at 297.
\textsuperscript{209} Id. at 300-01. Contemporary scholarship agrees with Tocqueville's claims about the reason for the decline of religion in Europe. See Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 27-29 (1994); Shiffrin, supra note 16, at 48-54. On the other hand, establishment, of an unusually oppressive kind, has not diminished religiosity in Iran. When survey takers asked if respondents believed in God, 99 percent in Iran, 94 percent in the United States, and 56 percent in France said yes. Steven Goldberg, Bleached Faith: The Tragic Cost When Religion is Forced into the Public Square 95 (2008).
\textsuperscript{210} Tocqueville, supra note 200, at 295.
He is too sanguine, however, in his suggestion that “even . . . the most false and dangerous religions” can produce these valuable results. Marvin Zetterbaum observes that Tocqueville’s solution to the problem of how to make self-centered people virtuous “lies in a simple extension of the principle of self-interest to include the rewards of a future life.” But it matters what those rewards are supposed to be rewards for. It is true that one must look beyond narrow self-interest in order to be willing to fly an airplane into a building. Steven Smith has observed that “we cannot sensibly talk about the effects of ‘religion’ on character because different forms of religion attempt to inculcate very different character traits.” Whether religion is conducive to virtue “also depends on the kind of virtues that a particular society chooses to foster.” Tocqueville’s vagueness on this point anticipates the famous remark of Dwight Eisenhower that “our form of government has no sense unless it is founded

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214 Id.
in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is.”

iii. Hugo Black

The architect of modern Establishment Clause law is Justice Hugo Black, who wrote the most important early opinions interpreting the Clause. Decisions authored by him declared that the Establishment Clause was applicable to the states, that a “released time” program in which religious instruction was offered in the public schools was unconstitutional, that state officeholders could not be required to profess a belief in God, and that state-authored school prayers violated the Constitution.

The last of these contained the most explicit invocation of the corruption rationale in any Supreme Court opinion, quoted more fully above, which concluded with the declaration that “religion is too personal, too sacred, too sacred, too sacred.”

215 Quoted in Mark Silk, Spiritual Politics: Religion and America Since World War II 40 (1988). Less famously, Eisenhower made clear in the next sentence that he was not talking about just any religion at all: “With us of course it is the Judeo-Christian concept but it must be a religion that all men are created equal.” Id.
216 The following discussion is heavily indebted to Dane, supra note 32, at 568-71.
221 See supra text accompanying note 46.
too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”

According to one account, when Black delivered the judgment of the Court, his “‘voice trembled with emotion as he paused over ‘too personal, too sacred, too holy’ . . . And he added extemporaneously, ‘The prayer of each man from his soul must be his and his alone.’”

Three days after the decision was announced, in a letter explaining his decision to a niece, Black dismissed the idea that “prayer must be recited parrot-like in public places in order to be effective,” citing the passage of the Sermon on the Mount that emphasizes the value of praying privately.

Similarly strong language appears in his dissent in Zorach v. Clauson. “Under our system of religious freedom, people have gone to their religious sanctuaries

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224 Id. at 523-24; Dane, supra note 32, at 569. He reportedly cited the same passage in other correspondence concerning Engel. See Mr. Justice and Mrs. Black: The Memoirs of Hugo L. Black and Elizabeth Black 95 (1986). His son recalls him saying, in response to the protest against Engel: “Most of these people who are complaining, son, are pure hypocrites who never pray anywhere but in public for the credit of it. Prayer ought to be a private thing, just like religion for a truly religious person.” Hugo Black, Jr., My Father: A Remembrance 176 (1975).

Similar impatience with the rote recitation of words not felt is evident in a concurring opinion he coauthored with Justice Douglas in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943) (Black, J., and Douglas, J., concurring): “Words uttered under coercion are proof of loyalty to nothing but self-interest. Love of country must spring from willing hearts and free minds . . . .”
not because they feared the law but because they loved their God. The choice of all has been as free as the choice of those who answered the call to worship moved only by the music of the old Sunday morning church bells. The spiritual mind of man has thus been free to believe, disbelieve, or doubt, without repression, great or small, by the heavy hand of government.  

The language of the holy and the sacred appear once again: “State help to religion injects political and party prejudices into a holy field... Government should not be allowed, under cover of the soft euphemism of ‘co-operation,’ to steal into the sacred area of religious choice.”

Similar themes can be found in almost all of his Establishment Clause opinions. He quoted with approval the religious anti-establishment arguments of Roger Williams, Jefferson and Madison. On this basis he laid down the most fundamental Establishment Clause restrictions, most of which remain unquestioned to this day:

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226 Id. at 319-20.
227 Id. at 320.
228 The exception is his concurrence in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), in which he argued that a statute barring the teaching of evolution in the public schools should be invalidated on grounds of vagueness rather than as an Establishment Clause violation. He there suggested that, because both Darwin and the Bible were excluded from the curriculum, it was arguable that the exclusion “leave[s] the State in a neutral position toward these supposedly competing religious and anti-religious doctrines.” Id. at 113 (Black, J., concurring).
229 Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13; Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-34.
The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of separation between Church and State.”

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230 Id. at 15-16. He fought with Justice Felix Frankfurter over whether this opinion ought to be cited in subsequent Supreme Court opinions. See James P. Simon, The Antagonists: Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter and Civil Liberties in Modern America 180-83 (1989); Samuel A. Alito, Note, The “Released Time” Cases Revisited: A Study of Group Decisionmaking by the Supreme Court, 83 Yale. L. J. 1202, 1210-1222 (1974). Black repeated this entire passage in McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210-211, Torcaso,
Repudiating the claim that his decisions manifested hostility to religion, he wrote that “the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”

He rejected the requirement that a Notary Public profess a belief in God, because “The power and authority of the State of Maryland thus is put on the side of one particular sort of believers—those who are willing to say they believe in ‘the existence of God.’”

He then quoted an earlier opinion: “we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the state and religion is best for the state and best for religion.”

He cited the old theme that establishment breeds hypocrisy, arguing that the rule followed “the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept.”

The school prayer decision declared that “the


231 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.

232 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490.

233 Id. at 494, quoting McCollum, 333 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), which in turn was quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

234 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 494.
constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government."\(^{235}\) Disestablishment meant that "the people's religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government for change each time a new political administration is elected to office."\(^{236}\) The Establishment Clause, Black claimed, "was written to quiet well-justified fears which nearly all of them felt arising out of an awareness that governments of the past had shackled men's tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts that government wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God that government wanted them to pray to."\(^{237}\)

Recent scholarship has emphasized Black's suspicion of the Catholic church, and his early involvement in the Ku Klux Klan, as evidence that modern Establishment Clause doctrine is contaminated with bias.\(^{238}\) Yet the more important factor in explaining his approach to the

\(^{235}\) Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
\(^{236}\) Id. at 430.
\(^{237}\) Id. at 435.
Establishment Clause is that he was raised a Baptist. By
the time he wrote Engel, he was no longer formally
affiliated with any church\textsuperscript{239} – he told his son, “I cannot
believe. But I can’t not believe either.”\textsuperscript{240} – but he
continued to hold a typically Baptist view of the
corrupting effects of establishment.\textsuperscript{241} The corruption
claim, as he states it in the passages just quoted, could
have been written by Backus or Leland.

A much shrewder critique of Black was offered
immediately after Everson and McCollum by the Catholic
theologian John Courtney Murray. Murray argued that the
idea of separation that underlay these decisions depended
on “a particular sectarian concept of ‘religion.’”\textsuperscript{242} The
idea that religion is a fundamentally private and
individual matter, one that can never be expressed in
communal ritual, depends, Murray argued, on “a deistic
version of fundamentalist Protestantism.”\textsuperscript{243} The idea of an
absolute ban on assistance to religion “even in the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[239] He occasionally attended services at a Unitarian church. Newman, supra note 223, at 521.
\item[240] See Black, supra note 224, at 172.
\item[241] He also had a typically Baptist view of the primacy of individual
conscience, as in his opinion for a plurality in Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), in which he held that even those who did
not believe in God could claim a religious exemption from the draft.
He wrote that the law “exempts from military service all those whose
consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to
become a part of an instrument of war.” Id. at 344.
\item[242] Murray, supra note 3, at 29.
\item[243] Id. at 31.
\end{footnotes}
demonstrable absence of any coercion of conscience, any inhibition of full religious liberty, any violation of civil equality, any disruption of social harmony” cannot be sustained without this religious premise, he thought. Responding to Justice Rutledge’s claim that separation “is best for the state and best for religion,” he asked: “by what constitutional authority is the Supreme Court empowered to legislate as to what is ‘best for religion’? I thought church and state were separated here.”

Murray was on shakier ground when he claimed that “Madison’s radically individualistic concept of religion” was “today quite passé.” In fact, as we have seen, the individualistic premise was pervasive in the thought of the founding period.

The problem about the religious roots of the corruption argument is nonetheless a pressing one, and for just the reason that Murray notes. A rule against establishment of religion ought not itself to establish a religion. The point is a powerful one, and it is remarkable that so little has been made of it since Murray wrote.

244 Id. at 30.
245 Everson, 330 U.S. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
246 Murray, supra note 3, at 30 n.33.
247 Id. at 29 n.29.
IV. The troublesome religious roots

Now that we have examined the argument for corruption as it was deployed by the founding generation, we can ask whether any of this matters for contemporary constitutional interpretation. It is clear that the corruption argument mattered to the framers, and that they thought that preventing corruption of religion was one of the purposes of barring establishments of religion. Can that offer us any guidance in interpreting the clause today?

The role of original meaning is contested in constitutional law. But it’s generally agreed that, when a provision is aimed at a specific historical evil, the provision should be read as preventing a recurrence of that evil or others relevantly like it. Of course, there is room for disagreement as to what counts as other evils relevantly like it. For that, we have to look at what the problem is and offer an account of why it makes sense to remedy it. For such an account, the original meaning won’t help us. The prohibition rarely arrives with a rule for its interpretation, and often the framers had no specific interpretive rule in mind.\(^{248}\) When the authors of the first

\(^{248}\) Thus, for example, Leonard Levy has shown that, at the time of the framing of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, neither James Madison nor anyone else had figured out that the protection of free
amendment condemned establishment, Thomas Curry notes, "they had in their minds an image of tyranny, not a definition of a system." \(^{249}\)

Jed Rubenfeld has observed that constitutional interpretation is frequently guided by paradigm cases, which are specific core commitments that are memorialized by the constitutional provisions. An example is the Fourteenth Amendment. The Amendment’s language is broad, but it was enacted specifically in order to outlaw the Black Codes – laws enacted by white-controlled legislatures after the Civil War, that imposed specific legal disabilities on blacks, such as requiring them to be gainfully employed under contacts of long duration, excluding them from occupations other than manual labor, and disabling them from testifying against whites in court. \(^{250}\) Any plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment must invalidate the Black Codes. More generally, any interpretation that specifies the more general types of inequality that the Amendment forbids must be a chain of speech must prevent the state from punishing seditious libel, even though this core meaning of the Clause would shortly be argued by Madison in his critique of the Sedition Act a few years later. Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (1985).

\(^{249}\) See Curry, supra note 52, at 211. The Court has similarly observed that the purpose of the Framers of the First Amendment "was to state an objective, not to write a statute." Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).

\(^{250}\) See Theodore Brantner Wilson, The Black Codes of the South (1965).
inferences from the core commitment represented by the paradigm case.\textsuperscript{251}

Similarly with other constitutional provisions that are aimed at specific evils. The Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures should be read in light of the controversies over general searches and writs of assistance before the American Revolution.\textsuperscript{252} The contract clause should be read as a response to debtor relief legislation in the 1780s.\textsuperscript{253} If original meaning is to count at all, then a constitutional provision must be understood to address the very problem that it was designed to address.

Unless it states a specific rule, it must also be understood to stand for some principle. That principle must be a principle that addresses the very problem that the provision was designed to address. But it cannot simply be a rule that addresses that problem and nothing more. If the framers had intended to do that, they could have said so, and they didn’t.

\textsuperscript{251} Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government 178-195 (2001). The idea that constitutional provisions should be interpreted in light of paradigm cases is, of course, hardly original with Rubenfeld; see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and the Religion Clauses, 4 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 683, 690 (1990); but Rubenfeld lays out the argument with unusual clarity and detail.


\textsuperscript{253} Laycock, supra note 251, at 690.
The Establishment Clause is a particularly apt candidate for paradigm case interpretation, since the core historical wrong that is intended to be barred—here, an establishment of religion, of the kind that existed in England—is specifically named in the text.254

Paradigm case reasoning proceeds by “extrapolating general principles from the foundational paradigm cases and applying those principles to the controversy at hand.”255 With respect to provisions such as the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which prohibit certain government actions, the general principle should give a convincing account of the result in the paradigm case while at the same time properly specifying the kind of evil that the prohibition reaches. The principle should explain what kind of wrong the provision is prohibiting, so that in subsequent controversies, it is possible to tell whether the same kind of wrong is or is not occurring.

In Establishment Clause cases, then, to the extent that one wants to rely on original meaning—and I am by no means suggesting that this should be the sole source of constitutional law256—one should ask, (1) why did the

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254 Rubenfeld briefly discusses the interpretation of the Establishment Clause in Rubenfeld, supra note 252, at 29-30.
255 See Rubenfeld, supra note 251, at 191.
256 In fact, original meaning is more conventionally taken to be one of several sources of constitutional meaning, along with text, precedent,
framers think establishment of religion is a bad thing, and (2) is the same bad thing brought about by the challenged action in this case? There will obviously be room for disagreement about both of these issues. The paradigm case method does not decide cases, but it makes clear which questions the judges should ask.

With respect to the first question, why the framers thought establishment was a bad thing, the corruption argument is indisputably relevant. It was only one of the reasons why establishment was thought bad, but it was a consideration that played an important role, and so the clause should be read in light of it.

At the same time, the original argument for corruption cannot be used today without modification. In that original form, it is crucially dependent on Protestant or Deist premises. Today, Deism has disappeared, and the largest religious denomination in the United States is Catholicism. More generally, an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that relies on specific, contested theological premises is inconsistent with the purpose of


257 This is why modern defenders of nonestablishment cannot simply invoke the original religious arguments to defend their position. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton and Rachel Steamer, The Religious Origins of Disestablishment Principles, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1755 (2006).
the Clause. The trouble is that the corruption argument has a paradoxical and potentially self-nullifying quality: the corruption claim can always be applied to the understanding of religion that is the basis for any specific corruption claim. So in order to be usable now, the argument will need some translation.

To begin this exercise in reconstruction, let us enumerate the recurring claims that fall under the rubric of “corruption.”

A. The claims distilled

Religious behavior, without sincerity, is devoid of religious value. From this premise some, but hardly all, commentators have inferred that the religion that the state can promote is likely to be worthless. The idea that religious sincerity is crucial to salvation, and that one should follow one’s own conscientious beliefs even in the teeth of contrary religious authority, was endorsed as early as Pope Innocent III (1198-1216): “One ought to endure excommunication rather than sin . . . no one ought to act against his own conscience and he should follow his conscience rather than the judgment of the church when he
is certain . . . one ought to suffer any evil rather than sin against conscience.” 258 Noah Feldman observes that the idea of freedom of conscience is already being suggested by this kind of argument: “If it was sinful to act against conscience, then there might be reason to avoid requiring anyone to act against conscience.” 259 But here it is only inchoate. Aquinas, who held basically the same view as Innocent, did not suggest that conscience entailed religious toleration. On the contrary, he supported the persecution of heretics. 260 The present populations of South America and Africa are ample evidence that state coercion can eventually bring about many people’s sincere adherence to the favored religious belief. Additional premises appear to be necessary in order for this argument to be a constraint on state power.

260 St. Thomas Aquinas, Selected Political Writings 77-79 (A.P. D'Entreves ed. 1981). There is some tension within this position, since the heretic may be exercising his own rational faculties to the best of his ability. Aquinas found it necessary to deny this, and to claim that the heretic is willfully denying the truth. See David Richards, Toleration and the Constitution 87-88 (1986). “Aquinas did not make clear whether he believed that a well informed conscience could ever be in conflict with ecclesiastical authority.” Michael G. Baylor, Action and Person: Conscience in Late Scholasticism and the Young Luther 57 n.138 (1977). Contemporary Catholicism takes a very different view. Dignitatis Humanae [Declaration on Religious Freedom] (1965) declares the right of individuals to seek the truth in religious matters, even if they follow false religions.
Establishment exaggerates the importance of doctrinal divisions. In fact, a variety of religious positions have religious value. State-induced religious uniformity therefore attacks the very value it seeks to promote. This goes beyond Aquinas, because it holds that heresy is not a harm against which the state can legitimately protect the public. It may not be a harm at all. This may be because the theological differences at issue are not really that important. Or it may be because the differences that are likely to bother the state are unlikely to be the ones that matter, or even that the state is likely to promote the wrong views, as Milton, Locke, and Madison argued. It may be that false religious views have positive value because engagement with them brings us closer to the truth, as Milton, Pufendorf, and Jefferson thought. This claim also supports the next argument:

The state is an unreliable source of religious authority. In part this follows from the above. To those who have been on the losing side of state-imposed uniformity, it is also an inference from experience. Note, however, that since the corruption argument is itself religious, it has inherent limits: the state evidently is not so unreliable that it cannot discern religious value when that value is described at this level of abstraction.
In order to make any use at all of the corruption argument, the state must be competent to say what is religious.

Religious teachings are likely to be altered, in a pernicious way, if the teachers are agents of the state. This can be derived from theological premises, as in Roger Williams. It may also be an inference from experience, but if it is, it presupposes some idea of what it means for a change in religion to be pernicious. That idea cannot be religiously neutral.

Establishment tends to produce undeserved contempt toward religion. This, too, is an inference from experience.

The legitimate authority of the state does not extend to religious questions. This can be derived from a kind of social contract argument, and Locke so derived it, in an argument independent of his theological arguments. But it also follows from the above.

All of these arguments depend on some conception of the good of religion which is being promoted by the corruption argument. What could such a conception look like today? It’s clear what it can’t be: an unmediated connection with God arrived at through personal study of the New Testament, as Milton and Elisha Williams wrote and
many of the other writers we have surveyed may have thought. What could take its place?

B. Scalia’s reformulation

As Jared Goldstein has observed, a rule that the state may not examine the merits of religious practices and beliefs depends on the premise that the state can tell what religion is. Otherwise, it is impossible to follow the rule.261 But the discernment of what religion is itself appears to present a religious question. The problem becomes more acute once it is noted that the corruption argument depends on the premise that religion is a good thing. Then we have to ask, what is this good thing? Is it possible to answer that question without committing oneself on controversial religious questions?

Larry Alexander argues that, if religion is accommodated because it is a good thing, then one should only accommodate the true religion. If duties to God have

priority over duties to the state, this priority only holds with respect to real rather than imagined duties to God. In order to apply this rationale, the state would have to decide what the true religion is and to exempt only that religion’s believers from generally applicable laws. In the context of the corruption argument, a variation on Alexander’s claim would be that the state should figure out which religious beliefs fell within the range of neighboring differences that had religious value, and then keep its hands off only those beliefs. That was the position of all of those proponents of disestablishment who drew the line at certain religious beliefs that they thought were obviously false and destructive, such as atheism or Catholicism.

Something like this formulation has been proposed by Justice Antonin Scalia. He offers his approach as a solution to the free exercise/establishment dilemma. “We have not yet come close to reconciling [the requirement that government not advance religion] and our Free Exercise cases, and typically we do not really try.”

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he, Justice Thomas, and the late Chief Justice Rehnquist have proposed would impose dramatic limits upon the Establishment Clause. They would read the Clause only to prohibit favoritism among sects, while permitting states to favor religion over irreligion. Of this group, Scalia has offered the clearest formulation of the alternative rule: “our constitutional tradition . . . ruled out of order government-sponsored endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement is sectarian, in the sense of specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the divinity of Christ.)”

More recently, in *McCreary County v. ACLU*, dissenting from a decision barring one ceremonial display of the Ten Commandments, he frankly acknowledged that ceremonial theism would entail “contradicting the beliefs of some people that there are many gods, or that God or the gods pay no attention to human affairs.” The Commandments “are assuredly a religious symbol, but they are not so closely associated with a single religious belief that their display can reasonably be understood as preferring one religious sect over another. The Ten

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266 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
267 Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J., dissenting).
Commandments are recognized by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam alike as divinely given."\(^{268}\) Justice Stevens objected that "[t]here are many distinctive versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even different denominations within a particular faith; to a pious and learned observer, these differences may be of enormous religious significance."\(^{269}\) Scalia (here joined by Rehnquist, Thomas, and Kennedy) retorted that "The sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not widely known. I doubt that most religious adherents are even aware that there are competing versions with doctrinal consequences (I certainly was not)."\(^{270}\) Justice Scalia thus envisions a role for the Court in which it decides which articles of faith are sufficiently widely shared to be eligible for state endorsement (and in which determinedly uneducable judicial ignorance is a source of law!). Evidently, the state may endorse any religious proposition so long as that proposition is (or is believed by a judge unacquainted with doctrinal niceties to be) a matter of

\(^{268}\) Id. at 909. There is a delicious ambiguity, which I won’t pursue further here, about what it means to be "associated with a single religious belief." If the Ten Commandments are not so associated, then neither is the divinity of Christ, since Protestants and Catholics who violently disagree on many religious issues are nonetheless in agreement about that.


\(^{270}\) McCreary, 545 U.S. at 909 n. 12 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
agreement between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It would, for instance, be permissible for the state to declare that Gabriel is one of the most important archangels. The interpretation of the establishment clause would then depend on the further development of the Moslem idea of the People of the Book—those who have received a revelation that is deemed (formerly by the Koran, now by the Supreme Court) to be reliably from God.

Like Backus or Adams, Scalia’s vision of state incompetence is limited only to certain theological propositions. The state must not adjudicate the divinity of Christ. But it is only disagreement among monotheists that the state must keep its hands off. It can authoritatively and reliably pronounce its views on the question of theism.271

Scalia’s solution will not work, because it discriminates among religions. Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that the establishment clause forbids “asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over

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271 For a similar criticism of the nonpreferentialist position, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616-18 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). A defender of Scalia might say that there is a difference between saying that the state can discern the broadest religious truths (probably Locke’s position about atheism) and saying (as Scalia does) that the state can discern a consensus or historical tradition and act to reflect the consensus view. As the development of Scalia’s position makes clear, this distinction is unsustainable in practice. “Acknowledgement” easily slides into endorsement. Thanks to Kent Greenawalt for pressing me on this point.
others."\textsuperscript{272} Scalia once agreed: "I have always believed, and all my opinions are consistent with the view, that the Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion over others."\textsuperscript{273} Not all religions involve a belief in "a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world."\textsuperscript{274} Scalia's formulation does discriminate among religions. Christians, Jews, and Moslems are in; Hindus, Buddhists, and atheists are out. And the outs are a lot of people. Justice Scalia defended his approach by noting that the monotheistic religions "combined account for 97.7% of all believers."\textsuperscript{275} But he's fudging the numbers: in calculating the level of exclusion here, nonbelievers are doubly excluded, since they are not even entitled to be part of the denominator. If one adds the nonbelievers, as enumerated in the 2004 Statistical Abstract of the United States,\textsuperscript{276} the number of religious adherents drops dramatically.

\textsuperscript{274} The Court held long ago that the Establishment Clause forbids government to "aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). The Court noted that "[a]mong religions in this country, which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others." Ibid. at 495 n.11. To say that Buddhism rejects theism is something of an overstatement. While the historical Buddha had no interest in theological questions, some forms of Buddhism make theological claims, sometimes assigning divine status to Buddha himself. For a general overview of these issues, see Masao Abe, \textit{Buddhism}, in Arvind Sharma ed., \textit{Our Religions} 69-137 (1993). Hinduism is only the most prominent of many polytheistic religions. There are, conceded, monotheistic interpretations of Hinduism, but not all Hindus subscribe to these.
\textsuperscript{275} McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
States which Scalia cites, the excluded adult population is 33 million out of 207 million, or 16 percent.\textsuperscript{276}

The numbers are in fact a bit more complicated than the Statistical Abstract suggests. The proportion of Americans who report having no religious preference doubled in the 1990s, from 7 percent in 1991 (which had been its level for almost 20 years) to 14 percent in 1998. However, most of the members of this category are in fact religious. More than half believe in God, more than half believe in life after death, about a third believe in heaven and hell, and 93 percent sometimes pray. The most careful study of this group concludes that the newer members of this group are mostly “unchurched believers” who declare no religious preference in an effort to express their distance from the Religious Right.\textsuperscript{277}

It is pretty clear that these people are not interested in being part of the theistic triumphalism that Scalia wants to license. Similarly, Steven Gey observes that, in order to calculate the number of people excluded


from Scalia’s formula, one ought also to include the large number of theists who reject state sponsorship of religion, including “[t]raditional Roger Williams-style Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, most Jews, many Presbyterians, and other modern nonfundamentalist Protestants.” Scalia does not explain his indifference to these people while he conspicuously includes Jews and Moslems, who together comprise fewer than 4 million Americans.

Scalia’s position is essentially that the state may take one side in the modern culture wars, in favor of traditionalists and against modernists. It may not be irrelevant that the traditionalists have become an important constituency of the Republican party. This kind of religious division, with the coercive power of the

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279 As Gey notes, most Jews are separationists who aren’t interested in being included in Scalia’s numerator.
280 See Geoffrey Layman, The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics (2001); Wuthnow, supra note 33, at 218-22. The effect has become more pronounced over time. In the 2004 presidential election, those attending church more than once a week voted for Bush by a margin of 65 percent to 35 percent, while those who never attend church were almost the inverse: 36 percent to 62 percent. Among Orthodox Jews, 69 percent voted for Bush, while Conservative Jews gave him 23 percent and Reform Jews 15 percent. Bush won 40 percent of the votes of Jews attending synagogue on a weekly basis, compared to 18 percent of those who rarely or never attend. Jay Lefkowitz, The Election and the Jewish Vote, Commentary, Feb. 2005, at 61.

It may also be relevant that the “originalist” credentials of Scalia’s position are deeply flawed, suggesting that he is basing his position on something other than the intentions of the framers. See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009).
state as the prize for which the religious factions struggle, is one of the central evils that the religion clauses aim at preventing. One may also wonder why he thinks that the state’s competence extends to this particular set of religious question, when he concedes its incompetence with respect to so many others.

Perhaps Scalia’s central concern is to promote a certain kind of civic unity which recognition of religion makes possible. This is clearest in his dissent from a decision invalidating a high school graduation prayer:

The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of sectarian religious belief to generate civil dissension and civil strife. And they also knew that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a toleration-- no, an affection--for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God whom they all worship and seek. Needless to say, no one should be compelled to do that, but it is a shame to deprive our public culture of the opportunity, and indeed the encouragement, for people to do it voluntarily. The Baptist or Catholic who heard and joined in the simple and inspiring prayers of Rabbi Gutterman on this official and patriotic occasion was
inoculated from religious bigotry and prejudice in a manner that cannot be replicated. To deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism, in order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law.281

Social unity, he evidently thinks, depends on shared norms. The problem with his prescription of official monotheism is that Baptists and Catholics and Jews can indeed be part of the overlapping consensus he contemplates, but we live in a society that also includes millions who aren’t monotheists. Charles Taylor’s point about the limitations of a common ground strategy are salient here. If the aim is shared agreement, then it is counterproductive to propose unifying principles that large numbers of citizens cannot possibly agree to. The size of the remainder matters. Perhaps Scalia’s solution made sense in the 1950s, when the idea of a “Judeo-Christian” overlapping consensus was invented,282 but it is no longer appropriate in contemporary American society.283

282 See Silk, supra note 215, at 40-53.
283 See generally Gedicks and Hendrix, supra note 276.
Overlapping consensus is unstable and constantly under construction.

Scalia is right about the importance of shared norms. A sense of solidarity is indispensable to democracy: if majorities are to rule legitimately, then the losers need to feel that they have some stake in the system. A sense of solidarity is also necessary to a functioning welfare state. The split between American liberals and the religious has greatly truncated the possibilities for a transformative left politics.

As the common ground shrinks, however, its basis must become more abstract and vague. Christianity will no longer do the job. Neither will monotheism. But the idea that religion is something of value, and that that value is jeopardized when religious questions are adjudicated by the state, may continue to provide the common ground that is needed.

The pluralism we now face was not imagined by the framers. It is therefore impossible to attribute to them any view about it. Protestant Christianity was so pervasive in their culture that they did not even consider whether its establishment was inconsistent with religious

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Modern religious pluralism has generated new knowledge about the range of religious issues that are potentially subject to corruption by state interference.

V. A proposal

A. Defining religion

What, then, is the “religion” that the state must keep its hands off?

Religion is a category that is hard to delimit. The best treatments of the problem of defining “religion” for constitutional purposes, most prominently that of Kent Greenawalt, have concluded that no dictionary definition will do, because no single feature unites all the things that are indisputably religions. Religions just have a “family resemblance” to one another. In doubtful cases, one

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285 Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875, 918-19 (1986); Curry, supra note 52, at 218, 221.
286 Many writers have tried to evade this problem by saying that what is to be protected is not religion, but conscience. The reasons why this stratagem will not work are explored in Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions (unpublished ms.).
can only ask how close the analogy is between a putative instance of religion and the indisputable instances.\footnote{See William P. Alston, Religion, in 7 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 142 (Paul Edwards ed. 1967); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 Geo. L.J. 1519 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 753 (1984); Tribe, supra note 23, at 1181-83; Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 Yale L.J. 791 (1997); Greenawalt, supra note 39, at 124-156; Koppelman, supra note 6, at 125-139. Courts in Europe have done no better in devising a definition. Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State 110-26 (2005). Lest one think that the neo-Wittgensteinian approach advocated here is an artifact of academic preciousness, note that an analogical criterion is also used by that singularly hardheaded entity, the Internal Revenue Service. See Defining “Religious Organization” and “Church,” 868 Tax Mgm’t & Port. (BNA) III (2007).}

This process need not yield indeterminacy. The concept of “family resemblance” is drawn from the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who famously argued that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”\footnote{Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 20 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958).} Thus, for example, there is no single thing common to “games” which makes them all games, but “similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.”\footnote{Id. at 31.} The use of the word “game” is thus not circumscribed by any clear rule. But that does not mean that it is not circumscribed at all. “[N]o more are there any rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all of that and has rules too.”\footnote{Id. at 33.}
Explaining Wittgenstein’s idea here, Charles Taylor observes that, with respect to a great many rule-guided social practices,

the “rule” lies essentially in the practice. The rule is what is animating the practice at any given time, and not some formulation behind it, inscribed in our thoughts or our brains or our genes, or whatever. That’s why the rule is, at any time, what the practice has made it.\(^{291}\)

The rules of appropriate comportment when riding on a bus, for instance, are not codified anywhere. But natives of the culture may understand quite well what they are, and there may be no doubt at all as to how they apply in particular cases, even if they have not been codified and could not be codified.\(^{292}\)

The definition of religion in American law appears to work just this way. There is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that will make something a “religion.” But it is remarkable how few cases have arisen

\(^{291}\) Charles Taylor, To Follow a Rule, in Philosophical Arguments 178 (1995).

\(^{292}\) See Al Yankovic, Another One Rides the Bus (Placebo Records 1981).

As Jonathan Z. Smith has observed, the term “religion” denotes an anthropological category, arising out of a particular Western practice of encountering and accounting for foreign belief systems associated with geopolitical entities with which the West was forced to deal. Religion, Religions, Religious, in Critical Terms for Religious Studies 269 (Mark C. Taylor ed. 1998). Arising thus out of a specific historical situation, and evolving in unpredictable ways thereafter, “religion” would be surprising if it had any essential denotation.
in which courts have had real difficulty in determining whether something is a religion or not.\textsuperscript{293}

In the context of the hands-off rule, religion should be understood by reference to a set of ultimate questions that the state must not try to answer. But the state can recognize and promote the good of religion, understood at a certain level of abstraction. Neutrality is fluid; it is available in many specifications.\textsuperscript{294} The American approach is one defensible specification. The state is agnostic about religion, but it is an interested and sympathetic agnosticism. The state does not say “I don’t know and you don’t either.” Rather it declares the value of religion in a carefully noncommittal way: “It would be good to find out. And we encourage your efforts to do that.”

The precise character of the good being promoted is itself deliberately left vague, because the broad consensus on freedom of religion would surely collapse if we had to state with specificity the value promoted by religion. “Religion” denotes a cluster of goods, including salvation

\textsuperscript{293} The list of reported cases that have had to determine a definition of “religion” is a remarkably short one. See Religion, 36C Words and Phrases 153-57 (2002 & supp. 2008). A recent survey laments the absence of a clear definition, but offers no evidence that the courts have had any trouble deciding cases as a result. Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Constitutional “Religion”: A Survey of First Amendment Definitions of Religion, 6 Tex. F. on C.L. & C.R. 117 (2001).

(if you think you need to be saved), harmony with the transcendent origin of universal order (if it exists),\textsuperscript{295} responding to the fundamentally imperfect character of human life (if it is imperfect),\textsuperscript{296} courage in the face of the heartbreaking aspects of human existence (if that kind of encouragement helps),\textsuperscript{297} a transcendent underpinning for the resolution to act morally (if that kind of underpinning helps),\textsuperscript{298} contact with that which is awesome and indescribable (if awe is something you feel),\textsuperscript{299} and many others. No general description of the good that religion seeks to promote can be satisfactory, politically or intellectually.\textsuperscript{300} The establishment clause permits the state to favor religion so long as “religion” is understood very broadly, forbidding any discrimination or preference among religions or religious propositions.

\textsuperscript{295} John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 89-90 (1980).
\textsuperscript{297} Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (1952).
\textsuperscript{298} Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1794; New York: Harper, 1960).
\textsuperscript{300} Charles Taylor has stated the difficulties for any general theory of religion:
I doubt very much whether any such general theory can even be established. I mean a theory which can gather all the powerful élans and aspirations which humans have manifested in the spiritual realm, and relate them to some single set of underlying needs or aims or tendencies (whether it be the desire for meaning or something else). The phenomena are much too varied and baffling for that; and even if they were more tractable, we would have to stand at the end of history to be able to draw such conclusions.

This understanding makes it possible to defend accommodations without running into the free exercise/establishment dilemma. The state is recognizing the value of religion, but it is making no claims about religious truth. It is the making of such claims that violates the establishment clause.

This understanding also provides a basis for the hands off rule. Each of these understandings of the good of religion is manipulable for political purposes. Each is likely to be abused. There is no reason to trust the state to resolve religious questions. The incompetence and futility extend to the deepest religious divisions today.

Recall the basic elements of the claim that establishment corrupts religion.

Religious behavior, without sincerity, is devoid of religious value. Each of the understandings of the good of religion that I have described at least has a personal dimension, even if it also has communal aspects. So hypocrisy is a ubiquitous worry, and state efforts to nudge citizens toward a particular religious view conduces to hypocrisy. Of course the nudge may be gentle, and if it is gentle enough, it is unlikely to produce this particular
pathology and may be quite effective.\textsuperscript{301} So this argument needs supplementation if it is to support as broad a hands-off rule as the Court has adopted.

\textit{Establishment exaggerates the importance of doctrinal divisions. In fact, a variety of religious positions have religious value.} This follows from the premise that everything in the cluster should be treated as participating in the value of religion. The cluster conception of religion is essentially pluralistic. Some religions reject this premise, of course. But their adherents may nonetheless be persuaded that religious liberty will be more secure if the state is required to act as though this premise were true.

\textit{The state is an unreliable source of religious authority.}

\textit{Religious teachings are likely to be altered, in a pernicious way, if the teachers are agents of the state.}

\textit{Establishment tends to produce undeserved contempt toward religion.}

All of these may be treated as inferences from experience. The most notable datum that has presented itself since the framing is the frequently noted fact that

in Europe, with its established churches, religion is withering away; in the United States, it is thriving.\textsuperscript{302} One may also note the unattractive ways in which religion is transformed when the state tries to embrace it in a politically acceptable way. Steven Goldberg’s book \textit{Bleached Faith} does this in some detail, noting that when the state displays the Ten Commandments, it typically does so in forms that deprive it of any meaning; that the movement to teach “intelligent design” in the schools demotes God to the status of a second-rate engineer of biological minutiae; that the promotion of Christmas produces a bland, commercialized Christianity while distorting the place of Hanukkah in the Jewish calendar.\textsuperscript{303} These examples have limited power, because they will move some people more than others. All the argument needs in order to be effective, however, is that audiences be able to think of some illustrations of these propositions.

The legitimate authority of the state does not extend to religious questions. This follows from all of the above. It entails a hands-off rule with respect to theological questions.

\textsuperscript{302} See Casanova, supra note 209.
\textsuperscript{303} Goldberg, supra note 209.
Implicit in the hands off rule is something analogous to the civil religion that Robert Bellah has observed is implicit in American practice. Bellah observes that there are “certain common elements of religious orientation that the great majority of Americans share” and that “provide a religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including the political sphere.”304 This orientation, which he labeled “the American civil religion,”305 included as its tenets “the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance.”306 This civil religion does not, however, include such controversial matters as the divinity of Jesus Christ. “The God of the civil religion is not only rather ‘unitarian,’ he is also on the austere side, much more related to order, law, and right than to salvation and love.”307

Robert Wuthnow observes that the American civil religion described by Bellah has been fragmenting in recent years into two very different visions.308 A conservative narrative holds that America’s government is legitimate because it reflects biblical principles and has the

305 Id.
306 Id. at 172.
307 Id. at 175.
308 See Wuthnow, supra note 33, at 241-67.
potential to evangelize the world. A liberal narrative holds that America has a responsibility to use its vast resources to alleviate the material problems that face the world. In this liberal narrative, “[f]aith plays a role chiefly as a motivating element, supplying strength to keep going against what often appear as insuperable odds.”\footnote{Id. at 251.}

The two visions have become increasingly hostile to one another. As a consequence, neither can effectively claim to speak for common American values.

The civil religion implied by the hands off rule cannot by itself provide such common values. But neither does it preclude them. It is even more abstract than Bellah’s Unitarian civic God. It is a negative God, a God without predicates.\footnote{See Anthony Kenny, \textit{Worshipping an Unknown God}, 19 Ratio (n.s.) 441 (2006).} The hands off rule reveals its reverence for the Absolute by omitting all reference to it in public decisionmaking. The aspiration should be for an eloquent silence, like a rest in music.

B. The shaping of modern religion

The usefulness of an exceedingly abstract conception of the value of religion is reinforced by the recent work

\footnote{Id. at 251.}

\footnote{See Anthony Kenny, \textit{Worshipping an Unknown God}, 19 Ratio (n.s.) 441 (2006).}
of Charles Taylor on the history and character of modern secularity. Taylor argues that the emergence of a world in which religiosity is one option among others has roots in Christian theology. From this he infers that the gap between religiosity and secularism is less profound than many think; “both emerge from the same long process of Reform in Latin Christendom.”

In the primitive world of nature rituals and tribal deities, there was no clear distinction between the immanent and the transcendent. The sense of cosmic order pervaded everything. The individual was deeply embedded in this world; there were no clear boundaries between self and nonself, personal agency and impersonal force. Possession by demons was a real and terrifying possibility. In such circumstances, unbelief was literally unthinkable.

Around the middle of the first millennium B.C., the great world faiths appeared. (Following Karl Jaspers, Taylor calls this moment the “Axial Revolution.”) Confucius, Lao-tse, Siddhartha Gautama, the Hebrew prophets, Socrates, and Plato brought new visions of universal ethics and individual salvation. A new line was drawn between sacred and profane. A world that had been

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311 See Taylor, supra note 300, at 675.
312 Id. at 25-89.
unified was now divided between the disordered lower realm and the higher aspiration toward which individuals were to strive. The new imperative toward moral improvement produced what Taylor calls “the Great Disembedding,” in which the individual was separated from his social and cosmic environments, and Western individualism began.

Taylor focuses on the evolution of the Christian world. From the beginning, he argues, there was a tension in Christianity between salvation for all, promised by a transcendent God, and the pagan practices and habits of mind that persisted among the laity. The movement that culminated in the Reformation began in the middle ages. After the Hildebrandine Reform of the eleventh century, there were repeated efforts by the Church, first to reform its own practices, and later to restrain as idolatrous the veneration of saints and relics, magic, miracle-mongering, and dancing around the maypole. The idea gradually took hold that everyone, not only the clergy, could practice the virtues of the Gospel. Ordinary life, including work, play, and sex, began to take on sacred meaning.

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313 Id. at 151-53.
314 Id. at 61-75.
315 Id. at 104, 242-43, 265-66.
316 Id. at 179. The story of the growing affirmation of everyday life is more fully developed in Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity 211-302 (1989).
The Christian virtues were no longer those of ascetic monks; an ethos of personal responsibility and self-discipline became available to everyone. This attempt to bring Christ into the previously unhallowed world inspired a new focus on the world.\(^\text{317}\) Human beings now had to inhabit the world "as agents of instrumental reason, working the system effectively in order to bring about God’s purposes; because it is through these purposes, and not through signs, that God reveals himself in his world."\(^\text{318}\)

This disengaged stance toward a disenchanted world became the moral basis of the new scientific method. Technological control of the world became yet another way of doing God’s work, benefiting the human race in accordance with His plan.\(^\text{319}\) The highest goal was understood to be "a certain kind of human flourishing, in a context of mutuality, pursuing each his/her happiness on the basis of assured life and liberty, in a society of mutual benefit."\(^\text{320}\)

The this-worldly ethos thus begotten eventually made it possible to cut loose from religiosity altogether. Once

\(^{317}\) Taylor, supra note 300, at 94.
\(^{318}\) Id. at 98.
\(^{319}\) See especially the discussion of Francis Bacon in Sources of the Self, supra note 316, at 230-33.
\(^{320}\) Taylor, supra note 300, at 430.
“God’s goals for us shrink to the single end of our encompassing this order of mutual benefit he has designed for us,”321 it is easy for God to drop out of the picture completely. The goal of order becomes simply a matter of human flourishing, and the power to pursue that goal is a purely human capacity, not something we receive from God.322

Thus a reforming movement in Christianity was in time transformed into militant secularism. In this new vision, the transcendent aspirations of Christianity are a danger to the goods of the modern moral order; they risk fanaticism and estrangement from our own nature.323 Religion is suspect because it posits transcendent goals, alien to human fulfillment; it is the enemy of human fulfillment. Moreover, the problem of theodicy becomes more acute in a world in which the purposes of the world are understood to center around human flourishing: “The idea of blaming God gets a clearer sense and becomes much more salient in the modern era where people begin to think they know just what God was purposing in creating the world, and can check the results against the intention.”324

But the secular world view has discontents of its own, manifest in repeated waves of Romantic protest. It can

321 Id. at 221.
322 Id. at 84.
323 Id. at 230, 239, 305, 308-09, 546-47.
324 Id. at 388.
beget a sense “that something central is missing, some great purpose, some élan, some fulfillment, without which life has lost its point.”325 It also cannot offer a good account of its own commitment to universal benevolence, which it cannot disentangle fully from its roots in Christian agape.326

That I am left with human concerns doesn’t tell me to take universal human welfare as my goal; nor does it tell me that freedom is important, or fulfillment, or equality. Just being confined to human goods could just as well find expression in my concerning myself exclusively with my own material welfare, or that of my family and immediate milieu. The in fact very exigent demands of universal justice and benevolence which characterize modern humanism can’t be explained just by the subtraction of earlier goals and allegiances.327

The claim that universal benevolence is just part of human nature is not especially plausible. It also can’t account for “our sense that there is something higher, nobler, more fully human about universal sympathy.”328 It is unclear how this benevolence can be sustained in the face of the

325 Id. at 312; see also id. at 302.
326 Id. at 245-59.
327 Id. at 572.
328 Id. at 694.
manifest shortcomings of actual human beings. A secular world view has notorious problems of its own in dealing with the facts of suffering and evil. It is because secular language finds it difficult to articulate the force of ethical demands, or for that matter creative human agency and the power of artistic experience, that many people find religious language indispensable.

The two polar positions, secularism and religious belief, are each animated, for many of their adherents, by pictures of the world in which the other position is simply unimaginable. “What pushes us one way or the other is what we might describe as our over-all take on human life, and its cosmic and (if any) spiritual surroundings.” It is possible to feel some of the force of each opposing position, to stand “in that open space where you can feel the winds pulling you, now to belief, now to unbelief,” but “this feat is relatively rare.”

What is far more common is to occupy some intermediate space between the polar positions. There has for the past few centuries been a growing proliferation of views.
that do this, first among the elite and then later
generalized to the whole society.\textsuperscript{336}

[T]he gamut of intermediate positions greatly widens:
many people drop out of active practice while still
declaring themselves as belonging to some confession,
or believing in God. On another dimension, the gamut
of beliefs in something beyond widens, fewer declaring
belief in a personal God, while more hold to something
like an impersonal force; in other words a wider range
of people express religious beliefs which move outside
Christian orthodoxy. Following in this line is the
growth of non-Christian religions, particularly those
originating in the Orient, and the proliferation of
New Age modes of practice, of views which bridge the
humanist/spiritual boundary, of practices which link
spirituality and therapy. On top of this more and
more people adopt what would earlier have been seen as
untenable positions, e.g., they consider themselves
Catholics while not accepting many crucial dogmas, or
they combine Christianity with Buddhism, or they pray
while not being certain they believe.\textsuperscript{337}

\textsuperscript{336} Id. at 423.
\textsuperscript{337} Id. at 513.
This entire historical movement “has opened a space in which people can wander between and around all these options without having to land clearly and definitively in any one.”\textsuperscript{338} This, Taylor insists, does not mean simply the decline of religion, but at the same time “a new placement of the sacred or spiritual in relation to individual and social life. This new placement is now the occasion for recompositions of spiritual life in new forms, and for new ways of existing both in and out of relation to God.”\textsuperscript{339}

Whatever position is held depends on its resonance for the individual. The reforming emphasis on free faith inevitably decentralizes; it is contradictory to seek “a Church tightly held together by a strong hierarchical authority, which will nevertheless be filled with practitioners of heartfelt devotion.”\textsuperscript{340} What matters is personal insight, without which external formulas are useless.\textsuperscript{341} The upshot is an ethic of authenticity, in which people are encouraged to discover their own way in the world, to “do their own thing.”\textsuperscript{342}

\textsuperscript{338} Id. at 351.
\textsuperscript{339} Id. at 437.
\textsuperscript{340} Id. at 466.
\textsuperscript{341} Id. at 489.
\textsuperscript{342} Id. at 475; the point is elaborated in Sources of the Self and in Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (1991). This individualist framework does not necessarily mean that the content will be individuating; people may find themselves joining powerful religious communities. Taylor, supra note 300, at 516; this idea is developed in
This complicates any religiously based sense of group identity. It is a particular problem in those regimes, of which the United States is a notable example, in which “the senses of belonging to group and confession are fused, and the moral issues of the group’s history tend to be coded in religious categories.” It is hard to think of America as “one nation under God” when we disagree so radically about the nature of God. At the time the Constitution was framed, a society that tried to realize immanent goods was understood to be identical with a society obedient to God’s will. Because these have come apart, both sides of today’s culture wars can plausibly claim to be effectuating the founders’ design.

It is nonetheless possible to believe that the fragmentation of religions conceals a larger unity. This belief is encapsulated, Taylor observes, in the familiar American injunction to worship in the church of your choice.

This supposes that each church doesn’t just operate for its own ends, in competition, even hostility to others. There will inevitably be lots of that. But the idea is that there will also be a convergence, a


343 Taylor, supra note 300, at 458.
344 Id. at 447-48.
synergy in their ethical effect. So that together, they constitute a wider body, a “church” - or at least those of them do which fit within certain tolerable limits. 345

Those limits have shifted over time: Catholics were originally outside; by the mid-twentieth century, Jews and Catholics were included; the circle has widened again to include Muslims. 346 “Denominationalism implies that churches are all equally options, and thrives best in a regime of separation of church and state, de facto if not de jure. But on another level, the political entity can be identified with the broader, over-arching ‘church,’ and this can be a crucial element in its patriotism.” 347

The lesson I draw from Taylor’s magisterial narrative is that religious fragmentation is an irresistible and ongoing trend, and that therefore any attempt to define communal identity in any but the vaguest terms is a prescription for inevitable division. A persistent theme

345 Id. at 453-54.
346 Id. at 454, 524.
347 Id. at 454. This, Taylor thinks, has to include overtly religious participants in public life, so that “God or religion is not precisely absent from public space, but is central to the personal identities of individuals or groups, and hence always a possible defining constituent of political identities. The wise decision may be to distinguish our political identity from any particular confessional allegiance, but this principle of separation has constantly to be interpreted afresh in its application, wherever religion is important in the lives of substantial bodies of citizens – which means virtually everywhere.” Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries 193-94 (2004).
in all of the classic accounts of corruption that we reviewed in Part III was the idea that religion is individual, and that state interference distorts it. Modern developments have radicalized this individualistic tendency, although, as Milton and Roger Williams show, it was there from the beginning.

The broadening of the American civil religion is a sensible response to this trend. There are no longer any specific theological propositions that constitute the common ground. Rather, what unites the various religious views is a more generalized commitment to the humane treatment of every human being, the promotion of a culture of nonviolence and mutual respect. The state should not discriminate among the citizens who share this common ground. Taylor’s account also suggests that religious evolution is a delicate process in which the state is unlikely to have much to contribute. The hamhandedness of any contemporary intervention is the modern face of corrupting establishment.

VI. Objections

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The corruption claim is, as we’ve seen, necessarily parasitic on some conception of the good that is allegedly being corrupted. So any claim of corruption of religion must be parasitic on a claim about the good of religion—or, as we’ve seen, about the cluster of claims that constitute that good.

The persuasiveness of the corruption claim that I have formulated here therefore depends on the contingency that you, my audience, agree that there is a genuine good in what I am trying to protect. If you think that there is some deep and enduring source of value in the cluster of ends I’ve described, and you think that the state is likely to choose badly if it is called upon to determine the relative merits of the ends within the cluster, or of the particular avenues by which any of these ends are pursued, then you have reason to want the state to define religion as a good in precisely the way that I’ve described here. And, for the reasons I have given, that will entail, among other things, a hands-off rule.

The argument I have offered gives rise to obvious objections. I will consider three. First, one might object that the conception of “religion” I have offered is not specific enough, protecting some activities that are worthless. Second, one might object that it is too
specific, unfairly privileging some activities over other equally valuable ones. Finally, one could claim that the entire approach is misguided, because it is not appropriate to use such a contestable conception of the good as “religion,” even defined as capacious as I have proposed, in an argument for any particular deployment of political power.

The first objection has been developed by Timothy Macklem. Recall that Greenawalt and others have argued that “religion” should be given its conventional meaning, as denoting a set of activities united only by a family resemblance, with no set of necessary or sufficient conditions demarcating the boundaries of the set. My proposal follows and elaborates Greenawalt’s claim. Macklem objects that the question of what “religion” conventionally means is a semantic one, but the question of what beliefs are entitled to special treatment is a moral one, and it requires a moral rather than a semantic answer.349

Macklem’s analytical point is sound. But there are powerful reasons for denying the state the power to judge the objective value of particular religions. Macklem himself inadvertently displays those reasons when he

proposes that courts undertake "a frank examination of the contribution that any doctrine held on the basis of faith, be it traditional or non-traditional, is capable of making to well-being."\(^{350}\) In a pluralistic society, there are obvious dangers in giving judges the power to assign legal consequences to different religious beliefs based on the judges' own conceptions of well-being. Macklem's own confident withholding of protection from "cults" is not reassuring.\(^{351}\) The decision to define religion vaguely, relying on the fuzzy semantic meaning, itself rests on moral grounds.

David Richards has developed the second objection, attacking Greenawalt from the opposite direction by arguing that common-sense conceptions of religion "hopelessly track often unprincipled and ad hoc majoritarian intuitions of 'proper' or 'real' religion."\(^{352}\) This is a version of the corruption argument: the majoritarian intuitions he describes will distort the exercise of the individual conscience, which is the truly valuable thing that the disestablishment of religion ought to protect. His objection is the same as Macklem's: the question of what to protect is a moral, not a semantic one. While Macklem

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\(^{350}\) Id. at 142.

\(^{351}\) Id.

\(^{352}\) See Richards, supra note 260, at 142.
would narrow protection, however, Richards would broaden it. Richards has argued that the moral basis of the free exercise clause is “a negative liberty immunizing from state coercion the exercise of the conceptions of a life well and ethically lived and expressive of a mature person’s rational and reasonable powers.”³⁵³ His broadly libertarian account entails that “the right to conscience protects the sphere of action when state intervention therein is not justified by the protection of all-purpose goods.”³⁵⁴ For Richards, conscientious objections to law need not be based on morality or religion; it is enough that they arise out of the agent’s exercise of his practical reason. This, he acknowledges, entails constitutional protection for “everything and anything.”³⁵⁵

The concerns that motivate Richards’s philosophy are rooted in his own experience as a young gay man in the 1960s and 1970s, when he took major professional risks in order to be forthright and truthful about his sexuality. He was an early and courageous defender of gay rights at a time when most gay academics were deeply closeted and terrified of writing about these issues.³⁵⁶ The right to

³⁵³ Id. at 140.
³⁵⁴ Id. at 144.
³⁵⁵ Id. at 141.
³⁵⁶ He describes his personal history in David A.J. Richards, The Case for Gay Rights (2005). Richards’s position on the scope of the
conscience, he argues, protects “our moral autonomy in acknowledging the ethical principles that both define personal integrity and give shape indissolubly to the unity of belief and action that is one’s life.”357 It is hard to see whose claims would be excluded by this principle: gay men who are less earnest and serious than Richards? The unserious gay man is also exercising his rational and reasonable powers. Richards himself is driven by concerns of a moral depth that his principle fails to capture.358

The problem with any claim that purports to insulate all human conduct from state interference is that a rule that nominally protects everything in fact protects nothing. There are indeed plural values of great weight. Religion does not outweigh all other human concerns. But there is no way to operationalize a rule that one must

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357 Richards, supra note 260, at 144.
358 Moral seriousness is more salient in Joseph Raz’s otherwise similar account of the reasons to protect conscientious objection. Raz thinks that the case for accommodating conscientious objectors depends on self-definition: “The areas of a person’s life and plans which have to be respected by others are those which are central to his own image of the kind of person he is and which form the foundation of his self-respect.” Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 280 (1979). This understanding goes beyond religion or conscience. “A law preventing dedicated novelists from pursuing their vocation with the freedom essential to it is bad, and bad for the same reasons, as a law conscripting pacifists to the army.” Id. at 281.
protect all deeply valuable activities. All one can do is enumerate and protect them one at a time.\textsuperscript{359}

The deepest objection to what I have proposed is Rawlsian. “[O]ur exercise of political power is fully proper,” Rawls argues, “only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”\textsuperscript{360} The basic idea of political liberalism, as noted earlier, is that people with different comprehensive conceptions of the good can and should reach an “overlapping consensus” on the principles of political cooperation. They may disagree about the ultimate foundations of the political principles that govern them, but they agree upon the principles, those principles are moral ones, and they are affirmed on moral grounds.\textsuperscript{361}

A common ground strategy entails endless political struggle. The common ground is contingent and subject to continuing negotiation. The upshot is a messier liberal theory than the kind attempted by, for example, Rawls. A common ground strategy is, from Rawls’s point of view, costly, because it gives up on the idea of universal civic

\textsuperscript{359} See Koppelman, supra note 45.
\textsuperscript{360} John Rawls, Political Liberalism 137 (expanded ed. 1996).
\textsuperscript{361} See id. at 144-50.
friendship. That is the deepest problem with the corruption argument: it necessarily depends on a contestable conception of the good – in my formulation, the value of religion, understood very abstractly – and so can have no persuasive power to those who do not see any value in the good that the corruption claim seeks to protect. On this basis, Samuel Freeman, one of Rawls’s most prominent followers and expositors, concludes that public reason excludes all comprehensive conceptions from public and even private deliberations about coercive laws. This is why “[a]ppeals to Christian doctrine simply do not count as good public reasons in our political culture.”362 The same can equally be said of all appeals to the idea that religion as such is a good to be promoted.

The Rawlsian objection to the claim about the good of religion that I have formulated here is that some people reasonably reject it, and that it therefore is not an appropriate basis for the exercise of political power. The idea that the search for meaning in life is good, Martha Nussbaum writes, “is just a bit too dogmatic. We live in a country in which many people are skeptics, doubting that there is such a thing as the ultimate meaning of life, and

362 Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian Political Philosophy 201 (2007); see also id. at 200, 220, 224.
where many others have dogmatic anti-meaning views. For government to declare what Koppelman declares goes just a bit too far for such skeptical and/or anti-metaphysical views.”363 A regime that treats religion as a good is illegitimate for the same reason as a regime that treats Christianity as a good. It is not a regime “the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”

Since the corruption argument favors religion only by keeping the state away from it, it does not bias the basic structure in the ways that concern Rawls. No one’s life chances are adversely affected by their holding any particular religious views. The favoring of religion by the corruption argument is in no way inconsistent with freedom of conscience. On the contrary, it is one path to such freedom.

A Rawlsian might still object to the favoring of religion by rules that disable government from deciding religious questions, in the way that the rules described at the beginning of this paper do, because these rules make a contestable idea of the good into part of the basic structure. The objection is related to Rawls’s conception

363 Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 168.
of distributive justice. If government is going to be concerned with distributive justice at all, then it needs to know what it is distributing. One of the distinguishing marks of a liberal political theory is that it will decline to specify those goods too precisely: there are good reasons for keeping “salvation by Christ” off the list.

Rawls sought to base his own theory of distributive justice on a thin theory of the good, because he did not want government deciding any issue of deep value. In his final formulation, the primary goods that are the objects of distributive justice are citizens’ needs understood from a political point of view. According to the political conception, every person has higher-order interests in developing and exercising his moral powers to develop a sense of justice and a conception of the good. Justice requires “conditions securing for those powers their adequate development and full exercise.”364 The primary goods are “essential all-purpose means to realize the higher-order interests connected with citizens’ moral powers and their determinate conceptions of the good (so far as the restrictions on information permit the parties to know this).”365 Obviously religion cannot be a primary

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364 Rawls, supra note 360, at 74.
365 Id. at 76.
good in this sense; one can exercise one’s moral powers without religion. The mere fact that most people value something highly does not make it a primary good.  

But the thin theory of the good that Rawls lays out is too parsimonious a basis for human rights. Aspects of the person that are not involved in the exercise of the moral powers may nonetheless be very important. For example, Rawls lacks the resources to condemn female genital mutilation, which does not deprive its victims of their moral powers or their normal capacities for cooperation. FGM hurts them in other ways. If a fuller conception of the person and the person’s needs are needed than Rawls offers, then Rawls is poorly positioned to object to the inclusion of religious concerns in that catalog of needs.

Rawls evidently thinks that pure constructivism is the only reliable path to social unity. In modern societies, there is so much normative pluralism that the only

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366 Id. at 308.
367 The argument of the previous two paragraphs is developed in detail in Andrew Koppelman, The Limits of Constructivism: Rawls, Habermas, and sex (unpublished ms.).
368 So is Nussbaum. She argues that political respect should be given to "the faculty with which each person searches for the ultimate meaning of life," not its goal, and that we should "agree to respect the faculty without prejudging the question whether there is a meaning to be found, or what it might be like." Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 168-69. This effort to be just barely specific enough is a delicate one. As other critics of Nussbaum have observed, it is not clear how one can valorize a capability without valorizing what the capability is for. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values 41-46 (2003); Linda Barclay, What Kind of Liberal is Martha Nussbaum?, 4 Sats – Nordic J. Phil. 5, 15-16 (2003).
overlapping consensus that is consistent with respectful relations is that constructed without any reference to the actual normative views of members of society. That is why "partially comprehensive" views must be excluded.

Political liberalism, he argues, should be freestanding, so that it "can be presented without saying, or knowing, or hazarding a conjecture about, what [comprehensive] doctrines it may belong to, or be supported by."369 "[T]he political conception of justice is worked out first as a freestanding view that can be justified pro tanto without looking to, or trying to fit, or even knowing what are, the existing comprehensive doctrines."370 This approach may possibly work under certain circumstances, but they are likely to be as unusual as the circumstances in which it is safe to drive a car while blindfolded.

T.M. Scanlon explains why the strategy of surveying and finding common ground among actual comprehensive views would not be satisfactory to Rawls. "It would be impossible to survey all possible comprehensive views and inadequate, in an argument for stability, to consider just those that are represented in a given society at a given time since others may emerge at any time and gain

adherents.\textsuperscript{371} On the other hand, as the persistence of the corruption argument over the past 350 years shows, a consensus built around the convergence of a contingent set of actual views may last for quite some time.

VII. Understanding the Rules

Return to the Establishment Clause rules that we had trouble explaining at the outset: no endorsement of religion; no discrimination against particular religious practices; laws must have secular purposes; courts will not resolve controversies over religious doctrine. They are not well tailored to prevent division or alienation. How will these be appreciably worsened if, say, a court awards property to a claimant after a showing that the opposing party has departed from church doctrine?\textsuperscript{372} If the purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prevent corruption of religion, on the other hand, all of these rules make sense. The central evil is actions of the government that are intended to manipulate the religious beliefs of the citizens. That’s why the state can’t engage in speech endorsing religious propositions, employ religious tests,


\textsuperscript{372} See Presbyterian Church.
or enact laws which are tantamount to endorsement of religious propositions because they have no secular purpose. Discrimination among religions is likewise an effort to interfere in the development of religious doctrine. An obvious corollary is the state’s incompetence to resolve controversies over religious doctrine. “[T]he government may not displace the free religious choices of its citizens by placing its weight behind a particular religious belief, tenet, or sect.”

An obvious implication of the corruption argument is that the state may not declare religious truth. All of the religious practices that the authors considered here objected to had this as a common element. To review: Milton opposed the censorship of heresy and the payment of clergy by the Crown. Roger Williams objected to similar practices in colonial Massachusetts. Locke opposed the repression of religious dissenters. Pufendorf wrote against Louis XIV’s repression of Protestantism. Elisha Williams opposed a law banning ministers from preaching

374 I set this premise forth as axiomatic in Secular Purpose, supra note 6. Some writers have observed that this premise was inadequately defended in that article. Michael J. Perry, What Do the Free Exercise and Nonestablishment Norms Forbid? Reflections on the Constitutional Law of Religious Freedom, 1 U. of St. Thomas L. J. 549, 570-72 (2003); Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 625, 634-36 (2003). The present article is, in part, a response.

Official declarations of religious truth raise recurring, core concerns of the corruption argument: that the state will manipulate religion to serve its own, decidedly nonreligious ends; that citizens will be induced to profess the state’s religious line in order to curry official favor; that the state will meddle in matters of great importance, with respect to which it is incompetent and untrustworthy.

The core Establishment Clause violation, from the perspective of the corruption argument, is action by the state that intentionally manipulates religion to serve official ends. Actions that have the incidental and unintended effect of advancing or inhibiting particular religious ideas present more ambiguous cases, and so it is harder to say what the corruption argument implies about them. It happens that the boundary that separates clear from contested issues in Establishment Clause doctrine runs along precisely these lines. We have already reviewed the areas of clarity. Now consider the field of uncertainty.
Three questions dominate contemporary religion clause scholarship. First, should religiously based exemptions from generally applicable laws be determined by the courts or the legislatures? Second, is it appropriate for citizens to seek to enact laws based on their religious beliefs? And third, may government directly fund

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religious activity, so long as the principle that
determines who gets the funding is not itself religious?\textsuperscript{377}

With respect to the first question, almost everyone
agrees that exemptions, such as excusing Quakers from
military service, are permissible. The hard and hotly
disputed question is whether those exemptions should be
made by the legislature or the judiciary. That is a
question of comparative institutional competence, and the
corruption argument says nothing about it. The corruption
argument, as we have noted, presupposes that religion is in
some way a good thing. That presupposition offers the way
out of the free exercise/establishment dilemma. The

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{377} See, e.g., Commentary: On School Vouchers and the Establishment
Clause, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 803 (1999); Steven K. Green, Private School
Vouchers and the Confusion Over "Direct" Aid, 10 Geo. Mason U. Civ.
Rts. L.J. 47 (1999/2000); Steffen N. Johnson, A Civil Libertarian Case
L.J. 1 (1999/2000); Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding
Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 989 (1991);
Allan E. Parker, Jr. & R. Clayton Trotter, Hostility or Neutrality?
Faith-Based Schools and Tax-Funded Tuition: A GI Bill for Kids, 10 Geo.
Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 83 (1999/2000); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades,
Public Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems of Government Neutrality,
28 Conn. L. Rev. 243 (1996); Symposium: Education Reform at the
The concern about religious accommodation that the corruption argument highlights is that accommodation can sometimes be an occasion of hypocrisy. From its earliest formulations, the corruption argument has rested on the premise that only genuinely felt religious activity has value; a persistent objection to Establishment has been that it produces feigned and therefore worthless religion. Exemptions can produce such hypocrisy. But this is a reason for being selective in making accommodations available, so that they are given more stingily when they involve some substantial secular benefit. It is not a reason to reject exemptions as such.

As for the second question, the corruption argument is not, in any way, an argument that it is inappropriate for citizens to vote based on their religious beliefs. Its concern is that the coercive power of the state will be deployed to manipulate the religious beliefs of the citizens, not that the citizens’ political behavior will be influenced by their own beliefs. It comes into play only when the state enacts a law that lacks a secular purpose.
and so is tantamount to an official declaration of religious truth.\textsuperscript{378}

Finally, there is the question of funding for religious activity. Here it matters crucially whether the state is making a religious determination when it provides the support. If it is making such a determination, then it is violating the core prohibition of declaration of religious truth, and concerns about corruption come to the fore. If it is not, then the issue is, as with the exemption question, whether incentives for hypocrisy and pressure on religious minorities is being created.\textsuperscript{379} That is a question of fact, and so the corruption argument has no clear implications about the question.

What about ceremonial deism? Questions of religious doctrine are in fact directly addressed by the placement of “In God We Trust” on currency, or “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance. The Court has sometimes claimed that these practices are not really religious, but that is a silly

\textsuperscript{378} See generally Koppelman, supra note 6.
\textsuperscript{379} Here I am basically in agreement with the analysis offered in Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 26, at 198-239. The gap in their analysis, one on which they do not dwell, is that no constitutional issue is raised if pressure is placed on other ideological minorities, such as racists. Their argument implicitly singles out religion for special treatment without admitting that that is what it is doing. See Koppelman, supra note 45.
argument, since they are overtly and conspicuously religious.\(^{380}\)

The general rule now seems to be that old forms of deism are grandfathered, but newer ones are unconstitutional. As noted earlier, Justice Breyer, in the recent Ten Commandments cases, invalidated a recent display while upholding an older one. Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence in the Pledge of Allegiance case,\(^{381}\) explicitly made the age of a ceremonial acknowledgement relevant to its constitutionality. She thought that constitutionality was supported by the absence of worship or prayer, the absence of reference to a particular religion, and minimal religious content. But the first of her factors was “history and ubiquity.” “The constitutional value of ceremonial deism turns on a shared understanding of its legitimate nonreligious purposes,” O’Connor wrote. “That sort of understanding can exist only when a given practice has been in place for a significant portion of the Nation’s history, and when it is observed by enough persons that it can fairly be called ubiquitous.”\(^{382}\) The consequence is to make old and familiar forms of ceremonial deism constitutional, but to discourage innovation.

\(^{380}\) This is elegantly argued by Gedicks, supra note 15, at 62-80.
\(^{382}\) Id. at 37.
There are two aspects of this area of the law that distinguish it.

The first is that it represented a common ground strategy - an effort, in its own time, to understand "religion" in an ecumenical and nonsectarian way. At the time that these elements of civil religion were put in place, the existence of God appeared to be the one aspect of religion that was common to the various religious factions then dominant in American life. This was true of the vague deism embraced in the Declaration of Independence and the speeches of the Presidents, beginning with Washington; it was also true of the idea of a "Judeo-Christian" ethic that was invented in the 1950s. This old settlement is part of the background in which contemporary American religion has developed. Its continuation is not an effort by an incumbent administration to manipulate religion. It simply recognizes that people are invested, in some cases very deeply, in the status quo.

Of course, ceremonial deism has an effect on religion. It produces a culture in which many people feel that their

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383 See Silk, supra note 215, at 40-53; Feldman, supra note 15, at 164-70. Nonsectarian Bible reading was a less attractive and less successful variant, since it quickly became inflected with anti-Catholicism. See Feldman, supra note 15, at 61-92, 108-110.

religious beliefs are somehow associated with patriotism. This has the salutary effect of fostering civic unity and common moral ideals and tempering religious fanaticism. It also has the less attractive effect of encouraging self-righteous nationalism and the idea that whatever the United States does, however repugnant, is somehow divinely sanctioned. What matters for present purposes is that neither of these effects is specifically aimed at by government when it perpetuates these rituals. Political manipulation, in that sense, is not occurring. Some writers have argued that government should aim to minimize its effect on religion, but that goal is not a coherent one: any government actions at all will cause religion to be different from what it otherwise would have been.

Today, on the other hand, the invocation of theism, and specifically the erection of a Ten Commandments display, is an intervention in the bitterest religious controversies that now divide us. Douglas Laycock thinks that a lesson of O’Connor’s opinion is that “separationist

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386 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 451-56; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 26, at 27-28. This is why the corruption argument has so much more bite when government tries to affect religion as such than when it engages in facially neutral action that has a religious impact, such as providing education vouchers that can be used at religious schools.

387 See Gedicks and Hendrix, supra note 276, at 275.
groups should sue immediately when they encounter any religious practice newly sponsored by the government.”\textsuperscript{388} That is precisely the right lesson for them to take. New sponsorship of religious practices is far more likely to represent a contemporaneous effort to intervene in a live religious controversy than the perpetuation of old forms.\textsuperscript{389}

There is one more aspect of the corruption argument that needs to be considered. This may be the most paradoxical aspect of all: the argument, even if it plays a powerful role in Establishment Clause theory, cannot be directly relied upon to decide cases. If a court tries to decide whether corruption has occurred in any particular case, it must first decide what a non-corrupted religion looks like. And that will itself violate the Establishment Clause.

Justice Souter, the principal modern proponent of the corruption rationale, has fallen squarely into this trap.\textsuperscript{390}

\textsuperscript{388} Laycock, supra note 15, at 232.
\textsuperscript{389} For a similar conclusion, see Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 26, at 147.
\textsuperscript{390} Hugo Black, who made even more frequent use of the corruption argument, never did. See supra notes 216-237 and accompanying text.

Black’s influence on Souter is sometimes direct, as when Souter quoted with approval Black’s declaration that the framers thought “that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions.” Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2588 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting), quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
Dissenting in *Zelman v. Simmons-Harris*,\(^{391}\) in which the Court upheld a program that allowed parents to pay religious school tuition with state-funded vouchers, he cited the risk of corruption described by Madison. Then he declared: “The risk is already being realized.”\(^{392}\) He noted the decisions of many religious schools to comply with the Ohio program’s requirements that schools not discriminate on the basis of religion, nor “teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of ... religion.”

Kevin Pybas observes that Justice Souter’s argument amounts to “an accusation that the religious have been unfaithful to their God and to what their God requires of them.”\(^{393}\) Pybas is entirely correct to belabor Souter with the familiar concern about the limits of state competence: “how does Justice Souter know when a particular religious community has compromised its principles? Is he or the Court generally so well-versed in the theologies of the various religious traditions in this country that he or it is in a position to say to a religious community that it has violated its own principles?”\(^{394}\)

\(^{392}\) Id. at 712.
\(^{393}\) Kevin Pybas, *Does the Establishment Clause Require Religion to be Confined to the Private Sphere?*, 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 71, 102 (2005).
\(^{394}\) Id. at 101-102.
Souter’s error shows that, even if the corruption
rationale is accepted, it cannot be operationalized as a
requirement that courts look for corruption in particular
cases. It is rather a reason for the state to avoid making
any religious determinations at all.\footnote{395}

Souter offers a more telling objection to the voucher
program’s restrictions when he observes that the ban on
teaching “hatred” itself raises religious questions. This
condition, he notes, “could be understood (or subsequently
broadened) to prohibit religions from teaching
traditionally legitimate articles of faith as to the error,
sinfulness, or ignorance of others.”\footnote{396} Any such
understanding might violate the hands-off rule, for the
same reason that it was violated by the charge of fraud
against Edna and Donald Ballard for claiming that St.
Germain had given them extraordinary healing powers.\footnote{397}
Claiming that the Christian religion is the only path to
salvation and that all nonChristians are damned may or may
not constitute “hatred.” It is not clear how a state can
decide that without getting into forbidden questions of

\footnote{395} The point here is analogous to one that Richard Garnett has made
about the rule, sometimes entertained by the Court, that a law may be
unconstitutional because it has the potential to divide the populace
along religious lines. Garnett shows that divisiveness cannot provide
a workable criterion for constitutionality. He does not, however, deny
that religious division is one of the underlying concerns of the
establishment clause. See Garnett, \textit{supra} note 20, at 1667.
\footnote{396} 536 U.S. at 713.
\footnote{397} United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
theology. For example, a religious group might argue that its claims about the damnation of nonbelievers reflects loving concern rather than hatred. How could a state respond to that?

This objection is not fatal to the program, however, since the “hatred” proviso does not unambiguously require this result. A familiar canon of statutory construction holds that ambiguous laws are not to be read in a way that renders them unconstitutional.398 Federal courts are also not to adjudicate the constitutionality of ambiguous state laws before the state courts have the opportunity to interpret them.399 For the same reason that a court can’t decide whether the Ballards’s religious claim is fraudulent, it can’t decide whether such a claim is hateful. If Ohio were to read its hatred proviso in the way Souter suggests, that would raise constitutional difficulties. It hasn’t happened yet, however, so it can’t be an argument against the law’s constitutionality.

Conclusion

398 See 2A Singer & Singer, supra note 1, § 45:11 at 81-84.
399 Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
The corruption argument was once the basis for a political consensus among people with radically differing religious views. They agreed that religion was valuable, and that it was likely to be damaged by state efforts to manipulate it. The same understanding underlies much of modern Establishment Clause doctrine. When the Court invalidated a prayer that New York State had composed for public school classrooms, it declared that “[i]t is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.” 400 This vision of the Establishment Clause is worth reviving.

Citizens do need to share an understanding of what is valuable. But when the details of this particular Valuable Something are so hotly disputed, the most effective way for government to pay it reverence is just to shut up about it.